Did the UK have an alternative to WW2?

General Zod

Banned
The bulk of all European strategic thinking in the 1930s was anti communist . It was only after Munich that this began to change.

Actually, after Hitler's betrayal of Munich and the invasion of Czechia in 1939. European public opinion was mostly happy with the result of mMnich.

But Hitler hated the Jews more than he hated the commies so after Munich he made it his mission to defeat the Anglo American threat to German race.

Actually, he thought of his main mission to build the Lebenstraum and destroy the Jewish-Bolshevik menace, which he thought of one and the same, since he was persuaded that the Soviet ruling elite was a puppet of the Jewish conspiracy. Attacking Russia accomplished both. He thought of Britain as a worthwhile possible "Aryan" ally, and was quite reluctant to wage war on the British Empire. As of the USA, he wavered between respecting and despising their strength, according to whether he focused more on the "Aryan" i.e. racist and imperialistic or "Jewish" i.e. democratic aspects of US society (too bad for him he swung the wrong side on December 11, 1941). Anyway, he pictured the USA as the likelt opponent for the next generation of the Reich, somewhere in the 1970s or 1980s.

A reversal at the time of Sudatenland crises could have left enough of a mark to slow Hitlers slide to abandoning the long term strategic build up to total war, infavor of limited eastern war earlier.

Political victory disease. He did not acknowledge that even British committment to appeasement had limits, and since he still had to submit Poland, total conquest of Bohemia-Moravia instead of gradual satellization was not worth alienating the British over Poland. He gambled on the British repeating the Munich strategy, and that would have worked only if his word had not lost any credibility after the betrayal of Munich.

BTW the horrors of the extent of the Holocaust was not really understood until later in the war.

Indeed. Especially because neither the Final Solution neither the butchering of Slavs did really took wing until 1942-43. Mistreatment of Poles in the early phases of the war does not really remotely compare. Word somewhat spread in 1943-44, but full knowledge was not available until 1945, with the Allied troops in the death camps. One thing that slowed acknowledgement is that anti-semitism did not really became taboo in the West until the full extent of the Holocaust was known, and another that the Allies had tarnished their credibility on this kind of charges when their propaganda blew the somewhat harsh treatement of Belgians by the Germans in WWI to truly ridiculous proportions.


LL was significant later in the war but by then the Soviets were well on their way. Overall its be credited contributing 10% to the Soviet war effort. Its main impact seems to have allowed Stalin to balance his books by mid 1942 and not go bankrupt. The main dynamic of WW -II Eastern Front would have remained. As long as Hitler was incharge they would lose.

10% ? Ridiculous. The vast majority of Red Army trucks were from the Americans, and American foodstuffs kept the Russians fed until they recovered Ukraine. Just because the vast majority of Soviet tanks were homebuilt, it does not mean you can win a total war with them alone. And you can not wage a war very well if you go bankrupt.
 

General Zod

Banned
1. No second front may make a difference but it is somewhat debatable. They will want to leave a garrison force of some strength throughout Europe to guard their conquests.

Which conquests ? If Britain never entered the war, so they will France, Benelux, or Norway. Only conquests will be, if ever, Czechia and Poland.

Of course, they will still need a decent garrison force to guard against France. However, the likelihood of pacifist '30s France backstabbing Gemrany is quite low. They already have what they wanted with Alcase-Lorraine, and WWI exausted and shocked them more than any other nation.

Britain will continue to re-arm and a return to war is relatively plausable.

Which return ? And as long as France is free, Britain's strategic interests on the Continent will not be vitally threatened.

2. No Strategic bombing. Well this didn't really hit its stride untill 1944 and by then in OTL the Red Army had already torn the guts out of the Wehrmacht.

They may spare all the flak personnel, which IIRC upped one-million.

Germany might be able to produce some more tanks, guns, trucks and so on, but they are still going to be outnumbered 2:1, going on 3-5:1 as the war goes on.

Without Land-lease, the Soviets will not have but a trickle of trucks, and will be critically low on foodstuffs. Good luck for Roosevelt persuading the Congress to gift the Godless Bolsheviks a dime if they are not allies of the USA in the same war. A lot of the workers in those ammo factories will have to till the fields, or they will starve. Without the trucks, goodbye in-depth Soviet offensives, and if they will produce them, nowhere as many tanks.

I don't see it changing all that much. Germany lost the war by the complete failure to make any worthwhile gains in 1942.

They had lost the chance to force a decisive victory, not the option to exaust the Russians to a partial victory or a stalemate.

In that year strategic bombing had almost no impact.


4. No L-L for Russia. Would probably prevent such a swift advance, but L-L was not critical to Russia's ability to fend off German attacks in 41 and even 42 and while they might not bounce the Dnieper in late 43 for want of trucks and other vehicles, the fact is clear that the Germans are going to be on the defensive while vastly outnumbered and out-gunned.

And of course all the manpower and weapons the Germans may spare from France, Italy, North Africa, Norway, the Balkans, anti-aircraft duty, will vanish in the air instead of being redeployed on the unique Eastern Front ?

See above for lack of Land-Lease. Those Siberian factories were not a limitless barrel.

5. Manpower. Sorry I don't know which book you are reading but it was Germany who was reduced to equipping children and telling them to die for the Reich.

Irrelevant. Germany had exausted her manpower reserves in 1945, but the Soviets were almost to the same point. The troops they deployed in 1945 were the least they could have, to any substantial degree.

Stalin was apparently so concerned by this lack of manpower his orders to take Berlin at speed cost some 360,000 casualties.

