Does Japan still attack Pearl Harbor without the Fall of France?

If France doesn't fall in 1940 (or later), does Japan still attack Pearl Harbor?

No. The PH attack was regarded by the Japanese naval staff as a reckless gamble that would divert a very powerful element of the Navy from the all-important Southern Operation. Yamamoto got it approved only by threatening to resign from the Navy.

If there is no Fall of France, British and French defenses in SE Asia will be much stronger, and the Navy staff will never agree to sending Kido Butai 10,000 km away.
 
Basically agree, but my general impression is that the Japanese then really didn't step back from doing something just because it was stupid.

I generally agree, but there is one piece of counter-evidence. Col. Masanobu Tsuji was one of the most rabid Japanese militarists - an all-out advocate of war with the US and UK, planner of the Malaya offensive, and war criminal. Despite his modest rank, he was a very influential figure in high command circles. He had been in Manchuria during the Nomonhan incident, and saw what the Red Army could do. Thereafter he was a determined opponent of any attack on the USSR. IOW, he learned.
 
The basic reality that Japan faced was that they could not sustain a war against China even if the most severe parts of the summer, 1941 embargo don't go forward. They had to get access to petroleum, various raw materials, some manufactured goods, and access to the international monetary system in order to continue the war. Absent the above, and imported food (how to pay for it), their economy will collapse withing a few years (longer than the OTL 12+ months post embargo), but still at most 2+ years. They had a binary choice - find some way to end the war in China through diplomacy or seize the resources needed to continue the war. ITTL they have the same two choices.

If they choose "poorly", like they did OTL, they need to seize the PI otherwise even a successful attack on the "southern resource area" is held hostage to the PI strangling the sealanes from SEA to Japan. Attack the PI without diminishing the USN, failure guaranteed. The issue is not Yamamoto and the IJN, the issue is the IJA. Anything less than total victory and dictating terms to a supine China was unacceptable to the IJA. Industrial capacity, logistics, geography all meant nothing to the IJA as an institution - Japanese spirit would overcome these obstacles. Unfortunately the drugs we use to treat delusional thinking today were not available in 1941...
 
my general impression is that the Japanese then really didn't step back from doing something just because it was stupid.
LOL. Bravo.:cool:
their Empire building ambitions
It wasn't entirely that. There was a goal of achieving autarky (&, I have a sense, of returning to pre-Meiji isolationism).
If the Japanese government had serious considerations about a compromise like that phx1138 describes above I think it was the fall of France in June 1940 that weighed decisively in on the "go all out" option as it gave a realistic opportunity to seize FIC, which again was necessary if Malaya, Singapore and DIC was to be taken.
I can't say as a fact it was ever seriously considered. The fall of France, & the weakness of Britain, did seem to tip the balance in favor of invading, with a sense they'd be unable to respond effectively.
Next question is what happens if France still falls, but FIC is in the camp of de Gaulle and not Vichy. IMHO it would still be too stupid to attack.
Now you've got a crux. Japan is going to see French weakness, combined with opportunity & a real need to cut supply lines to Chiang's forces in southern China. Is it a gamble? Yes. Will all the parties opposing Japan be stronger later? Yes. Does that make it worth doing now, rather than later? IMO, there's a really good chance Japan says yes to that, too.
it would mean a full involvement of the British Empire (and probably USA too)
I'd agree on the first, but not the second. In 1940, it's less evident in Japan the U.S. & Britain are "joined at the hip". So there's a reasonable chance, moreso than 1941, Japan leaves the U.S. alone. (Unless you believe IJN posited the attack on Hawaii to avoid becoming the poor stepchild in defense $$ allocations...which may well be the case.) That being so, it's just possible you don't see attacks on Hawaii or the P.I. TTL.
That makes it impossible to achieve the actual object - gaining access to resources in Malaya and DEI.
Yet that obtained OTL, & didn't dissuade. There's really no way Japanese planners could know the outcome would be as bad as it was--& given their penchant for rosy predictions...:rolleyes:
They had a binary choice - find some way to end the war in China through diplomacy or seize the resources needed to continue the war.
That suggests U.S. diplomacy really was pretty inept, since it managed to push Japan in exactly the opposite of the desired direction. I wonder about the U.S. expressly offering Japan a deal: cheap oil for 5yr, in exchange for leaving metropolitan China (& keeping Manchuria), & trying to get Chiang to sign off on it, too.
 
