Different Spark to WWI

Say that Frank Ferdinand is not shot and that no war erupts in July. Instead war erupts when the Greek-Turkish Naval Crisis flares up and conflict ensues. How exactly would the alliances play out and what strategies would the various powers use, for example would the war breaking out in the Aegean lead to a more Balkan focus for the war's beginning?
 
Say that Frank Ferdinand is not shot and that no war erupts in July. Instead war erupts when the Greek-Turkish Naval Crisis flares up and conflict ensues. How exactly would the alliances play out and what strategies would the various powers use, for example would the war breaking out in the Aegean lead to a more Balkan focus for the war's beginning?


I'm not sure this would- could- have sparked
off WWI. It's difficult to imagine ANY of the
powers beside Russia getting interested, let
alone thinking their vital interests were so
@ stake that they had to go to war over it.
 
I'm not sure this would- could- have sparked
off WWI. It's difficult to imagine ANY of the
powers beside Russia getting interested, let
alone thinking their vital interests were so
@ stake that they had to go to war over it.
Although I agree, to be entirely fair, absent what actually happened in real history, you would probably also think it's a bit of a stretch to think that Britain would declare war on Germany because an obscure Serbian terrorist group killed a member of the Austro-Hungarian royal family.
 
I tend to agree that a Greco-Turkish War likely wouldn't lead to a general European war. None of the Great Powers have major interests that are threatened by such a war. Russia's only real concern would be a Greek attack on Constantinople for the same reasons they opposed the Bulgarian attack on the city in the First Balkan War. Basically, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand lead to war because the Russia saw an Austrian attack on Serbia as threatening to destroy its position in the Balkans and, most importantly to my mind, Russia felt it couldn't back down from its position in support of Serbia after being humiliated in the Bosnian crisis in 1908. That line of thinking goes that if Russia always has to back down from confrontation, then is it really a Great Power? Your military power doesn't matter if you don't use it and always retreat diplomatically. I don't necessarily agree that this perspective is a correct reading of the situation, but I think it is a good explanation of Russia's thinking and why it drove the crisis in the way it did.

In this scenario though, that same situation doesn't apply because there's no threat to Russian (or another Great Power's) interests that would create the same inability to back down. Its "just" a war between Greece and Turkey, which I don't think will last all that long before the Great Powers force an end to the conflict. As the tension built over the summer, Greece sounded out Serbia on its position regarding a potential Greco-Turkish conflict and Serbia indicated it was very much not interested in getting involved in such a conflcit, especially not over possession of the Aegean islands. However, this stance was dependent on Bulgaria's position. If Bulgaria comes in against Greece, then Serbia will enter the war. To me, this says that Sofia will determine if the war stays limited or broadens. I'm inclined to think this makes escalation unlikely.

So, I don't see a Greco-Turkish conflict triggering a European war, even if it does become another Balkan war. I just don't see what Great Powers' interests are threatened by the conflict and why they would go to war. That said, I'm very interested to hear if anyone has a different opinion.
 
How about a situation where a near assassination of Kaiser Wilhelm II takes place, he survives and unfortunately so does his assassin. The assassin is found out to be a member of (fill in the ethno/political group) this in turn leads to an escalation of events that brings on the Great War.

Joho :)
 
How about a situation where a near assassination of Kaiser Wilhelm II takes place, he survives and unfortunately so does his assassin. The assassin is found out to be a member of (fill in the ethno/political group) this in turn leads to an escalation of events that brings on the Great War.

Joho :)
Not exactly many groups that fulfill that though. Communists/socialists? Everyone hates them. Poles? Who's gonna back them? A-H won't, Russia DEFINITELY won't.

Germany's not the unstable mess that the Balkans were. The GPs weren't competing influence there, the ethnic makeup wasn't nearly as mixed, and German lands, outside of Alsace and Lorraine, were pretty well acknowledged as rightfully German (whereas Bosnia was very recently annexed from the Ottomans).
 
How about a situation where a near assassination of Kaiser Wilhelm II takes place, he survives and unfortunately so does his assassin. The assassin is found out to be a member of (fill in the ethno/political group) this in turn leads to an escalation of events that brings on the Great War.

