Different Case Blue (Stalingrad What If)

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Deleted member 1487

I know this is an issue that has been discussed repeatedly here on the forum, myself included. But I wanted to gain a fresh perspective on this from the community.

What if the Germans did not make the Caucasian oil a priority in 1942 and simply used the campaign season to finish taking all of the Ukraine and grabbing Stalingrad, perhaps keeping it or just wrecking the city/industry before retreating to defensible river lines? I know that the idea behind the campaign was to cripple Soviet industry, but what if Hitler + the German General Staff realize that the logistics are just not there for a campaign down into the Caucasus? Combined with another campaign to reach defensible boundaries in Russia while chewing up Russian forces in limited battles, this could preserve their strength for a more decisive campaign in 1943 while not allowing the Russians any opportunities for a riposte.

Perhaps then in 1943 a strike into the Caucasus once logistics have been improved would have been feasible, once the Russians had tried their Mars and a different Uranus offensives. Thoughts?
 
I know this is an issue that has been discussed repeatedly here on the forum, myself included. But I wanted to gain a fresh perspective on this from the community.

What if the Germans did not make the Caucasian oil a priority in 1942 and simply used the campaign season to finish taking all of the Ukraine and grabbing Stalingrad, perhaps keeping it or just wrecking the city/industry before retreating to defensible river lines? I know that the idea behind the campaign was to cripple Soviet industry, but what if Hitler + the German General Staff realize that the logistics are just not there for a campaign down into the Caucasus? Combined with another campaign to reach defensible boundaries in Russia while chewing up Russian forces in limited battles, this could preserve their strength for a more decisive campaign in 1943 while not allowing the Russians any opportunities for a riposte.

Perhaps then in 1943 a strike into the Caucasus once logistics have been improved would have been feasible, once the Russians had tried their Mars and a different Uranus offensives. Thoughts?

wiking

I have wondered at times something slightly larger. I.e. take or isolate and destroy Stalingrad and also advance down the west bank to the Astrakhan region. Basically greatly hinder Soviets getting oil from the Baku region and mean that any strike from Stalingrad south has to cross the Volga, a sizeable barrier. Possibly still too big a logistical burden but significantly easier than trying to reach Baku, i.e. much shorter and over open steppes rather than trying to cross/swing around the Caucasus.

Steve
 
I don't think the Germans can win this one but obviously theie defeat won't be nearly as bad as the original Blue. A "big" offensive in 1943 would also be folly, by that point the Soviets were beginning to outproduce the Germans, Lend Lease was beginning to have a real impact and the allies were poised to invade southern Europe.
 

burmafrd

Banned
There is no doubt that the mistakes of Stalingrad (trying to take the town instead of bypassing it) shortened the war. Hitler lost so much men and many of them some of his best that it to a great extent crippled them. Had they instead been less ambitious and tried to interdict the oil supply (get close enough to have airfields so that Baku could be bombed) would have been much more sensible. Then Kursk, instead of doing what Manstein and others wanted which was to wait for the Soviets to attack and then counter attack, also shortened the war. Change those two events and the war probably lasts longer with the Russians maybe not getting to berlin before the allies, and certainly gettting less of Eastern Europe. But there was no way Germany was going to win with so much against it.
 

Deleted member 1487

The ultimate motivation for the Germans, thanks to the wonderful book "Wages of Destruction", was the need for oil for their economy, not their military. They had enough to get by, but without extra for civilian purposes, especially in occupied territories like France, which had been motorized, but was forced to turn to horse-drawn wagons once the British blockade kicked in. Change the thirst for oil, or at least the understanding that oil would not be flowing as a result of the thrust and the motivations change.

True, Blue would not be a war winner by any stretch and may not even forestall the Soviet resurgence, but it sets up a more sustainable situation for the future vis-a-vis the Soviet war machine. By taking the Donets Basin and wrecking the industrial center of Stalingrad, while simultaneously interdicting the Caucasian oil and preserving offensive strength for the next campaign, the Axis could do much better than historical, which in turn makes the Soviet response that much more difficult. The later campaigns are then changed and with a greater Axis strength preserved, the Soviet build up is less significant in 1943 than it would be historically.

The new positions allow the Germans to strike deeper into the Soviet heartland and open up many new options all while making their defensive positions much more managable and the Soviet options more difficult and painful.
 

burmafrd

Banned
Interdicting the Soviet oil supply was the only way Germany had to really hurt the Russian war machine. If they had somehow made it close enough to destroy the oil field before being forced back it would have been a severe blow to the russians, as that area furnished them with about 80% of their oil. If they could have caused enough damage to turn the spiggot off for 6 months or so the effects would have been very telling.

