Did the volkssturm changed anything?

Any speculation on why the Volkssturm didn't have an arsenal of strange and diverse weapons like bottle throwers and sticky bombs? They had Panzerfausts, but they didn't have a range of weaponry to compensate for their lack of Mausers.
They were also equipped with stockpiles of captured weapons which the Germans captured from subdued nations during the early days of the war.
 

Redbeard

Banned
It must also be remembered that the basic Volkssturm/Home Guard idea was much older than the Nazis. Ordinary men taking up arms in times of war had been widespread since the origin of mankind, but after the defeats to the French "people's armies" in the revolutionary and early Napoleonic Wars the systematic organisation of ordinary men into the army was developed. Not just in a draft system but also in having the conscripts first serve in the standing army, then in various degrees of reserve and then eventually in the Landwehr, which usually was obliged to local service only. Many of the German speaking nations included Landwehr units in the regular armies however (Prussia, Bavaria and Austria and possibly other) and generally they did quite well (I think in most cases those joining the field armies were volunteers - ie motivated beyond average). Not at least the Prussians also used Landwehr units for besieging French garrisons in eastern Europe in 1813. In that way a lot of regular French troops were locked up by a lot of Prussian peasants.

In that context I can see where the Wehrmacht got the inspiration and hope for the Volkssturm, the problem just was that the difference between regulars with muskets and peasants with muskets is much smaller than the difference between Volkssturm with Panzerfausts and a WWII regular unit capable of combining arms. Combining arms is THE battle winning factor.
 
They were also equipped with stockpiles of captured weapons which the Germans captured from subdued nations during the early days of the war.

Which was another massive downside for the Volksturm. Nobody had a clue what ammo to send to who so once their initial issue was gone they were screwed.

Whereas the Home Guard were all armed with weapons which fired standard British ammunition (eventually).
 

Redbeard

Banned
Which was another massive downside for the Volksturm. Nobody had a clue what ammo to send to who so once their initial issue was gone they were screwed.

Whereas the Home Guard were all armed with weapons which fired standard British ammunition (eventually).
That certainly was a logistic challenge but I don't think so much in the Volkssturm. The Volkssturm units were not intended for a campaign where the troops moved forward or backwards and had to be continuously supplied, but were supposed to take the one and only battle in its home region with what it had - game over - win or die. I doubt if there was any resupply schemes or capacity at all.

In that context I think issuing the Volkssturm with the countless weapons and ammo taken in various occupied countries like it was optimal to place confiscated artillery in static positions in the Atlantic wall. A lot of field army units also were equipped with foreign materiel, but some of that wasn't more foreign than still being produced in German controlled factories. The Pz 38 is one example, but AFAIK a lot of French trucks and spare parts were produced in occupied France and delivered to the Wehrmacht.

Next we often tend to evaluate German logistics by US Army standards. Apart from US doctrine requiring much more arty ammo (about 75% of the logistic burden) the US system meant each part being transported first over an ocean and then continuously distributed to the engaged units. That was extremely complicated and required the number of different parts to be managed to kept as low as possible. The German system was very different, not just because of the much shorter lines of supply, but mainly because German army units were not expected to be kept up to strength during an engagement, but basically fought until having spent its combat power and then either ceased to exist or was withdrawn to be rebuilt - with new men, materiel and ammo supply. So, in the German logistic system you didn't have to keep track each day all the way to the frontline of "that kind of oil filters for that Divisions and that kind of tires for that Divisions" but when a Division was withdrawn for rebuildling they got what was stockpiled near them and spent it in the next engagement - simply put.

Of course they preferred standardised materiel, all other things being equal that is an advantage, but the German system made it possible to utilise a lot of materiel that otherwise would have been wasted and so was specialised for the German situation. They wouldn't have benefitted from the US system and the US wouldn't have been served with the German.
 
Digressing back to the British Home Guard. When it was stood down 1944 were any of the members fit for use as replacements in the Brit armies on the continent?
 
