Different German machine gun philosophy for WW2

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Yet the Germans themselves were even dissatisfied with the squad abilities of the MG42 and ended up replacing it with the StG44 in their ideal planned squad (not that anything ever really reached planned TOE by mid-1944), relegating the belt fed MG to a platoon support weapon much like the modern US infantry doctrine.

Chroming barrels was something all sides were doing in WW2, but even the non-chromed barrels of the MG42 could handle several hundred rounds before needing to be switched out and that was at a very high rate of fire, which shortened the time between changeouts more than the same number of rounds from a low rate of fire weapon. Supposedly the Bren gunners didn't bother changing barrels, because the weapon didn't heat up quickly enough to make it necessary due to having a 500 rpm ROF.

Having two automatic rifles instead of one belt fed weapon adds nothing? Having a weapon that could keep up with the advance and allow for mutually supporting fire teams doesn't change a thing? In terms of cost the machined MG34 was not cheap and had to be replaced with the MG42; even that was due to be replaced by the MG45 that was much simplified and lighter, but the war ended before it could be produced. Having a light stamped steel automatic rifle would be a lot less expensive. The ZB26 for instance was cheaper to make than the MG34 and IIRC even the MG42.

Which goes back to the observation on Germany and the lessons of ww1. They went through the 30s not sold on the relatively lightweight magazine fed LMG and were content with a belt fed ( even if in saddleback) GPMP. There is a Masters thesis on line regarding US tribulations with LMG, they being the other army not sold on the concept.

If you are looking at the modern US fireteam, well its automatic rifle is a belt fed weapon in the army and the USMC intends to equip all riflemen with the M27. And the USMC is not proposing to fight WW2.

But the answer is depends. It also detracts.

If you are looking at mid - late war Western practice you also have to look at the addition of vehicle mounted MG always being available, as are ( for the british) large volumes of sustained from water cooled MG and the ability to introduce an additional companies worth of firepower from the carrier platoon, which can move fast across the battlefield. As well as actual practice which tended to have more LMG than the TOE would describe. Standard British practice was a squad of 8 with the additions be either dead, wounded, on courses or deliberately Left Out of Battle at platoon HQ or higher as deliberate policy.

And the infantry assault is the final 90 seconds of the attack which also features artillery bombardment intended to remove any sort of MG from the issue.

So yes having a large number of automatic weapons available is an advantage which is why the British and French with experience of operating on the offensive in WW1 moved in that direction quickly post war. But defensively the mobility issue is not so important the ability to sustain the fire is ( and that's including the protection for the gun and crew not just sustained fire) as is the ability to put a lot of fire out in a short period to engage a fleeting target in the final stage of the assault or at a range beyond which their grenadiers can engage. That includes the French fetish for rifle grenades.

German experience in the east is different. The Russians never had the density of firepower available to the Germans in the west so attacking them required far less concentration of firepower to overcome the defence. The main German lesson from WW1 was don't get stuck into a materiel war with Western powers in the first place. They were not studying how they tactically lost in 1918 but how they failed in 1914.

The solution being a panzergruppe.

By 1943/4 and the German issue is not so much having tactically mobile firepower but having survivable firepower and enough of it to stop a Russian infantry attack before they can close. The MG34 problem is that as soon as its identified it becomes the target for everything. Having more targets means you have more engaging before someone fires a 75mm tank round at you. The point of the tank being deal with the unsuppressed MG.

This is really a pre WW1 issue deriving from Balle D and the introduction of Machine guns in the first place. The original calculus was that with those a defensive position could stop an infantry assault far enough away that a bolt action rifle could not supress the position on its own without exposing the whole unit to fire, nor could the type of mg available move fast enough to keep up with advancing infantry. All the armies were looking at increasing infantry firepower to avoid that pre war and all looking at 'automatic rifles' which at the time could be either an LMG or semi auto weapon. The Chauchat as designed is a semi auto rifle not an MG. But pre war priority went to more important systems for their doctrine and national sensibilities. The German conception was for a tactical defensive battle after a successful strategic offensive so the LMG is less important than artillery. The British and French also had to consider small unit colonial actions where without large artillery formations they would still have to deal with rifle armed defenders able supress the infantry attack.

