Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

  • Yes

    Votes: 97 27.2%
  • No

    Votes: 99 27.8%
  • To a degree

    Votes: 160 44.9%

  • Total voters
    356

Deleted member 1487

I'll just requote myself on that:
And you completely missed my point with your repost.

That latter assertion is actually not clear if that is the case. It is quite possible that the Axis numbers exclude those in the hospital and in rear-area garrison duty, which could account for the discrepancy between my numbers and his (at least, as far as the Axis side is concerned).
http://worldwariiarchives.weebly.com/uploads/9/5/1/1/9511171/world_war_ii_eastern_perspective.pdf
Iststarke Actual strength, includes all men that are part of the unit's composition. Men on leave or temporarily detached to other units are included. Also men sick or wounded are included if they are assumed to return to service within eight weeks. Thus, despite its name, this strength category does not give the actual number of men available for service with the unit at the given time.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=219452
As to Müller-Hillebrand's figures for 1 July 1942: Original documents give an Iststärke (without Finland and SS/Lw) of 2,635,000 in the rea of operations and just 99,000 (instead of 212,000) additional soldiers in the rear zone. They are in good agreement with the attached document.
Regarding the increase in Army Iststärke, I would surmise that it was primarily due to the addition of security units in the Reichskommissariate. There's also the Luftwaffe field divisions that arrived late in the year, which apparently are being counted as Heer personnel until spring 1943. What this shows is that German forces deployed against the Soviets (putting aside the RKs) remained remarkably stable between summer 1942 and spring 1943, at roughly 2.9 million (2.7m+ in the east proper and 150,000+ in Finland).
Given that that number roughly matches what Glantz is putting out his numbers are more likely than not 'Iststärke', which does not include all men actually at the front. Similarly citing all Axis minor forces as 'at the front' for his comparison also has a similar issue of those soldiers not being actually at the front, just mobilized and inducted in the military in some capacity.

Regardless though, even if we go by Glantz's numbers for November 1942 they outnumbered the Axis 1.76:1, which means that even matching man for man across the front the Axis, they'd have an additional 2.584 million men to use wherever they wanted...which they did for Mars, Uranus, and Saturn to overload the Axis forces...which they did.


Blatantly false. Glantz's numbers are pretty clearly about what the Germans had on hand. They are too low by around a million-and-a-half for what the Germans should have on hand according to their TO&Es.
That gets into the variety of terms the Germans used. I was referring to the Iststärke number, which is the most commonly cited one, which counts everyone officially assigned to units, but who may actually be in the hospital, on leave, or detached; as it says above this category does not give the actual number of men available with the units even if officially posted.

Yes. In addition to supporting Torch and Guadacanal, the US had to field convoys to Britain, to Russia through three different routes, to Egypt, to India, to Australia, and to operation bases throughout the rest of the Pacific... just to name a few. The Americans very much felt this at Guadalcanal. Supporting the operation was a nightmare for the Americans, and in the words of Admiral Turner "we were living from one logistic crisis to another." When Nimitz asked Turner how many transports and cargo ships he could make available to support MacArthur's upcoming offensive operations, Turner through a fit, explaining that he barely had enough ships as it was, and he certainly didn't have enough to give any to anyone else. For all that Guadalcanal may have been a logistical nightmare for the Japanese, don't for a moment think that the Americans just blithely shipped men and equipment thousands of miles on unlimited numbers of ships without a logistical care in the world.
In 1942 the US wasn't the bulk of shipping used. They kept the majority of their shipping to service their domestic needs; the British provided the bulk of shipping, especially given that their naval industry had been building merchant shipping for Britain flat out, not retaining it for their own use. Compare though US shipping problems to those of the Japanese and you'll find that comparatively the US was swimming in logistics surplus.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
Merchant Ship Production (in tons)
Year United States Japan
1942 5,479,766 260,059
 
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How many men were committed to Europe by the Americans in 1942? The US left the majority of the Asian theater to the Brits in 1942, same with the Atlantic. US Iranian participation was limited throughout 1942. In 1942 the US also did not supply the USSR with 100k trucks, about half of that for both 1941-42. Meanwhile the Japanese had to garrison and occupy Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, Indochina, China itself, attack and occupy the Phillipines and Indonesia, invade Burma, attack most of the Pacific islands to up Midway, while threatening and bombing Australia, etc. By comparison in most of 1942 if not all of it including the invasion of North Africa the Japanese moved far more men and material around their area of operations. 1943 would be a different story as US production and military expansion kicked into high gear, but 1942 was their lowest level of commitment compared to the rest of their war and what the Japanese were doing at the same time.

