Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

  • Yes

    Votes: 97 27.2%
  • No

    Votes: 99 27.8%
  • To a degree

    Votes: 160 44.9%

  • Total voters
    356
I feel there's a tendency to dismiss Axis successes due to overall failure, and a tendency to dismiss Allied failings because of overall success... On a tactical level, the Germans were nothing short of herculean in the scope of their successes, especially factoring in their chronic logistical issues.

Oh, geez.

This thread is yoyo-ing back and forth between "Popular mythology overrates the Germans" and "The pushback against pop history has gone too far and underrates the Germans" that I can't even tell which side I am supposed to be on anymore.

I would point out, however, that of the four great powers against which Germany chose to go to war between 1939 and 1941, they defeated precisely one of them. Even in baseball, that's a pretty modest record.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
Oh, geez.

This thread is yoyo-ing back and forth between "Popular mythology overrates the Germans" and "The pushback against pop history has gone too far and underrates the Germans" that I can't even tell which side I am supposed to be on anymore.

I would point out, however, that of the four great powers against which Germany chose to go to war between 1939 and 1941, they defeated precisely one of them. Even in baseball, that's a pretty modest record.


That literally cannot be further from the point. In fact, it's only reaffirming my point of people ignoring German successes on a tactical level due to strategic failure.


Comically I think the off-base responses only fuel the wehraboo posts to an extent. Just acknowledge the truth about Germany competency and success at certain levels without this habitual need to qualify it with a "but *insert rebuttal*.

Its no different than arguing with your spouse in real life. You want to talk about how miserable Axis logistics were, they want to talk about Axis tactical success.

There's no argument to even be had until one of you deliberately does something to aggravate the other.


Now stop being petulant brats and trying to get the last word over each other.
 
That's right everyone, listen to FBKampfer, the man with the Objectively Correct Opinion. How could you be so childish? :p
 
we could very easily be looking back and saying, "Wow, why on Earth did they think getting Warspite torpedoed might be justified for the sake of sinking of a few destroyers.

I think the Royal Navy response would include "engage the enemy more closely".
 

hipper

Banned
Do a proper recon with attached FAA support (he had it) and not be surprised and counter-ambushed.

i see, your advice to Warbuton Lee on the morning of the 10th would be to do nothing and wait till daylight untill Penelope or Renown could launch a floatplane. That could have been some time as the weather was very poor. the previous day there had been a force 7 gale and the actual battle was fought in a snowstorm.

Warbuton Lee entered the Vestford in darkness. in an attempt to suprise the enemy and succeeded, his plan worked.

Attacking in daylight could have turned out worse as he was attacking twice his numbers. especially as the german destroyers would have finished refuelling. If he had more force with him at 4:30 am on the 10th outside Vestford i’m sure he would have used it instead given the choice to do nothing or attack immediately with the forces under his command he decided to attack.

in the process he destroyed most of the Heavy equipment for the German invasion force, the refuelling tanker for the German Destroyers. in addition he sunk two enemy destroyers and damaged several more all for the loss of two of his own destroyers and damage to another.
i’m sure if you could have told him the results in advance he would have made the same choice.

it’s easy to second guess the decisions of men at the scene. harder to understand their real choices.
there are many poorer decisions made by british Sailors in WW2 i’m still mistified why you chose to attack WL in your story.

Still I had not realised that Crace was Warspite’s Captain at the second battle so you learn something new, and I agree that Crace’s swordfish spotter plane at Narvik performed probably the best piece of arial support by a single aircraft in the war. but I doubt the weather would have permitted that level of support during the first battle.
 
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Deleted member 1487

The Germans could march to where they needed to go in a regional war (I discount the North Africa adventure. Italy had a considerable hand in making that fiasco even remotely possible for which they never get any logistics credit.). The Allies, at least the western ones, had two tough oceans to cross and fought globally and in the beginning were outnumbered and outgunned. It was only 1943 onward that the so-called overwhelming Allied force was martialed to defeat the Axis, despite the massive work Russia, the UK and US exerted to lay the groundwork for 1943 to come into place. What were the Axis doing in 1942? Getting defeated by inferior forces (Germans and Japanese by Russians, Chinese, UK and Americans). 1939 and 1941; even, if we count Russia's first two great defensive successes (Japan at Khalkin Gol and Germany in front of Moscow and I do.).

