Does Germany do worse with just Panzer IVs?

Lower numbers than the technically defective 1943 Panther?

The technical defects of the 1943 models of the Panther had little impact upon it's ability to be mass produced, as it was a design made for mass production. The Panzer IV was not. That just under 2,000 Panther's were made in 1943 is actually pretty good for the first year of production for a brand new model of tank, roughly comparable to the T-34s. By comparison, the Panzer IV began production in 1936 but didn't come close to a annual production rate of even a thousand units until 1942... a full six years later.

Plus putting resources into expanding existing production is a lot easier than phasing in totally new, rushed, technically compromised design 20 tons larger than anything in mass production already. Expanded Pz IV production is liable to start in 1942, not 1943 for that reason. Also I don't think OP is saying the Panther would ever be produced at all.

It is if you use the resources that were historically used to build the Panther facilities to instead simply expand the Panzer IV facilities, like your proposing here. If you then recommend, then the result is the utter cessation of Panzer IV production in 1944 compared to OTL in exchange for a greatly reduced Panther production compared to OTL. Retooling assembly lines for a whole new design is a pretty substantial effort and causes considerable loss of productivity in the interim, as the Soviets found out when switching the factories that had been making the T-26 and BT-series to the T-34.
 
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Deleted member 1487

The technical defects of the 1943 models of the Panther had little impact upon it's ability to be mass produced, as it was a design made for mass production.
The initial production was throttled to fix the deficits before it was put back on full production. The first 3 months of production were severely defective, so they had to be fixed and production problems solved before production could ramp up, a problem the Ju88 had in 1939 when first put into production. For several months it initially had defects in production and with the design itself that needed to be worked out before mass production could resume. Though the design itself was designed for mass production it took time to iron out issues, which weren't even done by July as two burned up just exiting the train around Kursk.

The Panzer IV was not. That just under 2,000 Panther's were made in 1943 is actually pretty good for the first year of production for a brand new model of tank, roughly comparable to the T-34s. By comparison, the Panzer IV began production in 1936 but didn't come close to a annual production rate of even a thousand units until 1942... a full six years later.
Sure, the Pz IV was not initially designed for mass production, but it became more mass produceable with time (same with Ju88) as redesigns and changes were factored in to make it easier to make and more effective in combat. The 1942-43 model had greatly evolved since 1936. Yes the Panther's first year wasn't bad all things considered, a testament to the design for production ease, but also the huge expansion of AFV production resources and what could be done in war time. IIRC the T-34 got it's first 12 months in peacetime, so production conditions were quite different. The Panzer IV was not selected as more than a secondary support design until 1942 when it was realized that the 75mm cannon was a necessity, the Pz III couldn't take the 75mm gun, and a new design was not going to be able to replace the Pz IV any time soon. That was fully a matter of production choices, not the inability of the Pz IV to be mass produced.

It is if you use the resources that were historically used to build the Panther facilities to instead simply expand the Panzer IV facilities, like your proposing here. If you then recommend, then the result is the utter cessation of Panzer IV production in 1944 compared to OTL in exchange for a greatly reduced Panther production compared to OTL. Retooling assembly lines for a whole new design is a pretty substantial effort and causes considerable loss of productivity in the interim, as the Soviets found out when switching the factories that had been making the T-26 and BT-series to the T-34.
I'm not simply suggesting to expand the facilities themselves (except for subcomponents that could benefit from scales of economy), but phasing them in at any new facilities opened up (converted facilities at MAN for instance), which could get advice from existing production facilities, rather than having to figure it out on their own for a much heavier design that no one has experience with. Why is 1944 cessation of Pz IV production given, OP didn't suggest that at all.
 
Coming back to the topic: You know, perhaps Germany can temporarily be better off, since the whole Kursk fiasco was mostly due to delays from the panzers. Not waiting for Panther and having a few extra Panzer IVs to throw in the north might have tipped the scale just enough for the operation to be a success.

What comes afterwards would have killed it, though.
 

Deleted member 1487

Coming back to the topic:
So you don't have the answers to the questions posed.

You know, perhaps Germany can temporarily be better off, since the whole Kursk fiasco was mostly due to delays from the panzers. Not waiting for Panther and having a few extra Panzer IVs to throw in the north might have tipped the scale just enough for the operation to be a success.

