Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

[Byzantine fanatic]

German methodology also required a distinct disregard for their losses. Again, Sedan: Guderian lost fully a third of his lead infantry regiment in a single day, a loss rate which would have horrified any American or British commander, being more then double what they’d consider enough to render a unit “combat-ineffective”. Post-War mythmaking not withstanding, the Germans showed a willingness to grease the tracks of their tanks with the blood of their own soldiers almost equal to that of the Russians.

Better to lose 90% of a unit today and win a decisive victory that ends the campaign quickly, than to take lower casualties but allow the war to drag on.

Germany's whole ethos of the war was stretching things to the utmost limit in pursuit of quick victory. It's ironic that they ended up getting the opposite of what they intended; instead of two six-week campaigns, one in Poland and one in the USSR, they got a grinding 6 year war with 5.5 million dead soldiers. Events did not unfold as planned.

 

[McPherson]

The two American landings were a shambles: but adapt improvise and overcome and success follows.

(^^^)

There was a bit of luck involved for the Allies, a lot of guile, and supreme consummate skill. Teddy Roosevelt III for example and the British, themselves, sure were skilled .

 

[hipper]

YOU really need to read the timeline where I tackle the Americans in the Southwest Pacific Ocean Area. You think I'm unkind to the British?

I like bits of Your torpedo saga, your writing is good and you are very Knowlegable about the Subject.

still you make bizarre leaps that put you with the worst of the Acis naval revisionists. your criticisms of Warbuton Lee’s action at Narvick is however very misplaced Warbuton lee did exactly what was expected of a british Destroyer Captain he went straight at the Enemy and gained a strategic and tactical victory ( he destroyed the German troops equipment the tanker that could refuel the German Destroyers. tactically he inflicted more damage on the Enemy than he received while outnumbered two to one. i wonder where your animus comes or why you think Warbuton Lee did so badly.

Based on his reporting on the Battle of Midway (Read "The Shattered Sword") Fuchida is worthless as a reporter on anything. The Japanese say so themselves. He is sort of the Japanese Marc Mitscher when it comes to alibis about what he did wrong.

in this case he was quite correct the incoming Japanese raid was seen at 50 miles out.

On the 9th. The British were caught on the ground on the 5th. I mentioned that.
Not true. The British air intercepts collapsed on the 9th. That is not an air defense network. That is Pearl Harbor 3.0.

on the 9th the RAF and RN mounted the most effective air defence that the Japanese carrier force had encountered. including their first Fighter losses in air to Air combat.

True, sorta. An Albacore found Nagumo and Somerville could have tried a night attack. Somerville actually ran for it, instead (Orders?). I think that was the correct decision considering the poor readiness state of British forces in theater and what Nagumo would do to them come the dawn. I was trying to be polite and not hurt the RN's reputation.

this is why I get so enraged, Prior to the Indian ocean Raid Somerville was given orders only to engage an obviously inferior force.

instead he when given similar intelligence to the Americans prior to midway planned an ambush. Somerville continued to seek an engagement
and continued to search for the Japanese fleet on the 5/6 april.

Claiming that he ran for it during the Indian ocean Raid is incorrect.

 

[marathag]

(steam locomotives need charging about every 80 kilometers, so that is the water tank along the rail line.)

Soviet Locomotives were like the US, large tender that held much more water than what German tenders held.
So even with facilities intact, stops were much farther apart than what the Germans were used to.

Then they weren't winterized to deal with real cold temps, for either

 

[McPherson]

I like bits of Your torpedo saga, your writing is good and you are very Knowlegable about the Subject.

still you make bizarre leaps that put you with the worst of the Acis naval revisionists. your criticisms of Warbuton Lee’s action at Narvick is however very misplaced Warbuton lee did exactly what was expected of a british Destroyer Captain he went straight at the Enemy and gained a strategic and tactical victory ( he destroyed the German troops equipment the tanker that could refuel the German Destroyers. tactically he inflicted more damage on the Enemy than he received while outnumbered two to one. i wonder where your animus comes or why you think Warbuton Lee did so badly.

I stand by what I wrote. I used British sources to reach my conclusions.

in this case he was quite correct the incoming Japanese raid was seen at 50 miles out.

If you believe Fuchida, then this discussion is not going to reach mutual consensus. I cannot accept anything the man reports for the same reason I disregard Marc Mitscher. I politely agree to disagree.

on the 9th the RAF and RN mounted the most effective air defence that the Japanese carrier force had encountered. including their first Fighter losses in air to Air combat

Same statement again. USAAF fighters shot down at least one Zero of the nine crashed and recovered during the Pearl Harbor raid (Rearden, Jim. Koga's Zero: The Fighter That Changed World War II. ISBN 0-929521-56-0, second edition. Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Publishing2nd visit; pp 28-29).

this is why I get so enraged, Prior to the Indian ocean Raid Somerville was given orders only to engage an obviously inferior force.

