Discussion: Why Did France Fall So Easily in 1940?

I wouldn't say the French over relied on the Maginot line; it did precisely what it was supposed to, which was make the Germans attack elsewhere.

They didn't think that tanks would successfully head through the Ardennes.
 
Accounts from the time also mention bad morale - the French remembered WW1 quite well and did not want another bloody war (pun intended).
 
Wretched civil-military relations, bad doctrine, terrible morale amongst the troops, a lot of obsolescent equipment (especially air force) although some good, all of that before the beginning of the war. Then, once the war starts, a basically passive stance until the German attack in the west which is met with one wretched decision after another. Even with the situation as OTL with better decisions beginning in 1939 (when Germany was naked in the west) France could have done much better - but as they say a fish rots from the head.

Once the armistice was signed, a large chunk of the right in France was more than happy to try and undo the legacy of Republicanism - replacing Liberté, Equailité, Fraternité with Patrie, Famille, Travail (liberty, equality, brotherhood replaced by the Vichy country, family, work)
 
it takes two sides to create a military disaster.

The Germans had excellent doctrine not only in their armored forces but their infantry doctrine was the worlds best for most of the war. They had a brilliant plan that succeeded in spite of some brief bouts of panic. They had a first rate tactical air force at the peak of its power. German equipment was generally excellent except in some cases were it was simply adequate.

Really it was the perfect time and place for a feat of operational brilliance. Just big enough in size for the full scope of German power to be focused but not so large as to allow the opponent to survive disaster (unlike the Soviet Union the following year).

The Anglo-French had their problems, the biggest of which was lack of a proper strategic reserve, a commander in chief who was literally down the road (and reachable by messenger only) from telegraph and phone communications (not to mention radio), and finally worst of all preparing to fight 1918 all over again but with better tanks (the French and British had some tank models that were markedly superior in gunpower and armor to German tanks).

But most importantly of all, the Anglo-French had a massive failure of imagination. They simply could not conceive of the campaign going in any direction than what they planned for. They were well positioned to defeat the original German plan (the one that fell into Dutch and later Allied hands by accident). But the unexpected was something no one in authority imagined.

The Anglo-French are hardly unique in that military mistake
 
Even with the situation as OTL with better decisions beginning in 1939 (when Germany was naked in the west) France could have done much better - but as they say a fish rots from the head.



Germany was weak in the west, not naked, they had a second line army there. When the French advanced during the Poland fighting they ran into resistance from the Westwall guns/mines, started taking losses and quit.
 
Once the armistice was signed, a large chunk of the right in France was more than happy to try and undo the legacy of Republicanism

IIRC, Petain considered the French democratic system to have been a squabbling, rotting thing and he wasn't alone in that. Too many thinking this wasn't so bad and they could make something out of it.
 
IIRC, Petain considered the French democratic system to have been a squabbling, rotting thing and he wasn't alone in that. Too many thinking this wasn't so bad and they could make something out of it.

Charles Maurras, one of the most active germanophobes in France during the 1930's (although he switched somewhat following the Popular Front victory) loved the fall of the republic as much that he called it a "divine surprise"! For surprisingly many French rightists (historically anti-German) the fall of France was a price worth paying for the fall of the republic.
 
... For surprisingly many French rightists (historically anti-German) the fall of France was a price worth paying for the fall of the republic.

How many of those guys came through the war with their reputation, career, fortune, and lives intact? Their actions and writing or recorded verbal statements become increasingly pathetic as the Allies close in during 1943 - 44.

Petain was just one of many right wing French leader who were nonplussed when Hitler did not open peace treaty negotiations in the autumn of 1940. The Japanese occupation of Indochina further underscored the bankruptcy of their leadership, and being stripped of their military forces simultaneously by both the Allies & Germans at the end of 1942 made their ineffectuality painfully obvious. Still the die hards acted as if they mattered. As the Allies, including a French Army were overrunning France in August 1944 Petains cabinet were discussing stepping forward to act as a interim government of national reconciliation in Liberated France. A day or two later Gestapo handlers & army guards bundled them off to Germany & a golden cage in a Bavarian hotel.
 
Why did France fall so easily in 1940?

Discuss!

I'd recommend a short reading list;

Doughtys 'Seeds of Disaster' analyzing the development of French army & air forces from 1919 through 1939.

Hornes 'To Lose a Battle; Chapmans 'Why France Fell'; and Jackson all picking apart the precedents and course of the campaign.

Getting deeper into the weeds

Doughty 'The Breaking Point' deconstructs the battle at Sedan.

Mays 'Strange Victory' charts the evolution of the "Sickle Cut" maneuver from October 1939 through the spring of 1940. (Hint, Mansteins role in it is mostly in the imagination of his fans.)

There are a few others similar to Doughty. Deconstructing specific battles, Hannaut, Gembloux Gap, Arras, Dunkirk, act… All are useful for understanding the relative advantages & disadvantages of the two armies at the tactical & operational levels.
 
The number one reason I think was the command structure. As I understand it the French equivilant of the Pentagon wasn't even in radio communication and possibly telephone communication with command levelsbelow them. This may be an urban legend but it would explain a lot. Second is tactics and force structure on the operational level

It is a distortion. Gamelins role was global & at the upper levels of grand strategy. His habit of intervening to micromanage details somewhat obscures that the management & leadership of the defense of France itself was a full echelon of command below him. & a level below that Georges had responsibility for all of North Eastern France from the Channel to Switzerland. Georges had the direct responsibility for the larger decisions. His HQ was the true nerve center of the French armies defense. Note than when Gamelin decided to intervene in the battle he went to Georges HQ & acted. His own office was exactly that, a personal office & staff offices for planing long term allocation of resources, not local operational matters. In that context a few telephone lines made sense. Most of the communications in & out were in the form of long documents concerning tank production or infantry training. The global communications for the French military, including radios were somewhat dispersed so that a single German air strike could knock out the entire system.

While Gamelin does bear responsibility for the choices in strategy, Dyle vs Escaut plan, act… it was not his lack of a radio in his office building that lost the operational battle. that was the responsibility of Georges, Billotte, Corap, Huntzinger, Flavigny & others down to division level.
 
The French Army was geared more to repeat of WW I, and only formed armored divisions in early 1940 ...

Just to nitpick, the first armored divisions were formed circa 1936. Planning for them reached back further & occurred parallel to the German work. Expansion beyond the 1st & 2d DLM was stalled for three years, which obviously was a problem. Motorization of the French army reached further back, into the 1920s. By 1940 over 40% of the French artillery was motorized, vs under 25% of the German army. Seven infantry divisions were fully motorized, vs five undersized German infantry divisions.
 
An interesting note on Charles Maurras. At his trial after the war, when he was convicted of various offenses including undermining French morale, collaboration etc, he declaimed at hearing the sentence "C'est la révanche de Dreyfus" (it is Dreyfus' revenge). Maurras had started his political career (as an intellectual/commentator not an elected official) as an anrti-Dreyfusard. His newspaper (Action Française) continually ran anti-Semitic, anti-UK/US editorials, and saw the defeat of France as a tragedy with a "bright side" of allowing "La France réale" a chance to be reborn. He was an ultramontanist/monarchist, definitely not a fascist (saw that as too close to socialism/Marxism).

refs:
1. Le Procés de Charles Maurras (trial transcript, 1946)
2. "Action Française: 1939-1944 (pub Paris, then Vichy)
 
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