1. The US did ship about 100,000 trucks.
2. Take 1 small example: Burma.
3. The Japanese had about 40 divisions equivalent in China and the equivalent of an air force (about 1100 IJAAF aircraft). Most of those guys were COIN fighting and not engaged in conventional war operations. Hardly what I call heavy combat nor logistically intensive. Give the Chinese credit, that is 2 million men not chugging down to Australia. The Chinese are never given enough credit for the victory over Japan, but it was their ability to act as sponge more than as active combatants that is the point. The logistics for the China war were not that intensive for Japan in the overall picture. Trucks are nice to have and so are planes, but a Japanese army could march on its feet and still get the job done on rice and bullets. (Ichi-go) which is why I do not buy your argument about the intensity of the China effort.

Now as to the fighting in the Pacific?

The Japanese had troop lift and sustainment for about 150,000 troops one way. Once they got where they were going, they were supposed to conquer and live off the locals. In the case of a real "genius" named Homma, the force lift was originally 45,000 men into the Philippines. He was supposed to get by on about 125,000 tonnes of shipping and conquer Luzon in 60 days. Homma shot off about 5000 tonnes of ammunition and screwed up his timetable. The Japanese had to send a siege train and divert an additional 100,000 tonnes of shipping scheduled for Java and throw their timetables off by two months because the inept MacArthur was at least able to stage a fighting retreat good enough to accomplish that much.

This is the same MacArthur who will be given Australia on a silver plate and will be fed everything in the US larder ready to go, (4 divisions and about 2/3 an air force and will start the New Guinea campaign before ABDA has been wiped out. he will face about the same force of Japanese. But I digress.

The forces headed to Europe during the same period included about the same amount, all for the British Isles.

Anyway, things for the US were logistics, logistics, logistics. Most of the Pacific effort from February to Coral Sea was to build a string of bases from Pearl Harbor to Sydney and I can even tell you about how much tonnage it took in shipping. 1 million tonnes. NONE OF IT BRITISH, because the British were using all of their tonnage in the Indian Ocean. The only allied tonnage for the Americans was either Dutch, Australian or French. (and Norwegian oddly enough.).

No. They massed part of their forces in front of Moscow and attacked in December for Operation Mars. They had been building up around Stalingrad for many months prior. Moscow reserves started moving to Stalingrad in July. The battle of Kalach in late July involved all the reserve armies being built up in 1942 around Moscow. Uranus forces started building up in September after the fighting for the city started. Soviet units did not move by road all the way from Moscow in October. Plus river shipping was extensively used by the Soviets before the Volga froze.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steamboats_on_the_Volga_River#World_War_II_and_beyond

Not quite correct. Stalin in his usual meddling had decided August 1942 that the Germans would try for Moscow again. So he ordered the strategic reserve posted on the Central front.

061.jpg


Do you notice the road and rail movements on your own map? And that from the central front? Just asking.
 
And you completely missed my point with your repost.

No, that's you whose counting every last Soviet soldier regardless of whether he's on the Japanese border or not against only the German soldiers deployed in the east.

http://worldwariiarchives.weebly.com/uploads/9/5/1/1/9511171/world_war_ii_eastern_perspective.pdf


https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=219452

Given that that number roughly matches what Glantz is putting out his numbers are more likely than not 'Iststärke', which does not include all men actually at the front. Similarly citing all Axis minor forces as 'at the front' for his comparison also has a similar issue of those soldiers not being actually at the front, just mobilized and inducted in the military in some capacity.

Except those figures given in the quotes don't really match what Glantz is putting out. Indeed, they are LARGER then what Glantz gives: his figures for November 1st 1942 is that of 2.4 million Germans while your quote says Iststärke strength "remained remarkably stable between summer 1942 and spring 1943" at 2.9 million. In other words, according to your links Glantz is underestimating the total size of German forces on the Eastern Front by around a half-million men. These also would only be German forces, not Axis minors.

they'd have an additional 2.584 million men to use wherever they wanted...which they did for Mars, Uranus, and Saturn to overload the Axis forces...which they did.