What comes afterwards would have killed it, though.
The Kursk offensive wasn't damned by waiting for the Panther, it was pretty much doomed by mid-May:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2014.963418
 
Coming back to the topic: You know, perhaps Germany can temporarily be better off, since the whole Kursk fiasco was mostly due to delays from the panzers. Not waiting for Panther and having a few extra Panzer IVs to throw in the north might have tipped the scale just enough for the operation to be a success.

That's a myth, actually. Most of the forces that the Soviets used to halt the Kursk attack were already in place. They weren't quite as well trained as they would be two months later, but then neither were the rebuilt German forces. All attacking in May does is kick off the entire sequence of battles two months early, duly accelerating the Soviet advance.
 
Is Germany worse off in WW2 had they stopped with the Panzer IV rather than developing the Panzer V, VI, Tiger II, Jadgpanther, etc?
I'd suggest that the Germans did get value from at least some of the their post Panzer IV vehicles. In my opinion the Tiger I comes to mind as a reasonably effective and reasonably reliable heavy tank that could be produced in (just) enough numbers to cause the allies a considerable degree of trouble.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'd suggest that the Germans did get value from at least some of the their post Panzer IV vehicles. In my opinion the Tiger I comes to mind as a reasonably effective and reasonably reliable heavy tank that could be produced in (just) enough numbers to cause the allies a considerable degree of trouble.
IIRC this book suggests that in terms of combat losses the Tiger achieved 10:1 kills, but including non-combat losses, which were at least 50% of losses, then it was only about 5:1. Still probably cost effective in the end, but could have been much more so had they invested in recovery vehicles and maybe built 1/3rd less (to make Berge Tiger).
https://www.amazon.com/Sledgehammers-Strengths-Flaws-Tiger-Battalions/dp/0971765022

Edit:
as an aside to the main question, what if the Panther was decided on to be the VK3002 Daimler design...but instead of the KWK42, they made it with the Czech 7.65cm L52.8?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8_cm_PL_kanon_vz._37
It would be like an M4E8, but with rear drive, better armor, and better mobility, plus a diesel engine. It could probably use an existing turret too.
 
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What's the source for this? Additionally do you have a similar chart for T-34 and M4 Sherman production to compare? Also which of the several factories was this at.

If you find a chart for International Harvester tractors, that would give an idea, since they provided the template plant via Albert Kahn, the famous US industrial designer, that would be similar.
His group also designed Chrysler's Detroit Tank Arsenal
 
So you don't have the answers to the questions posed.
Or perhaps I missed it in middle of work.

Need to go through my files, I just had that one on hand for some reason.


The Kursk offensive wasn't damned by waiting for the Panther, it was pretty much doomed by mid-May:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2014.963418
That's a myth, actually. Most of the forces that the Soviets used to halt the Kursk attack were already in place. They weren't quite as well trained as they would be two months later, but then neither were the rebuilt German forces. All attacking in May does is kick off the entire sequence of battles two months early, duly accelerating the Soviet advance.

It was doomed for a number of reasons, obviously. I'm just thinking that it wouldn't have been as big a failure if Model had actual tanks instead of a few moving pillboxes.
 

Deleted member 1487

Or perhaps I missed it in middle of work.

Need to go through my files, I just had that one on hand for some reason.
I'll be interested to see what you've got.

It was doomed for a number of reasons, obviously. I'm just thinking that it wouldn't have been as big a failure if Model had actual tanks instead of a few moving pillboxes.
The rolling 60 tonners were needed to breach the huge defensive belts the Soviet built up even by May. Panzer IV's would not fair that well against lots of dug in AT guns, even with artillery and infantry support. Even StuGs and Sturmpanzer still needed Tiger support.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzerkeil
But you're right about the Panther, waste of time and energy in Summer 1943.

If you find a chart for International Harvester tractors, that would give an idea, since they provided the template plant via Albert Kahn, the famous US industrial designer, that would be similar.
His group also designed Chrysler's Detroit Tank Arsenal
Based on the very limited info I can find about it (other than size and output), based on pictures I'm not seeing much difference in methods, no conveyer belt assembly lines for M4s, just a layout similar to what the chart O. Smith posted, but on a much larger scale. The reality is US 'mass manufacturing' of tanks was built on the fact that they had an economy 4x as large as Germany's by 1944 and had highly concentrated purpose built facilities bigger than anything anyone else in the world had because strategic bombing of the facility was not possible. Dispersion of facilities due to threat of bombing (and actual bombing) meant the Germans couldn't concentrate production in huge facilities like the Detroit arsenal, while the machine tool industry couldn't keep up with demand in Germany, because their pre-war industry was limited by the relatively small demand compared to US machine tool production.
 
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