Did the British policy of maintaining the European Balance of Power pay dividends?

Thomas1195

Banned
Possibly, but then again things got pretty dicey for the Allies at certain points in 1914. It's possible that, without British involvement, the Germans would be able to defeat the French army and force a peace on them. (Yes, I know the BEF was small, but when you're fighting to defend your capital from enemy occupation every little helps.)

Plus, whilst with hindsight we know WW1 turned into a trench-filled slogging match, nobody expected this before the war. Indeed, all the recent major European conflicts had been decided very quickly, often in one or two battles. Given what was known at the time, neither Britain nor any other country had much reason to expect that the war would be as exhausting and destructive as it turned out.
If the French realized that Britain would stay out from 1910 (to remain neutral, I believe Britain must made it clear of its and Belgium's position as early as 1910 or even earlier, maybe due to Bannerman being PM longer), they and maybe the Russian might reconsider their strategy, as they would be underdogs now.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
Also Britain would reap the same economic benefits that the US and Japan reaped in WW1 historically, simply because Germany would not be able to compete with Britain for markets while under the war, a their industrial production would be directed towards the conflict. If Britain does not enter the war all that they could lose would be the title of greatest power, and even then they would still be recognized as an power because they would still be intact.
Well, actually the War provided an incentive for Britain to modernize its industries, after a series of shortage, especially in dyes, acetone, explosives, optics, or machine tools. All the National Munition Factories OTL that were fully mechanized and electrified, as well as the supporting infrastructures, would never existed. They would also never have strong interventionist policies like import quotas and rationalization on chemical industry that led to the formation of ICI. All of these productive interventions by Lloyd George would be butterflied away. Finally, a strong British aircraft industry OTL might have never existed.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
BEF was not just small, it was also handled in an erratic manner. The campaign was for the French to win.
It seriously lacked machine guns, heavy artillery, as well as communication devices like field telephones and radios, which were the first symptoms of the deficiencies in British industries.
 
It paid dividends right up until it brought their empire crashing down. I am not of the mind that Britain had to fight ww1, in fact had it stayed out it would have had a significant amount of time to prepare for germany's coming challenge to its international dominance as the germans would be tied up securing their hegemony on the continent for decades and another war with Russia is a probability.
 
Realistically, the British were going to lose their empire at some point. The two world wars hastened the process, sure, but the colonized people in Asia/Africa were going to not accept rule from Europe forever, and a medium-sized country like Britain could not hold them down indefinitely.

However, the balance-of-power strategy in Europe did allow Britain to build that empire in the first place, and it reaps the benefits of it to this day - witness the spread of the English language across the globe.
 
Sure. But not getting involved in WW1 meant Britain would be satellized by Germany in the medium run.

@Moikan Yoloko
We were dealing in reasons and motivations for Britain's actions. Before outbreak of hostilities Britain could not have made the predictions that we can.
Britain chose the option which looked to be meaningful at the moment.
Britain was not the United States that it would feel assured of its complete supremacy in matters of material.
Britain never faced this situation. What if a decade or two later a Germany strongly recovering decides to out-build them?
No one new just how bad the next general European conflagration would be so no one would bet on letting the stronger side go away based on fuzzy assumptions.

Why would it be an existential necessity for Britain to join the war against Germany? The assertion seems to suppose that unless they stopped Germany in France, they'd inevitably be forced to bow down to the irresistible force of Prussian dominance as they start bringing their troops across the Channel and unloading their troops at Dover somewhere a couple of decades down the track. I am very sceptical of the notion that the Second Reich, as we know it OTL, would develop either the means or the motivation to seriously harass and threaten British naval supremacy, simply by virtue of the fact that they had won a war on the continent. As others point out, an exhausted Germany would have other pressing matters than picking a fight with a rested and financially secure British Empire...

Indeed, you're right, but you're assuming that Germany wins big on the land war, frankly a WW1 without Britain does not necessarily equates to an easy win for Germany.
But i do not believe, with what we know today, that Germany would be able to start another european war any time soon, simply because, even if they win, they would not leave the war intact, this is still an trenches conflict.
Britain entered the war due to assumptions that seemed true in the time period, that does not mean that they were true, principally that with the WW1 done, unless Germany wins by an landslide, they would still have threats in the continent, minor, yes, but enough of a threat that they cannot just start a naval building program out of the blue. The British still had the greatest navy of the world.
Also Britain would reap the same economic benefits that the US and Japan reaped in WW1 historically, simply because Germany would not be able to compete with Britain for markets while under the war, a their industrial production would be directed towards the conflict. If Britain does not enter the war all that they could lose would be the title of greatest power, and even then they would still be recognized as an power because they would still be intact.
Tl;dr Even if Britain does not enter WWI, Germany would still have just fought it's worst war in a century and would in no way be ready to start another war.

