Divided France after Hundred Years War?

[Yi Sun Sin]

I looked through the various threads regarding the Hundred Years War, in which England somehow wins the war and obtains all control of France. But many threaders also point out that it would be just too difficult for the Plantagenet rulers to assert control over all of France. From a military and strategic point of view, the most that the English and the Burgundians (provided that they are able to maintain mutual cause with each other) could accomplish was as far as they got in OTL.

If I were the Duke of Bedford, since he was the most capable of the English leaders at the time, I would work on consolidating all holdings north on the Loire River while also securing Orleans, Chinon, and Nantes. I would then establish the equivalent of the marcher lords in Wales and on the Scottish border, empowering loyal northern Frenchman and of course English knights who have financial interests in France. A mixture of royal and local investments in things like castles and a restructuring of how troops are recruited should be able to maximize the natural topography along the new boundaries, thus making it harder for the Valois-aligned French lords and the king to counterattack. I would also keep an eye on how the French are reorganizing their forces to include more gunpowder artillery, as that would be a game-changer as shown in OTL Castillon.

Most importantly, the English have to change up the the entire political scheme in the territories that they control in a way that the northern French lords and the Burgundians would have second thoughts in siding with the Valois, basically that they would have more to lose than gain if the English are somehow ejected from France.

I think a divided France was a much better outcome if the English wanted to stay than just conquering than entire country, since by Henry V's reign, the war turned into a conflict of attrition and the English should have prepared for the long-term.

This is assuming a lot of "ifs" and rather than the English being worn down, they should have made the French king exhausted to the point where he would have to acknowledge a de facto division of his kingdom, just like how the Welsh were slowly overcome and the Scottish regarding Berwick.

 

[profxyz]

IMHO the problem with a post-Henry V 'divided France' scenario is that the Plantagenet/Burgundy position was simply not as powerful as the Armagnac one, so there was no real reason for A to accept a permanent division. As you said, P/B didn't have the resources to project power south of Loire, so they couldn't compel A to accept anything.

But beyond that, P/B was also fundamentally caught in a dilemma when it came to stopping A from projecting power north of Loire. Bedford might have been able to establish a militarily/strategic equilibrium (i.e. stalemate) with A by building more castles, raising more armies etc... but that very effort would require raising taxes on the French, which would shift the political equilibrium away from P/B and encourage defections to A. England couldn't and wouldn't fund a war solely for the benefit of a French regime (which the P/B Regency was). So whatever policy Bedford decided to focus on, Charles VII could simply sit back, concentrate on reorganization and harassment, and rest assured that the gap between his capabilities and that of P/B would continue to grow.

The only real way to have destroyed Charles VII as a political contender to the French throne would have been for Charles VI and his wife to issue a full-throated declaration of 7's illegitimacy (not just disinheritance as in Troyes). But in that case, Henry VI's claim to the entire realm of France would have been ironclad (in law, anyway).

 

[Yi Sun Sin]

IMHO the problem with a post-Henry V 'divided France' scenario is that the Plantagenet/Burgundy position was simply not as powerful as the Armagnac one, so there was no real reason for A to accept a permanent division. As you said, P/B didn't have the resources to project power south of Loire, so they couldn't compel A to accept anything.

But beyond that, P/B was also fundamentally caught in a dilemma when it came to stopping A from projecting power north of Loire. Bedford might have been able to establish a militarily/strategic equilibrium (i.e. stalemate) with A by building more castles, raising more armies etc... but that very effort would require raising taxes on the French, which would shift the political equilibrium away from P/B and encourage defections to A. England couldn't and wouldn't fund a war solely for the benefit of a French regime (which the P/B Regency was). So whatever policy Bedford decided to focus on, Charles VII could simply sit back, concentrate on reorganization and harassment, and rest assured that the gap between his capabilities and that of P/B would continue to grow.