Irrelevant, too. Stalin knew that the enemy was on his last throes and was kept in a deadly strategic vise, and his main concern was to occupy as much of Germany as he could in order to better Soviet position at the peace table. He knew he could waste troops, even if no substantial reinforcements were coming, by that point.


The bucket might not have been limitless but they were not at the bottom of the barrel just yet.

Yes, they were, but very few noticed since Germany was done in 1945.

The idea they would have run out of manpower before they hit the Dneipr is simply ludicrous unless you imagine the Wehrmacht are going to kill or capture approximately one million men in the Red Army for almost no losses. In which case Germany has presumerably won the war.

Maybe not the Dneipr, maybe there or maybe on the Vistula or soemplace in between, the point is that since they were at the bottom of the manpower barrel by mid 1945, with the help of three years of L-L , the Italy front, the troops Germany lost in North Africa, the France front, the occupation troops in Norway and the Balkans, strategic bombing, German A-A personnel, with less weapons (no L-L), against more German manpower and weapons (none of the above), they would have suffered much worse attrition and made much slower gains, unless they had much better generalship (unlikely) the Germans much worse (unlikely), which means they would have reached exaustion much before than Vienna and Berlin. A very conservative estimate is before achieving a strategic breakthrough in Poland and the Balkans, which still denies them a decisive victory and ends the war in a stalemate. If the Germans get any better performance, or the Soviets any worse, the final truceline gradually moves East.
 
2. No Strategic bombing. Well this didn't really hit its stride untill 1944 and by then in OTL the Red Army had already torn the guts out of the Wehrmacht. Germany might be able to produce some more tanks, guns, trucks and so on, but they are still going to be outnumbered 2:1, going on 3-5:1 as the war goes on. I don't see it changing all that much. Germany lost the war by the complete failure to make any worthwhile gains in 1942. In that year strategic bombing had almost no impact.

3. Luftwaffe on the front. Would it really change things? Some argue that it would, but to my mind it would not be that decisive. Germany already had significant logistical problems. Now they have to try and get more aircraft and aircraft fuel to vaguely near the frontline. I doubt a drastic expansion of the numbers deployed there in OTL is possible, although it may help turn the tide as the Red Army closes in on Germany.

5. Manpower. Sorry I don't know which book you are reading but it was Germany who was reduced to equipping children and telling them to die for the Reich. Stalin was apparently so concerned by this lack of manpower his orders to take Berlin at speed cost some 360,000 casualties. The bucket might not have been limitless but they were not at the bottom of the barrel just yet. Mixed Metaphor? Ah well. The idea they would have run out of manpower before they hit the Dneipr is simply ludicrous unless you imagine the Wehrmacht are going to kill or capture approximately one million men in the Red Army for almost no losses. In which case Germany has presumerably won the war.
I do not think that the POD "Britain not involved in World War II" is particularly likely. But If it had happened, it would have been much more difficult, probably impossible for the Soviet Army to tear "the guts out of the Wehrmacht". During any given year between 1938 and 1944 Germany (as defined by its 1937 borders) produced more steel than the Soviet Union. If we add the various territories occupied by Germany after 1937, Germany's superiority over the Soviet Union becomes quite marked: in 1940 it was 19,1 million tonnes for Germany (1937 borders) + 10,7 million tonnes from the German-occupied areas versus 19,0 million tonnes for the Soviet Union.

During the next two years in OTL the situation shifted dramatically in Germany's favor:
1941 20,8 + 11,7 for Germany 14,5 for the Soviet Union
1942 20,5 + 12,9 for Germany 10,0 for the Soviet Union

Even in 1944 Germany produced 18,3 million tonnes and the Soviet Union 16,4 million tonnes.
In the timeline caused by this thread's POD Germany's superiority will be even stronger. Germany will need no occupation forces in Denmark, Norway, Greece and Yugoslavia, no Afrika Korps and fewer occupation forces in the West. If the Luftwaffe is concentrated exclusively on the Eastern front, this means that it is 50 per cent stronger there, even if we do not take into account the losses incurred during the Scandinavian and Balkan campaigns and the Battle of Britain. The argument that it is impossible to station them there because Germany had logistic problems even in OTL can be countered quite simply: supply lines are not God-given constants. A certain proportion of the personnell saved and mentioned above is used to build trucks, locomotives and railroads. And of course having no other fronts to supply, the amount of trucks and locomotives needed there is also available for the Eastern front. With no British blockade, oil might possibly simply be bought on the world market.

With stronger forces being available in 1941, the area that Germany can conquer then is likely to be substantially larger than in OTL. This means that the reservoir of manpower and raw materials available to the Soviets in 1942 is even smaller, which in turn means that Germany can conquer still more in 1942, which means that then still fewer raw materials are available for the Soviets. And so on... I do not say that a Soviet recovery is impossible. But if it takes place at all, it will take even more time in this timeline than it did OTL. A slower reconquest of territory means that the same raw materials will be available for a longer time to Germany, and will be available later to the Soviets. The same goes for the manpower potential. The manpower and raw materials not being available will of course slow down the reconquest of the next swathe of land too and make it more costly, and so on....
 

hammo1j

Donor
Agree with you there, General. It's one of the more prevalent "Sealion could have worked" type myths that the SU defeated the Nazis single handed with minor contributions from the Allies. This was probably spread by Socialist teachers, useful idiots, who fell for the great Marxist lie.

That is not to say the SU could not stand up for itself. One on one the two countries are evenly matched but with different advantages. Its the rumble again with Ali vs Foreman.
 

General Zod

Banned
Agree with you there, General. It's one of the more prevalent "Sealion could have worked" type myths that the SU defeated the Nazis single handed with minor contributions from the Allies. This was probably spread by Socialist teachers, useful idiots, who fell for the great Marxist lie.

