Does Japan still attack Pearl Harbor without the Fall of France?

... My understanding is FIC was invaded because of France crushing military defeat, the lack of opposition, and Vichy overall weakness. With half the country looted by Germany, there was next to zero military resources to be send to FIC ....

All that and the Germans gave permission. The saw it as a better alternative to either British occupation, or breaking away to a government in exile as the Dutch colonies had. The Franco German armistice required France defend its colonies from all attackers. Thats why France was allowed to retain so much equipment in its colonies, & send more. When the Japanese ambassador inquired about Germanies attitude toward a Japanese entry into FIC the nazi government encouraged the act.
 

raharris1973

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Did the British and "fighting French" have the spare forces to support/occupy FIC before the Japanese got there?

Did the British have enough spare forces to do a friendly occupation of key points in the DEI before the British got there?

If they had such in 1940 (probably more likely sourced from Australia, NZ and India than Britain, Canada or South Africa)would they have been able to get into position and deter later Japanese challenges, or would Japan cry foul and react to any de facto British occupations by contesting any of these moves with their own forces in 1940?

What if France still fell in Europe but Decoux or his predecessor in FIC decided to declare for Free French and to oppose Japanese occupation? They may not get any help from anyone, but they could ask for cooperative help from the British and Chinese to create a defense in-depth.
 

raharris1973

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The Japanese had been told, in advance what the result of invading French Indochina would be,

Really, before which stage of the Japanese occupation, the first northern stage or the second southern stage? Where's you hear/read this?

Worst part was the whole reason for invading was to gain the supposed huge rice surpluses the region produced and export the excess to the Home Island and to Manchuria. Never happened. First few years there was barely enough to feed the locals and the IJA forces conducting the occupation, when they finally got that unSNAFU'd the U.S. Navy had also gotten the submarine torpedo issue sorted, so almost no rice arrived. Literally started the whole Pacific War to gain a resource that was never actually available.

Ha, too bad so sad on them.

By comparison how much return did they get on their other big resource grabs.

Essentially given Japan's slender resources before and going into the war, I'm wondering how they managed to keep trucks, planes and ships running at any level all the way until August 1945, even while under nasty blockade, aerial mining and bombing.

Their ability to do suggests, they did manage to loot other vital resources more effectively than Indochinese rice:

Anybody know how much of the following resources they were able to loot/import from their Southeast Asia conquests?

Oil and all petroleum derivatives - ?
Tin - ?
Rubber - ?
Rice (from non-Indochinese sources) - ?
Coal - ?
Rare earths (tungsten, antimony, chrome, bauxite etc)
Foreign shipping captured and impressed into Japanese service from throughout the Asia-Pacific region?

Essentially, the algebra for how long materially Japan could have persisted in a continued China war in the absence of the Pacific War, looks something like this:

X=OTL's result (losing but slow enough to still occupy a lot of ground and remain locally active until August 1945)
Y= ATL hypothetical situation of Japan in August 1945 in the absence of the Pacific War but continuance of the China War

Essentially the question we are grappling at is what is the time value of "Y", how much is it plus or minus "X"

The value of "X" is known. To credibly estimate the value of "Y" would require an equation like this one:
Y (ATL) = X (OTL) +plus Allied attrition combat against Japanese imports and shipping (A)+plus fuel consumption and other aeronaval production necessitated specifically for the Pacific War instead of China(B)+plus wartime reconstruction costs/property destruction due to Allied bombing of Japanese held territory(C), +plus any domestic agricultural production lost by manning the Pacific War at full wartime levels (D), but -minus looted imports and shipping (including food consumed by Japanese within occupied Southeast Asia that could not be otherwise important to pre-Pacific War territories, and including any captured foreign exchange they were able to spend and any debts they could stop paying with the onset of war) (E), -minus the time value of when Japan runs out of exchange to pay for any imports from areas not already under their occupation (F)

Generally speaking, Y will only be less than X (Japan has to quit China by "Z" months earlier August 1945) if the variable "E" above is quite large and in fact much larger than the value of "F" also.

