Did the Soviet Union ever consider approaching Taiwan in offering to help subvert the Communist regi

Did the Soviet Union ever consider approaching Taiwan in offering to help subvert the Communist regime in Beijing during the Sino-Soviet conflict?

Reviewing the history of the Kuomintang of China, which formed the KMT / Nationalist Party of China that eventually ruled Taiwan, I discovered that it was heavily influenced by Soviet influence.
Please see:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuomintang#Ideology_in_mainland_China_(1920s–1950s)

I also discovered that the KMT did much to assist Chinese Muslim minorities in western China cary out continued resistance to the Chinese Communists in Beijing after the Chinese Civil War was officially over in 1949. Also heavily supported by the CIA, this source of resistance lasted until 1953.
Please see:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuomintang_Islamic_insurgency

My question is did the Soviet Union ever consider approaching the KMT with help assisting it overthrow the Communists in Beijing? The Soviets would have been in a much better position to help support Chinese Muslim rebels for Taiwan than the CIA.

If this ever happened, I would presume the Soviets would have tried to achieve two goals:

1) Either put a pro-Soviet regime in power in Beijing or

2) Put a regime that was committed to the non-aligned movement, like India

Also, if this ever did happen, I could see why the KMT would have reservations:

1) In the past, Soviet behavior in western China more or less sought to absorb territory at mainland China's expense. This was the case in the 1934 Soviet Invasion of Xinjiang, the Xinjiang Islamic Revolt in 1937, and the 1944 Ili Rebellion.

2) If mainland China realized what was going on, they could have escalated the situation by trying to initiate an attack against Taiwan, or possibly even the Soviet Union itself, if threatening Taiwan in this case did not restrain Soviet behavior.

Ghilliotti
 
(1) Shifting political calculation: the secret Taiwan-Soviet talks, 1963–1971

Abstract
When the United States and mainland China attempted to reach out to each other in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union and Taiwan had already been cooperating with each other against China. Starting in 1963, the Soviet Union and Taiwan interacted through different channels, with the culmination being the arrival of Victor Louis in Taipei. By 1971 Chiang Kai-shek decided that the Soviet Union was no longer an option as a negotiating partner. The authors, based on rare archival resources, try to restore details of the talks and interpret how they failed to accomplish a strategic partnership as the US and mainland China had done.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14682745.2015.1031115


**

(2) The second historical event Kawashima reviewed was a visit to Taiwan by Victor Louis, a KGB operative and Moscow-based freelance reporter for the London Evening Star. While in Taiwan, Louis met with Chiang Ching-kuo, the Generalissimo's son, and his advisors. With relations between the Soviet Union and mainland China worsening, Louis told the Taiwanese that the Soviet Union and the R.O.C. should explore ways to cooperate in order to bring down Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. Many analysts have framed the Chiangs' openness to Louis' message as an attempt to gain leverage over the United States, which too had noticed the Sino-Soviet split and was beginning to see China as a potential foil to be used against the Soviet Union.

However, Kawashima noted that in his diary, Chiang Kai-shek did not mention leverage over the United States in his relations with Victor Louis. Instead, Chiang continually stressed that his priorities lay with opening up possibilities for an attack on China, and that the R.O.C. "must not lose this chance" to cooperate with the Soviets. There is no mention in Chiang's diary that he later leaked information about the Louis visit to the international media, despite the assertion of some scholars that coverage of the visit was an R.O.C. attempt to secure a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States. Also, messages to Chiang from the U.S. ambassador in Taipei suggest that Washington was fairly sanguine about the prospect of Taiwanese moves toward the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, nothing much came of the meetings with Louis, and when Chiang made the provision of Soviet weapons to the R.O.C. a condition for Taipei's cooperation with Moscow, he was rebuffed. Chiang subsequently rejected further offers from Louis to meet, which indicate that his thoughts did not necessarily lie in using the appearance of improved Soviet-R.O.C. relations as leverage against the United States. While Kawashima believes that an attempt to gain such leverage was probably a factor in Chiang's calculations, there is not enough evidence in the Generalissimo's diaries to say that it was the primary motivation in his exploration of more conciliatory relations with Moscow.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/soviet-taiwanese-relations-during-the-early-cold-war
 
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