Different German Rearmament

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date
1. Contemporary sources say Luleå was closed for 18-20 weeks a year, not 12.

2. There were other ports, too, mainly Oxelösund. However, the British Admiralty assessed in 1939 that this latter port could handle no more than 20% of the iron ore Germany imported from Sweden. It was mainly used for the shipments from other iron-producing regions.

3. From 1939 to 1944, at a time when the British where sending submarines and Coastal Command bombers along the Norwegian coast, both to directly attack freighters and to leave mines behind, the Germans kept using Narvik. On average, 20.1% of the Swedish iron ore going to Germany in those years went through Narvik. This implied, BTW, repairing those damages you quoted.

There's a technical solution to those problems available at fairly small cost - that is running icebreaker service convoys. Ships will need to be somewhat higher technical standard, but the problems won't be insurmountable at all.

That would, however, require some crash industrial effort and long term planning and some time, perhaps a year, all these weren't easy to do in Third Reich.
 
Well, if there is no Norway, we might have the UK support Finland against the Soviets and all of the ramifications that might cause; indeed, if the UK decides to bomb Baku, as was planned, WW2 just became a Triangular war...
I don't believe in Triangular War. It would be just Britons chumming up with Nazi and slowly bringing USA in. Just your old school Anti-Communist Crusade...
 
Would it be possible to achieve more or less all the important stuff the Kriegsmarine achieved OTL with less resources?

important AFAIK:
(...)
-capable of invading Norway/Denmark
(...)

Wouldn't the Germans be capable of achieving this without having the pocketbattleships, the heavy cruisers, a pair of battlecruisers AND a battleship building program?
(...)

Still, wouldn't the Germans be better off then?

Read post #3. It specifies how many of the ships you don't want were heavily damaged or sunk during OTL's Weserübung. It shows, IMHO, that attempting the Norwegian operation with anything less than what the Germans had in OTL means an extremely high likelihood of utter failure.

Given what the Germans had in OTL after the Norwegian invasion and what they had lost there, if by some miracle they carry off the Norwegian operation with much less, then they will be left with positively nothing - IOW no Seelöwe threat.
 
Read post #3. It specifies how many of the ships you don't want were heavily damaged or sunk during OTL's Weserübung. It shows, IMHO, that attempting the Norwegian operation with anything less than what the Germans had in OTL means an extremely high likelihood of utter failure.

Given what the Germans had in OTL after the Norwegian invasion and what they had lost there, if by some miracle they carry off the Norwegian operation with much less, then they will be left with positively nothing - IOW no Seelöwe threat.

My bad, I thought the PBB's weren't used during the Norway campaign, but I was wrong. The BC's are also needed, or the Germans will lose even more destroyers against amongst others Renown and the British wouldn't lose Glorious then.

Ehrr, anyways, you could still skip the battleships and win Weserübung?
;)
 
My bad, I thought the PBB's weren't used during the Norway campaign, but I was wrong. The BC's are also needed, or the Germans will lose even more destroyers against amongst others Renown and the British wouldn't lose Glorious then.

Ehrr, anyways, you could still skip the battleships and win Weserübung?
;)

I don't know; I wouldn't bet on that, considering how a close-run thing it was with everything the Kriegsmarine had, being thrown at it.
That said, of course the very fact that it was a close-run thing, a high-risk, high-yield gamble, and that the German leadership was not averse to that kind of risks... sometimes the unlikely happens.

But if it happens in this case, at a minimum _all_ (or, let's say, 95%) of that reduced Kriegsmarine gets sunk or heavily damaged for Norway. Which in turn means nobody believes Seelöwe is anything but an empty threat, a bluff. This in itself has heavy consequences. The British are not afraid of sending more troops in North Africa, and maybe this time around they manage to drive onto Tripoli. A year later, the Soviets won't believe the German Heer is still preparing for an invasion of Britain or for being redeployed in the Mediterranean…
 
Well what about the bigger picture?

Say for instance the Kreigsmarine is a non factor as it would be in this TL, keeping that in mind perhaps Hitler would just use what he had to keep the British at bay while he fought the Russians. I'm pretty sure that the Germans never really considered Sealion a realistic possibility at least in the short term. Also lets say the British and French still lose all their heavy equipment at Dunkirk, as such they would still need American lend lease aid to help out in their resupply and would be delayed in any attempt to retake France. So in the meanwhile the British have more to play with as far as their navy goes, and so they send their warships off to the Pacific to deal with the Japanese. How would that effect the war in the Pacific? Is it possible that the Japanese would forget about attacking Pearl Harbor? After all the attack was only meant to delay American intervention into their business long enough to secure the resources they needed to complete their plans. With a Royal Navy on their backs the American Pacific fleet becomes a nonissue since the Imperial Navy already has a major naval confrontation on their hands with the British now.

