Does Japan still attack Pearl Harbor without the Fall of France?

aBut wouldn't japan eventually run out of cash reserves to buy up all those resources due to the war in China?

It's possible, I never said who would necessarily win in a continued Sino-Japanese war, only that it is the only outcome I can see from a no Fall of France scenario in regards to Pacific.
 

raharris1973

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But wouldn't japan eventually run out of cash reserves to buy up all those resources due to the war in China?

Sure, by 1949, or 47 at the earliest.

Unless the other great powers decide to embargo Japan after the defeat of Germany, for example.

Maybe in the earlier forties the expense of fuel forces the Japanese to reduce air operations in China. That still is not game over for Japan. Japan also had a decent sized gold hoard. In OTL, with the dollar freeze of July 1941 they had trouble spending it. In a less monopolized economy they could possibly find more places where its accepted as payment.

The Japanese were able to cut their airpower in China down by something like two-thirds, once the Pacific War started, yet this did not cause the Japanese to lose any occupied ground.
 
but can they win China or will they just be bogged down in a forever war they can not hope to win?
They can win if they pick a line to draw and make a deal with the Chinese. They can't conquer China but they can win the war at a point they choose if they can keep discipline.
 
We are assuming there is no catastrophic increase and complete embargoes put in place, but the sanctions against Japan are going to slowly increase either way. So the noose will slowly start strangling Japan instead of the head simply being lopped off.

It's more likely that, assuming that the US and Japan don't join in the European war, the US will start strengthening sanctions against Japan once the Two Ocean Navy Act starts bearing fruit. Combine that with the fortification of the US Pacific islands that are going to be strengthened and the expansion of the army in the Philippines, and Japan will see whatever potential window south close. With a much stronger hand than before, the US will be freer to act.

Mind that Japan's economy was nearly maxed out; I think at this time, roughly 25% of its economy was devoted to solely military matters. If there is any upset in its plans, then it is going to start hurting. And, considering Japan at the time, it is more likely that they will do something that will raise international ire. Perhaps not as much as the invasion of Indochina, but it's far more likely something will occur.

Then again, a war that starts in 1942/1943 is only going to end one way, especially if both France and Britain have healthy, prepared navies that can join in (and, as well, the Dutch might be able to contribute more.)
 
It's more likely that, assuming that the US and Japan don't join in the European war, the US will start strengthening sanctions against Japan once the Two Ocean Navy Act starts bearing fruit. Combine that with the fortification of the US Pacific islands that are going to be strengthened and the expansion of the army in the Philippines, and Japan will see whatever potential window south close. With a much stronger hand than before, the US will be freer to act.

Good point on the Two-Ocean Navy Act. I don't see France still fighting in June-July 1940 as truncating it into a One-Ocean Navy Act or butterflying it away entirely. The USN is going to be strengthened immensely, and that will be a major factor in Japanese calculations, along with the fact that Japan simply cannot conduct any major naval action until its last two carriers (Shokaku and Zuikaku) have been commissioned.
 
But does Japan just stay focused on China without an embargo? I would think they'd look somewhere else for 'easy pickings'

Contrary to "conventional" knowledge, China was the most important front for Japan. If they didn't need to or could not afford to invade elsewhere, they wouldn't.



That being said, I believe people are underestimating Japan a bit here. Delaying the embargo would mean Japan has more room to continue with the industrialization of Korea and Manchukuo, mostly due to access to US technology and expertise. This would likely mean that Japan wouldn't be so run down or backward as it was in OTL.
 

CalBear

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Almost certainly not. It was the, in hindsight, idiotic decision to invade/annex French Indochina that set off the Oil Embargo. That in turn put the Empire into a position where it could either withdraw and lose face (with a couple of the civilian members of the Council almost certainly paying with their lives via assassination by ultra-nationalists) or find another source of oil. Since the British and Dutch were with the Americans on the boycott (the UK being a declared ally of the Free French, and the Dutch Queen living in exile in the UK, making the Netherlands a de facto ally there were not really any source of oil to be had and, even one could be found, the Norwegian merchant fleet had been handed over to the British for the duration. with the UK & U.S. merchant fleets out of the picture meant there was no one to transport the oil to Japan, even if someone would sell it for yen (and the yen of 1940 was far from that of today, it was weak, mainly disdained currency outside the "Greater co-prosperity Sphere").

