Different Confederate Strategy (Late Game)

To cut Schofield's line of retreat they need to beat Thomas quickly and easily and cross 10 miles before he can respond. For MacPherson it is 15 miles and there is still a bridge further beyond that. And in both cases they have to hold against fresh Union forces that are now between them and their line of supply and retreat. Given the forces involved are numerically even the odds of beating Thomas rapidly and easily are fairly low. I don't think Hood thought about more than mauling Thomas to divert the flanking moves and buy time for Atlanta

Hood's entire plan was to beat Thomas and then turn on Schofield and McPherson. He also did not need to advance all the way to the fords themselves to cut off the Federals, but merely get behind them; this is especially doable in the case of Schofield, as that would require an advance of probably no more than four miles (There was a two mile gap between Thomas and Schofield). Given Schofield is pinned in place by Cheatham's larger command, I sincerely doubt he will be able to do much of anything before he suddenly finds Hood to his rear in addition to the forces already to his front. Once that occurs, that leaves just McPherson, who is probably going to have to make a run for the fords. Hood's forces would also not be risking their own rear as there are no federal forces to their flanks or rear,

As for the Battle itself, Hood's force did come close to decisively breaking Thomas as any reading of the battle shows. There were numerous lost opportunities, whether from the need to re-position prior to the battle, the failure for Manney and Cleburne to be decisively committed, etc.

The British reinforcements were a show of force and contingency, the intention was to go to war if the US did not do as they wanted. All Albert did was soften the language of the ultimatum sent to the US, the decision was unanimous in Lincolns Cabinet to give the British what they wanted, and public opinion among the political class was turning that way before they found out the British demands. Unless a more strongly worded ultimatum somehow changes the minds of a bunch of people who wanted to avoid war, they would do the same as OTL and avoid war

In other words, exactly as I said.
 
Hood's entire plan was to beat Thomas and then turn on Schofield and McPherson. He also did not need to advance all the way to the fords themselves to cut off the Federals, but merely get behind them; this is especially doable in the case of Schofield, as that would require an advance of probably no more than four miles (There was a two mile gap between Thomas and Schofield). Given Schofield is pinned in place by Cheatham's larger command, I sincerely doubt he will be able to do much of anything before he suddenly finds Hood to his rear in addition to the forces already to his front. Once that occurs, that leaves just McPherson, who is probably going to have to make a run for the fords. Hood's forces would also not be risking their own rear as there are no federal forces to their flanks or rear,

As for the Battle itself, Hood's force did come close to decisively breaking Thomas as any reading of the battle shows. There were numerous lost opportunities, whether from the need to re-position prior to the battle, the failure for Manney and Cleburne to be decisively committed, etc.
Your quote only says turn on Schofield and McPherson, it doesn't say when, it could be later that afternoon, it could be the next day. Beating Thomas is not exactly going to be easy with only parity of forces. You have to beat him, reorganize and regroup, then get behind Schofield all before dark, starting at 1:00. And of course you have to beat Thomas in such a way that he is cut off from retreat and doesn't render Hood's forces incapable of further fighting that day before going down. And beyond that you have to cut off Schofield from McPherson so he doesn't join up with him in the dark. And you have to hope during all this time that Sherman can't react fast enough to salvage the situation

Come close to beating Thomas and throwing him back across the creek certainly, but breaking him, that's the question. Very few armies actually broke in the ACW, fewer still were annihilated. with the forces arrayed I doubt Hood could manage it. Knock out Thomas for a few weeks and Schofield a day, absolutely certain, but to render 2 of 3 armies facing him completely unsalvageable in one day, that would be the greatest feat in the entire ACW, don't see it happening without very improbable levels of luck
In other words, exactly as I said.
No you said they were on the verge of war. They weren't, Britain made some prudent preparations just in case, and the US caved to their demands as soon as they got them, Britain wasn't going to war unless the US didn't agree to their demands and that wasn't going to happen as the US didn't want war at all and the UK did not want a war enough to make unreasonable demands. Albert merely changed the language not the demands
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I happen to know a teeny, tiny bit about the Battle of Peachtree Creek.

A Confederate victory is entirely possible. Indeed, under better leadership, it could have turned into a truly decisive victory. In Shattered Nation, I go with the idea that the plan was originally Johnston's and that he is retained in command by Davis. This, by itself, would give the Confederate a much greater advantage vis-a-vis what happened IOTL. The change in command had three principal impacts on the course of the battle.