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Next we often tend to evaluate German logistics by US Army standards. Apart from US doctrine requiring much more arty ammo (about 75% of the logistic burden) the US system meant each part being transported first over an ocean and then continuously distributed to the engaged units. That was extremely complicated and required the number of different parts to be managed to kept as low as possible. The German system was very different, not just because of the much shorter lines of supply, but mainly because German army units were not expected to be kept up to strength during an engagement, but basically fought until having spent its combat power and then either ceased to exist or was withdrawn to be rebuilt - with new men, materiel and ammo supply. So, in the German logistic system you didn't have to keep track each day all the way to the frontline of "that kind of oil filters for that Divisions and that kind of tires for that Divisions" but when a Division was withdrawn for rebuildling they got what was stockpiled near them and spent it in the next engagement - simply put.

...

This worked for men & equipment. For ammunition it failed in the east. I've found frequent complaints or reports from artillery commanders, describing how they were chronically short the ammunition they need for their tasks. Identification of one or two "units of Fire" being on hand when 3 or 4 were necessary to support a attack are not uncommon. In the Polish, western, and Balkans campaigns the Germans got away with short artillery ammunition supply due to the brief campaigns, and fluidity of the battles. In the east this became a constant problem.
 

Deleted member 9338

The role of the Home Guard was to slow down the invaders and make them use supplies, to buy time while the regular army redeployed and the RN scattered the barge convoys.

This role didn't exist for the Volkssturm.

The Home Guard also acted as a training ground for British youth before they were of an age to enlist.
 
Digressing back to the British Home Guard. When it was stood down 1944 were any of the members fit for use as replacements in the Brit armies on the continent?

I believe

The youngest members were eligible for conscription as the home guards took men a year earlier than the army did. These would have been eligible for front line service.

The majority of the younger members would have been in reserved careers kept away from the army on that basis.

The older members were too old for front line service.
 

Redbeard

Banned
This worked for men & equipment. For ammunition it failed in the east. I've found frequent complaints or reports from artillery commanders, describing how they were chronically short the ammunition they need for their tasks. Identification of one or two "units of Fire" being on hand when 3 or 4 were necessary to support a attack are not uncommon. In the Polish, western, and Balkans campaigns the Germans got away with short artillery ammunition supply due to the brief campaigns, and fluidity of the battles. In the east this became a constant problem.

I agree. Which was also why the Wehrmacht could never rely on weight of fire but rather had to rely on movement. That worked fine until the opponent found out how to counter contemporary movement (actually the French did already in June 1940, but too late and with too little). German fire control was not inept, and certainly more refined that the usual Soviet, but never came close to the Anglo-Saxon - probably because they never had access to the number of reliable radiosets that the Anglo-Saxons had.
 
The 75% to 80% of the artillery that was horse drawn could not rely on movement, & the commanders placed a emphasis on precision fires, hoping to make fewer rounds count for more effect. They also tried to make fire planning as efficient as possible, using artillery only where it was absolutely the best option.
 
The Volkssturm had a SMG that was basically made up of welded pipes and roughly resembled the MP-40, an Assault Rifle (Volksgewere) that was a very crude copy of the MP-43/44 and the Volkspistole which was a crude copy of the Lugar - none built in large numbers and apparently distribution was spotty at best. IIRC a lot of obsolete equipment like 37mm cannons and old WWI MG's were to go to them but as no one got more than rudimentary raining (mostly how to fire the Panzerfaust) they weren't issued support weapons. And the units had no organic transport anyway...

With little to no training their ability to use them effectively was spotty at best anyways. It takes months to years for partisan groups to be effective at all. By that time all but the best troops have died and the ones who have survived either have a natural gift for soldiering or intelligent enough to pick up enough to survive. Even most of those two died meantime. So what you have left of the original soldiers are people who are natural soldiers and are lucky.
 
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