In answer to the author's question, i do not believe that the policy reaped benefits for Britain after the industrial revolution.


It paid dividends right up until it brought their empire crashing down. I am not of the mind that Britain had to fight ww1, in fact had it stayed out it would have had a significant amount of time to prepare for Germany's coming challenge to its international dominance as the germans would be tied up securing their hegemony on the continent for decades and another war with Russia is a probability.

I largely agree with this assessment. Yes, a Germany that wins in an alt- WW1 with no British involvement will become somewhat militarily and economically preponderant in Europe, and yes, to certain extent, they may try to fend off British trade and turn Europe into a quasi-captive market (worked really well for Napoleon...), but that makes Germany a continental hegemon, not a serious maritime threat. They're not exactly going to be marching Stahlhelms into Cherbourg, Brest, Nantes, Antwerp, etc and all the shipbuilding centres of Europe, claiming them as assets of the Reich war Ministry. Their focus would still be land-driven and somewhat circumscribed in an age of rampant nationalism. They won't be able to throw their weight around too much or else the will face open defiance. As well, they would be dealing with tricky issues at home in terms of domestic political reform, an aspect that is more stable in an un war-scared Britain. A victorious Germany simply will not possess the raw power or desire to "out build" the British Empire's navy. It was impossible before WW1, and would be just as impossible afterwards. They get absolutely nothing out of doing it.

Realistically, the British were going to lose their empire at some point. The two world wars hastened the process, sure, but the colonized people in Asia/Africa were going to not accept rule from Europe forever, and a medium-sized country like Britain could not hold them down indefinitely.

However, the balance-of-power strategy in Europe did allow Britain to build that empire in the first place, and it reaps the benefits of it to this day - witness the spread of the English language across the globe.

Perhaps, but actually I think the Empire would be the remedy to any problems of Germany blocking them out after WW1. Although I believe the City of London will prove impossible for Germany to keep out of Mittleuropa due to the paucity of German finance-capital in this era and the prewar London dominance on the continent, the British may find difficulty maintaining other industrial export footholds. The empire provides the ultimate solution, in the form of an Imperial system of customs union. In the late 20th century, capitalists discovered that offshoring manufacturing and 'mass-produced services' (e.g. telemarketing, accounting) to low-wage countries can make enormous profits for the West, while building up a middle class in the mass markets of Asia. In the context of a German victory in WWI which Britain sits out, I think the British would turn more to the high returns available for investing in the industrialisation of Empire. This would simply make Britain like it is today, only much sooner: a de-industrialised financial services hyper-power that exacts rents from investment in other countries as a way to balance its own books. In this sense, an Empire of beneficial informal business networks could persist long after any abolition of formal Empire, which in any case if moved to a more egalitarian 'Commonwealth Union' scheme of trade and common defense, could last potentially a very long time.

I would advance it a century and say this was true from 1688 onward. During the 1588-1688 century England didn't necessarily have a coherent strategy for the European continent, tending to shift course from one conflict to another, or even within the same conflict (as in the Dutch War). From William III onward, though, we see a more straightforward "balance of power" strategy.

Quite so, I stand corrected.
 
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longsword14

Banned
Why would it be an existential necessity for Britain to join the war against Germany? The assertion seems to suppose that unless they stopped Germany in France, they'd inevitably be forced to bow down to the irresistible force of Prussian dominance as they start bringing their troops across the Channel and unloading their troops at Dover somewhere a couple of decades down the track. I am very sceptical of the notion that the Second Reich, as we know it OTL, would develop either the means or the motivation to seriously harass and threaten British naval supremacy, simply by virtue of the fact that they had won a war on the continent. As others point out, an exhausted Germany would have other pressing matters than picking a fight with a rested and financially secure British Empire...
You ought to tell me.
Fear of a single entity dominating Europe had been Britain's grievance for a few centuries. Britain likely thought fighting with powerful others to oppose Germany was better than having a weaker hand later on.
Perhaps the simple reason is that Britain did not like the odds in a long term scenario where they were at war with the Reich.
It is not as if anybody could predict the war of attrition that would follow, so Germany bled badly could appear to be a thinly supported notion.
 
You ought to tell me.
Fear of a single entity dominating Europe had been Britain's grievance for a few centuries. Britain likely thought fighting with powerful others to oppose Germany was better than having a weaker hand later on.
Perhaps the simple reason is that Britain did not like the odds in a long term scenario where they were at war with the Reich.
It is not as if anybody could predict the war of attrition that would follow, so Germany bled badly could appear to be a thinly supported notion.