1. Hood only took command on the morning of July 18, two days before. Being elevated from corps command to army command is an enormous task, much more complicated that going from the command of a brigade to a division or a division to a corps. Lee knew what he was talking about when he argued to Davis that it was not a good idea to change army commanders in the middle of an active campaign. Hood had been an excellent brigade and division but only a mediocre corps commander. He lacked the administrative skill to be an army commander under ideal conditions and conditions were terrible. The movements of the Army of Tennessee were confused and disjointed. This was made all the worse by the fact that the army chief-of-staff, General William Mackall, was a close friend of Johnston's, thought Hood was a complete moron, and was more outraged by the removal of Johnston than even Johnston himself was.

2. Hardee was generally a competent corps commander, but Peachtree Creek was his worst day of the war. His attack was weak and not well coordinated. Hardee followed orders on July 20 but his heart clearly was not in the effort.Much of this can be attributed to the shock and anger he felt at Hood's elevation over him, since he was far senior in rank, age, and record (why Davis did not pick Hardee over Hood is a fascinating topic but would take too long to go into here). This doesn't reflect well on Hardee, obviously, but this doesn't change the fact that Hardee probably would have been much more effective during the attack had Johnston still been in command.

3. Among Army of Tennessee units, Cheatham's division of Tennessee troops was second only to Cleburne's division for its effectiveness and ferocity on the battlefield. But the elevation of Hood to army command meant that Cheatham was moved from his division to command of Hood's old corps, which was deployed to the east of Atlanta and played no role at Peachtree Creek. In his place, the division was commanded by General George Maney, who was a decent commander but had trouble moving from brigade to division command. His uncertainty that day meant that the division was hardly engaged in the fight, engaging in more of a heavy skirmish than anything else. Had Cheatham still been in command, I would expect him to hit the Union line with mass force.
 
Your quote only says turn on Schofield and McPherson, it doesn't say when, it could be later that afternoon, it could be the next day. Beating Thomas is not exactly going to be easy with only parity of forces. You have to beat him, reorganize and regroup, then get behind Schofield all before dark, starting at 1:00. And of course you have to beat Thomas in such a way that he is cut off from retreat and doesn't render Hood's forces incapable of further fighting that day before going down. And beyond that you have to cut off Schofield from McPherson so he doesn't join up with him in the dark. And you have to hope during all this time that Sherman can't react fast enough to salvage the situation

Most likely the attack against Schofield would develop the next day; I don't see this as an issue, for the reasons both of us have outlined. Schofield is pinned in place by Cheatham and 10 miles from the fords while McPherson is at least 15. That's almost a full day's march and it's not like Schofield can withdraw to aid Thomas, nor can McPherson come to the aid of either in a timely manner as Sherman had ordered him to sweep out and attempt to attack Atlanta. Despite Thomas being under heavy attack all day and several close calls, Sherman appears to either have not known or understood the severity of the situation given he made no effort to reinforce Thomas and did the aforementioned movement with McPherson. As for Thomas and his command, the original Confederate battle plan was for sequential attacks from Left to Right with the Chattahoochee to his rear. In such a situation, his complete destruction would happen sans a few ragged survivors.

Come close to beating Thomas and throwing him back across the creek certainly, but breaking him, that's the question. Very few armies actually broke in the ACW, fewer still were annihilated. with the forces arrayed I doubt Hood could manage it. Knock out Thomas for a few weeks and Schofield a day, absolutely certain, but to render 2 of 3 armies facing him completely unsalvageable in one day, that would be the greatest feat in the entire ACW, don't see it happening without very improbable levels of luck

Again, not sure why you have an insistence on the one day factor nor do I get the "because it didn't happen" argument given we're discussing Alternate History.

No you said they were on the verge of war. They weren't, Britain made some prudent preparations just in case, and the US caved to their demands as soon as they got them, Britain wasn't going to war unless the US didn't agree to their demands and that wasn't going to happen as the US didn't want war at all and the UK did not want a war enough to make unreasonable demands. Albert merely changed the language not the demands

The British quit selling war materials, had begun to mobilize forces and were preparing the Royal Navy to establish a blockade if the U.S. refused the ultimatum. Said ultimatum was watered down by Prince Albert because, as it was, the Lincoln Administration could not accept it without losing face. You say the U.S. agreed to all demands in it, but forgot to mention it was the said watered down variant they agreed to.
 
