Different Navy in the 70s
- Thread starter Peg Leg Pom
- Start date
I do agree on service life, but British procurement time does indicate longer time from concept to service than you think. Let's see:
EE Lightning - Operational requirement in 1947 - In service December 1959
Blackburn Buccaneer - OR in 1952 - Into service in 1962 (satisfactory model in 1965)
Hawker Siddeley Harrier - OR in 1957 - Into service in 1969
De Havilland Sea Vixen - OR in 1949 - Into service in 1959 (satisfactory variant in 1964)
The problem seems, for layman like me, to be far too many types to develop...
AST.403 which eventually gave us the Typhoon was initially published in 1979 - 25 years to get a plane!! As aircraft complexity has increased, time to service has also increased, and the complexity model is exponential. At the same time, the R&D costs are increased so the same amount of money has to be spread about fewer projects.
If the Navy of today could do with Fairey Swordfish, then no doubt BAE SYstems could get it into service within a year...!
P1154 was due into service in 1968, and as with the Harrier, appropriate systems and materials upgrades could have kept the basic configuration flying for 50 years. However, which weapons would the P1154 be using to defend the fleet...hence the purchase of the Phantom.
If the Navy of today could do with Fairey Swordfish, then no doubt BAE SYstems could get it into service within a year...!
P1154 was due into service in 1968, and as with the Harrier, appropriate systems and materials upgrades could have kept the basic configuration flying for 50 years. However, which weapons would the P1154 be using to defend the fleet...hence the purchase of the Phantom.
AST.403 which eventually gave us the Typhoon was initially published in 1979 - 25 years to get a plane!! As aircraft complexity has increased, time to service has also increased, and the complexity model is exponential. At the same time, the R&D costs are increased so the same amount of money has to be spread about fewer projects.
If the Navy of today could do with Fairey Swordfish, then no doubt BAE SYstems could get it into service within a year...!
P1154 was due into service in 1968, and as with the Harrier, appropriate systems and materials upgrades could have kept the basic configuration flying for 50 years. However, which weapons would the P1154 be using to defend the fleet...hence the purchase of the Phantom.
If the Navy of today could do with Fairey Swordfish, then no doubt BAE SYstems could get it into service within a year...!
P1154 was due into service in 1968, and as with the Harrier, appropriate systems and materials upgrades could have kept the basic configuration flying for 50 years. However, which weapons would the P1154 be using to defend the fleet...hence the purchase of the Phantom.
So we definitely don't buy Clems, right? Right?
If CVA-01 is the largest they could go, what makes a minimum they would be prepared to drop to to please the treasury (insane cut for no gain)?
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Well there it is then. A smaller, but still large 48,000 ton carrier seems more likely to be accepted.
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I reckon this site is pretty much the best for CVA 01, http://frn.beedall.com/cva01.htm.
It wasn't that Treasury wanted it to cost XX pounds less, it was a drama across the entire political spectrum.
Jukra, those OR/service dates you mention encompas periods where the UK aviation industry was ravaged twice by govt, once in the later 40s and then again a decade later. In addition the same timeframe was a period of massive change in the aviation world, the USN intorduced all sorts of wierd ad wonderful things like the Tiger, Cutlass, Demon alongside classics like the A4 and F8. I doesn't surprise me that with so much meddling during such a fluid period planes were slow to arrive, I'd suggest that with solid govt support and clear targets such timeframes would be shorter. In addition money was wasted on pieces of shit like the Seamew, WTF was that about?
It wasn't that Treasury wanted it to cost XX pounds less, it was a drama across the entire political spectrum.
Jukra, those OR/service dates you mention encompas periods where the UK aviation industry was ravaged twice by govt, once in the later 40s and then again a decade later. In addition the same timeframe was a period of massive change in the aviation world, the USN intorduced all sorts of wierd ad wonderful things like the Tiger, Cutlass, Demon alongside classics like the A4 and F8. I doesn't surprise me that with so much meddling during such a fluid period planes were slow to arrive, I'd suggest that with solid govt support and clear targets such timeframes would be shorter. In addition money was wasted on pieces of shit like the Seamew, WTF was that about?
I would not be THAT certain and this is a pun not against just BaE but all the defense contractors worldwide...
The key is, was due into service. Every post-war aircraft project, in every country, has been severely late and with British track record up to 1968 I see no reason why P.1154 would be any different.
The 1960's were a period of change too, although at this time the focus was turning from airframes to avionics. After all, 50's Phantom, Mirage, MiG-21 or Draken could be well fitted with todays avionics and would be, if not terrific at least very adequate fighters.
The Soviet Mole!
But let's consider, with all the hindsight, a minimum route of British carrier aircraft up to late 1960's:1945: Seafire fighter, Firefly strike / ASW / night fighter
Early 1950's: P.1052 strike / night fighter / day fighter; Gannet AEW / ASW
Early 1960's: Add Buccaneer for strike, supersonic fighter for fleet air defense...
Additionally, for early 1950's, any British naval jet fighter would actually do quite well as long as there was concentration on one type, whether Sea Hawk, P.1052 or Sea Venom, which would bring the aircraft type to service in time, in sufficient numbers and in large enough numbers to guarantee avionics upgrades.
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One route not mentioned yet which might guarantee the British carriers... How about surface mounted Polaris missiles? Instead of putting Polaris missiles on single-purpose SSBN's, how about mounting them on A) Surface ships which would travel with a British carrier task force or B) Carriers themselves?