Fair enough, I guess I kind of was directing that more to Matteo than you. It's kind of the deal some have been alluding to in this thread and which you also dide: that the same mentality, which served the British so well in preventing large agglomerations of the French or HR empires from arising in past centuries that could and would command Europe like an orchestra, was out of date for the kind of threat of economic and financial, rather than military, competition they were staring down in German continental hegemony (and potentially Russia also). It wouldn't be be a command economy of all of Europe's resources at the disposal of Germany's rulers: more like trading federation biased towards German wishes somewhat (our OTL EU) that to a greater or lesser extent hampered somewhat British export opportunities. This Europe was never going to be an entity that could marshall itself to invade Britain, or if it did there would be enough lead time for a retaliatory response that would deter such an ambition.

It was the erroneous perception, rather than, IMHO, the true threat, that drove British intervention in WWI

I just wanted to know why some posters were adamant that Britain was doomed to be 'satellized' by a victorious Germany. I doubt that very much.
 

longsword14

Banned
I just wanted to know why some posters were adamant that Britain was doomed to be 'satellized' by a victorious Germany. I doubt that very much.
In case of a great naval buildup, it is possible that Britain loses.
Mind, I do not believe that Berlin wanted Britain on its feet, prostrated.
Making long-term predictions is a risky move that we can make with hindsight and knowing that many roads were not taken.
All defence has insurance against long term issues as a concern.
 
I am very sceptical of the notion that the Second Reich, as we know it OTL, would develop either the means or the motivation to seriously harass and threaten British naval supremacy, simply by virtue of the fact that they had won a war on the continent.

Germany in the run up to WW1 had embarked on a naval build-up with the specific intention of challenging the Royal Navy, so the motivation was definitely there.

As others point out, an exhausted Germany would have other pressing matters than picking a fight with a rested and financially secure British Empire...

Bear in mind that the previous wars in Prussia's/Germany's rise to prominence -- the Schleswig-Holstein War, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War -- had all been decided very quickly, often by just one or two battles, and left the victor in a stronger position and not at all exhausted. The meat-grinder that WW1 became was a shock to everybody.
 
Germany in the run up to WW1 had embarked on a naval build-up with the specific intention of challenging the Royal Navy, so the motivation was definitely there.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-German_naval_arms_race
http://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-naval-race-between-britain-and-germany-before-the-first-world-war
http://www.encyclopedia.com/history...anscripts-and-maps/naval-rivalry-anglo-german

The Germans challenged and the British rallied, thus defeating their efforts at curtailing British naval supremacy. Hence my assertion that that they did not have the means to overtake an equally resolved Admiralty. As to the motivation, that's a little less clear cut, but losing one naval race is enough to give one pause. I think the Germans would have learned from experience and deduced that they won absolutely nothing the first time around: no new colonies, no major engagements, just rusted ships costing billions of marks that ended up at the bottom of Scapa Flow.

Bear in mind that the previous wars in Prussia's/Germany's rise to prominence -- the Schleswig-Holstein War, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War -- had all been decided very quickly, often by just one or two battles, and left the victor in a stronger position and not at all exhausted. The meat-grinder that WW1 became was a shock to everybody.

Thats true, and no Britain may = victory in 1914 or 1915, which is very different from a pyrrhic victory in 1917 or 18. But it will still cost them. Casualties for Germany by year ending 1914 total about 140,000 dead, with I assume many more than that wounded. By the end of 1915 it was another 500,000 killed.

http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_losses_germany

Thus, even a quick win is going to knock some stuffing out of the Germans, to say nothing of how much money it would cost even to win (hint: ask Britain and France). I think it will be a somewhat chastened Germany that emerges, with a large and influential veteran class that will be quite anti-war, knowing the true cost of industrial conflict. The British will be similarly sobered, but with no losses at all for their nation, they might possess more verve and diplomatic aggression due to not having directly experienced the realities of loss. This, for want of a better term, 'freshness' to war might help give them an edge in dealing with a more circumspect Germany.
 
The Germans challenged and the British rallied, thus defeating their efforts at curtailing British naval supremacy. Hence my assertion that that they did not have the means to overtake an equally resolved Admiralty. As to the motivation, that's a little less clear cut, but losing one naval race is enough to give one pause. I think the Germans would have learned from experience and deduced that they won absolutely nothing the first time around: no new colonies, no major engagements, just rusted ships costing billions of marks that ended up at the bottom of Scapa Flow.

A Germany with European hegemony would have more resources at its disposal, though, so the fact that they failed IOTL doesn't necessarily mean that they would in an alternate history where they were the dominant power of the continent.

