Difference in the Philippines

Geon

Donor
I know that a recent TL on this board asked what would have happened if Eisenhower and not MacArthur had been in charge of the Philippines when the Japanese invaded in 1941, but I would like to ask two questions based on some items Calbear mentioned in another forum.

Let's assume that - for the sake of argument - MacArthur has a sudden bout of common sense. As a result he does two things differently from what he did in 1941-42 during the invasion of the Philippines.

  1. He scrambles all the aircraft on the ground within say ten to fifteen minutes of getting the news of the Pearl Harbor attack. Thus they are not neatly lined up ready for the Japanese to blast them when they attack.
  2. He saves all the food supplies he can so that the Bataan bastion can hold out for a while longer.
Doing just these two things how does the first Battle of the Philippines go and how long do Bataan and Corregidor hold out before they capitulate or - follow up question - do they hold out long enough to be relieved?
 
all or some of the squadrons had been up and down throughout the night/day. that is one of the reasons why they were caught on the ground. what happened in the philippines was not unpreparedness, as at hawaii.
 
I know that a recent TL on this board asked what would have happened if Eisenhower and not MacArthur had been in charge of the Philippines when the Japanese invaded in 1941, but I would like to ask two questions based on some items Calbear mentioned in another forum.

Let's assume that - for the sake of argument - MacArthur has a sudden bout of common sense. As a result he does two things differently from what he did in 1941-42 during the invasion of the Philippines.

  1. He scrambles all the aircraft on the ground within say ten to fifteen minutes of getting the news of the Pearl Harbor attack. Thus they are not neatly lined up ready for the Japanese to blast them when they attack.
They were not neatly lined up. The Luzon airfields were in chaos after repeated launches and landings between dawn & the Japanese main attack.

Messages of the PH attack started arriving between 02:00 & 03:00. About fours hours before sunrise. The Japanese main bomber force did not arrive until about noon. At dawn CAPs were launched and the bombers sent south to orbit out of harms way. At approx 09:30 a force of nine Japanese bombers raided some auxilliary airfields in northern Luzon. The radar did spot these and warned the interceptor wing HQ, extra CAP were launched in response. At 10:30 a thunderstorm at sea created a false contact on the radar & the CAP was reinforced again. As 11:00 approached the decision was made to arm the bombers & they were recalled to Clarks Field - the only location with bombs. The fighter command also landed all the fighters aloft in the CAP to refuel, but failed to organize imeadiate replacement flights. There was a small USN CAP over Cavite, but it was out of position for the moment & too small. The radar did spot this second attack and telephone a warning, but the confusion within the interceptor wing had reached critical mass & they were unable to accelerate launch of the replacement CAP.
 

Jack Brisco

Banned
Well, getting all the food/supplies possible into Bataan/Corregidor would have helped some, IF MacArthur decided to stick with War Plan Orange and not try to fight the landings on the beaches, as he did. Another big help would have been overriding Philippine law/regulations that said large quantities of rice couldn't be moved from the province where they were purchased, and taking all the food and clothing in warehouses of Japanese companies/traders in the Philippines. IRL this kept a lot of rice from feeding hungry soldiers and civilian refugees. Also IRL a US Army Quartermaster colonel was threatened with court-martial if he took 2,000 cases of canned food in a Japanese company's warehouse. The siege would have gone on longer, but nowhere near long enough to allow a relief expedition.
 
They were not neatly lined up. The Luzon airfields were in chaos after repeated launches and landings between dawn & the Japanese main attack.

Messages of the PH attack started arriving between 02:00 & 03:00. About fours hours before sunrise. The Japanese main bomber force did not arrive until about noon. At dawn CAPs were launched and the bombers sent south to orbit out of harms way. At approx 09:30 a force of nine Japanese bombers raided some auxilliary airfields in northern Luzon. The radar did spot these and warned the interceptor wing HQ, extra CAP were launched in response. At 10:30 a thunderstorm at sea created a false contact on the radar & the CAP was reinforced again. As 11:00 approached the decision was made to arm the bombers & they were recalled to Clarks Field - the only location with bombs. The fighter command also landed all the fighters aloft in the CAP to refuel, but failed to organize imeadiate replacement flights. There was a small USN CAP over Cavite, but it was out of position for the moment & too small. The radar did spot this second attack and telephone a warning, but the confusion within the interceptor wing had reached critical mass & they were unable to accelerate launch of the replacement CAP.

I've never heard of a USN CAP over Cavite. Details please, this is interesting!
 
1. The air power issue
Based on my research I feel that no matter what, due to lack of spares and replacement aircraft, the V Fighter Command was going to be worn down within a couple of weeks of the campaign to the point of being combat ineffective. It would have inflicted more losses, but its ultimate fate is pretty clear. Without a stable and adequate supply line for parts, ammunition etc an aircraft force simply will be worn down until it is no longer combat capable. The B17s of the V Bomber Command are even more vulnerable to that, plus the B17C/Ds available are far more vulnerable than the later B17E/F/G models 1943-44. They were also just not enough of them to do more than maybe, if its a good day, the weather cooperates. opposition is relatively minimal, etc to maybe damage substantially a couple of Japanese airfields and maybe knock out some Japanese aircraft undergoing maintenance or awaiting parts. They are not going to sink any substantial numbers of ships (if they sink any at all), nor are they going to clobber the Japanese air forces in Formosa.