The only real way to have destroyed Charles VII as a political contender to the French throne would have been for Charles VI and his wife to issue a full-throated declaration of 7's illegitimacy (not just disinheritance as in Troyes). But in that case, Henry VI's claim to the entire realm of France would have been ironclad (in law, anyway).

Oh, my God. It’s you! I loved your video on the Peloponnesian War. So stoked to hear your take on this.

From a legal point-of-view, simply declaring his children illegitimate would have raised a whole range of problems ranging from Catholic clergymen contesting it to native French lords not accepting it, right? For that to happen, would you envision Henry V or any of his generals like Bedford or Lord Salisbury inflicting another crushing defeat on a scale that exceeds Agincourt to the point where the French do not have the guts to fight in open battle again (Exactly what happened to the Scottish Army in France after Vernueil) and agree to remove the legitimacy in an ATL treaty?

Would you say that the best chance for the Plantagenets to pull off a French conquest was before France actually instituted Salic law? If we are to take into account only bloodlines, Edward III was the closest make relative of the Capetians before the French said, “Not him.” I can envision them getting the French throne if the Black Prince was more restrained in his war conduct and they didn’t agree to the Bretigny treaty in which Edward III simply owned French lands rather than wanting the throne

 

[profxyz]

Thanks for your kind words.

I think for an authoritative illegitimate declaration (which don't get me wrong, a first step rather than the be-all and end-all of controlling France), it would probably have been enough for Isabeau of Bavaria to make said declaration before a bishop etc.

I'm not sure if it was ever in Henry V's power to extract such a damning/humiliating confession from royalty: he'd already demonstrated that he was the ONLY person who could bring peace to the French north (the French were already avoiding battle with him specifically after Agincourt) and that still only got him as far as Troyes. The impetus for such a declaration would have had to come from Isabeau herself.

I think however legitimate the Plantagenet claim, the French nobility would have been hard-pressed to prefer an English king whose existing court would surely compete with their own re: patronage and favor. Most dynastic unions tend not to be happy affairs in this regard.

As for best chance, I suspect it's probably the Angevin period (though totally not familiar with that). As for Edward III, he surely recognized that in order to become French King, even after Poitiers, he would have had to siege down major French towns/castles to get them to acknowledge his authority - and from the experience of Calais, he would have known how difficult and thankless a task that was. The actual gains offered by the chevauchee and Bretigny were the much better option.

 

[Yi Sun Sin]

Thanks for your kind words.

I think for an authoritative illegitimate declaration (which don't get me wrong, a first step rather than the be-all and end-all of controlling France), it would probably have been enough for Isabeau of Bavaria to make said declaration before a bishop etc.

I'm not sure if it was ever in Henry V's power to extract such a damning/humiliating confession from royalty: he'd already demonstrated that he was the ONLY person who could bring peace to the French north (the French were already avoiding battle with him specifically after Agincourt) and that still only got him as far as Troyes. The impetus for such a declaration would have had to come from Isabeau herself.

I think however legitimate the Plantagenet claim, the French nobility would have been hard-pressed to prefer an English king whose existing court would surely compete with their own re: patronage and favor. Most dynastic unions tend not to be happy affairs in this regard.

As for best chance, I suspect it's probably the Angevin period (though totally not familiar with that). As for Edward III, he surely recognized that in order to become French King, even after Poitiers, he would have had to siege down major French towns/castles to get them to acknowledge his authority - and from the experience of Calais, he would have known how difficult and thankless a task that was. The actual gains offered by the chevauchee and Bretigny were the much better option.

In this instance regarding Isabeau, she would need a lot more influence and a lot more control than in OTL for her to be a more useful asset for English purposes. But as you point out, that is only a first step, as she would need to pacify French lords who would be stubbornly opposed (and that’s a difficult task considering the bad blood between the Burgundians and Armagnacs).

Maybe like his ancestor at Bretigny, Henry V would have to negotiate a new treaty in which his demands prior to his landing at Harfleur would be acknowledged minus the financial terms (which would have to be negotiated downwards).