Part of the problem was that the USA was not in a position to tell Chiang what to do, even though he was dependent to a large extent on US support. The Japanese wanted various economic concessions which the US was unwilling to get behind. The basic problem was if Japan got some economic concessions, but otherwise reverted to status quo antebellum with Manchuria/Manchukuo formally ceded, that would be seen by a large element of the IJA/Kwantung Army as a defeat (giving up conquered territory). Minimal Japanese demands were going to exceed what the USA was willing to get behind, and were probably over and above what Chiang would be willing to sign on to. The USa did have some concerns that Chiang would turn to the USSR for support, he had received some from them, and as long as the USSR was not in a life and death struggle with Germany this could happen.
 
Part of the problem was that the USA was not in a position to tell Chiang what to do, even though he was dependent to a large extent on US support. The Japanese wanted various economic concessions which the US was unwilling to get behind. The basic problem was if Japan got some economic concessions, but otherwise reverted to status quo antebellum with Manchuria/Manchukuo formally ceded, that would be seen by a large element of the IJA/Kwantung Army as a defeat (giving up conquered territory). Minimal Japanese demands were going to exceed what the USA was willing to get behind, and were probably over and above what Chiang would be willing to sign on to. The USa did have some concerns that Chiang would turn to the USSR for support, he had received some from them, and as long as the USSR was not in a life and death struggle with Germany this could happen.
The U.S. couldn't dictate, but was in a position to influence his decision, & Japan's: the idea is to move them in the direction of agreement, instead of pushing them further apart, which the "frighten Japan" approach was doing.

You're completely right about the IJA feeling any concession equalled defeat.:rolleyes: It's not helped by Hirohito believing he could get away with it all...:rolleyes:

As for what demands the Japanese would make, or Chiang & U.S. support, IDK. What is the minimum Japan would agree to? My thought is, if the U.S. bribe is big enough, Japan's desire for conquered territory is mitigated.

As for the SU, if Chiang's no longer actively at war with Japan, the need for Sov aid is much less--destroying the ChiComs should be much less intensive; indeed, if there's no war, the U.S. might happily provide everything Chiang needs to achieve that (seeing he's fighting Communists, after all;) {Yes, I know, not the '50s, but even at the time...}).
 
IMHO Japan will demand territory over and above Manchukuo. The other sorts of concessions the Japanese would want include restrictions on Chinese military, all sorts of economic concessions for Japan probably making the Chinese economy part of the Yen zone, and various favorable economic deals to edge out the US and other "non-Asiatic" countries from much access to the Chinese market. While the USA might be OK with Manchukuo, more Japanese territory in China, perhaps military bases especially naval/air outside of actual annexed territory would be a no-go. Most if not all of the economic demands the Japanese would make - the longer term sort not just "reparations" - were unacceptable to the US and went completely against the long standing US China policy of the open door. Just getting to get Chiang to accept Manchukuo would be difficult, and further territorial cessions as well as extraterritorial basing and rights for Japan would be totally unacceptable. Basically handing over control of the Chinese economy is likewise unacceptable.

Chiang felt that time was on his side. China was vast, and the more the Japanese Army advanced the more it was caught in the tar baby. The price of dead Chinese and a ravaged countryside was a price Chiang was willing to pay for eventual victory. As long as the Japanese MINIMAL demands were seen by the USA as unacceptable, Chiang could maintain this attitude. The only way you get a diplomatic end to the war is if Japan is willing to reduce its demands to whatever the USA can accept (and force Chiang to swallow). My two cents, and your mileage may differ, is that the IJA/Kwantung Army who had a veto over Japanese policy were incapable of putting such a deal on the table.

From the beginning of the fighting up until Pearl Harbor there was plenty of opportunity for Japan to stop and end up with Manchukuo and other concessions, but that was never enough. Anything short of a prostrate China giving Japan whatever it wanted with a sword at its throat was not going to fly.
 
With no war in Europe then French power (both politically and Militarily) in FIC is not nearly as weak as OTL

Japan took advantage of this weakness OTL in this TL I doubt this move would have been made
 
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