But if handled better they could have done more damage before being forced to retreat south.

2. Better staff work, and better supervision would have made a substantial difference in OTL in moving food, of which there were more than sufficient supplies available. The problem is too much was moved forward, or abandoned in the hurried retreat to Bataan. The Navy did an excellent job of taking care of its personnel in that respect, but the Army failed its troops and that is ultimately a failure of staff and thus a failure of the commander in charge of that staff.

More abundant rations for longer would have made a huge difference in the ability of the troops at Bataan to put up effective resistance as poor nutrition makes people more vulnerable to disease and sicker longer once they become sick, while the statistic of who was combat effective during the final days of Bataan in OTL was someone able to move 100 yards carrying a weapon and still able to fire it at the end of that movement.

It also means healthier men with more physical reserves able to handle not only the Bataan Death March (the worst killer of which was men falling out due to illness and dying or being murdered by the Japanese) as well as better able to handle the hell of Japanese captivity.

The USAFE failed to take care of its troops with the resources that were available to it at the start of the war in OTL. That is the most damning indictment of all.
 
As to being relieved... there is no possibility of the USAFE holding out until 1945, which was when the liberation of the Philippines happened in OTL, and the US Navy was in no position to make a strong move until it defeated the IJN, which was not until 1944. The logistics just wouldn't support it. The only possibility of earlier relief requires an abandonment of Germany First, and allocation of more airpower to the Pacific. Which would have been a very high risk strategy indeed.
 
I've never heard of a USN CAP over Cavite. Details please, this is interesting!

Seen it mentioned here & there. Unsure which version I've read is the more accurate. Some place the CAP as few as four aircraft, others place it at 12. Some versions claim the Army sent a radio message begging the Navy CAP to intervene @ Clark Field, others dont mention such radio messages.
 
I've never heard of a USN CAP over Cavite. Details please, this is interesting!

The USN had no land based fighters in the P.I. all operational aircraft were float planes or amphibians. IIRC, Admarial Yarnell ( Com Asiatic Fleet 1936-1939) had recommended a naval fighter/ scout naval station. Nothing came of it. All land based aircraft were to be Army.
 
I know that a recent TL on this board asked what would have happened if Eisenhower and not MacArthur had been in charge of the Philippines when the Japanese invaded in 1941, but I would like to ask two questions based on some items Calbear mentioned in another forum.

Let's assume that - for the sake of argument - MacArthur has a sudden bout of common sense. As a result he does two things differently from what he did in 1941-42 during the invasion of the Philippines.

  1. He scrambles all the aircraft on the ground within say ten to fifteen minutes of getting the news of the Pearl Harbor attack. Thus they are not neatly lined up ready for the Japanese to blast them when they attack.
  2. He saves all the food supplies he can so that the Bataan bastion can hold out for a while longer.
Doing just these two things how does the first Battle of the Philippines go and how long do Bataan and Corregidor hold out before they capitulate or - follow up question - do they hold out long enough to be relieved?

As I understand from my readings the B17s could have done an early morning raid on the Japanese airfields on Formosa. There was fog that day which made the Japanese late in taking off, so their aircraft would have been sitting out in the open although I guess a challenge to spot from the air if it was foggy. A successful strike would have have given the US another week or two of functioning aircraft I suspect. It might also have delayed the Japanese landings.

As Galveston highlights there were real problems in maintaining a functional US air defence for any prolonged period, they had too few aircraft to start with and the maintenance problems would rapidly cause further declines even if the air campaign went as well as it could.


On land MacArthure was a bit short on kit and the Philippine troops were not well enough trained, an earlier mobilisation would have made a difference as would a couple more convoys worth of gear. I think MacArthur needed to have had some success in the field to prolong the campaign in a useful manner. Being stuck on Bataan for longer does not cause enough of a delay to regional Japanese plans to make a material contribution to the war effort. That said it is clear with hindsight that he should have stockpiled more food and ammunition if he planned to dig in there.
 

Geon

Donor
Okay, let me add in one more factor to what I mentioned at the start of this thread. In addition to the two points I made in my first post let us also assume that MacArthur, once he receives the order from FDR to evacuate decides not to. We know he contemplated doing just such a thing in OTL. He had actually threatened to resign his commission and continue on as a guerilla fighter in the hills as one source I read indicated.

In any case, assume MacArthur's big ego doesn't let him leave. He evacuates his family and stays with his troops at Corregidor to the end. Whether he is able to slip away to join the Philippine guerillas in the hills I will leave open for discussion.