So at this point the US isn't entering the war at least not as early as in OTL, and also the British are pretty much concentrating all their ground forces on fighting the Russians. With the extra divisions on their side they might have been able to take down the Russians. Also as much as Churchill despised Hitler he might have been willing to sit things out for the time being. Stalin was the only guy who the western allies feared anywhere near as much as they did Hitler, given the chance to let the two of them slug it out and then facing a weakened victor might be a possibility. Plus with no USA fighting along side them the ability for the Allies to actually launch a land invasion of continental Europe was pretty far fetched for the forseeable future. Although the British wouldn't have faired any worse in this TL you might see a drastically different outcome in Russia and the Pacific.

As far as actually joining the Germans against the Russians, i find that hightly unlikely for Churchill or any PM to do at this point. I mean Hitler had broken pretty much every international agreement he made aside from the tri-partide act, there would be no way anybody would trust him not to turn on them as soon as the dust settled with the Russians.
 

Deleted member 1487

But consider too what the benefits would be to the Germans to have these extra resources at their disposal. They would have a heavy bomber fleet that would be able to retaliate against the British, probably at night just like the RAF. This would tie down British resources that they otherwise would be using towards their bomber fleets. This could also be useful in the East against Russian cities like Moscow, Leningrad and Baku.
 
the British are pretty much concentrating all their ground forces on fighting the Russians. .

You mean the Germans are concentrating on fighting the Soviets.
Anyway, what extra divisions?

In June 1941, 145 German divisions of all stripes were in the East, either directly under the Heeresgruppen or as OKH reserves.
Then there were 8 divisions between the Balkans and Denmark, the mere minimum for garrison duties (even too few in the Balkans actually).
12 were in Norway, but of these, some 5 were actually going to attack the Soviet Union. The others were for garrison.
2 plus bits were in North Africa. The reason why they were there was that otherwise, an Italian defeat there seemed quite possible. And BTW, that is the theater the British will consider their main theater of operations. Abandoning it to the Italians only is not necessarily the best course of action.
This leaves just 38 divisions in the West (France, Holland, Belgium). These are all strictly infantry divisions; the best of them have been stripped of most of their experienced personnel, vehicles and artillery. Then 7 of them are 15. Welle divisions.

Now a part of these 38 foot divisions are certainly needed for mere garrison duties. A part might be considered as part of a continuing Seelöwe bluff, and therefore sent East instead if the bluff is unsustainable due to a complete shortage of a Kriegsmarine. How many? 15? Will 15 low-quality, no-mobility infantry divisions really make a difference in the East, apart from increasing the logistical burden for the Germans?

Last but not least, no Kriegsmarine means that those garrisons are not just needed to guard those ungrateful French and Dutch and Belgians. No Kriegsmarine means no traffic in the Continent-British Isles direction, but what about the reverse? The British still have a Royal Navy. In OTL, they staged a commando operation in Norway in December 1941. It was a minor raid, but within its limitations it was a great success, and what's more, it spurred Hitler to worry about Norway and to increase the garrison there. In this ATL, with no Kriegsmarine to worry about _and_ a reduced occupation force in the West? I think the British commandos will have a field day. Not that their raids can achieve victory on their own, but surely will have the Germans think again and send back troops from the East along those exposed coastlines… anything to relieve our brave Soviet allies.

All of that, without taking into account that no Kriegsmarine, as already mentioned, may give Norway to the British. If so, not only the iron ore shipments from Sweden to Germany will be more difficult. There are a host of other consequences. For instance, on the one hand the Germans can spare some 7 garrison divisions in Norway – but they will need them to strengthen the Danish occupation force, and the German coasts themselves. Otherwise, with no Kriegsmarine, the British raids will be far too easy from Southern Norway against Denmark – and maybe Germany. Another thing is no threat against Murmansk: the Soviet troops in the area can be used against the Finns only. If the British deploy bombers in Oslo, then the bad news for Rostock and other Baltic cities begin earlier than in OTL. There will be some advantages for the Germans, too; in OTL, they spent a lot to make Norway their occupation show case, and they will not have that problem in this ATL. But all in all, I don't see it as a gain for them.
 