We tend to overlook that.
Check the numbers on the Soviets at in 1941-43. They had a numerical advantage in every category on the Eastern Front from at least Autumn 1941 on. That's not even counting anything the Brits added to the equation.

Also don't forget the RAF actually had more single engine fighters than the Luftwaffe by the end of the BoB due in large part to purchases in the US, not to mention later, yet still got smashed on the Channel Front from 1941-42 (in 1941 the RAF lost 849 fighters not counting bomber losses vs 183 Luftwaffe fighters):
https://books.google.com/books?id=UmwwBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA239&lpg=PA239&dq=raf+circus+1942&source=bl&ots=2QtDIldFIq&sig=kPqJmrYc2cA4uGRJPlymZJxp6JM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiB2c_whdneAhXim-AKHVfWDmAQ6AEwD3oECBoQAQ#v=onepage&q=raf circus 1942&f=false
 
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Also don't forget the RAF actually had more single engine fighters than the Luftwaffe by the end of the BoB due in large part to purchases in the US, not to mention later, yet still got smashed on the Channel Front from 1941-42 (in 1941 the RAF lost 849 fighters not counting bomber losses vs 183 Luftwaffe fighters):

Some have called the Rhubarb missions similar to 'Breaking Windows with Guineas' an old UK habit.
 
German successes on a tactical level due to strategic failure.
Tactics are only relevant in as far as they helped achieve strategic goals. If you have all the tactics in the world but you never translate this into strategic success then your tactics FAILED, and it doesn’t matter what temporary victories you achieved.

As to the question, brute force and skill cannot be separated. Brute force is a legitimate option when you have drastically superior resources available. To ignore it, or label it as not skilled because of some misplaced idea of fair play is foolish. You use the options available.
 
Tactics are only relevant in as far as they helped achieve strategic goals. If you have all the tactics in the world but you never translate this into strategic success then your tactics FAILED, and it doesn’t matter what temporary victories you achieved.

After all, the goal is to win the War, winning battles was nice, but incidental to a degree.

See George Washington, didn't win many battles, but skillful in retreat
 
IMHO the strategic advantages held by the allies meant that they did not have to show tactical nous and skill on the battlefields, it simply meant, in the long run, they could not lose the war.
 
i see, your advice to Warbuton Lee on the morning of the 10th would be to do nothing and wait till daylight untill Penelope or Renown could launch a floatplane. That could have been some time as the weather was very poor. the previous day there had been a force 7 gale and the actual battle was fought in a snowstorm.

The Germans were not going anywhere. The British wiped out their tanker support. How much do you really know about Narvik? If you read my accounts then you know that I mention the RN made it a point to capture the false flagged tankers the Germans were trying to sneak into Narvik from Murmansk to refuel their stranded destroyers.. IOW Warburton Lee could mousehole the Fjord until the weather permitted his air support to work. Of course with the incompetent D'Orly Hughes that raises a whole host of other issues, but two people who don't know what they are doing is a bit much to analyze in a situation, don't ya think? or do you want me to tell you how the Twins caught HMS Glorious?

Warbuton Lee entered the Vestford in darkness. in an attempt to suprise the enemy and succeeded, his plan worked.

Then why the SECOND Battle of Narvik?

Aattacking in daylight could have turned out worse as he was attacking twice his numbers. especially as the german destroyers would have finished refuelling. If he had more force with him at 4:30 am on the 10th outside Vestford i’m sure he would have used it instead given the choice to do nothing or attack immediately with the forces under his command he decided to attack.

Who wrote anything about daylight? The [night] recon is to find out where the Germans set up their ambushes. One can still attack at night and do the parachute flares and starshell things (which happened at Second Narvik by the way). The point is that Warburton Lee was surprised and got half his force destroyed in his disorganized retreat: he did not damage the Germans all that much. It was a bloody shambles that the RN felt it had to avenge or see the Germans crow about it. Hence Warspite and Victor Crutchley's sterling, and I mean STERLING performance.

in the process he destroyed most of the Heavy equipment for the German invasion force, the refuelling tanker for the German Destroyers. in addition he sunk two enemy destroyers and damaged several more all for the loss of two of his own destroyers and damage to another.
i’m sure if you could have told him the results in advance he would have made the same choice.