After all, with A-3 Polaris a British carrier task force, travelling either in Arabian Sea, North Atlantic or the Mediterranean would be able to fire Polaris missiles on Soviet strategic targets. This would create a requirement for four carrier task forces (three to guarantee one on patrol, one to guarantee deployable task force), but inserting the cost savings due to lack of Resolution-class might just be feasible. This should probably require a precedent, ie. British nuclear deterrence mounted on carrier based bombers during 1950's. This would naturally make military sense, would be feasible etc. but would mean bad things for RAF and the V-bombers and thus is not doable.
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The aviation industry does go through boom and bust with the cycle of warfare, and it seems to me that it's the government that always gets the blame whilst the aviation industry assume state aid in the lean periods. For any aviation collector, the variety of products made by Avro is staggering - their billiard tables are still around!!
The reason behind this is that the military procurers want leading edge technology that only exists in the research field. The aerospace companies have to make these ideas operationally feasible.
Back to topic, there are lots of aspects to the procurement decisions. The state of the British economy in the 1960s (i.e. bankrupt) was key. However the change in nuclear strike away from V Bombers and Buccaneers to ICBMs meant that we did not need strike carriers or strategic bombers if our military/foreign policy was singly focused on war with the USSR.
No it wouldn't. Maybe for the US as an additional nuclear arm, but not the UK.
That was actually touted by some nations, but makes them pretty much as vulnerable as land-based silos (the design of which the UK pioneered and subsequently passed on this to the US and A) since they're more vulnerable to attack, even if harder to attack because they're more mobile.
It would also tie down an expensive surface ship to deterrent patrols rather than other duties - and would, of course, always require a substantial escort. This would actually cut into hull numbers available for other duties, in peace or war.
A naval commander should always be willing to risk losing ships and one could hardly do this if it maintained 1/4 (total?) of the available UK deterrent arsenal: if the fleet needed to go very close to a hostile coastline, under air/missile threat to complete its mission. (It would be like using an SSBN on a deterrent patrol for inserting special forces on an enemy coastline.)
It would also tie the UK to firing its nuclear arsenal early rather than risk losing it conventionally; having SSBNs largely precludes this because they can be kept alone, hidden and safe until - and if - required. And they're generally cheaper to crew and operate.
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Boom and bust; lots of new white goods and other luxuries, like cars and foreign holidays, became affordable; in comparison to post-war years' dirge-like existence was an aspirational time.
Not that they dealt with the unions or any other economic problems on the horizon, such as foreign competition undercutting British heavy industry.
The Buccaneer was armed with a nuclear bomb that it could toss in the air before bugging out. I doubt that this would work as the sole nuclear capability, however. It maybe a cheap option, but it lacks the certainty that a strategic response requires. More of a operational capability that we wouldn't use. Waste of money really. The Chicken Bombs in Germany are a better bet. Just enough of a trip wire to slow the Russian advance and escalate to strategic weapons without the expense of the BAOR.
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While putting Polaris on board surface ships would mostly serve purpose of having more carriers, what I meant is that in it's first stage British nuclear deterrent would have been much better served by putting the nuclear weapons on board carriers instead of having them on V-bombers. That was due to low availability of V-bombers and difficult and long preparation of nuclear weapons themselves. British nuclear deterrent was in no way credible, especially as soon as V-bomber force was operational the Soviet IRBM's and SLBM's were too. Of course this did not mean much as Britain was married to the US anyway.
As for putting Polaris missiles on board carriers, while carrier task force is easier to detect than a SSBN, it's also much harder to strike against.
In comparison to Polaris, a carrier based bomber lacks certainty, but compared to V-bomber force, to which Britain was married until the US cancelled Skybolt, a carrier based force is a much more credible deterrent...
For quite a long time, I'd suppose. With Polaris A-3 range the Soviet Naval Aviation or submarine force would have been quite hard pressed to eliminate the carriers as they could operate quite far away from Soviet Union (Arabian sea, Mediterranean, North Atlantic). When you throw in the fact that Soviet Union was challenged at sea not only by quality but in practice also by quantity (due to low serviceability rates) the task would have been very difficult. Sure, surface Polaris missiles would not have been dead-sure as the SSBN's, but almost sure by themselves.
As for SSBN's, compared to SSBN the ability of a carrier strike group to evade and destroy a possible SSN tasked to destroy it would have been far greater due to longer contact range and ability to connect to data networks and ability to detach units to investigate and kill the contact (In my layman's thought I'd imagine SSBN would destroy a pursuer only as a very last resort).
If it was one or so older Soviet SSN, perhaps, but the Soviets had a habit of trailing NATO carrier groups continuously in peacetime, just waiting for the order to attack. Of course, this was a double-edged approach since they were frequently detected (or seen overtly) doing this, but it was a constant source of concern.
Imagine everytime your deterrent putting to sea, it's trailed quite openly by a Kirov Class cruiser and a couple of SSNs (which you might or might not detect). Not very comforting.
And, of course, the threat posed by Soviet submarines running across the group and being able to strike would've been significant; to say nothing of long-range bombers.
If just one nuclear torpedo was fired at the group in time it could do a huge amount of damage; to say nothing of any other subsequent attacks.
And SSBNs really only have other weapons as a defence against a pursuer they can't get rid of (or for hunting when their missiles have all gone).