It is known that there were secret talks about arriving at an armistice in 42, before stalingrad. After that, Stalin pretty much knew he would win no matter what the costs. If the germans did get to the oil, it is possible Stalin might have been willing to stop for a year or two (no one was under any illusion that it would be anything more then temporary). The overall effects of that are hard to quantify.
 

Deleted member 1487

Could the Germans had forced a negotiation at this point and would they want to?
 

Eurofed

Banned
Could the Germans had forced a negotiation at this point and would they want to?

Assuming someone can talk Hitler some sense about "let's take what we can surely grasp now and finish the job of destroying Soviet Russia much later from a superior position of strength, when we have dealt with the Western powers and rebuilt the strength of the Reich for the rematch", which is not a given but not terribly unlikely either, since he allowed armistice talks in 1942-43.

Germany would want the basic Brest-Litovsk set-up: the Baltic states, Belarus with the Smolensk oblast, Ukraine with the Rostov, Don, and Kuban regions, the Caucasus, and the 1939 border for Finland.
 
Cool:cool:
Supposing Stalin goes for it from the same motive (we can always get it back later on, comrades), what effect does this have on the Western Allies?
 

Eurofed

Banned
Cool:cool:
Supposing Stalin goes for it from the same motive (we can always get it back later on, comrades), what effect does this have on the Western Allies?

A substantial collapse of morale, most likely. Although America is going to crush Japan and pick its revenge for PH no matter what, now the invasion of continental Europe mostly seems (and actually is) quite foolhardy and going to end up in a very bloody failure, almost surely. Although if they really care, the Anglo-Americans can easily press on and secure North Africa, they can otherwise twiddle their thumbs. If they really care, the Western Allies can try and invade peripheral areas of the continent where logistics are so bad thay immediate German counterattacks can't crush them on the beachead, such as Norway, Spain, or perhaps Greece. It won't avail them much good, however, since the same logistical troubles would prevent any quick Allied advance towards the core of the continent before the Germans can amass enough forces to bottle them for good. Forget any successful landing in France or Italy, a Wehrmacht that is freed of the eastern front burden would surely massacre Allied troops on the beaches. As it concerns the bombing offensive, now Germany has the surplus industrial potential to build up its air force and anti-air defenses to the degree that it can surely get at least air parity, if not supremacy, over continental Europe. As a result, Allied bombing shall become less and less effective with more and more casualties, a reverse Battle of Britain.

Although the American nukes would still win the war for the Allies, the Anglo-American public doesn't know that they are coming, and so they are acutely vulnerable to a crisis of confidence if the conventional war looks unwinnable. Depending on political butterflies, Churchill and Roosevelt are most likely going to retain enough political leverage to try a big badly rushed-up landing or two in France and/or Italy (most likely, FDR gets the upper hand on this despite Churchill's objections) which turn out most bloody abject failures, before the irate public kicks them out of office (FDR is guaranteed to lose the 1944 election in this scenario, Churchill is voted no confidence) and presses for an armistice. The Anglo-American bloc shifts to Cold War, and you may usher in your typical Fatherland scenario. Stalin most likely tries to recoup his losses by backstabbing Japan and trying to gain control of Manchuria (which is quite feasible), Korea (quite possibly, it depends how bad the Americas have scewwed the Japanese war machien when the Soviets attack) and mainland China (not too likely, the Americans are going to oppose him every step of the way, most likely China ends up divided between Red North and pro-US South). Welcome to three-way Cold War.
 
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When I close out some of my open works I intend to do a full victory at stalingrad tl

Rubicon is also working on one although IMO his involves a pod that is too late to save the situation
 
Assuming someone can talk Hitler some sense about "let's take what we can surely grasp now and finish the job of destroying Soviet Russia much later from a superior position of strength, when we have dealt with the Western powers and rebuilt the strength of the Reich for the rematch", which is not a given but not terribly unlikely either, since he allowed armistice talks in 1942-43.

Germany would want the basic Brest-Litovsk set-up: the Baltic states, Belarus with the Smolensk oblast, Ukraine with the Rostov, Don, and Kuban regions, the Caucasus, and the 1939 border for Finland.

I hear about these armistice talks a lot, but I have never seen any hard evidence or details. Does anybody have any?
 
I hear about these armistice talks a lot, but I have never seen any hard evidence or details. Does anybody have any?

The Historian Antony Beevors book 'Stalingrad'* claims that the Soviets were seriously considering giving up territory akin to Brest-litovsk in 1918[Ukraine,Belorussia and the Baltic states] given how disasterous things were at the front in the very early days of Barbarossa. Molotov even arranged a meeting with the Bulgarian ambassador, Ivan Stamenov , to ask him to act as an intermediary in negotiations with Berlin but he refused citing his personal conviction that the Soviets would win the war in the end.
Other negotiations[initiated by the soviets] were supposed to have been attempted up to 1943 through Swedish channels though these are harder to substantiate.
*p.9
 
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