But consider too what the benefits would be to the Germans to have these extra resources at their disposal. They would have a heavy bomber fleet that would be able to retaliate against the British, probably at night just like the RAF.

Certainly at night, otherwise they are slaughtered. You mean they will have this heavy bomber fleet by late 1942, right?
 

Redbeard

Banned
The British during WWII calculated that the total cost of building and running one battleship was equivalent of building and running a force of 40 twin engine bombers (mentioned in Churchill’s memoirs, and referred to in D.K. Brown’s ”From Nelson to Vanguard”). So never laying down Tirpitz and Bismarck would only increase the German bomber force with about 100 planes (incorporating that B & T were bigger and probably more expensive than a British BB) – hardly enough to change the outcome of any significant campaign. IIRC 1200 twin engine bombers were available for Battle of Britain in OTL. As others have already said strategic bombing anyway was doubtful as a war winning instrument, and certainly would require much more.
If placing PoDs in the Luftwaffe I would rather suggest a focus on co-operation with the Kriegsmarine. If the Luftwaffe by 1939-40 has a respectable naval strike capacity (i.e. training a number of bomber squadrons in torpedobombing) that might provide a small window of opportunity for a slightly plausible Sea Lion – or at least grind down the RN enough to produce a peace with GB.
What must not be interfered with is the Luftwaffe’s primary focus on army co-operation – without that the Wehrmacht probably loose in France 1940 latest (might take a beating already in Poland).
All in all I think the consequences of a smaller Kriegsmarine will mainly be felt in the Far East. Without a German surface fleet to worry about the RN can well before 1941 place a truly deterrent force in Singapore. Japan is in deep trouble and the British empire will probably last a number of decades longer. Without a Kriegsmarine to keep part of the RN occupied I even doubt if Mussolini will be so eager to join Hitler – that will just reinforce Japan’s trouble.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 

burmafrd

Banned
I would SERIOUSLY question that only 40 twin engine bombers equal a BB in any respect. A BB has 40000 TONS of steel; 40 twin engine bombers maybe 800 AT most. The actual cost- NOT even CLOSE. You can build 40 bombers in ONE MONTH. IT takes a MINIMUM of 2 YEARS to build a BB.
 
I didn't say that the Kreigsmarine didn't exist I said it would be a non-factor, as in the Germans never try to build a significant surface fleet. I figured that even without Plan Z there would still be a significant U-boat force but the Germans just use it to hunt shipping and keep the British Navy busy. Also with the British engaging the Japanese in the Pacific it would preclude Pearl Harbor and thus keep the US out of the war. Without hopes of the US bolstering Allied troop levels or spearheading the offensives in Europe the British and free French would be alone against the Germans and would probably have favored attacking the "soft underbelly" of Europe in Italy as the British command did in OTL, and without extra US troops to fill out the ranks I seriously doubt that just the British and Free French could have mounted a second invasion in Northern France when they found themselves bogged down in Italy.

Also it's not just the troop numbers, but also without an Allied bombing campaign on the scale of OTL the German homefront isn't nearly as damaged as it was in OTL. The added resources might have been put toward new weapon research, and without ever having to fuel a large surface fleet Hitler(who often seemed to make decisions on a whim) might have decided to put off taking the caucusus oil fields and gone straight for Moscow instead. Keep in mind in OTL Moscow was defended by a relatively small force. As I recall they only had like 150 tanks and 90000 men to defend the city.
 

Deleted member 1487

I would assume the bombers are ready earlier if the Kriegsmarine was several ships light. The money and resources are spent on heavy bombers instead. As the German BB's and other ships that won't exist ITTL will not be laid down in 1936-39, the Heavy bombers could be ready by 1939-40, in numbers in excess of 150. Might that make a dent in London?
 
I didn't say that the Kreigsmarine didn't exist I said it would be a non-factor, as in the Germans never try to build a significant surface fleet. I figured that even without Plan Z there would still be a significant U-boat force but the Germans just use it to hunt shipping and keep the British Navy busy.

U-Boote still do not allow Weserübung.
Besides, British ASW assets are busy; battleships aren't.

Also with the British engaging the Japanese in the Pacific it would preclude Pearl Harbor and thus keep the US out of the war.

For some more months, that is. You are aware that the USA were in an undeclared shooting war with Germany in the Atlantic, that the policy of "Germany first" was framed _before_ December 1941, that the ABC I staff agreements had been signed in early 1941...

The Germans sink a couple more US destroyers, maybe a cruiser. Meanwhile the US armed forces have trained up and expanded. By mid-1942 the US public opinion has had enough and the USA can DoW on Germany.
 