The Japanese had been told, in advance what the result of invading French Indochina would be, they then were shocked when it actually happened. Worst part was the whole reason for invading was to gain the supposed huge rice surpluses the region produced and export the excess to the Home Island and to Manchuria. Never happened. First few years there was barely enough to feed the locals and the IJA forces conducting the occupation, when they finally got that unSNAFU'd the U.S. Navy had also gotten the submarine torpedo issue sorted, so almost no rice arrived. Literally started the whole Pacific War to gain a resource that was never actually available.
 

CalBear

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I agree that no fall of France probably means the Japanese need to make a move against all the westerners at once, or not at all.

However, lack of bases in Indochina is *not* a geographic barrier to Japanese ops in the DEI. The Japanese hopped from one conquest to the other in OTL along multiple axes of advance. The axes of Japanese advance into eastern DEI, and even for one of the landings in Kalimantan/Borneo, were from the northeast, the Japanese mandated islands, not via the South China Sea. The Japanese of course held the mandated islands like Truk and Palau for over 20 years before the war.

In any case, if the Japanese went for an "all at once" offensive in Southeast Asia, not starting from Indochina is a disadvantage for the mainland campaign. The Japanese can probably never get to Burma. French forces can possibly hold out in collaboration with the Chinese in the rough country of Laos, southern China and upper Burma.
THe Japanese did jump from one place to another, but you need to look at distances. The operations were generally only a few hundred miles apart.
 
... but you need to look at distances. The operations were generally only a few hundred miles apart.

Yup. Their army operational doctrine was not to attack beyond range of land based air. The exceptions were often trouble for them. Midway is the most well known example, but both the Guadalcanal battle & the New Guinea campaigns were fought at the extreme limits of land based air support. Nagumos Indian Ocean raid is noteable by the lack of effective Commonwealth air opposition. Ditto for the landings on Maylasia & Thailand. Most of the 1942 operations were timed and placed to assure a desired level of land based air support.
 

wikipipes

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Probably. Japanese motivation for war was almost entirely separate from European affairs.

Perhaps Japan enjoys minor benefit from increased trade to the French, but it's not sufficient to meet needs, thus still pushing Japan to war to get the resources she needs, and inevitably on collision course with the United States.

Perhaps PH is butterflied away, or perhaps it's even more successful. Potentially the carrier fleet could be at least partially crippled as well. Specifics of patrols and deployments are far too nuanced and interrelated to determine specifics from such a broad POD.

I doubt this, the Royal Navy placed emphasis on the European theater because France fell. The general wisdom among British commanders and strategists was that the French Navy and the RN would work co-cooperatively to contain the Kriegsmarine and bottle them up in the North Sea. The fall of Paris caused panic that an invasion was not just possible but likely, that is why the somewhat mediocre "Force Z" was dispatched to Singapore. Bearing that in mind, the Japanese would be more cautious with more tonnage in the region.
 
We are assuming there is no catastrophic increase and complete embargoes put in place, but the sanctions against Japan are going to slowly increase either way. So the noose will slowly start strangling Japan instead of the head simply being lopped off.

...

My guess is Japans credit runs out fairly soon, perhaps with US & British government encouragement. Unless Japan is a active ally against Germany neither the New York of London banks have much incentive to risk capitol on Japan. The US and other Allied governments are a better risk. As Allied policy solidifies in 1942 & post war plans start to emerge Japan may very well lose the short term loans necessary to keep its economy moving and and China war above water. If the government cannot find a solution there then it will lead to a larger crisis when the western governments wont guarantee or will discourage the next set of long term loans. This could occur as early as mid 1943. How the imperialists in the Army and among the Zaibatsu deal with this Gordion Knot would be 'interesting'.
 
With France still in the war we will see the bulk of the French fleet remain in the Mediterranean with select units detached for allied service in the Atlantic.

We will also see Uboat sinking drop to around a third of our time line due to range and travel time.

We may see a 'Force XYZ' of 3 fast capital ships, 3 slow capital ships and 3 carriers. It's enough that even Japan would know they can't tackle it without suffering losses.

Not sure if the RAF in the far East can be bulked up in a France fights on scenario.
 

raharris1973

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Mind that Japan's economy was nearly maxed out; I think at this time, roughly 25% of its economy was devoted to solely military matters. If there is any upset in its plans, then it is going to start hurting. And, considering Japan at the time, it is more likely that they will do something that will raise international ire. Perhaps not as much as the invasion of Indochina, but it's far more likely something will occur.