As it happened both the British and French were able to develop a sort of LMG in WW1 because they needed it and had access to the designs that existed and had thought about it a lot more than the Germans pre war. The Germans had neither access to the designs nor the need.

The production cost problem well depends on the considerations taken into account. If you are looking at a weapon with a design life of 15-20 years then a better made weapon even if it costs more initially is fine. If you are looking at a weapon with a battlefield life of 15-20 weeks then different calculation.
 

Deleted member 1487

Which goes back to the observation on Germany and the lessons of ww1. They went through the 30s not sold on the relatively lightweight magazine fed LMG and were content with a belt fed ( even if in saddleback) GPMP. There is a Masters thesis on line regarding US tribulations with LMG, they being the other army not sold on the concept.
Germany was forbidden to develop machine guns by the treaty of Versailles, which is why the first adopted MG after Hitler took power was the MG13, a modernized 1918 Dreyse design. They were prevented from experimenting significantly openly, but German armaments designers in exile came up with the magazine fed MG30, which was adopted by the Luftwaffe as the MG15. The GPMG idea was more about saving money during rearmament by having only one design to make to do all the jobs, rather than developing more specialized LMGs and M/HMGs. They had any number of ideas, but were ultimately constricted by the rapid rearmament program and opted to focus on perceived economies of scale rather than any other consideration.

Do you have a link to the thesis on US MG programs?

If you are looking at the modern US fireteam, well its automatic rifle is a belt fed weapon in the army and the USMC intends to equip all riflemen with the M27. And the USMC is not proposing to fight WW2.
The US military that went to war with one BAR per squad. I'm not sure what point you're making here, considering the US military ended WW2 with 2-3 BARs per squad.

If you are looking at mid - late war Western practice you also have to look at the addition of vehicle mounted MG always being available, as are ( for the british) large volumes of sustained from water cooled MG and the ability to introduce an additional companies worth of firepower from the carrier platoon, which can move fast across the battlefield. As well as actual practice which tended to have more LMG than the TOE would describe. Standard British practice was a squad of 8 with the additions be either dead, wounded, on courses or deliberately Left Out of Battle at platoon HQ or higher as deliberate policy.
Ok? I'm still proposing that the MG13 is around for the MMG/HMG role.

And the infantry assault is the final 90 seconds of the attack which also features artillery bombardment intended to remove any sort of MG from the issue.
Depends on the scale of the assault, artillery isn't always or arguably mostly present in tactical combat. Mortars though would be a factor more often than not, which makes the dependency on a belt fed less necessary; the Germans had plenty of mortars IOTL.

So yes having a large number of automatic weapons available is an advantage which is why the British and French with experience of operating on the offensive in WW1 moved in that direction quickly post war. But defensively the mobility issue is not so important the ability to sustain the fire is ( and that's including the protection for the gun and crew not just sustained fire) as is the ability to put a lot of fire out in a short period to engage a fleeting target in the final stage of the assault or at a range beyond which their grenadiers can engage. That includes the French fetish for rifle grenades.
Rifle grenades were highly present for everyone in WW1 and 2. And beyond that. On the defensive a squad is not going to be fighting independently in the vast majority of situations, so again a belt fed weapon at the squad level isn't all that necessary. Also the large number of automatics was hardly only a British and French lesson of WW1, it was pretty damn important to German defensive/counterattack doctrine. When people like to point to German WW1 Western Front experience they are completely ignoring the counterattack part of their doctrine, which was pretty crucial from at least 1916-18 and involved a lot of attacking.

German experience in the east is different. The Russians never had the density of firepower available to the Germans in the west so attacking them required far less concentration of firepower to overcome the defence. The main German lesson from WW1 was don't get stuck into a materiel war with Western powers in the first place. They were not studying how they tactically lost in 1918 but how they failed in 1914.
I'd read about the fighting in 1916 and on in the East, especially the Brusilov Offensive that cost about 350k German casualties when they intervened to help the collapsing Austrians. The Russians had a ton of firepower then and in 1914. In 1914 the Russians had probably the 2nd most artillery per division/corps/army of all European combatants after the Germans thanks to their Russo-Japanese war experience and used it to smash the Austro-Hungarians. They ran into ammo issues in 1915 due to very poor management by their leadership, but had learned their lesson and largely fixed it by 1916.