I couldn't agree more. That, and Soviet manpower exaustion by 1945 is a little known fact even today which Communist propaganda was careful to hide for decades. So, people are led to imagine that the Soviets could have gone on throwing hordes of conscripts to their enemies for years without end. Plus, they mythicize the moving of the Russian factories to Siberia and the capabilities of the selfsame Siberian factories to similar near-godlike proportions, not realizing how many key parts of Soviet war effort were essentially provided by American supplies.

Therefore, Sovietwankers are led to believe that the moment the Red Army fires the first shot with any enemy, be it the 1941 Wehrmacht, or the 1950s NATO, they are fatebound to show up on the shores of Atlantic in due order, no matter the odds or the PoDs. :rolleyes:
 
I do not think that the POD "Britain not involved in World War II" is particularly likely. But If it had happened, it would have been much more difficult, probably impossible for the Soviet Army to tear "the guts out of the Wehrmacht". During any given year between 1938 and 1944 Germany (as defined by its 1937 borders) produced more steel than the Soviet Union. If we add the various territories occupied by Germany after 1937, Germany's superiority over the Soviet Union becomes quite marked: in 1940 it was 19,1 million tonnes for Germany (1937 borders) + 10,7 million tonnes from the German-occupied areas versus 19,0 million tonnes for the Soviet Union.

During the next two years in OTL the situation shifted dramatically in Germany's favor:
1941 20,8 + 11,7 for Germany 14,5 for the Soviet Union
1942 20,5 + 12,9 for Germany 10,0 for the Soviet Union

Even in 1944 Germany produced 18,3 million tonnes and the Soviet Union 16,4 million tonnes.

They actually produced more steel as such, I don't think I'm denying that. But their war economy management of it was worse (eg, they didn't have industrial stamping - the Sovs did, and that mattered a lot). Also, raw materials shortages for alloy metals (mangan, chrome etc) made for worse armour, lack of tungsten sapped the power of the APs etc. Germany didn't have the industrial infrastructure to match the USSR.

In the timeline caused by this thread's POD Germany's superiority will be even stronger. Germany will need no occupation forces in Denmark, Norway, Greece and Yugoslavia, no Afrika Korps and fewer occupation forces in the West. If the Luftwaffe is concentrated exclusively on the Eastern front, this means that it is 50 per cent stronger there, even if we do not take into account the losses incurred during the Scandinavian and Balkan campaigns and the Battle of Britain. The argument that it is impossible to station them there because Germany had logistic problems even in OTL can be countered quite simply: supply lines are not God-given constants. A certain proportion of the personnell saved and mentioned above is used to build trucks, locomotives and railroads. And of course having no other fronts to supply, the amount of trucks and locomotives needed there is also available for the Eastern front. With no British blockade, oil might possibly simply be bought on the world market.

But also, they would not have access to captured French equipment (eg, rebuilt Char self-propelled guns) or the French industry, and their forces would be much less experienced at armoured warfare. Poland was poor repetition for a modern war; yes, the Poles incurred them significant casualties, but they didn't have what you'd call a modern military. Development of key equipment might lag, eg replacement of 37mm Paks when it's assumed they can knock out the enemy (no "field testing" against Chars, Suomas etc). Or for that matter, upgunning of Panzer IV.

Oil was a strategic resource and couldn't be sold willy-nilly to warring nations by neutrals. I guess you could transit it through Italy, but it's rather unlikely that it would be enough. And as noted, the Germans were desperately short on hard currency; do you imagine a "Lend-Lease being set up for them?

Finally, again as noted earlier, they can't leave the French border unguarded; that'll sap a couple of dozen divisions at least. And what guarantees a friendly Yugoslavia if Britain and France are still going strong? Mussolini might perhaps also act up, causing second-hand problems; not war with the powers, but a distraction.


With stronger forces being available in 1941, the area that Germany can conquer then is likely to be substantially larger than in OTL. This means that the reservoir of manpower and raw materials available to the Soviets in 1942 is even smaller, which in turn means that Germany can conquer still more in 1942, which means that then still fewer raw materials are available for the Soviets. And so on... I do not say that a Soviet recovery is impossible. But if it takes place at all, it will take even more time in this timeline than it did OTL. A slower reconquest of territory means that the same raw materials will be available for a longer time to Germany, and will be available later to the Soviets. The same goes for the manpower potential. The manpower and raw materials not being available will of course slow down the reconquest of the next swathe of land too and make it more costly, and so on....

The resources that were lacked most severely, namely fuel (esp high-quality avgas) and what HOI lumps together as "rare materials" (alloy metals, most prominently) weren't to be found in abundance in any area that the Germans could reasonably conquer; even if one posits that they reach the Caucasus, that doesn't give them much more fuel, as the Sovs would've wrecked everything before they left (unless we do a Skorzeny/Brandenburger ultrawank or some other Birmo nonsense to stop them). Furthermore, there are limits as to how much communications and infrastructure can be improved to alleviate the logistics difficulties; most of those weren't dependent on improvements in Germany, but had to do with the absence/bad quality of Soviet maps, railways and roads (as well as various shit like the gauge of the tracks, but all history buffs know of that detail). And as noted, the force that goes up against the Soviets will be less experienced and quite likely less well equipped (perhaps even Panzer IIs or IIIs in the frontline Panzer divisions???). I wouldn't celebrate the victory just yet.
 