The above is actually the relatively simple equation.

Other variables on the sliding scale influencing the material situation could include:
G: Extent and timing of any embargoes or financial freezes (the later and more selective the embargo the higher the value of Y can be)
H: Outside material support for Chinese forces and Chinese level of military activity (if worse than X, Y can be higher, if better than X, Y can be lower)

The omega variable throughout is Japan's level of political commitment to continue the China war under several alternate circumstances. Bolstering it similar to OTL is the threat of assassination of leaders for making compromises and the prospect of simple insubordination or non-responsiveness of the armed forces to ceasefire and/or withdrawal orders. *Possibly* something psychological that could make Japan's political commitment to the China War fade faster than OTL in addition to the simple material factors would be if the act of launching the Pacific War itself upped Japanese leaders psychological commitment and also provided "hope" that would not have been present otherwise.

So there you go, that's all the algebra related to the what-if.
 
...

By comparison how much return did they get on their other big resource grabs.

Essentially given Japan's slender resources before and going into the war, I'm wondering how they managed to keep trucks, planes and ships running at any level all the way until August 1945, even while under nasty blockade, aerial mining and bombing.

Their ability to do suggests, they did manage to loot other vital resources more effectively than Indochinese rice:

Anybody know how much of the following resources they were able to loot/import from their Southeast Asia conquests?

...

You can find several chapters on all that, including assorted charts, graphs, & numbers, along with detailed source citations in John Ellis 'Brute Force'.

Short answer is they did not keep things running to 1945. They started in late 1941 with varying amounts of critical items stockpiled, six months for one, three of another, a year or two of a third, ect... They also approached pre embargo import levels for some items in late 1942 or 1943, but not for everything or even a majority of items. One item Ellis notes is that in latter 1941 or 1942 they started retrofitting industrial power from oil back to less efficient coal. Coal had its supply problems, but was still in better supply than oil. One supply problem for coal is the far larger cargo capacity required for each BTU. To keep the power at the levels they did other items had to be left on the docks.

Another example is cargo shipping. Japans flagged fleet had about 50-60% capacity for pre embargo import/export requirements. Captured ships boosted this up a extra 10-15% for 1942. But raw material imports were still severely curtailed most of the year as military operations took much of the cargo fleet out of manufactoring service. New construction caused the capacity to peak somewhere near 70% in 1943, but after midyear the sinkings accelerated far past the replacement rate & during 1944 capacity collapsed below the 50% mark & continued to plunge.

To sum up Ellis's discussion; Japan on paper had X% of the worlds industrial capacity, but its actual output during the war started well below that due to material & fuel shortages and declined at a increasing rate from sometime in 1943.

Costello has a briefer version of this in the 'Pacific War'. 'Japans Decision to Surrender' also has some remarks on the problem.
 

CalBear

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Really, before which stage of the Japanese occupation, the first northern stage or the second southern stage? Where's you hear/read this?



...
The second phase of the occupation, namely that of Vietnam (which put a number of Western assets at risk, from Malaya to the DEI to the Southern Philippines).

The decision and the attempt to use it to reverse/prevent Imperial action is mentioned in numerous sources. One I have at hand is Bankrupting the Enemy (the mechanic of the embargo planning are mentioned in several chapters, with a meeting between State and Ambassador Nomura detailing what was going to happen actually taking place the day that the IJA landed at Cam Ranh Bay (25 July, 1941 DC time).

The original idea was to provide shipments on a individual basis, with both crude and refined products involved. The idea was to allow some shipments (e.g. supplying a relief effort after a natural disaster) and not others (fuel for warships, aviation fuel), with the restriction gradually being relaxed as the Empire returned to status quo antebellum in the region and then ended the on-going Sino-Japanese war.
 

raharris1973

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Thanks for the resources Carl, this does sound useful. Very useful.

