aBut wouldn't japan eventually run out of cash reserves to buy up all those resources due to the war in China?
aBut wouldn't japan eventually run out of cash reserves to buy up all those resources due to the war in China?
But wouldn't japan eventually run out of cash reserves to buy up all those resources due to the war in China?
They can win if they pick a line to draw and make a deal with the Chinese. They can't conquer China but they can win the war at a point they choose if they can keep discipline.but can they win China or will they just be bogged down in a forever war they can not hope to win?
It's more likely that, assuming that the US and Japan don't join in the European war, the US will start strengthening sanctions against Japan once the Two Ocean Navy Act starts bearing fruit. Combine that with the fortification of the US Pacific islands that are going to be strengthened and the expansion of the army in the Philippines, and Japan will see whatever potential window south close. With a much stronger hand than before, the US will be freer to act.
But does Japan just stay focused on China without an embargo? I would think they'd look somewhere else for 'easy pickings'
THe Japanese did jump from one place to another, but you need to look at distances. The operations were generally only a few hundred miles apart.I agree that no fall of France probably means the Japanese need to make a move against all the westerners at once, or not at all.
However, lack of bases in Indochina is *not* a geographic barrier to Japanese ops in the DEI. The Japanese hopped from one conquest to the other in OTL along multiple axes of advance. The axes of Japanese advance into eastern DEI, and even for one of the landings in Kalimantan/Borneo, were from the northeast, the Japanese mandated islands, not via the South China Sea. The Japanese of course held the mandated islands like Truk and Palau for over 20 years before the war.
In any case, if the Japanese went for an "all at once" offensive in Southeast Asia, not starting from Indochina is a disadvantage for the mainland campaign. The Japanese can probably never get to Burma. French forces can possibly hold out in collaboration with the Chinese in the rough country of Laos, southern China and upper Burma.
... but you need to look at distances. The operations were generally only a few hundred miles apart.
Probably. Japanese motivation for war was almost entirely separate from European affairs.
Perhaps Japan enjoys minor benefit from increased trade to the French, but it's not sufficient to meet needs, thus still pushing Japan to war to get the resources she needs, and inevitably on collision course with the United States.
Perhaps PH is butterflied away, or perhaps it's even more successful. Potentially the carrier fleet could be at least partially crippled as well. Specifics of patrols and deployments are far too nuanced and interrelated to determine specifics from such a broad POD.
We are assuming there is no catastrophic increase and complete embargoes put in place, but the sanctions against Japan are going to slowly increase either way. So the noose will slowly start strangling Japan instead of the head simply being lopped off.
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Mind that Japan's economy was nearly maxed out; I think at this time, roughly 25% of its economy was devoted to solely military matters. If there is any upset in its plans, then it is going to start hurting. And, considering Japan at the time, it is more likely that they will do something that will raise international ire. Perhaps not as much as the invasion of Indochina, but it's far more likely something will occur.
Yup. Their army operational doctrine was not to attack beyond range of land based air. The exceptions were often trouble for them. Midway is the most well known example, but both the Guadalcanal battle & the New Guinea campaigns were fought at the extreme limits of land based air support. Nagumos Indian Ocean raid is noteable by the lack of effective Commonwealth air opposition. Ditto for the landings on Maylasia & Thailand. Most of the 1942 operations were timed and placed to assure a desired level of land based air support.
So, Japan would simply continue its war in China in this TL without invading anyone else? If so, how long would Japan be able to sustain this?Almost certainly not. It was the, in hindsight, idiotic decision to invade/annex French Indochina that set off the Oil Embargo. That in turn put the Empire into a position where it could either withdraw and lose face (with a couple of the civilian members of the Council almost certainly paying with their lives via assassination by ultra-nationalists) or find another source of oil. Since the British and Dutch were with the Americans on the boycott (the UK being a declared ally of the Free French, and the Dutch Queen living in exile in the UK, making the Netherlands a de facto ally there were not really any source of oil to be had and, even one could be found, the Norwegian merchant fleet had been handed over to the British for the duration. with the UK & U.S. merchant fleets out of the picture meant there was no one to transport the oil to Japan, even if someone would sell it for yen (and the yen of 1940 was far from that of today, it was weak, mainly disdained currency outside the "Greater co-prosperity Sphere").
The Japanese had been told, in advance what the result of invading French Indochina would be, they then were shocked when it actually happened. Worst part was the whole reason for invading was to gain the supposed huge rice surpluses the region produced and export the excess to the Home Island and to Manchuria. Never happened. First few years there was barely enough to feed the locals and the IJA forces conducting the occupation, when they finally got that unSNAFU'd the U.S. Navy had also gotten the submarine torpedo issue sorted, so almost no rice arrived. Literally started the whole Pacific War to gain a resource that was never actually available.
So, Japan would simply continue its war in China in this TL without invading anyone else?
With France still in the war we will see the bulk of the French fleet remain in the Mediterranean with select units detached for allied service in the Atlantic.