They actually produced more steel as such, I don't think I'm denying that. But their war economy management of it was worse (eg, they didn't have industrial stamping - the Sovs did, and that mattered a lot). Also, raw materials shortages for alloy metals (mangan, chrome etc) made for worse armour, lack of tungsten sapped the power of the APs etc. Germany didn't have the industrial infrastructure to match the USSR.
Germany started its industrial revolution later than Britain, the USA or France, but considerably earlier than Russia. Germany was, despite the Nazis' economic meddling, largely a market economy, while the Soviet Union had a command economy. These two factors combined meant that Germany's economy was substantially stronger than that of the Soviet Union. West Germany alone had a bigger gross domestic product than the post-war Soviet Union - and West Germany was tiny compared to the area over which Hitler ruled in 1941 or 1942 - and of course the post-war Soviet Union was much bigger than the area that was still under Soviet control in late 1941.

Germany was perfectly capable of industrial techniques that facilitate mass production of armaments, such as sheet metal stamping or centrifugal casting. The reason why these were not used, or not used earlier than in OTL, was that the production batches that the German armed forces ordered were too small to make the application of these techniques worthwhile and that the mode of payment used by the Heer and the Kriegsmarine (not the Luftwaffe) up to a certain point in time did not encourage an economic use of resources. Even if this problem is not adressed earlier with the POD "Britain not in the war", the massive shift of resources to the Eastern front would completely change the balance of power in Germany's favor. The steel used for thousands of anti-aircraft guns could be used for armaments on the Eastern front. These guns were usually placed on top of bunkers, where the re-inforcement needed for the concrete used up even more steel than the guns themselves. The steel needed for building U-boats, escort craft, minesweepers, torpedo boats and so on would also not be needed and the material used up by them would also be used on the Eastern front.

Although the POD "Britain not in the war" does not neccessarily change the problem of neglect of mass-production techniques, it offers a genuine possibility to alleviate this problem. In OTL, one obstacle to mass production was the frequent shift of priorities of production - let's say from U-Boats to anti-tank guns to fighter aircraft in a matter of months. If there is just one enemy nation and no change of emphasis from naval to land warfare, this change of priorities is much less likely to occurr, which makes mass production much easier. At any rate, the massive savings that could be made if Germany does not have to wage a battle against a strategic bombing offensive, occurr in any case where Britain is not in WW II, irrespective of the fact whether mass production techniques are applied earlier or not.

Of course, not facing a strategic bombing offensive means that the massive destruction caused by the bombs is avoided. An air raid also causes loss of production in any factory that lies roughly in the bombers' flight path: because the workers do not know whether their factory is the target or not, they will flee to the air-raid shelter even if the factory is not attacked. Then you have loss of production caused by the death of workers in attacks on cities and you have loss of production because the workers are deprived of their sleep. A great deal of production was also lost because the German's attempted to disperse their production or to locate them underground - during the time the factory is being dismantled, transported (on railway lines that are under attack) and re-assembled somewhere else it cannot possibly produce anything. None of this will be a problem in a TL where Britain does not enter the war. On the other hand, it just might become a problem of the Soviets, with a frontline closer to the Ural and a much stronger Luftwaffe in the East.
 

Churchill

Banned
I do not think that the POD "Britain not involved in World War II" is particularly likely. But If it had happened, it would have been much more difficult, probably impossible for the Soviet Army to tear "the guts out of the Wehrmacht". During any given year between 1938 and 1944 Germany (as defined by its 1937 borders) produced more steel than the Soviet Union. If we add the various territories occupied by Germany after 1937, Germany's superiority over the Soviet Union becomes quite marked: in 1940 it was 19,1 million tonnes for Germany (1937 borders) + 10,7 million tonnes from the German-occupied areas versus 19,0 million tonnes for the Soviet Union.

During the next two years in OTL the situation shifted dramatically in Germany's favor:
1941 20,8 + 11,7 for Germany 14,5 for the Soviet Union
1942 20,5 + 12,9 for Germany 10,0 for the Soviet Union

Even in 1944 Germany produced 18,3 million tonnes and the Soviet Union 16,4 million tonnes.
In the timeline caused by this thread's POD Germany's superiority will be even stronger. Germany will need no occupation forces in Denmark, Norway, Greece and Yugoslavia, no Afrika Korps and fewer occupation forces in the West. If the Luftwaffe is concentrated exclusively on the Eastern front, this means that it is 50 per cent stronger there, even if we do not take into account the losses incurred during the Scandinavian and Balkan campaigns and the Battle of Britain. The argument that it is impossible to station them there because Germany had logistic problems even in OTL can be countered quite simply: supply lines are not God-given constants. A certain proportion of the personnell saved and mentioned above is used to build trucks, locomotives and railroads. And of course having no other fronts to supply, the amount of trucks and locomotives needed there is also available for the Eastern front. With no British blockade, oil might possibly simply be bought on the world market.

With stronger forces being available in 1941, the area that Germany can conquer then is likely to be substantially larger than in OTL. This means that the reservoir of manpower and raw materials available to the Soviets in 1942 is even smaller, which in turn means that Germany can conquer still more in 1942, which means that then still fewer raw materials are available for the Soviets. And so on... I do not say that a Soviet recovery is impossible. But if it takes place at all, it will take even more time in this timeline than it did OTL. A slower reconquest of territory means that the same raw materials will be available for a longer time to Germany, and will be available later to the Soviets. The same goes for the manpower potential. The manpower and raw materials not being available will of course slow down the reconquest of the next swathe of land too and make it more costly, and so on....

Good post.
 
By this reasoning Roosevelt would have never activated Project Manhattan. "Our weapons are good enough as they are" is an argument that only the really dovish of politicians buy. The other are convinced by the "our enemies may get better" argument.