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Most likely the attack against Schofield would develop the next day; I don't see this as an issue, for the reasons both of us have outlined. Schofield is pinned in place by Cheatham and 10 miles from the fords while McPherson is at least 15. That's almost a full day's march and it's not like Schofield can withdraw to aid Thomas, nor can McPherson come to the aid of either in a timely manner as Sherman had ordered him to sweep out and attempt to attack Atlanta. Despite Thomas being under heavy attack all day and several close calls, Sherman appears to either have not known or understood the severity of the situation given he made no effort to reinforce Thomas and did the aforementioned movement with McPherson. As for Thomas and his command, the original Confederate battle plan was for sequential attacks from Left to Right with the Chattahoochee to his rear. In such a situation, his complete destruction would happen sans a few ragged survivors.
If it's not one day when Sherman gets a message about Thomas's destruction he is going to go oh hell and pull back to reevaluate, marching at night if he has to if the situation is that bad. Sherman's orders, according to your source were sent after the 1:00 when Hood wanted the attack to start, if it goes in on schedule McPherson is uncommitted. Command loops were not short, Hood gave up before Sherman found out about it, as it is Sherman did find out in a few hours. That assumes that Thomas doesn't see his lines wavering and pull back on his own before he is totally broken, in war the enemy gets a vote with your plans
Again, not sure why you have an insistence on the one day factor nor do I get the "because it didn't happen" argument given we're discussing Alternate History.
Because if it's not one day then Sherman has time to go oh hell, get out of there during the night. What actually happened gives us a basis for what could reasonably occur. If such an event or a similar one had happened somewhere else, I'd agree with you, but it didn't and there should be a reason for that. In this case the relatively limited organizational ability of ACW units in comparison to European formations
The British quit selling war materials, had begun to mobilize forces and were preparing the Royal Navy to establish a blockade if the U.S. refused the ultimatum. Said ultimatum was watered down by Prince Albert because, as it was, the Lincoln Administration could not accept it without losing face. You say the U.S. agreed to all demands in it, but forgot to mention it was the said watered down variant they agreed to.
Albert changed the wording, he didn't change the actual demands at all, as I have repeatedly said. The ultimatum was not public, even Lincoln did not find out about it until 4 days after delivery. If Lincoln had to lose face he would, the entire cabinet was unanimous in not wanting war with the UK, but he doesn't have to make the language public only the demands
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Despite Thomas being under heavy attack all day and several close calls, Sherman appears to either have not known or understood the severity of the situation given he made no effort to reinforce Thomas and did the aforementioned movement with McPherson.

Sherman did not even know the battle was happening until it was nearly over.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
That assumes that Thomas doesn't see his lines wavering and pull back on his own before he is totally broken, in war the enemy gets a vote with your plans

It would have been extremely difficult for Thomas to pull back his exposed corps with Peachtree Creek at his back. That was why the Confederates planned the attack in the manner they did.
 
It would have been extremely difficult for Thomas to pull back his exposed corps with Peachtree Creek at his back. That was why the Confederates planned the attack in the manner they did.
Peachtree Creek averages under 3.5 feet in normal times, under 2 feet in places, which it was given Thomas crossed a few hours prior. It would play hell with organized units and artillery, but that works both ways
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Peachtree Creek averages under 3.5 feet in normal times, under 2 feet in places, which it was given Thomas crossed a few hours prior. It would play hell with organized units and artillery, but that works both ways

The water level is low, but the banks of the creek are very high (higher in 1864 than today, incidentally). It was described as being similar to a castle moat. It was not easily passable except over bridges.

And yes, it works both ways. But Hood did not need to cross the creek. His goal was to pin Thomas against it.
 

Brunaburh

Gone Fishin'
I think this has been done to death, but the only chance for the Confederacy was the union not having the political capital to mobilize fully. This is incredibly under-explored, strangely, but it is by far the most likely confederate victory scenario.
 
The water level is low, but the banks of the creek are very high (higher in 1864 than today, incidentally). It was described as being similar to a castle moat. It was not easily passable except over bridges.

And yes, it works both ways. But Hood did not need to cross the creek. His goal was to pin Thomas against it.
No his goal, according to the source History Learner posted was to drive him over the creek and pin him against the Chattahoochee
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I think this has been done to death, but the only chance for the Confederacy was the union not having the political capital to mobilize fully. This is incredibly under-explored, strangely, but it is by far the most likely confederate victory scenario.

It is the most likely Confederate victory scenario. It annoys me when people assert that CS Victory TLs are ASB, quoting the same arguments that would suggest America had no chance in the Revolution and North Vietnam had no chance of defeating the United States.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
No his goal, according to the source History Learner posted was to drive him over the creek and pin him against the Chattahoochee

No, it was to pin him against the Chattahoochee on the south side of Peachtree Creek, not to cross the creek. At least not on July 20 itself. And that was more of a vague, general idea than a specific plan. Broadly, Hood's plan (and it might really have been Johnston's) was to smash up the exposed corps of the Army of the Cumberland on the south side of the creek and then exploit whatever opportunities offered themselves.
 