In any case there is no MacArthur agitating for an invasion of the Philippines in 1945 - no "I shall return" mythos. Think more "I shall remain."

How does this effect the Battle of the Philippines - in addition to what I mentioned above.

I realize by the way MacArthur staying has been discussed but I would like to examine the effects of his staying on the troops as well as possible effects on the War in the Pacific later on.
 
Seen it mentioned here & there. Unsure which version I've read is the more accurate. Some place the CAP as few as four aircraft, others place it at 12. Some versions claim the Army sent a radio message begging the Navy CAP to intervene @ Clark Field, others dont mention such radio messages.

There was a CAP over the Manile/Cavite area comprised of elements of the 3rd and 21st Pursuit Squadrons. The USN did not have any fighter aircraft in country.
There were 3 pursuit squadrons (or portions of them) in the air but they were all in the wrong place when the attack on Clark Field began.
 
1. The air power issue
Based on my research I feel that no matter what, due to lack of spares and replacement aircraft, the V Fighter Command was going to be worn down within a couple of weeks of the campaign to the point of being combat ineffective. It would have inflicted more losses, but its ultimate fate is pretty clear. Without a stable and adequate supply line for parts, ammunition etc an aircraft force simply will be worn down until it is no longer combat capable. The B17s of the V Bomber Command are even more vulnerable to that, plus the B17C/Ds available are far more vulnerable than the later B17E/F/G models 1943-44. They were also just not enough of them to do more than maybe, if its a good day, the weather cooperates. opposition is relatively minimal, etc to maybe damage substantially a couple of Japanese airfields and maybe knock out some Japanese aircraft undergoing maintenance or awaiting parts. They are not going to sink any substantial numbers of ships (if they sink any at all), nor are they going to clobber the Japanese air forces in Formosa.

But if handled better they could have done more damage before being forced to retreat south.

2. Better staff work, and better supervision would have made a substantial difference in OTL in moving food, of which there were more than sufficient supplies available. The problem is too much was moved forward, or abandoned in the hurried retreat to Bataan. The Navy did an excellent job of taking care of its personnel in that respect, but the Army failed its troops and that is ultimately a failure of staff and thus a failure of the commander in charge of that staff.

More abundant rations for longer would have made a huge difference in the ability of the troops at Bataan to put up effective resistance as poor nutrition makes people more vulnerable to disease and sicker longer once they become sick, while the statistic of who was combat effective during the final days of Bataan in OTL was someone able to move 100 yards carrying a weapon and still able to fire it at the end of that movement.

It also means healthier men with more physical reserves able to handle not only the Bataan Death March (the worst killer of which was men falling out due to illness and dying or being murdered by the Japanese) as well as better able to handle the hell of Japanese captivity.

The USAFE failed to take care of its troops with the resources that were available to it at the start of the war in OTL. That is the most damning indictment of all.

I agree with your #1 comment, there just wasn't the infrastructure and supplies in place to contest the skies long-term. If events had played out a little differently on 8 Dec, I think that the FEAF would have been able to prevent complete Japanese air superiority for about 10 to 15 days before becoming combat ineffective. That would have given USAFFE a little more time to get their act together. USAFFE ground forces wouldn't have been forced to withdraw as fast as they did and the extra time would have allowed for transfer of the stockpiled food that was eventually abandoned.
 
As I understand from my readings the B17s could have done an early morning raid on the Japanese airfields on Formosa. There was fog that day which made the Japanese late in taking off, so their aircraft would have been sitting out in the open although I guess a challenge to spot from the air if it was foggy. A successful strike would have have given the US another week or two of functioning aircraft I suspect. It might also have delayed the Japanese landings.

As Galveston highlights there were real problems in maintaining a functional US air defence for any prolonged period, they had too few aircraft to start with and the maintenance problems would rapidly cause further declines even if the air campaign went as well as it could.


On land MacArthure was a bit short on kit and the Philippine troops were not well enough trained, an earlier mobilisation would have made a difference as would a couple more convoys worth of gear. I think MacArthur needed to have had some success in the field to prolong the campaign in a useful manner. Being stuck on Bataan for longer does not cause enough of a delay to regional Japanese plans to make a material contribution to the war effort. That said it is clear with hindsight that he should have stockpiled more food and ammunition if he planned to dig in there.


issues with attacking taiwan that morning:
1) what targets? airfields-which one or two? or ports?
2) what is the earliest takeoff time? 06:00? for the squadrons at clark, only. so wait for the squadrons to come up from del monte and have one mass attack?
3) 06:00 take off ends up getting to taiwan with airfields still fogged in(so no air opposition), diverting to secondary targets also fogged in, flying around a bit waiting for fog to lift, then rtb,
arriving just in time to be caught on the ground or diverted to aux fields. or, arriving over target(s) as the fog is lifting, meaning some damage, but also lots of air opposition.
4) if the del monte squadrons come up and the whole group attacks, they likely encounter the japanese somewhere over SCS, with bad results for the bomb group.
 
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