I concede that the issue of UK purposefully putting all their eggs in the WMD basket is one that looks very convincing only in hindsight. However, given that the UK does not choose to intervene over Poland, eagerly pursuing conventional rearmement AND nuclear research is a worthwhile alternative course, even without full Hiroshima hindsight.

There is a bit of a double edged sword in working to develop entirely new weapons while at the same time building up existing weapons systems. Certainly, the USA did shorten the Pacific War significantly by developing the A-Bomb (assuming they would have been unwilling to accept terms that Japan would have settled for without the bombing), but the USA was a special case with an economy and industrial capacity that none of the other countries were able to match. While the USA had spare capacity to develop to the A-Bomb and still build the largest Navy in the World in 2-3 years, and supply thousands of trucks and other war aid to the Soviet Union and build so many merchant ships that the Germans literally could not sink them fast enough, no other country could really afford to do that. The Germans would have been far better off if they had concentrated on building up their conventional forces instead of working on the A-bomb, the V1, the V2, the Me-262 and all the other super weapons they wasted valuable resources.

In any case, I sincerely doubt that Britain had the resources to try to build a large conventional force and mount a serious atomic program at the same time.

--
Bill
 
Germany had exausted her manpower reserves in 1945, but the Soviets were almost to the same point. The troops they deployed in 1945 were the least they could have, to any substantial degree.

The information is correct but the conclusion is wrong.

Yes, the Red Army in 1945 was a wasting asset. However, _unlike the Germans_, that was a freely made choice by the Soviets. They knew by the fall of 1944 that the war was coming to an end. They decided they needed to get as far West as they could. So they decided to sacrifice the following levies, and recruited 18, 17, even some 16-year-olds straight away. They chose that because the war had become a contest of speed against the Western Allies, not because they were forced to do that.
They could have gone for the proper option, harvesting, so to speak, their manpower when mature. The outcome: they would still have won the war, but with their vanguards not as far West as they did.
The Soviets were the one advancing; they had the option to set the pace by carrying out that option, or not.

Additionally, there were vast manpower pools the Soviets, once again, freely decided not to tap for political reasons. The Romanians alone contributed some 540,000 men. But they were only used at a fraction of their potential, for the very simple reason that the Soviets did not want to arm and supply adequately the Romanian army. The Soviets had the Romanians use up their obsolescent stocks and wear out their German-produced equipment, and then did not replace those. Again, there was nothing unavoidable about that; it was a deliberate choice. A choice that had not much to do with winning the war at hand, but rather with post-war goals. It implied not exploiting that half-million men to its fullest potential, but the Soviets were happier that way.

Now, the Germans, those were forced to send 16, and 15, and 14-year-olds in the trenches to die for the glorious Führer. Had they chosen not to do so, they would have been overrun anyway. Indeed:


Stalin knew that the enemy was on his last throes and was kept in a deadly strategic vise, and his main concern was to occupy as much of Germany as he could in order to better Soviet position at the peace table. He knew he could waste troops, even if no substantial reinforcements were coming, by that point.

Yes, exactly. So you see you are making the same point as the other poster and me. The Soviets made some choices freely, which is different from the situation in which the Germans found themselves. Therefore your conclusion above is wrong: the Soviets were not, in 1945, "almost to the same point" as the Germans.
 
But also, they would not have access to captured French equipment (eg, rebuilt Char self-propelled guns) or the French industry, and their forces would be much less experienced at armoured warfare. Poland was poor repetition for a modern war; yes, the Poles incurred them significant casualties, but they didn't have what you'd call a modern military. Development of key equipment might lag, eg replacement of 37mm Paks when it's assumed they can knock out the enemy (no "field testing" against Chars, Suomas etc). Or for that matter, upgunning of Panzer IV.
The POD is "Britain keeps out of World War II". This does certainly not prevent Germany from conquering France, on the contrary it might make the conquest even easier.

In concrete terms this might mean that Britain does not give Poland the guarantee that it gave on 31 March 1939 in OTL. Britain not giving this guarantee will in all likelyhood result in France also refusing to give it. In practical terms this will mean that France has reneged on its 1921 alliance with Poland. In this case the contempt that Hitler had for the lack of willpower in the leaders of democracies will be even stronger than in OTL. In OTL Poland had hoped for a relief offensive from the Western powers, which, as we know, never happened. In this timeline, Poland has no hope for a relief offensive and will probably give in to Germany's initial demands for Danzig and a motorway and railway line through the Corridor. There will be no need for the Molotov - Ribbentropp pact.

When Hitler's demands are met, he will demand more territory and possibly also that Poland join the anti-comintern pact. Poland, being alone, would probably also give in to these demands. If it is territory alone, then Poland will be in an even worse position to fight Germany alone, but also less able to fight alongside France. If Poland joins the anti-comintern pact, Germany will have a starting line for Barbarossa that is much closer to Moscow than the one from OTL, because the Soviet army has not marched into Eastern Poland.
Meanwhile France has made herself contemptible in the eyes of Hitler and is lacking Britain and Poland as allies. In this timeline it is even less dangerous for Hitler to attack westwards than in OTL because the Soviet army is much further away from Berlin than in OTL, and with Britain absent the war in the West is likely to be much shorter. All of this makes it quite likely that Hitler attacks France at some point from 1939 onwards.