The lesson the Germans drew from WW1 wasn't that they shouldn't get into a material war in the west, which is effectively what it looked like they did in 1939-40 before the French imploded in weeks, it was don't get in a two front war so that you can't amass the necessary forces to achieve decisive operational success.

The solution being a panzergruppe.
The solution being the radio, aircraft, and trucks for logistics. The Panzers weren't strictly necessary, they just got the press; often it was the AT and FLAK that actually did the tank killing. After all German AFVs in 1940 were worse than French and British models and the Panzer divisions found they were too tank heavy and needed more infantry, which led to them getting cut in half in terms of tank numbers. What was lacking in 1918 was trucks of enough reliability and numbers to allow for the cutting loose from rail heads, having on demand CAS and aircraft interdiction, and most importantly radios down to the company level to coordinate exploitation of breakthroughs, which strangled any number of trench break ins during WW1.

By 1943/4 and the German issue is not so much having tactically mobile firepower but having survivable firepower and enough of it to stop a Russian infantry attack before they can close. The MG34 problem is that as soon as its identified it becomes the target for everything. Having more targets means you have more engaging before someone fires a 75mm tank round at you.
Having more automatics means there are more means of maintaining firepower if one is lost due to counterfire and of course also splitting up counterfire attention. The Germans found that having one LMG that was the basis of squad firepower meant that if lost the squad was screwed and since it was so obvious it immediately drew all the counterfire in the area that could be brought on it. Which is why the Germans adopted the StG44 for the squad and relegated the LMG to a platoon support weapon that fired at a distance on the attack when possible and was there on the defensive to support squads if needed. So by having say two or three automatic rifles per squad instead of an LMG you're avoiding the problems of concentrating all your eggs in one basket, which if lost dooms the squad.

The point of the tank being deal with the unsuppressed MG.
In 1916, not in WW2 for the most part. Infantry did the break ins, tanks were for exploitation to operational depths.

This is really a pre WW1 issue deriving from Balle D and the introduction of Machine guns in the first place. The original calculus was that with those a defensive position could stop an infantry assault far enough away that a bolt action rifle could not supress the position on its own without exposing the whole unit to fire, nor could the type of mg available move fast enough to keep up with advancing infantry. All the armies were looking at increasing infantry firepower to avoid that pre war and all looking at 'automatic rifles' which at the time could be either an LMG or semi auto weapon. The Chauchat as designed is a semi auto rifle not an MG. But pre war priority went to more important systems for their doctrine and national sensibilities. The German conception was for a tactical defensive battle after a successful strategic offensive so the LMG is less important than artillery. The British and French also had to consider small unit colonial actions where without large artillery formations they would still have to deal with rifle armed defenders able supress the infantry attack.
The Chauchat was an automatic (technically machine) rifle meant for automatic fire, not single aimed shots like a semi-auto rifle; the French had semi-auto rifles in WW1 and they filled a different role.

I don't know where you got your conception of German doctrine, but that is false and their WW1 'light' MG design was just a function of production issues of getting enough weapons produced, so they were forced to adopt a 'lightened' MG08 instead of something more modern and lighter so as not to disrupt production. They fully understood the need for a truly light automatic weapon for the infantry, but couldn't produce one without production disruptions they couldn't afford. So they used a lot of captured Chauchats and Lewis guns when available, especially in their assault units. Plus you're ignoring the counterattack doctrine and their own infantry developments of the Stosstruppen, which called for light offensive MGs and was the model for their WW2 doctrine.

As it happened both the British and French were able to develop a sort of LMG in WW1 because they needed it and had access to the designs that existed and had thought about it a lot more than the Germans pre war. The Germans had neither access to the designs nor the need.
They had LMGs in the works pre-war, but ultimately had to buy the US designed Lewis Gun and produced the Chauchat, which was an adapted aircraft defensive machine gun. The Germans had LMG projects pre-war, but production constraints prevented their production, as they were blockaded and unable to access the US trade and production system, which effectively doubled British and French industrial output. That left Germany focusing on producing one model and trying to adapt it to a light machine gun role, which didn't really work, but was the best they could do in their crappy strategic situation.