He did not render the Germans combat ineffective at all, but he removed an entire British destroyer division from the RN order of battle. That was why the British had to go back and finish what he failed to do. As an American I would have told him to whistle up air support and wait for "fair weather for battle". He had time and resources. The Germans were bottled by fuel shortages and weather and were suffering "harbor sickness". Nelson spent months on blockades just to wait on the French to get desperate and come to him, where he would trounce them because they were the ones morally beaten up by "harbor sickness" while his men were fresh and vigorous from sea duty. I take it Warburton Lee never was a USNWC graduate?

it’s easy to second guess the decisions of men at the scene. harder to understand their real choices.

there are many poorer decisions made by british Sailors in WW2 i’m still mistified why you chose to attack WL in your story.

I told you why I thought Warburton Lee made some poor decisions. Everything I used in the ITTL (see tag) was REAL. (^^^)

Still I had not realised that Crace was Warspite’s Captain at the second battle so you learn something new, and I agree that Crace’s swordfish spotter plane at Narvik performed probably the best piece of ariel support by a single aircraft in the war. but I doubt the weather would have permitted that level of support during the first battle.

Crace was in Australia being a PITA to the Menzies government. It was Victor Crutchley who commanded Warpsite.
 
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After all, the goal is to win the War, winning battles was nice, but incidental to a degree.

See George Washington, didn't win many battles, but skillful in retreat

George Washington had to win sometimes. He could not just retreat and retreat. Retreat is bad for morale and recruitment in a rebellion. Trenton and Princeton were not shining examples of the tactical evolution at all, but as high risk operational art exercises related to American Revolutionary War strategy, they make perfectly good sense.

And let's be honest, the operational art the British used in that war was surprisingly good. The Americans just had the advantages of home ground, a local logistics base, and a commander who was just a tad better at grand strategy than Lord North or those other gentlemen in London.
 
Tactically brilliant catastrophes are still catastrophes.
That seems to about sum up my reading of the histories. All of this talk of German tactical brilliance--an opinion with which I have long agreed--has forced me to wrack my brain to review German operations through the war and there is a repeating pattern to most (if not all) operations after about 1941, and certainly those after 1942-43: they never achieved their tactical objectives. Certainly there are operations when the power and surprise of their initial attacks appear to garner success, but after a mere day or two in most cases they come to a grinding halt and never quite reach their goals.

I'm reminded of a quote attributed to former Confederate Gen. George Pickett when after the war he was asked about why the attack on the third day at Gettysburg failed he tersely remarked, "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it."
 
Check the numbers on the Soviets at in 1941-43. They had a numerical advantage in every category on the Eastern Front from at least Autumn 1941 on. That's not even counting anything the Brits added to the equation.

Also don't forget the RAF actually had more single engine fighters than the Luftwaffe by the end of the BoB due in large part to purchases in the US, not to mention later, yet still got smashed on the Channel Front from 1941-42 (in 1941 the RAF lost 849 fighters not counting bomber losses vs 183 Luftwaffe fighters):
https://books.google.com/books?id=UmwwBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA239&lpg=PA239&dq=raf+circus+1942&source=bl&ots=2QtDIldFIq&sig=kPqJmrYc2cA4uGRJPlymZJxp6JM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiB2c_whdneAhXim-AKHVfWDmAQ6AEwD3oECBoQAQ#v=onepage&q=raf circus 1942&f=false

Ever hear of something called FORCE MULTIPLIERS?

--training
--logistics
--experience
--air support
--weapons effectiveness.
--defense
--competence at all levels in how to do the basics from Ivan to Zhukov?

The Russians only had two advantages; they were on defense and the Germans were not paying attention to logistics as they ought 1941-1943.

Let's take an excuse that some people have for German failure: the T-34 surprise just prior to Barbarossa.

From the numbers I can find, when the Germans invade, the Russians have about 1,000 T-34/76s available in 5 tank corps. The PROBLEM is that is that these tanks were new issue, with the short barrel 76 (Thank you Grigory Kulik!) that was woefully inaccurate, had a defective AP round and the tank crews had less than 10 hours in machines.

