"That brings us to the end of '71, correct?" inquired the Chancellor.
"That's correct. At this stage, Wolf brings in one of his highly talented proteges, Werner Grossman, and informs him of General Secretary Honecker's concerns about nuclear proliferation and the security of atomic arms and materials. Wolf orders Grossman to plumb the HVA's files on four topics to see what's already available-the Stasi were the world's most incredible pack rats. They collected more data than they could ever really process. Anyways, Wolf gives Grossman the charge of collating all existing data concerning a) NATO's policies, procedures, and experience with dealing with lost nuclear weapons, b) information concerning how NATO moves their tactical nuclear warheads within Western Europe , c) the recruitment status of any individuals with physical access to NATO storage depots, NATO airbases, or NATO artillery units, d) updated files on assets relevant to the area of nuclear weapons. Grossman is also tasked with recruiting a clean physicist with a nuclear technology background who is not already an asset of the Stasi. Outside of Grossman, Wolf also requests a question and answer session with the HVA's geology expert concerning West Germany. You note that none of this touches on acquiring warheads or materials from the Russians, He writes in his notes that he was convinced by this point that that barring a Soviet aircraft losing a nuclear armed aircraft at the correct time and place, it was practically impossible to grab a Russian warhead or fissile material."
"So, Wolf's trying to fill in his knowledge gaps beyond his initial orders from Honecker without arousing any suspicion from the Russians so that when the ask does come that he can lay out two to three options that could work? Right?"
"Something like that. Grossman reports back on the US Air Force's various misadventures with SAC bombers that have crashed. Among other incidents, they lost a B-47 in 1956 with a pair of thermonuclear bombs they never recovered, there's a lost nuke sitting in a swamp in North Carolina lost off a B-52, and most famously, the Palomeres crash off the coast of Spain. In that case, the Air Force recovered all four bombs, two of which exploded, spreading radioactivity over a patch of Andalusia. Their record recovering their "Broken Arrows" is decidedly mixed. Secondly, Grossman tells Wolf that unlike the Soviets, the Americans tend to move nukes around using helicopters. They're more afraid of terrorism than the chance of a helicopter crash; their Russian comrades have the inverse problem. As far as agent recruitment, the HVA's existing assets in the Luftwaffe and Bundeswehr are insufficient to open locked doors or provide physical materials. Nuclear storage facilities have not, as until now, been a high priority recruitment focus. That can change in a hurry. He did go on to note that there would be a new class of what their Soviet friends referred to as 'Sparrows' coming available in another month or two. Finally, Grossman also identifies four to five agents who might have illuminating supporting information useful to their research task at hand. Wolf wrote that he felt prepared for his meeting with Honecker on January 21st, 1972."
The Chancellor spoke "...an historic meeting?"
"Oh, yes."