1943 seems like a big tipping point period.

So was Japan, absent an embargo, on track to expend all foreign exchange by that point in 1943?

Is the second China theater worth it for the Allies to put a freeze on Japan in 1942, given the magnitude of the challenge of defeating Germany as it looks that year?

If you're waiting for two ocean navy build out, a lot more of it is complete by end of 1943 than by end of 1942.

Short answer is they did not keep things running to 1945.

Darn it, I have to take issue with this statement. Tell that to any Chinese, American, European or other Asian who was killed in action against Japan, in Japanese captivity or under Japanese occupation in 1945. Their relatives and friends at least remember these real people who were lost in 1945. There were a few you know.
 
...
So was Japan, absent an embargo, on track to expend all foreign exchange by that point in 1943?

I have seen claims for many different states of Japans cash flow & reserves, but not a lot of detailed numbers.

Darn it, I have to take issue with this statement. Tell that to any Chinese, American, European or other Asian who was killed in action against Japan, in Japanese captivity or under Japanese occupation in 1945. Their relatives and friends at least remember these real people who were lost in 1945. There were a few you know.

Depends here on the definition of 'running'. The navywas a spent force back in latter 1942. Between severe fuel shortages and insignificant replacement of losses anything it accomplished had more to do with US leaders misjudgement than japanese offensive or defensive combat power.

The airforce was turned into a rickety arsenal of cruise missiles that killed a number of US seamen, but failed to reach hit rates needed to cause severe enough losses.

The armies defensive battles were largely the abandonment of forces at assorted points to fight suicidal battles whose only point was to inflict unacceptable casualties. They managed to fail at that. The only thing that kept the common soldier going was a fanatical faith in the leadership of a group of duplicitious old men. All they could do was kill people with no real stratigic purpose.
 
One possibility for Japan going to war with the USA is that war is separate from the European war. Perhaps the USA and Japan come to blows while the war in Europe is still on. Or it happens after that war is over, France and Great Britain aren't inclined to jump in, it becomes Japan vs the USA and China. In theory, a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor could happen after a US DoW on Japan.

If France is still in the fight against Germany, I don't see Japan moving against France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the USA all at the same time. The Allies are obviously stronger in that scenario and Germany is weaker. The Japanese are also more careful about antagonizing the Europeans and Americans. I also think the USA won't be as involved in the European war. Germany doesn't appear to be as big a threat. US naval expansion may also be less urgent, with whatever ATL Two Ocean Navy Act being smaller than OTL. There isn't as great a need.
 
The second phase of the occupation, namely that of Vietnam (which put a number of Western assets at risk, from Malaya to the DEI to the Southern Philippines).

The decision and the attempt to use it to reverse/prevent Imperial action is mentioned in numerous sources. One I have at hand is Bankrupting the Enemy (the mechanic of the embargo planning are mentioned in several chapters, with a meeting between State and Ambassador Nomura detailing what was going to happen actually taking place the day that the IJA landed at Cam Ranh Bay (25 July, 1941 DC time).

The original idea was to provide shipments on a individual basis, with both crude and refined products involved. The idea was to allow some shipments (e.g. supplying a relief effort after a natural disaster) and not others (fuel for warships, aviation fuel), with the restriction gradually being relaxed as the Empire returned to status quo antebellum in the region and then ended the on-going Sino-Japanese war.


The bolded part of the statement is the key. The book referenced makes it clear that the goal of the sanctions/embargo regime was to find a solution to the ongoing war in China, preferably one that did not end up with major Japanese gains in territory or concessions. The buildup in the Pacific was specifically designed to be ready for a US-Japanese war, which had been the major concern (War Plan Orange) of the US military since the end of WWI. To the extent the US is using resources to rearm itself and help the UK & France, and if they get in to the war in Europe, actually using resources for a war, there is not going to be much that Japan needs that will be on the market for them. At a minimum whatever they want/need that they can get from third parties would have to be in hard currency, not yen or loans from the USA or anyone else. Until the Sino-Japanese conflict ends, sanctions against Japan will continue, and if anything will get worse as the war continues.
 