And to maneuver those men into position and then into the attack requires all the same sort of skillsets that the Germans used earlier in the war. Skill is skill, regardless of the numbers involved.

That gets into the variety of terms the Germans used.

No, it does not. The paper strength of German infantry divisions alone would have been 2.4 million if they had everything they were supposed to. Instead, it was closer to 1.6 million. It's a similar story for the panzer divisions, non-divisional units, logistical assets, etc.

In 1942 the US wasn't the bulk of shipping used.

In the Pacific it certainly was. British shipping was all in the Atlantic, Med, and Indian oceans.
 

Deleted member 1487

1. The US did ship about 100,000 trucks.
Source? I think you're mixing up the fact that the protocol period ran from mid-1942 to mid-1943. In that period 100k trucks were shipped, most of them in 1943. Between 1941-42 43k trucks were shipped to the USSR.

Burma in 1942 was a mostly British operation given Roosevelt's 'Germany First' policy and the demand the US already had in the Pacific. What US forces/equipment were sent that was so substantial?

3. The Japanese had about 40 divisions equivalent in China and the equivalent of an air force (about 1100 IJAAF aircraft). Most of those guys were COIN fighting and not engaged in conventional war operations. Hardly what I call heavy combat nor logistically intensive. Give the Chinese credit, that is 2 million men not chugging down to Australia. The Chinese are never given enough credit for the victory over Japan, but it was their ability to act as sponge more than as active combatants that is the point. The logistics for the China war were not that intensive for Japan in the overall picture. Trucks are nice to have and so are planes, but a Japanese army could march on its feet and still get the job done on rice and bullets. (Ichi-go) which is why I do not buy your argument about the intensity of the China effort.
40 divisions is a larger commitment than the US had in all of the Pacific in 1942.

Now as to the fighting in the Pacific?

The Japanese had troop lift and sustainment for about 150,000 troops one way. Once they got where they were going, they were supposed to conquer and live off the locals. In the case of a real "genius" named Homma, the force lift was originally 45,000 men into the Philippines. He was supposed to get by on about 125,000 tonnes of shipping and conquer Luzon in 60 days. Homma shot off about 5000 tonnes of ammunition and screwed up his timetable. The Japanese had to send a siege train and divert an additional 100,000 tonnes of shipping scheduled for Java and throw their timetables off by two months because the inept MacArthur was at least able to stage a fighting retreat good enough to accomplish that much.

This is the same MacArthur who will be given Australia on a silver plate and will be fed everything in the US larder ready to go, (4 divisions and about 2/3 an air force and will start the New Guinea campaign before ABDA has been wiped out. he will face about the same force of Japanese. But I digress.

The forces headed to Europe during the same period included about the same amount, all for the British Isles.

Anyway, things for the US were logistics, logistics, logistics. Most of the Pacific effort from February to Coral Sea was to build a string of bases from Pearl Harbor to Sydney and I can even tell you about how much tonnage it took in shipping. 1 million tonnes. NONE OF IT BRITISH, because the British were using all of their tonnage in the Indian Ocean. The only allied tonnage for the Americans was either Dutch, Australian or French. (and Norwegian oddly enough.).
Again you're only proving my point. US commitments were minor in 1942 compared to the Japanese. They had a shoestring budget and were committed to the hilt, while the US forces were quite limited and had a surplus of shipping, especially in comparison.


Not quite correct. Stalin in his usual meddling had decided August 1942 that the Germans would try for Moscow again. So he ordered the strategic reserve posted on the Central front.
Which is why he committed all those reserve armies against AG-South per that map? Plus as I said Uranus wasn't in planning and build up until September, but forces were being moved in from July despite whatever Stalin's strategic misconceptions were.

Do you notice the road and rail movements on your own map? And that from the central front? Just asking.
Yes; the majority of reserve armies moved directly west from their positions, with two armies moving behind the front to Stalingrad in July. The movement did not happen in October and wasn't by the majority of Soviet reserves either. Two Soviet reserves armies were about the strength of an underequipped, undermanned German corps each. Hardly a masterful difficult move by rail, especially as they only appeared in pieces and were largely destroyed as a result of their partial deployment in time.
 