If France, on the other hand, does give a guarantee to Poland, we have the Polish and Western campaigns that Germany waged in OTL, just with slightly smaller losses due to the absence of British troops. In both cases, fewer troops would be stationed in Western Europe than in OTL, because Germany would not have to worry about British Commando raids, any attempt at an invasion by Britain or the US or any air raids on occupied Western European territory. Since the resistance movements largely depended on weapons from outside, and since a Britain that does not fight cannot be a realistic base for any kind of Free French (or Belgian or Dutch) forces, resistance from inside occupied Western Europe would be negligible

In the unlikely event that France is not attacked, the absence of French equipment would probably not make a big difference. In OTL most of this equipment was used either in France or on fronts that would not even exist in this timeline like Norway and the Balkans. Some French equipment was indeed used in OTL on the Eastern front, but its absence will be more than compensated by the massive savings made possible by not having to wage a naval and air war against Britain and later the US. On the other hand, the massive advantage that Germany had over the Soviet Union in steel-making capacity in OTL will be far less marked, though it will certainly be there.

It is unlikely that the switch the Germans made in OTL from the 37mm to the 50mm anti-tank gun was influenced by their combat experience with French (or British) tanks. After all the 50mm gun was developed in 1938. See here.

The upgrade of the Panzer IV from the short-barreled to the long-barreled 75mm cannon was certainly not influenced by the French campaign. It did not take place before 1942 and was due to the superiority of the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 to all previous models of German tanks.
 
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In any case, I sincerely doubt that Britain had the resources to try to build a large conventional force and mount a serious atomic program at the same time.

--
Bill

IIRC the Manhattan Project cost $2B. However half of that was spent on the two Uranium enrichment plants (gaseous diffusion and electromagnetic separation). If there was a bit less of a rush on you could definitely dispense with one of those (building plants using both techniques was a belt and braces approach) and perhaps both (you could go straight to a Plutonium bomb instead, and plutonium can be chemically separated which is vastly cheaper).

Also the British Empire will be in a much better financial state not having to have had to overstrain its economy to try and match the Germans war machine in 1940-41 and in particular not having to partake in a fire sale of assets to fund the war before Lend-Lease got going.

Finally, some figures that IMO cast light on whether the British Empire could support Tube Alloys. In OTL Canada sent nearly $5B in Lend Lease to Britain and the USSR - enough to pay for two Manhattan Projects and Britain reverse Lend-Leased $7B to the USA (whilst receiving $31B).

So in summary, the cost of a British Bomb could be dramatically lowered, the British Empire will be in a far better economic shape without the war, and the money seems to be there.

Doesn't take away the hindsight though.

Figures from here and here
 
Oil was a strategic resource and couldn't be sold willy-nilly to warring nations by neutrals. I guess you could transit it through Italy, but it's rather unlikely that it would be enough. And as noted, the Germans were desperately short on hard currency; do you imagine a "Lend-Lease being set up for them?

What do the words "couldn't be sold" mean in this context??? Italy could purchase oil during its war against Ethiopia, although it was clearly the aggressor and was marked as such by the League of Nations. Officially, there was a trade embargo against Italy, but vital items such as oil were, also officially, exempt from this embargo.
Until Roosevelt, and under his influence the British and Netherlands East Indies governments, imposed an oil embargo against Japan in 1941, Japan was also buying oil from these countries, although Japan had been waging a war of aggression against China for many years. Believe it or not, Japan produced oil in Soviet-owned Northern Sakhalin until 1944, because it had a concession to do so and the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan until 1945.
So at least until circa 1941 the US will probably be quite willing to sell oil to Germany and other countries possibly even after that.

If Britain is not in the war against Germany, France probably will not be either, although, of course France might be overrun by Germany without either France or Germany declaring war. If France does declare war, it will be overrun as in OTL. With Britain not in the war against Germany, the US is very unlikely to be in it.
Who in the world will stop the oil from reaching Germany???

As for Germany's lack of foreign currency: During OTL World War II Germany kept trading with all countries on the European mainland with which it was not at war. In many cases the conquered enemy nations or smaller Axis partners were under pressure to sell goods to Germany on credit (Switzerland also sold on credit IIRC), but in many cases Germany was obliged to earn the currency by selling goods to these countries. To earn more currency for the purchase of oil Germany might have exported more of the same things that it exported both pre- and post-war: Machine tools, chemicals, weapons, cars (In OTL Germany did sell weapons even to the Soviet Union). It would have been worthwhile, because crude oil is cheaper than the products of coal hydration that Germany made herself.
 

General Zod

Banned
Yes, the Red Army in 1945 was a wasting asset. However, _unlike the Germans_, that was a freely made choice by the Soviets.


ITTL, they don't have the luxury of the choice, it is a necessity, and they reach that point much eastward than Vienna and Berlin, and with the Wehrmacht in a much better shape. Since the Germans won't lack all the men, weapons, and equipment they lost/wasted as garrison/were necessary to contain partisans or defend other other fronts in Italy, the Balkans, France, anti-air defense. A couple millions extra by a conservative estimate.

They knew by the fall of 1944 that the war was coming to an end. They decided they needed to get as far West as they could. So they decided to sacrifice the following levies, and recruited 18, 17, even some 16-year-olds straight away. They chose that because the war had become a contest of speed against the Western Allies, not because they were forced to do that.

And ITTL they will reach the same point when the enemy is still deep within the URSS, or the pre-war borders if they are exceedingly lucky and good, since for the whole war, they enemy would have had much more men and weapons than OTL, and them much less weapons than OTL. Therefore, they will consume their manpower sooner to gain less. The moment they close to the 1945 exaustion levels, it won't be choice, it will be necessity, with an enemy still firmly on his legs. Hence, the negotiation table.