CalBear

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The bolded part of the statement is the key. The book referenced makes it clear that the goal of the sanctions/embargo regime was to find a solution to the ongoing war in China, preferably one that did not end up with major Japanese gains in territory or concessions. The buildup in the Pacific was specifically designed to be ready for a US-Japanese war, which had been the major concern (War Plan Orange) of the US military since the end of WWI. To the extent the US is using resources to rearm itself and help the UK & France, and if they get in to the war in Europe, actually using resources for a war, there is not going to be much that Japan needs that will be on the market for them. At a minimum whatever they want/need that they can get from third parties would have to be in hard currency, not yen or loans from the USA or anyone else. Until the Sino-Japanese conflict ends, sanctions against Japan will continue, and if anything will get worse as the war continues.
The killer would have been, as was so amply detailed in the book, that the U.S. effectively had a lock on all of Japan's hard currency and was tightening that control every day. No one would have wanted to barter the quantity of silk the Japanese needed to move for trade without hard currency, and any country that would winds up having to chose between the U.S. and Japan (for South America that is a pretty simply decision).

What's worse is that the commercial bottoms that Japan had to rely on for trade were overwhelmingly foreign (with Norway's huge merchant fleet at the front of the line), and was virtually all being used to keep the UK in the war. Even if someone in South America was willing to deal, there was no way to move things from A to B.
 

CaliGuy

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Probably. How long it could last is anybody guess, but China too big for Japan, hence the war was unwinnable, so they economically collapse in the late 40's or in the 50's.
Wouldn't Japan's leaders have been afraid of being assassinated by hardcore Japanese ultra-nationalists if they withdraw from China, though?
 
Wouldn't Japan's leaders have been afraid of being assassinated by hardcore Japanese ultra-nationalists if they withdraw from China, though?

Yup, hence my remark about assassinations in a earlier post. Trivia note: Prime Minister Suzuiki, who in August 1945 asked the Emperor for the crucial opinion/vote in the final cabinet meeting debating capitulation or fighting on. Suzuiki carried in his chest a pistol bullet from a 1928 assassination attempt, a reminder of the very possible consequences of forcing the cabinets decision.
 

CaliGuy

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Yup, hence my remark about assassinations in a earlier post. Trivia note: Prime Minister Suzuiki, who in August 1945 asked the Emperor for the crucial opinion/vote in the final cabinet meeting debating capitulation or fighting on. Suzuiki carried in his chest a pistol bullet from a 1928 assassination attempt, a reminder of the very possible consequences of forcing the cabinets decision.
OK. However, does Japan's leadership simply decide to have Japan's economy implode in such a case? After all, their own lives are more important than their country, no?
 
The problem is the only leader who can stand up to the military before the situation totally turns to poop is the Emperor. Even that is not assured as OTL when the Emperor ordered the surrender after the atomic bombings there was plan to seize the recording of the surrender and kidnap the Emperor. While all Japanese were not batshit crazy, there was an element in the military particularly in the army, that was totally disconnected from reality - Yamato Damashii - Japanese Spirit would overcome any economic, technical, or logistic issues no matter how severe. Those would be busy assassinating any civilian leaders or civilian officers they saw standing in the way. Eventually the existing sanctions, let alone any others would crush Japan.
 
I thought that the sanctions the US applied were linked to the occupation of French Indo China, much less likely if France is not occupied. Were those sanctions not the key factor in Japan's attack?
Correct on both counts.

However, if France fights on (TM:openedeyewink:), Japan is going to put strong pressure on for access to ROC through IndoChina, which was a major reason for taking it over to begin with. (That Japan believed she could get away with it was French weakness in Europe; British, too.)
 