Deleted member 1487

No, that's you whose counting every last Soviet soldier regardless of whether he's on the Japanese border or not against only the German soldiers deployed in the east.
As he did with all the Axis forces mobilized in the East, regardless of whether they were not at the front. Axis forces not on the front lines were compared against Soviets that were, though not in total.

Except those figures given in the quotes don't really match what Glantz is putting out. Indeed, they are LARGER then what Glantz gives: his figures for November 1st 1942 is that of 2.4 million Germans while your quote says Iststärke strength "remained remarkably stable between summer 1942 and spring 1943" at 2.9 million. In other words, according to your links Glantz is underestimating the total size of German forces on the Eastern Front by around a half-million men. These also would only be German forces, not Axis minors.
I'll have to check Glantz's sources for what he's estimating; the 2.9 million figure you're talking about is for all German units in the East, even the occupation forces that Glantz has either excluded or weren't included in his figure in the first place. Iststärke would be even lower than that. It's not clear if Soviet 'front strength' has the same sort of technicalities that would lower strength. Axis minor strength is a whole separate issue, as just for the Finns the actual units at the front were at least 100k less than what he quotes for 1942, as he is citing the total mobilized manpower.

Edit: Glantz's source is Ziemke's "Stalingrad to Berlin":
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-EF-Defeat/USA-EF-Defeat-1.html#fn35
35. As of the first week in September 1942 the German strength on the Eastern Front totaled 2,490,000 men in 163 divisions, not including the Twentieth Mountain Army in northern Finland which had 6 divisions. The attached forces of Germany's allies, Italy, Rumania, and Hungary, totaled 48 divisions (including one Spanish and one Slovakian division) and 648,000 men. The Finnish Army, which operated independently, had some 17 divisions and brigades, slightly less than 400,000 men. OKH, GenStdH, (III) Nr. 420743; OKW, WFSt, Op. (H), 27.9.42; OKH, GenStdH, Op. Abt. (III) Pruef Nr. 75940, Zahlenmaessige Uebersicht ueber die Verteilung der Divisionen, Stand 77.9.42, H 22/235 file.
That's Iststärke strength and did not include some German troops in Finland, so it to be fair somewhat smaller than total German strength in the East in September. Axis minor strength would probably require a lot more detail digging in terms of what as actually at the front vs. what was theoretically there.

Soviet sources are the Defense Committee and seems much better sourced than Axis numbers.

And to maneuver those men into position and then into the attack requires all the same sort of skill sets that the Germans used earlier in the war. Skill is skill, regardless of the numbers involved.
Transporting men to the front in trains is basic logistics which everyone did. The maneuver skill set was something else.

No, it does not. The paper strength of German infantry divisions alone would have been 2.4 million if they had everything they were supposed to. Instead, it was closer to 1.6 million. It's a similar story for the panzer divisions, non-divisional units, logistical assets, etc.
Then clearly you did not understand what I said. Iststärke was what I was referring to, which is not TOE strength, it is the actual 'on hand' strength of men assigned at any one time, even when they are in the hospital for a 'short' stay of two months, detached to other units for whatever reason, or on leave. TOE strength would be something else.
 
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I suddenly remembered I had a copy of Gregory Liedtke's Enduring the Whirlwind, which specifically examines German manpower and their replacement system on the Eastern Front in WW2 up through to Kursk, sitting on top of the drawers to my right. Here is what he has to say:

"In regards to the Soviet figure [of 6,605,498], 5,781,229 personnel constituted the ground forces, the balance residing with the Soviet Army Air Force, the Air Defence Force(PVO), and the Soviet Navy. The number of Axis personnel includes 2.9 million Germans with the Ostheer (on 1 October) and roughly 1.2 million allied Axis troops (including 229,005 Italians, 206,197 Hungarians, 380,103 Romanians, and 400,000 Finns). The actual total is probably considerably greater since the one shown here does not include German security personnel within those regions under German civil administration, the large number of Luftwaffe personnel in the East who were not under Army command, Hungarian security forces, or the 71,211 Romanian troops occupying the Trans-Dniester region. See Kroener, et. al. GSWW. VolV: Part two, p. 1020, Dell'esercito, La Operazioni delle Unita Italiane al Fronte Russio 1941-1942, and Dutu et. al. Armata Romana in al doilea razboi Mondial, 1941-1945." Page 281-282

So that closes the case pretty solidly: 2.9 million German forces plus 230,000 Italians, 205,000 Hungarians, 380,000 Romanians, and 400,000 Finns comes out to 4.1 million total Axis forces. This is excluding German deep rear area security forces, Luftwaffe personnel, Hungarian security forces, and the Romanian forces in the Trans-D'niester region.