They could have gone for the proper option, harvesting, so to speak, their manpower when mature. The outcome: they would still have won the war, but with their vanguards not as far West as they did.

if by winning the war, you mean avoiding a clear defeat, i.e. achieving the 1939 borders, or the 1941 ones if truly all the factors align in their favor, yep, this is possible, although it is rather more likely that the final exaustion point is still deep within the URSS. But forget Poland or the Balkans.

The Soviets were the one advancing; they had the option to set the pace by carrying out that option, or not.

And since the Wehrmacht has much more resources than OTL, and them much less, they don't have this option. No one will rescue them, or divert precious German resources to any other front.

Additionally, there were vast manpower pools the Soviets, once again, freely decided not to tap for political reasons. The Romanians alone contributed some 540,000 men. But they were only used at a fraction of their potential, for the very simple reason that the Soviets did not want to arm and supply adequately the Romanian army. The Soviets had the Romanians use up their obsolescent stocks and wear out their German-produced equipment, and then did not replace those. Again, there was nothing unavoidable about that; it was a deliberate choice. A choice that had not much to do with winning the war at hand, but rather with post-war goals. It implied not exploiting that half-million men to its fullest potential, but the Soviets were happier that way.

The Soviets will never come remotely close to occupying Romania ITTL in the first place, so they don't have the luxury of those resources. Those half-million men replenish the ranks of the Axis.

Now, the Germans, those were forced to send 16, and 15, and 14-year-olds in the trenches to die for the glorious Führer.

See my point above. ITTL, the Germans never have to expend men but the Russian front.
 
Germany started its industrial revolution later than Britain, the USA or France, but considerably earlier than Russia. Germany was, despite the Nazis' economic meddling, largely a market economy, while the Soviet Union had a command economy. These two factors combined meant that Germany's economy was substantially stronger than that of the Soviet Union. West Germany alone had a bigger gross domestic product than the post-war Soviet Union - and West Germany was tiny compared to the area over which Hitler ruled in 1941 or 1942 - and of course the post-war Soviet Union was much bigger than the area that was still under Soviet control in late 1941.

German gross production of steel was bigger, as was its GDP. I don't deny this. The problem is that their available assets weren't used as they should've been; all manner of things put brakes on mass production (I'll deal with them below) and a total war economy was only put into effect in 1943. Prior to that, Germany had been rearming, including elements of war economy (price freezes etc), but not totally. This was partly a result of structural difficulties, but mostly the failure to rationalise and standardise (again, see below). The USSR was more willing to use its industrial capacity to the fullest, and unlike Germany it had had the benefits of a planned economy, in which the peacetime production was actually adjusted after wartime needs. (Planned economy sucks for peacetime, but it's good in a total war.)

Germany was perfectly capable of industrial techniques that facilitate mass production of armaments, such as sheet metal stamping or centrifugal casting. The reason why these were not used, or not used earlier than in OTL, was that the production batches that the German armed forces ordered were too small to make the application of these techniques worthwhile and that the mode of payment used by the Heer and the Kriegsmarine (not the Luftwaffe) up to a certain point in time did not encourage an economic use of resources. Even if this problem is not adressed earlier with the POD "Britain not in the war", the massive shift of resources to the Eastern front would completely change the balance of power in Germany's favor. The steel used for thousands of anti-aircraft guns could be used for armaments on the Eastern front. These guns were usually placed on top of bunkers, where the re-inforcement needed for the concrete used up even more steel than the guns themselves. The steel needed for building U-boats, escort craft, minesweepers, torpedo boats and so on would also not be needed and the material used up by them would also be used on the Eastern front.

True, in part; the lack of the air war would be a boon, as cannon could be transferred or else not built at all. This could be a quite considerable boost; I've read numbers that as much as 40,000 AA guns were stationed in Germany. Unfortunately, there were no details on their exact composition. Of the fleet I'm less certain; less U-boats, certainly, but the big resource-eaters like the Bismarck/Tirpitz and other heavy ships will still be constructed.

On the payment issue, are you talking about the idea that they bought their stuff on a cost plus basis? If so you're dead wrong; that's Speer lying. It's been debunked since (don't know any good English-language source; Adam Tooze talks about it, but not in great detail).

Although the POD "Britain not in the war" does not neccessarily change the problem of neglect of mass-production techniques, it offers a genuine possibility to alleviate this problem. In OTL, one obstacle to mass production was the frequent shift of priorities of production - let's say from U-Boats to anti-tank guns to fighter aircraft in a matter of months. If there is just one enemy nation and no change of emphasis from naval to land warfare, this change of priorities is much less likely to occurr, which makes mass production much easier. At any rate, the massive savings that could be made if Germany does not have to wage a battle against a strategic bombing offensive, occurr in any case where Britain is not in WW II, irrespective of the fact whether mass production techniques are applied earlier or not.

I agree it was due to frequent shifts in production priority, but these were rather due to the lack of coordination and standardisation than to shifts between the arms (it wasn't, usually at least, the same factories that built tanks and U-boats). For example, the different tank models; they kept building Panthers, Tigers, Tiger-IIs AND the Panzer-IV, in varying models. (This also led to huge problems with spare parts more directly in the field; they needed a separate set for EVERY kind of tank.) Or the multitude of assault guns. The Soviets stuck to a few good designs; the Germans should have, too. Not to mention that, say, the Panther was five to eight times as labour-intensive as the Panzer IV, and less reliable (while the IV was more reliable than the t-34). The Germans simply didn't rationalise their production, but kept dreaming up new KEWL designs; the media loves them for it, but it was a poor way to win a war.