The production cost problem well depends on the considerations taken into account. If you are looking at a weapon with a design life of 15-20 years then a better made weapon even if it costs more initially is fine. If you are looking at a weapon with a battlefield life of 15-20 weeks then different calculation.
Sure, the problem is the German military was planning on making a relatively small number of weapons last a while, as they planned for a long term build up, but then Hitler demanded it happen at a breakneck pace and left their design considerations woefully inadequate; what is surprising is that it took until 1942 for a stamped metal MG to be put into production given the need for a lot of MGs ASAP. Which is where the light, inexpensive, stamped metal early FG42-type automatic rifle would come in. It was a lot less expensive and easier to make as than the MG34, which would suit the rapid rearmament situation the German military was faced with, plus the demands of a high intensity war situation where equipment would be lost in combat in large numbers.
 
The MG81 wasn't really suitable without a ton of modification for ground operations. As noted it was optimized for aircraft operations, so it had a really chopped down barrel (about 18 inches), which meant it had a fireball muzzle flash that put the FG42 to shame. Plus the 1400 rpm minimum could only really be tamed with a longer bolt travel, plus heavier bolt and spring, which increases weight and recoil. An infantry MG81 would overheat really rapidly otherwise and would have to be heavily upweighted to have a buttstock and other necessary features. Seems like it was about 8kg empty with the buttstock and other features. Still had the super high ROF.
http://www.oocities.org/augusta/8172/panzerfaust5.htm

So while on the right track in terms of weight, it was in completely the opposite direction in terms of rate of fire and potential susceptibility to mud and such.

Well I was more looking at the MG81 as a starting point - it would have to be intended for the ground role from inception rather than Adapting it from teh aircraft gun which means a Longer heavier chrome barrel - a much lower ROF - say 500-600 and no heavier than 9 KGs with the bipod (copied from the ZB26)
 
I was suggesting a move to the long stroke gas piston system, which Strange knew about, as he adopted it. There were all sorts of lightening moves that could have been taken with the design, including using more wood say for the butt stock and a shortened barrel. The MG42 and FG42 lost about 4 inches of length for instance. Making it half the wait would require a significant redesign which included something like the FG42's piston system.
At that point it's not even a redesign, using a gas piston instead of short recoil and lightening the weight would make a completely different weapon. So the POD would not be "designing a lighter MG 30" so much as "designing the FG 42 10 years early instead of the MG 30." That is possible (it was possible as soon as the Lewis Gun was designed) but it is a bigger design change than originally thought.
FG-42 had a good amount of Lewis Gun DNA in it, so why not just go off the Mk.III, fitted with a simple bipod and sling.
That's because the FG 42 was directly based off the Lewis Gun. The Mk. III was too heavy to achieve the role of a light automatic rifle though, the Lewis Assault Rifle managed to reduce weight down to 12 lbs but only with much greater changes to the design (it's sort of a transitional design between the Lewis and the FG 42).
 

Deleted member 1487

Well I was more looking at the MG81 as a starting point - it would have to be intended for the ground role from inception rather than Adapting it from teh aircraft gun which means a Longer heavier chrome barrel - a much lower ROF - say 500-600 and no heavier than 9 KGs with the bipod (copied from the ZB26)
Why not then just use the ZB26 if you're taking a weapon that heavy? Not that the ZB26 was a bad weapon, just heavier than needed. As AJE below mentions, the Lewis assault phase rifle is probably closer to what I'm getting at.

At that point it's not even a redesign, using a gas piston instead of short recoil and lightening the weight would make a completely different weapon. So the POD would not be "designing a lighter MG 30" so much as "designing the FG 42 10 years early instead of the MG 30." That is possible (it was possible as soon as the Lewis Gun was designed) but it is a bigger design change than originally thought.
All true.