I would assume the bombers are ready earlier if the Kriegsmarine was several ships light. The money and resources are spent on heavy bombers instead. As the German BB's and other ships that won't exist ITTL will not be laid down in 1936-39, the Heavy bombers could be ready by 1939-40, in numbers in excess of 150. Might that make a dent in London?

a) no, they might not. Look at how much it took to Bomber Command to make dents in German cities, bombing them at night for years with numbers much in excess of 150 and with navigation/targeting aids gradually becoming extremely better than what the Germans might have had in 1940.
b) the British were spending on the RAF like mad and had made a clear decision for strategic bombing early on. It still took them all those years from a 1936 specification to the first 1941-42ish 4-engined bombers. Please don't tell me "but the British were building warships". Yes they were, but roughly at the same time (1936-1938) they had, for all practical purposes, no army. What the Germans would spare in this ATL by not building warships, the British did spare in OTL by not building an army.
c) additionally, if the Germans don't build warships after 1936, the British can also cut down their plans. Less battleships is a sizable saving for the British, and French, too. Building more ASW assets to crush the German U-Boote early on, for instance, or more fighters.
 
I don't believe in Triangular War. It would be just Britons chumming up with Nazi and slowly bringing USA in. Just your old school Anti-Communist Crusade...

Just because you don't believe in it, doesn't mean it can't happen.

What you would need, then, is for Hitler to call off Case Gelb after Norway--but I think he would go ahead with that;

Then, in 1941, Hitler can be counted upon to hit a extremely distracted Soviet Union...
 

Redbeard

Banned
I would SERIOUSLY question that only 40 twin engine bombers equal a BB in any respect. A BB has 40000 TONS of steel; 40 twin engine bombers maybe 800 AT most. The actual cost- NOT even CLOSE. You can build 40 bombers in ONE MONTH. IT takes a MINIMUM of 2 YEARS to build a BB.


You are free to question whatever you like, but it wasn't a typo - a BB for 40 bombers.

And you SERIOUSLY can't compare cost across different items by just weighing things. Do you expect a ton of Rolex to cost the same as a ton of bicycles? ;)

Building and not at least maintaining a plane is a quite delicate matter, where shipsbuilding for a large part is rather crude. Anyway manning costs must have weighed heavy in the comparison and from what I know 3-4 bomber command squadrons would require manning comparable to a battleship crew. Next the calculation says building and RUNNING, which must mean that over a given time of operational action, more than 40 planes had been issued to the units to replace attrition. Similarily a BB of WWII was expected to spend something like 20-30% of the time in dock refitting and repairing. All in all the builder's pricetag on the weaponsystem only is a fraction of the total cost.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
c) additionally, if the Germans don't build warships after 1936, the British can also cut down their plans. Less battleships is a sizable saving for the British, and French, too. Building more ASW assets to crush the German U-Boote early on, for instance, or more fighters.

Good point, especially the French.

They were cashstrapped enough before WWII, if they don't have to build ships because the Germans aren't building any ships either they would have a lot of money to spend on their army instead.

The French could then easily skip some of the next:
-Dunkerque (1935)
-Strassbourg (1936)
-Richelieu (1939)
-Jean Bart (1940)
 
Look at the number of bombers the British deployed and lost against Germany in 40-41. Then consider the impact (or largely lack thereof) they had on the German economy.

100-150 strategic bombers designed in 36-38 are going to have almost no impact at all. They will simply be shot out of the sky. The interesting thing will be when, having got this far, the Luftwaffe press for the construction of thousands of these things, which will inevitably cost far more than a handful of capital ships and probably prove impossible, making the whole venture nothing more than a waste of time.
 
Look at the number of bombers the British deployed and lost against Germany in 40-41. Then consider the impact (or largely lack thereof) they had on the German economy.

100-150 strategic bombers designed in 36-38 are going to have almost no impact at all. They will simply be shot out of the sky. The interesting thing will be when, having got this far, the Luftwaffe press for the construction of thousands of these things, which will inevitably cost far more than a handful of capital ships and probably prove impossible, making the whole venture nothing more than a waste of time.

The question is whether the Luftwaffe is as stubborn as the RAF in insisting on daylight operations. Historically, without 4-engined bombers, they accepted night bombing way faster than Bomber Command did. I suspect they would with their 150 heavy bombers do exactly the same.
Night bombing with that strategic force would make it much less vulnerable to enemy fighters in the early war years - it would also make it not much more effective than having an additional 400 medium bombers.
 
Top