For the very worst examples: Rebuilt Char self-propelled arty variants, in production runs of a few dozen for each model...:rolleyes:

Of course, not facing a strategic bombing offensive means that the massive destruction caused by the bombs is avoided. An air raid also causes loss of production in any factory that lies roughly in the bombers' flight path: because the workers do not know whether their factory is the target or not, they will flee to the air-raid shelter even if the factory is not attacked. Then you have loss of production caused by the death of workers in attacks on cities and you have loss of production because the workers are deprived of their sleep. A great deal of production was also lost because the German's attempted to disperse their production or to locate them underground - during the time the factory is being dismantled, transported (on railway lines that are under attack) and re-assembled somewhere else it cannot possibly produce anything. None of this will be a problem in a TL where Britain does not enter the war. On the other hand, it just might become a problem of the Soviets, with a frontline closer to the Ural and a much stronger Luftwaffe in the East.

Underground factories were fucking stupid, but not all that common; is that Speer talking again? And the impact of the strategic bombing campaign wasn't that very large until the Americans got into the battle anyway, and by then the war was already lost in any case. The British raids were problematic, but certainly no war winner; most of the factors you note wouldn't be present, or not to such a large degree as you posit. Say, workers scared from the assembly lines? Won't happen; the British bombed at night, and then the factories were closed. It was only late in the war that Germany began to work day-and-night shifts - that's one of the things Speer told the TRUTH about. Pathetic.

Otherwise, the things that hurt the most in the air war was the destruction of communications infrastructure (bridges, railways etc) and fuel resources (synthoil plants, depots etc). The British didn't have the precision to specifically target either; that started oonly when the Americans came along.
 
German gross production of steel was bigger, as was its GDP. I don't deny this. The problem is that their available assets weren't used as they should've been; all manner of things put brakes on mass production (I'll deal with them below) and a total war economy was only put into effect in 1943. Prior to that, Germany had been rearming, including elements of war economy (price freezes etc), but not totally. This was partly a result of structural difficulties, but mostly the failure to rationalise and standardise (again, see below). The USSR was more willing to use its industrial capacity to the fullest, and unlike Germany it had had the benefits of a planned economy, in which the peacetime production was actually adjusted after wartime needs. (Planned economy sucks for peacetime, but it's good in a total war.)
I agree very largely with this paragraph. The only exception is the second half of the sentence in brackets: I doubt very much whether a planned economy is that good in wartime. The Germans did indeed make the mistakes you point out, but there are probably a lot of mistakes the Soviets made about which you and I do not know anything. It is even possible that these will never been known, because it would have been inexpedient, to say the least, to write about them during the Soviet era. But this is just a thought, the point I am trying to make - the absence of Britain in the war would have caused Millions of additional Soviet losses and might even make a German victory possible - is not the least dependent on this thought.


On the payment issue, are you talking about the idea that they bought their stuff on a cost plus basis? If so you're dead wrong; that's Speer lying. It's been debunked since (don't know any good English-language source; Adam Tooze talks about it, but not in great detail).
I am indeed talking about a cost plus basis. I certainly do not have this idea from Speer's memoirs, but from a work whose authors are not altogether so likely to fall for simple self-serving lies by Speer - although I cannot exclude this possibility. The English title of the work is Germany and the Second World War, Volume 5, Organisation and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power, Part 1, by Kroener , Müller and Umbreit. The German original appeared in 1988 and the work has been edited by the Research Institute for Military History of the Federal German Armed Forces. I have found the reference to the cost plus basis on page 811 of the German original. To repeat myself, this does not look to me like a work that repeats a simple lie, though it's not impossible - unfortunately at this point there is no reference to an original source. But just assuming this really is just a lie of Albert Speer - this does not change my main point at all, that with Britain out of the war massive resources would be available on the Eastern front that were unavailable in OTL. There is absolutely no need for polemical language like "you're dead wrong"
 
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I agree it was due to frequent shifts in production priority, but these were rather due to the lack of coordination and standardisation than to shifts between the arms (it wasn't, usually at least, the same factories that built tanks and U-boats). For example, the different tank models; they kept building Panthers, Tigers, Tiger-IIs AND the Panzer-IV, in varying models. (This also led to huge problems with spare parts more directly in the field; they needed a separate set for EVERY kind of tank.) Or the multitude of assault guns. The Soviets stuck to a few good designs; the Germans should have, too. Not to mention that, say, the Panther was five to eight times as labour-intensive as the Panzer IV, and less reliable (while the IV was more reliable than the t-34). The Germans simply didn't rationalise their production, but kept dreaming up new KEWL designs; the media loves them for it, but it was a poor way to win a war.

For the very worst examples: Rebuilt Char self-propelled arty variants, in production runs of a few dozen for each model...:rolleyes:
It was a problem of both: there was lack of standardisation and constant shifting of priorities - although I certainly cannot quantify these effects - in all probability no one can. The lack of standardisation is not affected by the POD, but the shifts of priorities are quite likely to be alleviated by it. In OTL, a factory did not have to produce U-boats and tanks (or their components) at the same time to be negatively affected by changes in priorities. Let's assume a factory has received a large order for anti-tank guns and has tooled up for their production and already hired workers for this large order. At the last moment before production is scheduled to start, they receive notice that the steel that has been allocated to them will be needed for, say, U-boats or anti-aircraft guns. All the efforts of tooling up and hiring or training the workers will be in vain. This remains largely true even if the order is only substantially reduced in numbers, because investments that are worthwhile for producing large batches of an item will not be worthwhile for a small production batch. With only one enemy nation and one front to worry about, and this enemy, as you pointed out, producing only a limited number of types of weapons, these sudden changes of priorities are much less likely to happen.
 
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