That's because the FG 42 was directly based off the Lewis Gun. The Mk. III was too heavy to achieve the role of a light automatic rifle though, the Lewis Assault Rifle managed to reduce weight down to 12 lbs but only with much greater changes to the design (it's sort of a transitional design between the Lewis and the FG 42).
http://www.smallarmsreview.com/display.article.cfm?idarticles=2192
It might well have been exactly what I was talking about. Any idea if the info about it was made public so that Europeans could adopt or copy it?
 
Any idea if the info about it was made public so that Europeans could adopt or copy it?
I don't know (at least the third prototype was kept private by Lewis), but if that or a similar weapon like the FG 42 is your idea, then it would also replace the submachine gun and the bolt-action rifle as the standard infantry weapon. Those are basically battle rifles.
 

Deleted member 1487

I don't know (at least the third prototype was kept private by Lewis), but if that or a similar weapon like the FG 42 is your idea, then it would also replace the submachine gun and the bolt-action rifle as the standard infantry weapon. Those are basically battle rifles.
I'm only suggesting they replace the machine gun rather than be a standard rifle replacement due to cost.
 
The GPMG idea was more about saving money during rearmament by having only one design to make to do all the jobs, rather than developing more specialized LMGs and M/HMGs. They had any number of ideas, but were ultimately constricted by the rapid rearmament program and opted to focus on perceived economies of scale rather than any other consideration.

Well that's speculation. It certainly does have economies of scale but given the minor cost of MGs in terms of overall rearmament budget if the army had wanted an LMG they could have had one, and certainly after the occupation of Czechoslovakia used ZBZ for SS units, who then swapped them out for the MG34/42. This is a conscious decision and german squad level tactics led to it. These were developed in the 20s in the absence of lots of indirect fire support (in the 20s). With that the provision of a very high volume of MG fire is more important. Now they could have made the decision to use a rifle calibre and rifle range low capacity weapon incapable of any sort of sustained fire. And de facto would have experimented with that immediately post war when a whole mix of odds and sods were used to provide support but in the end they chose the MG34.

The Germasn did use the Madsen and Bergmann in WW1 so they do have experience of using lighter weapons. Even if cost prevented use in WW1 the experience is there and Seeckt did a thorough job in analysing the lessons of WW1. The Heer wanted the MG34 because they thought it was the best weapon for their needs.

You will have to google the item its on an old comp somewhere. One of the lessons though was the M14 was supposed to provide MG support as you advocate and that broke down because everyone was popping off and the guns were overheating, which means everyone has to pop off.

The US military that went to war with one BAR per squad. I'm not sure what point you're making here, considering the US military ended WW2 with 2-3 BARs per squad.

No they went to war with 4 squads, 3 of riflemen and one of 3xBAR which were a separate organisation, This is a WW1 organisation and given Pershings views on riflemen entirely credible. The armoured infantry dropped the BAR squad and had to rely on pintle mounted .30 cal. That lasted a good 10 seconds in a combat zone but it is the way the US were trained up to the 42 revision of the infantry manual

the AT and FLAK that actually did the tank killing.

But not the killing. The german early war success is built on not fighting tanks in the offence but using your invulnerable tanks to overwhelm leg infantry and immobile artillery. If you don't believe me believe the AGC infantry corps commanders who were demanding the break up of the panzer divisions because their - well equipped with AT weapons allegedly were being chewed up by odds and sods of Soviet armour through August and September 41 and were unable to attack at speed because the Soviet MG had to be suppressed one at a time.

The Chauchat was an automatic (technically machine) rifle meant for automatic fire, not single aimed shots like a semi-auto rifle; the French had semi-auto rifles in WW1 and they filled a different role.

I don't know where you got your conception of German doctrine, but that is false and their WW1 'light' MG design was just a function of production issues of getting enough weapons produced, so they were forced to adopt a 'lightened' MG08 instead of something more modern and lighter so as not to disrupt production. They fully understood the need for a truly light automatic weapon for the infantry, but couldn't produce one without production disruptions they couldn't afford. So they used a lot of captured Chauchats and Lewis guns when available, especially in their assault units. Plus you're ignoring the counterattack doctrine and their own infantry developments of the Stosstruppen, which called for light offensive MGs and was the model for their WW2 doctrine.