Other than military assaults against western held territories, about the only thing I think the Japanese could have done to retaliate for embargoes would have been to take all the westerners and western enclaves in occupied China and the Empire hostage. Not saying it would have done *anything* to solve their embargo problem, but if we assume big desperation combined with a south seas offensive being unfeasible (and of course, backing down unfeasible) its about the only other thing they could have done.
 
It could percipitate a internal power struggle within Japans leadership. Assasinations, one or more army coups, the emperor perhaps hostage, or backing a faction.
 

raharris1973

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Yup. Their army operational doctrine was not to attack beyond range of land based air. The exceptions were often trouble for them. Midway is the most well known example, but both the Guadalcanal battle & the New Guinea campaigns were fought at the extreme limits of land based air support. Nagumos Indian Ocean raid is noteable by the lack of effective Commonwealth air opposition. Ditto for the landings on Maylasia & Thailand. Most of the 1942 operations were timed and placed to assure a desired level of land based air support.

Well the only way to judge the vitalness of the pre-war position in occupied China would be to have a map showing the combat radius of Japanese land-based aircraft from all the airfields they possessed, and then subtract the airfields they held that were in Indochina.

Unfortunately, my google-fu is not coming up with any such maps, just the West Point maps of the axes of Japanese advances and leaps in the 1941-1942 campaign, without the benefit of aircraft range rings being overlaid.

http://www.emersonkent.com/images/japanese_offensive_1941.jpg
 
I should note that it's not inconceivable that the embargos winds up coming down anyways, if later then OTL, due to Euro-American dissatisfaction with Japan over the war in China... but it isn't guaranteed. And Japan's in a lot more of a pickle if they want to do something about it precisely because the French are still around.
 
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CaliGuy

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Almost certainly not. It was the, in hindsight, idiotic decision to invade/annex French Indochina that set off the Oil Embargo. That in turn put the Empire into a position where it could either withdraw and lose face (with a couple of the civilian members of the Council almost certainly paying with their lives via assassination by ultra-nationalists) or find another source of oil. Since the British and Dutch were with the Americans on the boycott (the UK being a declared ally of the Free French, and the Dutch Queen living in exile in the UK, making the Netherlands a de facto ally there were not really any source of oil to be had and, even one could be found, the Norwegian merchant fleet had been handed over to the British for the duration. with the UK & U.S. merchant fleets out of the picture meant there was no one to transport the oil to Japan, even if someone would sell it for yen (and the yen of 1940 was far from that of today, it was weak, mainly disdained currency outside the "Greater co-prosperity Sphere").

The Japanese had been told, in advance what the result of invading French Indochina would be, they then were shocked when it actually happened. Worst part was the whole reason for invading was to gain the supposed huge rice surpluses the region produced and export the excess to the Home Island and to Manchuria. Never happened. First few years there was barely enough to feed the locals and the IJA forces conducting the occupation, when they finally got that unSNAFU'd the U.S. Navy had also gotten the submarine torpedo issue sorted, so almost no rice arrived. Literally started the whole Pacific War to gain a resource that was never actually available.
So, Japan would simply continue its war in China in this TL without invading anyone else? If so, how long would Japan be able to sustain this?

Also, does Japan simply withdraw from China (minus Manchuria) once its economy becomes overheated?
 

Archibald

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By OTL 1940 French force in Indochina were certainly weak. But, if the country doesn't fall (let's say in a Blunted Sickle scenario) the rapid expansion of Army and Air Force after 1941 will extend to French Indochina. More aircrafts, more ships, more ground troops, more tanks there. My understanding is FIC was invaded because of France crushing military defeat, the lack of opposition, and Vichy overall weakness. With half the country looted by Germany, there was next to zero military resources to be send to FIC.

So, Japan would simply continue its war in China in this TL without invading anyone else?

Probably. How long it could last is anybody guess, but China too big for Japan, hence the war was unwinnable, so they economically collapse in the late 40's or in the 50's.

With France still in the war we will see the bulk of the French fleet remain in the Mediterranean with select units detached for allied service in the Atlantic.

There would be a token naval force send to FIC ports to defend the colony. The RN had naval forces in singapore, France would do the same in FIC.
 
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