B-29_Bomber

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They could of course try to take FIC anyway,

This would be stupid for another reason than what @CalBear stated.

If Japan needs to take Indochina, while also needing to take the Dutch East Indies, you'll need the Philippines. Attacking all of this would be dumb as OTL Japan was operating on shoestring logistics, if you ruin one of their OTL operations or add an additional one this would wreak their plans completely. A Pacific War where France actively contests Indochina (with the help of Britain of course) is a Pacific War that ends around 6 to 18 months earlier than OTL.
 
both the Guadalcanal battle & the New Guinea campaigns were fought at the extreme limits of land based air support.
As a matter of fact, the Guadalcanal landings by Japan were precisely because IJAAF was at the extremes of airpower's reach: the Tulagi base was supposed to "move the front". Then the U.S. counterattacked before Japan was ready, & in numbers IJA HQ refused to believe were real...:rolleyes:

And CalBear (as you may expect:)) is right: the embargo was a product of the seizure of southern IndoChina.

That said, however, FDR did not want the total embargo that obtained OTL: he'd meant it to be only on avgas & such, to curtail ops in ROC, not a "knife at the throat" that would provoke Japan to attack.:eek:

And had Chiang offered the right deal (& he considered Mao a bigger threat than Japan), the Japanese would've taken a deal to evac part of China (provided they could keep Manchuria--which the U.S. was also willing to sign off on).

Somewhat better diplomacy would have been a big help...:rolleyes:

And the seizure of IndoChina was designed not as "easy pickings", but as a route to cut off ROC forces in the south; had Japan been able to make a deal with France... (See "diplomacy"...:rolleyes:)
 
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Redbeard

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This would be stupid for another reason than what @CalBear stated.

If Japan needs to take Indochina, while also needing to take the Dutch East Indies, you'll need the Philippines. Attacking all of this would be dumb as OTL Japan was operating on shoestring logistics, if you ruin one of their OTL operations or add an additional one this would wreak their plans completely. A Pacific War where France actively contests Indochina (with the help of Britain of course) is a Pacific War that ends around 6 to 18 months earlier than OTL.
Basically agree, but my general impression is that the Japanese then really didn't step back from doing something just because it was stupid. Their problem was that with their Empire building ambitions they really didn't have anything but stupid options to choose between.

So, short of giving up the Empire building, they seen from 1940 had to realise they were in an extremely vulnerable position being dependent on western "goodwill" to have access to important strategic assets.

If the Japanese government had serious considerations about a compromise like that phx1138 describes above I think it was the fall of France in June 1940 that weighed decisively in on the "go all out" option as it gave a realistic opportunity to seize FIC, which again was necessary if Malaya, Singapore and DIC was to be taken.

If France doesn't fall I'm quite sure even the Japanese would step back from doing something as stupid as attacking SEA. Next question is what happens if France still falls, but FIC is in the camp of de Gaulle and not Vichy. IMHO it would still be too stupid to attack. Not because it would necessarily be impossible to seize FIC, but because it would mean a full involvement of the British Empire (and probably USA too) a year + ahead of OTL. That makes it impossible to achieve the actual object - gaining access to resources in Malaya and DEI.

And the OTL situation? It started out extremely well, much more than it should have, but soon went wrong, terribly wrong. I can see why they were tempted, but if there should have been a tiny option for success I think they should have left out the PH part. Not because that would keep the USA out of the war, but because it would have meant a far less determined USA.
 
The lack of easy access certainly seems to waive away Japanese aggression in 1941-42. What we can't predict is how the US/Brits, or the Jaoanese will behave later. The China war had become a economic drain on Japan, the US was engaged in low level sanctions vs Japan, and was allowing increasing support to China. Japanese debt to US banks was growing, & while I can't predict when this would become unsustainable it is possible the demands of the war in Europe would cause painful restrictions of Japans credit. So it is possible things come to a head in very late 1942, or more likely in 1943.
 
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