Joho :)

I agree with Bella Gerant. Although it's certainly plausible to see war resulting from an assassination attempt on Wilhelm II, it's not clear who would do it. Germany doesn't have the same oppressed ethnic groups with foreign support a la in the Balkans, the political groups like communists and anarchists similarly aren't backed by other major powers, and none of the other major powers would have any interest in trying to kill him themselves.
 
I tend to agree that a Greco-Turkish War likely wouldn't lead to a general European war. None of the Great Powers have major interests that are threatened by such a war. Russia's only real concern would be a Greek attack on Constantinople for the same reasons they opposed the Bulgarian attack on the city in the First Balkan War. Basically, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand lead to war because the Russia saw an Austrian attack on Serbia as threatening to destroy its position in the Balkans and, most importantly to my mind, Russia felt it couldn't back down from its position in support of Serbia after being humiliated in the Bosnian crisis in 1908. That line of thinking goes that if Russia always has to back down from confrontation, then is it really a Great Power? Your military power doesn't matter if you don't use it and always retreat diplomatically. I don't necessarily agree that this perspective is a correct reading of the situation, but I think it is a good explanation of Russia's thinking and why it drove the crisis in the way it did.

In this scenario though, that same situation doesn't apply because there's no threat to Russian (or another Great Power's) interests that would create the same inability to back down. Its "just" a war between Greece and Turkey, which I don't think will last all that long before the Great Powers force an end to the conflict. As the tension built over the summer, Greece sounded out Serbia on its position regarding a potential Greco-Turkish conflict and Serbia indicated it was very much not interested in getting involved in such a conflcit, especially not over possession of the Aegean islands. However, this stance was dependent on Bulgaria's position. If Bulgaria comes in against Greece, then Serbia will enter the war. To me, this says that Sofia will determine if the war stays limited or broadens. I'm inclined to think this makes escalation unlikely.

So, I don't see a Greco-Turkish conflict triggering a European war, even if it does become another Balkan war. I just don't see what Great Powers' interests are threatened by the conflict and why they would go to war. That said, I'm very interested to hear if anyone has a different opinion.
If you read a good survey book on pre-1914 diplomatic history, like Margaret Macmillan's The Road to 1914, it's clear that there were plenty of military or diplomatic crises in the leadup to 1914 that could have at least theoretically spun out into actual great power combat, not least of which was that there really was a Balkan war a couple years prior. It's equally clear that had things gone a little differently, 1914 might have been like the other crises -- resolved tensely, reluctantly, but resolved somehow -- and, for one reason or other, just wasn't. So I'm reluctant to dismiss it entirely. Britain is at least theoretically involved as an arms dealer, or rather battleship dealer. Who can say what might happen after 1914 if not overtaken by events elsewhere?

However at least from the history that did happen, I'm inclined to agree with you that there probably wasn't an obvious and foreseeable crisis on the horizon between Greece and the Ottoman Empire that would clearly have drawn in all the major powers.
 
Despite Europe avoiding an open war through many other moments of crisis, I think 1914 just had a certain "inevitability" to it. Not that anything is truly inevitable but the forces from all those other tensions seems to have truly fractured all involved, like thin ice the peace was fragile.

You will find other great comments in other threads on a possible Greco-Ottoman crisis sparked by the delivery of the Ottoman battleship due sometime in August, maybe September. I can see how the July Crisis might have unfolded without a full scale war, but by 1914 it seems to me at best less fully engulfing is the best one can find more highly plausible. I can navigate events to let the war unfold between just the Franco-Russian and Triple Alliance (maybe/maybe not Italy) leaving the British merely a hostile neutral and then I get the question of whether the Greeks intercept the ship and attempt or succeed in sinking her, more complex if she attempts the proposed invasion of the Gallipoli peninsula too. For me it gets the British into a war where Belgium was not invaded, another path to the abyss. The Great Powers had complex and cross-cutting interests as well as relations with both Greece and the Ottomans. But I do not see the alliances shifting much. Britain is caught in the cross fire as patron to both Navies. Germany is more mixed, good relations with the Greek King but heavy ties to the Ottomans who make a better ally on paper. France is invested in both, has been sinking a lot into the Greeks, might love to see the Ottomans dismembered. Russia wants the Straights so likely sides with the Greeks. A-H might see a good cover to take out Serbia. All the usual suspects have irons in the fire. If anything the diplomacy is even murkier than was in July.

