Different IJN-IJA strategic decisions in the Guadalcanal?

Now, the following is NOT a war-winner for Imperial Japan.

One of the recurring comments on IJN-IJA reaction on Guadalcanal is that instead of making decisive contributions to the battle the forces were committed in driblets.

What if Guadalcanal is recognized not as a raid, but an attempt of takeover and the IJN-IJA recognizes that here's a good chance to destroy a significant portion of the USN, not in a decisive battle with forces evenly matched but by attrition? Attrition is NOT a war-winner, but will have a chance of delaying inevitable USN offensive significantly.
 
Last edited:
It might actually delay the end of the war a bit...if only because with a faster Japanese buildup they might actually take Guadalcanal - which would (ironically) deprive the US of their best training ground for the pilot trainers of later in the war.

The pilots that survived the early battles over Guadalcanal were the core of the later trainers and leadership of the massive air forces that the US built up in 1944-45. Without that training the US air forces would have been less ready to handle the Japanese navy at the battles later in the war.

Same augment for navy but a bit less so for ground troops.
 
Top