Thus, even a quick win is going to knock some stuffing out of the Germans, to say nothing of how much money it would cost even to win (hint: ask Britain and France). I think it will be a somewhat chastened Germany that emerges, with a large and influential veteran class that will be quite anti-war, knowing the true cost of industrial conflict. The British will be similarly sobered, but with no losses at all for their nation, they might possess more verve and diplomatic aggression due to not having directly experienced the realities of loss. This, for want of a better term, 'freshness' to war might help give them an edge in dealing with a more circumspect Germany.

Again, you're looking at this with the benefit of hindsight, plus a hefty dollop of optimism. The overwhelming expectation in the years running up to WW1 was that any European war would be a quick matter, decided probably after one or two battles in the opening weeks, with any actions afterwards being essentially a mopping-up exercise. Given what people at the time expected to happen, as opposed to what we know actually happened, sitting tight and hoping that Germany would end up bleeding itself dry would have been foolish.

Plus, even after OTL's First World War and all the losses it entailed, Europe ended up being plunged into a new and even more destructive conflict (started by a Germany which had lost far more IOTL than it would ITTL). Sure, maybe Germany would emerge from an alt-WW1 chastened and peaceable, but this isn't/wasn't certain, and if it didn't happen Britain would find herself having to fight in far less favourable circumstances than 1914 offered.
 
Thats true, and no Britain may = victory in 1914 or 1915, which is very different from a pyrrhic victory in 1917 or 18. But it will still cost them. Casualties for Germany by year ending 1914 total about 140,000 dead, with I assume many more than that wounded. By the end of 1915 it was another 500,000 killed.

http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/war_losses_germany

Thus, even a quick win is going to knock some stuffing out of the Germans, to say nothing of how much money it would cost even to win (hint: ask Britain and France). I think it will be a somewhat chastened Germany that emerges, with a large and influential veteran class that will be quite anti-war, knowing the true cost of industrial conflict. The British will be similarly sobered, but with no losses at all for their nation, they might possess more verve and diplomatic aggression due to not having directly experienced the realities of loss. This, for want of a better term, 'freshness' to war might help give them an edge in dealing with a more circumspect Germany.
If all European powers had taken the right lesson from the Russo Japanese War they would have thought twice about attacking troops in trenches. The trouble was that they thought that a man with a bayonet would always get through. Also they had mobilisation plans that once rolling they dared not stop because to do so would give their opponents a serious numerical advantage.

If you look at the casualty level for the Russo-Japanese War they are about 10-20% of troops deployed over eighteen months. The lesson was there before WW1. The Central Powers and the Entente chose not to learn it. No reason for the British would take get the message if WW1 was fought without them.
 
People are IMO mistakenly regarding the British outlook heading into WW1 in a more homogenized fashion than was true at the time. I am not at all sure that a British government advocating staying out of a decision in the balance of European power would even be a viable internal option before WW1 reoriented perceptions. I think the government taking that stance would be portrayed as cowardly and against British interests and would quickly fall from power in the face of public jingoism that had certainly survived the Crimean/Boer experiences.

Iow, I think they were riding the tiger by that stage. Ironically, the one cure might have been already being engaged in a lesser-but-still-consuming colonial war, say a third Boer or another Mutiny or some such. Then you could sell the public on your hands being tied, satisfy the jingos and probably negotiate a softer/economic support of continental allies without getting pulled into the meat grinder.
 
Ironically, the one cure might have been already being engaged in a lesser-but-still-consuming colonial war, say a third Boer or another Mutiny or some such. Then you could sell the public on your hands being tied, satisfy the jingos and probably negotiate a softer/economic support of continental allies without getting pulled into the meat grinder.
Had things started six months/year later Britain could have been bogged down in a conflict in Ireland.
 
It seriously lacked machine guns, heavy artillery, as well as communication devices like field telephones and radios, which were the first symptoms of the deficiencies in British industries.

The Germans who actually fought the BEF in 1914 seem to have generally been quite complementary about its fighting abilities.
 
The Germans who actually fought the BEF in 1914 seem to have generally been quite complementary about its fighting abilities.

The Canadian Corps in particular, and then the ANZ. So much so that the Germans came to know that the C.C. being deployed to a front meant trouble was coming, and massively build-up, so the BEF began devising means of disguising where the Canadians were at any moment. Carried over into WWII, where several German leaders commented on the fact. And then there's that famous Churchill answer about how he'd go about putting together the best allied army; 'Canadian soldiers using American equipment directed by British officers.'
 

longsword14

Banned
The Germans who actually fought the BEF in 1914 seem to have generally been quite complementary about its fighting abilities.
Eh, I am not sure about that. Many criticised its lack of heavy support while some said they fought well. It is a mixed bag .
 
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Related question -- how would (continental) Europe have evolved differently over the past five centuries absent English interventionism? Would this mean (earlier) political and/or economic unification; if so, when?
 
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