You have the orders correct.

instead he when given similar intelligence to the Americans prior to midway planned an ambush. Somerville continued to seek an engagement
and continued to search for the Japanese fleet on the 5/6 april.

No he did not. His course was away from where Nagumo was, once he knew vaguely where Nagumo was.

Claiming that he ran for it during the Indian ocean Raid is incorrect.

He did. It was the correct decision. Spruance ran at Midway for the same exact reason to avoid contact under unfavorable tactical conditions. What is wrong with running when it saves your force to strike later when you have better circumstances?

 

[DaveBC]

I suppose since I've put myself on record saying that France was a near-run thing I've got to be fair the other way too and point out that instead of the battles of Narvik representing the finest in RN derring-do, we could very easily be looking back and saying, "Wow, why on Earth did they think getting Warspite torpedoed might be justified for the sake of sinking of a few destroyers from a navy that was already horrifically outnumbered anyways?"

There's the Allied application of brute force for you. I guess it paid off for them at Second Narvik.

 

[McPherson]

I only supply this, because I agree (^^^) that the Germans were incredibly lucky.

 

[Garetor]

It's better to be lucky than good, as the saying goes!

 

[DaveBC]

It's better to be lucky than good, as the saying goes!

Until it runs out...

 

[Ian_W]

It's better to be lucky than good, as the saying goes!

"In the long run, luck goes only to the efficient".

 

[WaterproofPotatoes]

Napoleon was alleged to have said somethibg to the effect of "Give me lucky generals, for luck is nothing more than the ability to see opportunity and sieze it."

 

[Garetor]

Until it runs out...

Sure. But that's what separates good rulers from great ones. Those who know when to turn from half mad gambler to cautious miser. Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, and Hitler didn't know when to stop the betting. Though at least the first two left enduring legacies behind. All Hitler left was a smoking ruin!

 

[DaveBC]

All Hitler left was a smoking ruin!

Plus the fifth largest army in Berlin. Not everyone accomplishes as much.

 

[Jellico]

They say you make your own luck.

I would argue that successful leaders have a system behind them that enables them to exploit luck when it goes their way.

 

[McPherson]

They say you make your own luck.

I would argue that successful leaders have a system behind them that enables them to exploit luck when it goes their way.

“God has a special providence for fools, drunkards, and the United States of America.”

― Otto von Bismarck

The Berlin maniac should have remembered it.

 

[hipper]

I stand by what I wrote. I used British sources to reach my conclusions.

there are lots of british sources about the battle but the conclusions are your own I find it difficult to understand what you expected Warbuton Lee to do, not attack? or sink 10 german Destroyers with his own 5 destroyers. it’s just bizarre.

If you believe Fuchida, then this discussion is not going to reach mutual consensus. I cannot accept anything the man reports for the same reason I disregard Marc Mitscher. I politely agree to disagree.

on this occasion, the attack on the 9th he was quite correct, the japanese air strike was detected about 5O miles out and interceptions took place before the attack on the Harbour this was the first time the KB has encountered a radar directed air defense system.


Same statement again. USAAF fighters shot down at least one Zero of the nine crashed and recovered during the Pearl Harbor raid (Rearden, Jim. Koga's Zero: The Fighter That Changed World War II. ISBN 0-929521-56-0, second edition. Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories Publishing2nd visit; pp 28-29).

It is possible Welsh shot down a Zero fair enough.

You have the orders correct.
No he did not. His course was away from where Nagumo was, once he knew vaguely where Nagumo was.
He did. It was the correct decision. Spruance ran at Midway for the same exact reason to avoid contact under unfavorable tactical conditions. What is wrong with running when it saves your force to strike later when you have better circumstances?

now you are claimong Somerville was a liar, From his dispatch.

At 1817 a further signal was received from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 position of the enemy force, amplifying it to include 2 carriers and 3 unknown vessels and giving the course as northwest. This was the first indication I had of an enemy course to the northwest.

I immediately ordered Force A to alter course to 315 degrees and instructed Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command to conform. These movements had the object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. search to locate the enemy, and to being Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendezvous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 3N, 75E.

Somerville Hewithdrew the Fleet after the return to Adu Atol not on the night of the 5/6 where he streamed towards his best estimate of the Japanese fleet with a fully armed strike ready.

 

[McPherson]

there are lots of british sources about the battle but the conclusions are your own I find it difficult to understand what you expected Warbuton Lee to do, not attack? or sink 10 german Destroyers with his own 5 destroyers. it’s just bizarre.