Brunaburh

Gone Fishin'
It is the most likely Confederate victory scenario. It annoys me when people assert that CS Victory TLs are ASB, quoting the same arguments that would suggest America had no chance in the Revolution and North Vietnam had no chance of defeating the United States.

I agree totally. But, I also think the problem is that most TL's fail down because they are written by people fascinated by the military aspects, but who fail to explore in any detail the political situations that would be needed to create a "fuck's sake, just let them go!" attitude. Yes, Southern victory in a total war is impossible, but there was no reason to expect total war.
 
OK here is a myth about the civil war. The South could win if they did "X."

I could ASB 30,000 extra golumns that shoot and don't eat for them and give Robert E lee the ability to mind read everyone he sees at will and the North still wins. Why is this?

Oh yeah, the South is comically outmatched by the North's economic engine even before the war. The North can produce what is needed to live. The South grow a cash crop to sell so they can buy what they need to live. The North had 3 or more times as much railroads as the South and railroads allow pre-plane era armies to outmaneuvure anyone on land. They could win the war if they decided Springfield rifles were too expensive and the war should be fought with musketmen.

Nothing realistic could make the South win after Antietam and the possibility of foreign intervention went out the window.

Such deterministic readings and interpretations of history, for myself, are quite flawed. In any war and conflict, there is thousands of variables, which could potentially all be in favor of a particular party.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I agree totally. But, I also think the problem is that most TL's fail down because they are written by people fascinated by the military aspects, but who fail to explore in any detail the political situations that would be needed to create a "fuck's sake, just let them go!" attitude. Yes, Southern victory in a total war is impossible, but there was no reason to expect total war.

I often find it interesting that we fixate on the political aspects of the American Revolution and ignore the military ones, while with the Civil War is it just the opposite. Educated Americans can name several political figures from the American Revolution, but probably no military figure aside from George Washington. Likewise, educated Americans know who Grant and Lee are and probably Jackson and Sherman, but could name no political figures aside from Lincoln and perhaps Jefferson Davis.
 
No, it was to pin him against the Chattahoochee on the south side of Peachtree Creek, not to cross the creek. At least not on July 20 itself. And that was more of a vague, general idea than a specific plan. Broadly, Hood's plan (and it might really have been Johnston's) was to smash up the exposed corps of the Army of the Cumberland on the south side of the creek and then exploit whatever opportunities offered themselves.
History Learner at least posted a source saying throw Thomas back across the creek, give me a contradictory source

Smashing up Thomas south of the creek I have no problem with, not even knocking out the entire AoC for a month or two. It's rendering the whole AoC unsalvageable I would, never happened to a Union Army before, it would need a hell of a lot of explanation why the circumstances align to make it happen in this case
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
History Learner at least posted a source saying throw Thomas back across the creek, give me a contradictory source

Hood outlined what the plan was in his memoir Advance and Retreat. It is confirmed by the journal kept by William Mackall, who was chief-of-staff of the Army of Tennessee on July 20. This is probably the only thing those two people actually agreed on, incidentally.
 
I think July 64 is probably too late but not even close to ASB. It's questionable to doubtful whether Mccellan would make peace. Northern War weariness was a factor. I also think some Confederate troops that deserted otl will stay in the field if they perceive they can "run out the clock" until March 65 rather than fighting for a lost cause.

So if the Confederacy's chances of winning in March 61 were 1 in 3 by July 64 those odds had degenerated to about 1 in 15. Doesn't matter if you disagree with that assessment of original odds, I would be surprised anyone disagrees with the idea those odds had degenerated.

But I'd argue the South's odds of mitagating the disaster that was the last 9 months of the war are pretty good, as are the odds of being able to extend the war, say another six months are doable.


Could the South negotiate a national surrender and avoid the March to the Sea if Jefferson Davis were to drop dead?

Yes.

Could it get more control of the terms of reconstruction through a negotiated surrender?

Yes.

Could Atlanta be held through election day?

Without Hood in charge, more than likely.

Could the threat of long term guerrilla warfare be used as a bargaining chip when negotiating (doubt the South could actually pull it off at this point but that's not important if the North doesn't know that)?

Yes.

Could the stupidity that was the Nashville Campaign be avoided?

Yes.

Could some of those non dead in an atl people or the fact that the South didn't fight to the bitter end change things, for good or ill?

Certainly.
 
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