The Chauchat was supposed to be fired from the hip in single or very short bursts (2-3) during marching fire on the attack to supress a position, that's the manual. As you said the AR were ( later on) given a different task It was pressed into use as an LMG and suffered all sorts of issues as a result.

I am not sure what you mean by the second para, I was referring to the German conception of the war as a battle of encirclement by rapidly moving armies encircling the enemy. They adoptoing a defensive position against which the enemy would break. That's very well attested to by all the pre war writings. In that war having a light mobile MG is a minor consideration - compared with the British or French who have different considerations. Notable the French. But for all of these the provision of an MG or replacement of rifles is secondary to the replacement of artillery.


They had LMGs in the works pre-war, but ultimately had to buy the US designed Lewis Gun and produced the Chauchat, which was an adapted aircraft defensive machine gun. The Germans had LMG projects pre-war, but production constraints prevented their production, as they were blockaded and unable to access the US trade and production system, which effectively doubled British and French industrial output. That left Germany focusing on producing one model and trying to adapt it to a light machine gun role, which didn't really work, but was the best they could do in their crappy strategic situation.

To be correct the Retired American Officer Lewis set up a factory in Belgium to develop his concept, which he did after the BSA collaborated resulting in him moving the factory and all production to the UK prior to the outbreak of WW1. Its then relicensed to Savage.

Be interested to know what LMG were in the works pre WW1. And what they meant by Light. Compared to the MG08 most things are light.

You will note that the Belgian factory was moved to England and only in mid war was a US plant picked up. And meantime yes the Germans went on with British Maxim derivatives.

Sure, the problem is the German military was planning on making a relatively small number of weapons last a while, as they planned for a long term build up, but then Hitler demanded it happen at a breakneck pace and left their design considerations woefully inadequate; what is surprising is that it took until 1942 for a stamped metal MG to be put into production given the need for a lot of MGs ASAP. Which is where the light, inexpensive, stamped metal early FG42-type automatic rifle would come in. It was a lot less expensive and easier to make as than the MG34, which would suit the rapid rearmament situation the German military was faced with, plus the demands of a high intensity war situation where equipment would be lost in combat in large numbers.

Not after 1936 they were not, And arguably not after 1933 which is prior to the decisions on the MG34. At that point they are not eking out the scraps available from a poverty stricken economy they are high on the hog as public #1 recipient of all largesse ( after the Luftwaffe.) But until 39 they have no idea when war will come or the rate of expansion of the army. Stamped parts btw are not a panacea. They are just a production technique and changing technique has implications of its own.


In 1916, not in WW2 for the most part. Infantry did the break ins, tanks were for exploitation to operational depths.

So you contention is that there are no machine guns at 'operational depths' how, novel, and please explain that to the Stormtroops and follow ups shot apart by the Vickers, Lewis, and Hotchkiss MGs after the initial breakthrough.


I'd read about the fighting in 1916 and on in the East, especially the Brusilov Offensive that cost about 350k German casualties when they intervened to help the collapsing Austrians. The Russians had a ton of firepower then and in 1914. In 1914 the Russians had probably the 2nd most artillery per division/corps/army of all European combatants after the Germans thanks to their Russo-Japanese war experience and used it to smash the Austro-Hungarians. They ran into ammo issues in 1915 due to very poor management by their leadership, but had learned their lesson and largely fixed it by 1916.

The lesson the Germans drew from WW1 wasn't that they shouldn't get into a material war in the west, which is effectively what it looked like they did in 1939-40 before the French imploded in weeks, it was don't get in a two front war so that you can't amass the necessary forces to achieve decisive operational success.

Sorry this is nonsense. My point was the German Experience of attacking Russians not the Russian experience of attacking Austrians. And BTW the abiding Austrian experience in 1914 was being shot apart by company volleys from entrenched Russian troops drawn up in echelon. The Russian artillery was concentrating on the Austrian - another lesson f the Russo Japanese war.

Seeing as the whole point of plan in 1914 was to defeat France prior to the Russians being able to mobilise at all I would say the German staff had worked out the issues with the two front war long long before that. Say maybe from Fredericks Military testament, it was available in German after all.
 
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