Transporting men to the front in trains is basic logistics which everyone did. The maneuver skill set was something else.

Only part of the trip could have been made by rail (particularly for the southern, where the nearest railhead lay a ways off to the north)). To get those forces in the final leg of position and then to have them overcome the enemy in front of them is, again, identical to the skillset the Germans had practiced earlier.
 
Source? I think you're mixing up the fact that the protocol period ran from mid-1942 to mid-1943. In that period 100k trucks were shipped, most of them in 1943. Between 1941-42 43k trucks were shipped to the USSR.

Burma in 1942 was a mostly British operation given Roosevelt's 'Germany First' policy and the demand the US already had in the Pacific. What US forces/equipment were sent that was so substantial?

I suppose Vineagar Joe Stillwell did not say this then;

‘I claim we got a hell of a beating,’ he snapped. ‘We got run out of Burma, and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it.’

3 Chinese field armies, US equipped and "led".

===============================================



===============================================

You might also note that a Japanese division is not what I wrote. Division equivalents is what I wrote. This means either British or American force measure. Their divisions (140 in China) are roughly "brigade or regiment" equivalent. Their actual designation is more like route army for their "division sized" units.

Anyway...

Imperial General HQ
Army Group Army Divisions
Kwangtung Army ……………(Manchuria)………………. Armies not known...……………….. total 13 divisions
China Expedition Forces ..(China)………………………. 1st, 11th, 12th, 13th Armies.... total 21 divisions
23th Army ………………………(against Hong Kong) ..38 Infantry...…………………………….,total..1 division
Southern Army Group …..(Pacific, East India, Burma)
Reserves:...…………………………………………………………….21 , 56 Infantry...…………………….total 2 divisions
14th Army ………………………(Formosa, Palau Islands -> Philippines).. 16, 48 Infantry total 2 divisions
15th Army ………………………(China and Indo-China -> Burma)...…...…33, 55 Infantry Division" total 2 divisions
25th Army (China and Indo-China -> Malaya, Borneo, Sumatra) 5, 18 Infantry, Guards Division total 3 divisions
16th Army (Japan and Palau Islands -> Dutch Borneo, Celebres, South Sumatra, Amboina, Timor, Java) 2, 56 Infantry total 2 divisions

================================================
And for another, you have not addressed the question I left you. If you notice the direction of movement all those Russian armies and the dates and their start points?

From the northwest and the Moscow front, not from the west at all.
 
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Deleted member 1487

I suddenly remembered I had a copy of Gregory Liedtke's Enduring the Whirlwind, which specifically examines German manpower and their replacement system on the Eastern Front in WW2 up through to Kursk, sitting on top of the drawers to my right. Here is what he has to say:

"In regards to the Soviet figure [of 6,605,498], 5,781,229 personnel constituted the ground forces, the balance residing with the Soviet Army Air Force, the Air Defence Force(PVO), and the Soviet Navy. The number of Axis personnel includes 2.9 million Germans with the Ostheer (on 1 October) and roughly 1.2 million allied Axis troops (including 229,005 Italians, 206,197 Hungarians, 380,103 Romanians, and 400,000 Finns). The actual total is probably considerably greater since the one shown here does not include German security personnel within those regions under German civil administration, the large number of Luftwaffe personnel in the East who were not under Army command, Hungarian security forces, or the 71,211 Romanian troops occupying the Trans-Dniester region. See Kroener, et. al. GSWW. VolV: Part two, p. 1020, Dell'esercito, La Operazioni delle Unita Italiane al Fronte Russio 1941-1942, and Dutu et. al. Armata Romana in al doilea razboi Mondial, 1941-1945." Page 281-282