Do a proper recon with attached FAA support (he had it) and not be surprised and counter-ambushed.

on this occasion, the attack on the 9th he was quite correct, the japanese air strike was detected about 5O miles out and interceptions took place before the attack on the Harbour this was the first time the KB has encountered a radar directed air defense system.

Not according to the British who claim their radar packed it in and the vector intercept was thus botched. Besides 80 kilometers is 5 real minutes warning. Do you know the climb rate of a Hurricane? I do. Somebody is not telling the truth about it.

It is possible Welsh shot down a Zero fair enough.

I know. THAT is why I said it.

At 1817 a further signal was received from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 position of the enemy force, amplifying it to include 2 carriers and 3 unknown vessels and giving the course as northwest. This was the first indication I had of an enemy course to the northwest.

I immediately ordered Force A to alter course to 315 degrees and instructed Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command to conform. These movements had the object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. search to locate the enemy, and to being Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendezvous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 3N, 75E.

Somerville Hewithdrew the Fleet after the return to Adu Atol not on the night of the 5/6 where he streamed towards his best estimate of the Japanese fleet with a fully armed strike ready.

now you are claimong Somerville was a liar, From his dispatch.

At 1817 a further signal was received from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 position of the enemy force, amplifying it to include 2 carriers and 3 unknown vessels and giving the course as northwest. This was the first indication I had of an enemy course to the northwest.

I immediately ordered Force A to alter course to 315 degrees and instructed Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command to conform. These movements had the object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. search to locate the enemy, and to being Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendezvous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 3N, 75E.

Somerville Hewithdrew the Fleet after the return to Adu Atol not on the night of the 5/6 where he streamed towards his best estimate of the Japanese fleet with a fully armed strike ready.

I would be amiss if I did not point out three things.

1. Somerville is still guessing if he trusts radar search planes to find Nagumo that late.
2. The report he had was off by 30 flying minutes to the East. The British pilot got his position wrong.
3. And Somerville from a previous episode was known to varnish the truth a little in his official reports when the results he produced were not as expected.

So yes... I do doubt the absolute accuracy of that quote as to ground truth, when the ship movements do not match declared commander intent. If I can do it to Mitscher with no heartburn at all, why would I hesitate with Somerville?

 

[FBKampfer]

I feel there's a tendency to dismiss Axis successes due to overall failure, and a tendency to dismiss Allied failings because of overall success.


The Allies had staggering industrial potential, and largely did not have to worry about bombing. This let them accomplish astounding logistical feats (LL to the Soviets included).

I think it's pretty obvious that had Germany been given the USA's resources and industrial capacity, nevermind the manpower disparity, Europe would be a German client state.

They had gross failures in logistics and efficiency, but it's important to remember that the Allies had the capability and reserves to suffer almost any reversal and still come to the next fight even better equipped than before.


On a tactical level, the Germans were nothing short of herculean in the scope of their successes, especially factoring in their chronic logistical issues.


This is not to say that the Allies were unskilled, only that if you were to throw them at Kursk, I doubt they could come out with a possibility casualty exchange rate. The Germans, somehow, managed to inflict twice the casualties on dug in defenders backed by the most densely packed antitank defenses in the history of war.



So yes, the German army might have a bit of an inflated reputation due to the more flashy, romanticized nature of tactical battles. However that does not in any way lessen their actual success, any more than allied tactical failings lessen their superior strategic planning.

 

[SactoMan101]

If you're talking "brute force" of industrial production, the Americans certainly way out-did the Axis. Thanks to already considerable industrial might of the USA, the Americans were able to convert factories and build new ones to MASSIVELY produce every weapon needed to win the war. This was something that one Isoroku Yamamoto very well knew when he was naval attaché in Washington, DC in the early 1920's.

It also helped that many military forces the Americans fielded could be rotated out on a regular basis.

 

[McPherson]

So yes, the German army might have a bit of an inflated reputation due to the more flashy, romanticized nature of tactical battles. However that does not in any way lessen their actual success, any more than allied tactical failings lessen their superior strategic planning.

The Germans could march to where they needed to go in a regional war (I discount the North Africa adventure. Italy had a considerable hand in making that fiasco even remotely possible for which they never get any logistics credit.). The Allies, at least the western ones, had two tough oceans to cross and fought globally and in the beginning were outnumbered and outgunned. It was only 1943 onward that the so-called overwhelming Allied force was martialed to defeat the Axis, despite the massive work Russia, the UK and US exerted to lay the groundwork for 1943 to come into place. What were the Axis doing in 1942? Getting defeated by inferior forces (Germans and Japanese by Russians, Chinese, UK and Americans). 1939 and 1941; even, if we count Russia's first two great defensive successes (Japan at Khalkin Gol and Germany in front of Moscow and I do.).

We tend to overlook that.