I recall, Zod, that Dewey was very hawkish compared to Truman.
No contest about that. I was not assuming he would be dovish.
I suggest that D-Day would get delayed if it were highly apparent that Germany simply had too many forces on the French Coastline.
Granted, it might be simply delayed until they develop the nukes. That's fairly possible. The delay might cause political problems (Roosevelt loses the election if Salerno failed and D-Day never happens or is a bloody failure too). And the lack of a second front till mid-1945 makes the relatively quick exaustion of Soviet manpower resources and a separate peace between Germany and the USSR in 1944 all the more probable.
It's much more likely (but not certain) to fail if the Germans are faring fine on the Eastern Front and have plenty of reserves available, no matter the Allied air superiority.
but let's not forget who declared war upon whom. Japan didn't even bother declaring war before attacking; Hitler DoWed the United States, and he DoWed Poland.
Indeed British will to fight is rather more likely to collapse than American one if the D-Day fails. They have fought much longer and sacrificed rather more.
Meanwhile, Germany has utterly screwed the pooch in the eyes of the United Kingdom--how many bloody defeats have they already suffered? The Loss of France? The Capture of Singapore? A disaster in Normandy might topple Churchill's government. But there are no prominent doves in 1944 OTL and so this strikes me as blatantly ASB.
Let's not forget that Churchill barely survived votes of no confidence in 1942 over defeats in North Africa and South East Asia, so the appeal of Churchill and his hold on the public and Parliament is not limitless. American support is a powerful point for Churchill but if repeated attempts to land in Europe (Italy, France) fail with heavy casualties, popular confidence in his war policy might just collapse. If there is a severe grassroots crisis of confidence, some public figure might well rise to represent it and fill hte political vacuum. Again, the crisis of confidence could be avoided if the public knew about the nuclear program but the government would be loathe to divulge the news for obvious reasons (although the likelihood that Germany would be able to build nukes in a year if given a definite hint about their existence is indeed very low, but the Allies overvalued German nuclear program).
Stalin's valuation of his population can be confirmed to be zero. Hardcore ASB in the opposite direction. This is a guy who has already had female air force pilots in the war and deliberately starved millions for political power. I think Stalin will accept "Economic Damage" to kill Germany at incredible price. More plausible that he totally racks out his manpower than he decides to yield personal power. Of course, he could be removed...
Sorry, I fear I misexplained my point here. Even if Stalin indeed values his population subzero, there are some very hard economic and demographic limits he can't break, no matter how much brutality he employs. If male manpower reserves are all but exausted and he starts recruiting females en masse (some female pilots aren't a problem but we are talking about replenishing the ranks of the land forces), the industrial production, food availability, and the efficiency of most services is going to plummet exponentially as he drafts the last remaining work force of substantial size. No Sonia the Riveter, no war production. The Stavka can extend the war effort for a couple months running on stockpiles, but afterwards it's over. Time for an armistice. Consuming the last troops manning the front in further offensives means you lose the war because you have either no more reserves or no more weapons.
The nukes are several years in the future for Stalin so he hasn't that option. When he racks the bottom of the manpower barrel he must cut the losses and make peace, no matter his dreams of conquest. If the Germans use the backhand blow and adopt elastic defense throughout, they gain at least one year of spared resources, and the Soviets consume theirs proportionally faster, which means the Soviets are hit by manpower crisis in mid-late 1944, and someplace between the Dneiper and the prewar border. The Soviets may bargain for the restoration of 1941 borders if they fared especially good, or be forced to accept 1939 ones if they fared relatively poorly, but conquest of Central and Eastern Europe is impossible.
Dominating Peace Lobby 1945 is ASB. If you insist on repeated failed invasions, I suppose you are referring to something like 1946-7 or later.
A failed D-Day in 1944 or 1945 (if it's delayed and they choose to use the first nukes on Japan) might indeed happen, but IMO after the first failure, if the peace faction doesn't materialize they simply wait for the nukes in 1945 or 1946. After the first nukes are revealed, a crisis of confidence won't happen. However, if they fail in Italy AND France, I doubt they are going to try a conventional invasion again with larger forces the following year. The likely butcher bill would be just too unpopular.
And removing Hitler from power is questionable at best. Remember who had the upper hand in OTL Valkerie. The assumption that Hitler would be deposed by the army is not sustainable--it certainly could happen, but it would be foolish to assume that this is the likely outcome.
Even most of the Japanese leadership accepted surrender after two nukes and on average they were rather more fanatical than the German leadership. How many of the latter are really so fanatical as to accept total nuclear destruction of the Fatherland ? This is no figthing conventioanl warfare to the last man, nuclear bombing makes you completely and obviosuly hopeless if you can't retaliate. Valkirie did fail for a matter of inches. I simply can't see the vast majority of the Generals and even many sane Nazi top echelons willing to follow the Fuhrer in nuclear incineration of Germany.
German nukes are ASB in one year;
I would certainly not argue on this, and as a matter of fact never did.
probably ASB even after five years of knowing of their power.
About this, instead I'm not so sure. It's ASB in five years if you have to start from scratch. The Germans surely did not in 1944-45. They had a working program, sure it had taken some dead ends, it not not have that much interest and support from the supreme politicl leadership and the committment of the program head was mostly dubious. But all these factors are removed or strongly diminished overnight when definitive proof exists that such weapons work.
And Nerve Gas is not a MAD deterrent--the introduction of chemical weapons CAN NOT possibly favor the Reich over the Allies.
You nuke my cities, I gas your own. Why isn't a MAD deterrent ? MAD is not about getting a favourable position, it's inflicting comparable horrendous damage to the enemy.
My problem here, Zod, is that the Allies are not going to run out of steam in 1945--there were no massive peace demonstrations, there was no massive internal struggles to continue the war.
The landings in Italy and France were not bloody failures.
Defeat in Normandy means the Allies gear up for a still larger operation.
Hmm, about this I'm deeply doubtful. Remember, the projected losses from landings in Japan were deeply controversial, and the American people was rather more committed to get Tojo's scalp than Hitler's. If D-Day is a massive bloody failure, assuming no popular crisis of confidence materializes, IMO a new attempt with ever larger forces would be too unpopular and controversial. And likely bound to fail again anyway.
They squat down in Britain and North Africa, maybe go on with some conventional bombing (of ever decreasing effectiveness as the German jet fighters go into line) and wait for the nukes. Of course, as long as it's just 2-3 nukes available for the European theater, there's the definite possibility they can't being them across German anti-air defenses.
The Allies are going to be in the fight until at least 1947--and by that point you are looking at dozens of nuclear weapons getting used against the Axis powers.
And that would be endgame. With that many nukes, at least an handful makes through German anti-air defenses, and it's too early for Germany to have developed their own.
Hitler lets his generals fight their war in Russia (NOT the same as favoring a Backhand Blow in Russia.) Low chances.
Yep, but not impossible, and by doing both, he can bleed Stalin to a draw on the Eastern front even if he missed the chance for total or decisive victory in 1941-42. Conceded it's a low-probability outcome but it's the basis of the scenario.
Stalin sues for peace because he'd rather concede industry and territory rather than suffer damage to the same: Extreme Longshot.
No, he's forced to because he has exausted the manpower resources available and can't drain on more without completely wrecking his war economy, a lose-lose situation that even the most ruthless dictator can't sidestep by more brutality.