So if I wind out the July Crisis to being averted and things look defused, the Greeks might just rekindle a very fresh fire. This is why I find 1914 so dangerous, that Summer was primed to release these powers all in fear of missing the fading chance to achieve victory over their enemies. I find that impulse, to vanquish their foes, to be what let July spin so far beyond what anyone assumed. Russia loomed large in all estimates, Germany appeared weak enough, France saw herself loosing the moment to redeem herself, Russia felt it must act or forever be regarded the fool, and the British had flirted with the tar baby and was stuck to the aspirations of France just as her reasons to do so were about to change again. We needed to get past this generation and all they thought they knew. That takes you to the 1930s or 1940s. Who knows what 1915 might have brought if 1914 had not shattered. To get the Great War averted is never an easy thing, the knot lays in this Summer of 1914, if one sword fails I find another to cut it.
 
Although it's certainly plausible to see war resulting from an assassination attempt on Wilhelm II, it's not clear who would do it. Germany doesn't have the same oppressed ethnic groups with foreign support a la in the Balkans, the political groups like communists and anarchists similarly aren't backed by other major powers, and none of the other major powers would have any interest in trying to kill him themselves.

Foreign support would be an useful ingredient here, but it's not necessary. It's enough if the German government believes the Polish gunman (or whoever) had foreign support. Or that it sees the war as desirable, and jumps on the excuse.
 
Hmmm... I'm not very well versed re: the Great War despite my deep knowledge of history.

Perhaps (another idea here), somehow Italy & the Ottomans get into a minor conflict that spreads and grows into the Great War.

Not sure how a fight between Italy & the Turks could spread... so if anyone has an idea about this (pro or con) explain to me.

If not Italy vs. Turkey or the failed assassination of Kaiser Wilhelm II, then what else could be the trigger that ignites the powder keg?

Joho :)
 
Hmmm... I'm not very well versed re: the Great War despite my deep knowledge of history.

Perhaps (another idea here), somehow Italy & the Ottomans get into a minor conflict that spreads and grows into the Great War.

Not sure how a fight between Italy & the Turks could spread... so if anyone has an idea about this (pro or con) explain to me.

If not Italy vs. Turkey or the failed assassination of Kaiser Wilhelm II, then what else could be the trigger that ignites the powder keg?

Joho :)

Austro-Hungarian civil war over continuation of the Ausgleich?
 
How about a situation where a near assassination of Kaiser Wilhelm II takes place, he survives and unfortunately so does his assassin. The assassin is found out to be a member of (fill in the ethno/political group) this in turn leads to an escalation of events that brings on the Great War.

Joho :)

I think this is plausible. Suppose-

IOTL, WWI was touched off when Frank Ferdinand was assassinated by Gavrilo Princip of the Serbian
terrorist organization The Black Hand in Sarajevo. But suppose FF got back to Vienna safe &
sound- & IOTL he was shot only because his chauffeur, in what should be regarded as one of the
great traffic accidents of history, made a wrong turn & drove FF's car right to where Princip was standing. The Black Hand would then have to decide what to do next. Germany was Austria-
Hungary's chief- really, only- friend(& Wilhelm & FF were good friends too). The Black Hand could
quite logically conclude that if Wilhelm was removed the AH-Germany alliance could be weakened
& maybe even destroyed. This would weaken A-H- & as far as TBH was concerned, anything that
weakened A-H was good. So they try to assassinate Wilhelm but fail(I'm sure his security was a LOT
better than FF's), the would-be assassin(s) are caught, talk, & implicate Serbia. Enraged Wilhelm- who generally did not have a very calm tempermant- either invades Serbia outright or does what IOTL A-H
did to Serbia in July 1914- present them with a # of demands that are so extreme Serbia cannot
agree to them & must refuse, even though doing so means war. This of course enrages Russia, which
in this ATL as well as IOTL, regarded itself as Serbia's protector. They would tell Germany to cease &
desist. Germany would refuse, A-H would stand by her, Russia's ally France would regard a German
attack on Russia as an attack on her and--- Well, the rest is obvious.
 
If you read a good survey book on pre-1914 diplomatic history, like Margaret Macmillan's The Road to 1914, it's clear that there were plenty of military or diplomatic crises in the leadup to 1914 that could have at least theoretically spun out into actual great power combat...
Honestly this is what I thought this thread would be about, based on the title; taking any of the non-Balkan based crises prior to 1914 (e.g. the Agadir Crisis) as the start of a war, and discussing how said war would shake out. Would that be on topic here?
 