If the Russians were going to stop the Germans at the tactical small unit level with tanks; it would be in T-26s and BTs. Those were tissue paper to existing German weapons. The PZKWIII even with the short barrel 50 mm was perfectly happy to punch holes in that junk. Add that the panzer crews knew how to fight their machines well.

Russian Infantry at the squad and platoon level was armed with junk that their grandfathers threw away as useless in the Russo Japanese war. Now the Mosni-Nagant was/is quite a good rifle, but you had to have good bullets to make it work. What did the Russians not have?

Back to the T-34/76. Have you been inside one? Ergonomic disaster. Commander station, loader's position, I've seen WW II French tanks that were better laid out. Anyway, the T-34/85 is a LOT better because the Russians learned from combat what sucked in the T-34/76 and fixed it. Bigger better gun is what most people notice, but it is the improved ergonomics and RADIOS that make Soviet tank crews much more effective. That happens mostly after Kursk.

Now in 1943, the Russians come out with an improved infantry machine gun, the T-34/85, arm their assault troops with the PPsh 41 and PPS 43, and start rolling out Sturmoviks and Yaks, but the things that really make it all work, is that they rationalize their logistics chain (American experts imported help with technical advice and know-how as well as locomotives and rolling stock and railroad track laying and bedding equipment and trucks, never forget all those trucks!.), the STAVKA has managed to sideline the political officers and muzzle Stalin (temporarily), and Sergeant Ivan since he is still alive can teach Recruit Boris how to fight Germans. It has to be Ivan because all those brand new Lieutenant Pushkins are still idiots. The sooner Ivan can get the Germans to kill those know it alls, the better. Anyway, field grades, OJT, division grades now pay attention to feeding the troops and making sure that the ammunition is distributed and there is some TRAINING.

It pays off. Tactical proficiency between Felix and Ivan at the soldier level narrows to the point where it is about 1.1 to 1 and that is when numbers finally BITE. That does not actually happen until January 1944.
 

Deleted member 1487

That seems to about sum up my reading of the histories. All of this talk of German tactical brilliance--an opinion with which I have long agreed--has forced me to wrack my brain to review German operations through the war and there is a repeating pattern to most (if not all) operations after about 1941, and certainly those after 1942-43: they never achieved their tactical objectives. Certainly there are operations when the power and surprise of their initial attacks appear to garner success, but after a mere day or two in most cases they come to a grinding halt and never quite reach their goals.
I think you mean operational/strategic goals.

Tactics are only relevant in as far as they helped achieve strategic goals. If you have all the tactics in the world but you never translate this into strategic success then your tactics FAILED, and it doesn’t matter what temporary victories you achieved.

As to the question, brute force and skill cannot be separated. Brute force is a legitimate option when you have drastically superior resources available. To ignore it, or label it as not skilled because of some misplaced idea of fair play is foolish. You use the options available.
Tactics do matter in the sense of how many casualties you take and how long the war lasts. Britain took so long and ended up losing their world power status, while the USSR ended up being permanently crippled by the war and left over extended based on how bad their losses were in WW2 and how oriented they were to military spending and aid from then on out. The US on the other hand became the world's sole hyperpower after the war due to how low their losses were compared to everyone else and created the world financial system that runs to world to today. Brute force can have serious long term draw backs. So of course at a certain point brute force can overcome tactics as it did in WW2 (though the Allies can't be exclusively said to have been solely using brute force) it isn't necessarily the best option, which is why the US and NATO military came to learn from the Germans about how to fight tactically rather than the Soviets and meld it to their systems.
 
Air-Land battle and its later iterations (Deep Battle for one.) is based off Soviet doctrine. The USN certainly pays attention to Red Navy innovation as it goes about its business. Current American military op-art is heavily Russian influenced. Those guys "beat" the Germans.
 
Tactics do matter in the sense of how many casualties you take and how long the war lasts. Britain took so long and ended up losing their world power status, while the USSR ended up being permanently crippled by the war and left over extended based on how bad their losses were in WW2 and how oriented they were to military spending and aid from then on out. The US on the other hand became the world's sole hyperpower after the war due to how low their losses were compared to everyone else and created the world financial system that runs to world to today. Brute force can have serious long term draw backs. So of course at a certain point brute force can overcome tactics as it did in WW2 (though the Allies can't be exclusively said to have been solely using brute force) it isn't necessarily the best option, which is why the US and NATO military came to learn from the Germans about how to fight tactically rather than the Soviets and meld it to their systems.
I'm not addressing WWII specifically, but rather challenging the basis of the question. I.e. attempt to say that brute force is a less legitimate strategy than things requiring more finesse.
 