If you read a good survey book on pre-1914 diplomatic history, like Margaret Macmillan's The Road to 1914, it's clear that there were plenty of military or diplomatic crises in the leadup to 1914 that could have at least theoretically spun out into actual great power combat, not least of which was that there really was a Balkan war a couple years prior. It's equally clear that had things gone a little differently, 1914 might have been like the other crises -- resolved tensely, reluctantly, but resolved somehow -- and, for one reason or other, just wasn't. So I'm reluctant to dismiss it entirely. Britain is at least theoretically involved as an arms dealer, or rather battleship dealer. Who can say what might happen after 1914 if not overtaken by events elsewhere?

I agree entirely. Pre-1914 was absolutely chock full of near-wars between the Great Power alliances. IIRC, 1911 was the closest to actually breaking out into war and Germany was very much caught off-gaurd by how bellicose Britain was in the diplomatic maneuvring. Previously they had expected Britain to be a restraining force on French aggressiveness, when in actual fact they were completely the opposite and encouraged France to take an aggressive position. But I think the crises most important to understanding 1914 are Bosnia in 1908 and Serbia in 1912 because they're functionally dry runs of 1914. By looking at those two, we can see what was different in 1914 that lead to war. Specifically, I think the critical difference is that Russia felt it had backed down in the Balkans too many times and needed to push or risk losing the ability to defend its interests in the region and that Austria had just seen military escalation be an effective tactic and thought Russia would respond similarly again.

So I agree that fundamentally there's nothing to prevent an earlier crisis from escalating if different decisions are made or to prevent 1914 from being diffused if earlier patterns are followed.

Honestly this is what I thought this thread would be about, based on the title; taking any of the non-Balkan based crises prior to 1914 (e.g. the Agadir Crisis) as the start of a war, and discussing how said war would shake out. Would that be on topic here?
While it seems to me to be the OP's perogative to decide that, I'd be interested in discussing that subject either on here or on a dedicated thread.
 
I agree entirely. Pre-1914 was absolutely chock full of near-wars between the Great Power alliances. IIRC, 1911 was the closest to actually breaking out into war and Germany was very much caught off-gaurd by how bellicose Britain was in the diplomatic maneuvring. Previously they had expected Britain to be a restraining force on French aggressiveness, when in actual fact they were completely the opposite and encouraged France to take an aggressive position. But I think the crises most important to understanding 1914 are Bosnia in 1908 and Serbia in 1912 because they're functionally dry runs of 1914. By looking at those two, we can see what was different in 1914 that lead to war. Specifically, I think the critical difference is that Russia felt it had backed down in the Balkans too many times and needed to push or risk losing the ability to defend its interests in the region and that Austria had just seen military escalation be an effective tactic and thought Russia would respond similarly again.

So I agree that fundamentally there's nothing to prevent an earlier crisis from escalating if different decisions are made or to prevent 1914 from being diffused if earlier patterns are followed.


While it seems to me to be the OP's perogative to decide that, I'd be interested in discussing that subject either on here or on a dedicated thread.
Actually France didn't want war in 1911: in a private conversation (found in Joffre's memoirs and confirmed by Conte, his biographer in 1991), Caillaux asked France's odds during a war with Germany. Joffre bluntly told to Caillaux that the odds to win a war against Germany were far lower than 70%, meaning they couldn't won. To this, Caillaux immediately replied: "Alright, then we will negociate".
So it was more direct British support which convinced France to negociate with a seemingly firm stance. Without British support, France would have accepted a more balanced compromise.
 
Actually France didn't want war in 1911: in a private conversation (found in Joffre's memoirs and confirmed by Conte, his biographer in 1991), Caillaux asked France's odds during a war with Germany. Joffre bluntly told to Caillaux that the odds to win a war against Germany were far lower than 70%, meaning they couldn't won. To this, Caillaux immediately replied: "Alright, then we will negociate".
So it was more direct British support which convinced France to negociate with a seemingly firm stance. Without British support, France would have accepted a more balanced compromise.
I wasn't aware of that, very interesting and it does add nuance to France's position in 1911. Thank you!
 
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