Deleted member 1487

Ever hear of something called FORCE MULTIPLIERS?

--training
--logistics
--experience
--air support
--weapons effectiveness.
--defense
--competence at all levels in how to do the basics from Ivan to Zhukov?

The Russians only had two advantages; they were on defense and the Germans were not paying attention to logistics as they ought 1941-1943.

Let's take an excuse that some people have for German failure: the T-34 surprise just prior to Barbarossa.

From the numbers I can find, when the Germans invade, the Russians have about 1,000 T-34/76s available in 5 tank corps. The PROBLEM is that is that these tanks were new issue, with the short barrel 76 (Thank you Grigory Kulik!) that was woefully inaccurate, had a defective AP round and the tank crews had less than 10 hours in machines.

If the Russians were going to stop the Germans at the tactical small unit level with tanks; it would be in T-26s and BTs. Those were tissue paper to existing German weapons. The PZKWIII even with the short barrel 50 mm was perfectly happy to punch holes in that junk. Add that the panzer crews knew how to fight their machines well.

Russian Infantry at the squad and platoon level was armed with junk that their grandfathers threw away as useless in the Russo Japanese war. Now the Mosni-Nagant was/is quite a good rifle, but you had to have good bullets to make it work. What did the Russians not have?

Back to the T-34/76. Have you been inside one? Ergonomic disaster. Commander station, loader's position, I've seen WW II French tanks that were better laid out. Anyway, the T-34/85 is a LOT better because the Russians learned from combat what sucked in the T-34/76 and fixed it. Bigger better gun is what most people notice, but it is the improved ergonomics and RADIOS that make Soviet tank crews much more effective. That happens mostly after Kursk.

Now in 1943, the Russians come out with an improved infantry machine gun, the T-34/85, arm their assault troops with the PPsh 41 and PPS 43, and start rolling out Sturmoviks and Yaks, but the things that really make it all work, is that they rationalize their logistics chain (American experts imported help with technical advice and know-how as well as locomotives and rolling stock and railroad track laying and bedding equipment and trucks, never forget all those trucks!.), the STAVKA has managed to sideline the political officers and muzzle Stalin (temporarily), and Sergeant Ivan since he is still alive can teach Recruit Boris how to fight Germans. It has to be Ivan because all those brand new Lieutenant Pushkins are still idiots. The sooner Ivan can get the Germans to kill those know it alls, the better. Anyway, field grades, OJT, division grades now pay attention to feeding the troops and making sure that the ammunition is distributed and there is some TRAINING.

It pays off. Tactical proficiency between Felix and Ivan at the soldier level narrows to the point where it is about 1.1 to 1 and that is when numbers finally BITE. That does not actually happen until January 1944.
It is shocking just how much nonsense you managed to spit out. The Soviets had 20,000 AFVs in 1941 the majority equal or better than the Pz II, III, and 38t, which made up at least 85% of the German AFV park; the T-26 and BT-7 were at least as good if not better than the PzII and 38T; Soviet 37 and 45mm guns were plenty to knock out at least 85% of Panzers in 1941. That's not counting the crap the Axis minor powers had. Meanwhile the T-34 was better than the Pz IV in any number of ways (mobility, gun power, armor) and there were WAY more of them than the PZ IV. Radios and ergonomics matter, but T-34s were shrugging off dozens of hits and continuing to fight; 1 KV tank held up a Panzer division for over 24 hours in Lithuania! That's also not counting the KV tanks either. In the air the Soviets had something also close to 20,000 aircraft and only lost about 2-3,000 of them during the first week of the war when they could be reasonably said to have been surprised and not on a war footing.

You're also forgetting how large the Red Army was in 1941 and on and how big it became by the end of the year despite taking as least 4.5 million losses in less than 6 months. By 1942 the Soviets were handily outnumbering the Axis, while in 1941 were at least at parity:
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2011/11/strength-and-loss-data-eastern-front.html
 
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