So that closes the case pretty solidly: 2.9 million German forces plus 230,000 Italians, 205,000 Hungarians, 380,000 Romanians, and 400,000 Finns comes out to 4.1 million total Axis forces. This is excluding German deep rear area security forces, Luftwaffe personnel, Hungarian security forces, and the Romanian forces in the Trans-D'niester region.
The Soviet forces then were 6.6 million men at the Front of which 5.7 million (Glantz's number) were army units.
There are a number of issues outstanding with the above quote, including the numbers of Axis minor troops actually at the front, rather than the round numbers given for various armies. In a previous quote I gave Luftwaffe strength was partially included in army strength late in 1942, as the Luftwaffe field divisions were under army command. The majority of Luftwaffe personnel were non-combat and included behind the lines security forces, plus units already attached to the army and counted under their strength. The author does not explain actually explain why he is making the assumption that security personnel were not included in his numbers or what Hungarian security units he is counting separate from their army (he doesn't cite a Hungarian source) or why Romanian troops in Trans-Dniester should be counted any more than units in Romania given that the TD was annexed into Romania proper. I'll see if I can track down the source he uses for German strength (Germany and the Second World War volume 5 part two), as I have seen it before and don't remember eastern front strength being mentioned in it.

But if we assume that the 2.9 million figure is accurate for German front strength and is every bit the same as the Soviet front strength number, we are still comparing it with the increased Soviet 6.6 million men figure for the front, as that includes all non-army units participating including the PVO, which was separate from the VVS and Soviet army and very much participating in the fighting at the front given where the front was in 1942. Also we still have to figure in that the 2.9 million German figure is the Iststärke strength, as that is the commonly cited number in German strength counts and leaves off potentially a large number of German troops given it includes the on leave and assumed to be back in 2 months sick/wounded numbers. Moreover the Axis minor strength could well have the same issues.

Therefore we're still at the lowest ratio probably at 1.5:1 for the Soviet to Axis strength by Autumn 1942 which again gives the Soviets a 2.5 million man advantage, not even counting the qualitative differences and supply differences between the Axis and Soviet forces (qualitative in terms of the Axis minors vs. Soviet average units).

Only part of the trip could have been made by rail (particularly for the southern, where the nearest railhead lay a ways off to the north)). To get those forces in the final leg of position and then to have them overcome the enemy in front of them is, again, identical to the skillset the Germans had practiced earlier.
Part certainly could be and was by river barge traffic. To get to the front they'd just have to walk/drive there, which wasn't that hard given they were behind the Don or Volga rivers. To attack they'd have to defeat the enemy, which wasn't really that hard against the ill equipped Italians, Hungarians, and Romanians especially once the Don and Volga froze.

You might also note that a Japanese division is not what I wrote. Division equivalents is what I wrote. This means either British or American force measure. Their divisions (140 in China) are roughly "brigade or regiment" equivalent.
Ok...and? Compare like to like. The Americans didn't have 40 divisions deployed in the Pacific in 1942 or in Britain and North Africa either.

And for another, you have not addressed the question I left you. If you notice the direction of movement all those Russian armies and the dates and their start points?

From the northwest and the Moscow front.
Most of those armies were already directly east of the German attack. Some units like the 5th Tank Army attacked directly south at the flank of the Case Blue advance and were destroyed after a short journey. There were two armies sent from around Moscow to Stalingrad and both were smashed up in July. Uranus forces later came from all over the USSR and started assembling in September, they weren't specifically deployed from the Moscow area, because the Soviets attacked there against AG-Center and North in November-December, so used their forces there. In Summer they hit hard at Rzhev, so most of the Moscow forces were pretty locked down in the region anyway.
 
Ok...and? Compare like to like. The Americans didn't have 40 divisions deployed in the Pacific in 1942 or in Britain and North Africa either.

Clearly you are trying to argue army on army and that is not the metric. I am arguing logistic effort. The US was putting the equivalent of 14 divisions worth into the Pacific. Three Chinese field armies at the end of a 10,000 kilometer line of supply? That's more than the British have, and incidentally, who is supplying those British forces?

Most of those armies were already directly east of the German attack. Some units like the 5th Tank Army attacked directly south at the flank of the Case Blue advance and were destroyed after a short journey. There were two armies sent from around Moscow to Stalingrad and both were smashed up in July. Uranus forces later came from all over the USSR and started assembling in September, they weren't specifically deployed from the Moscow area, because the Soviets attacked there against AG-Center and North in November-December, so used their forces there. In Summer they hit hard at Rzhev, so most of the Moscow forces were pretty locked down in the region anyway.

But your map does not show this. All those little red arrows show what I described, not what you stated. Why is that?

And while we mull that over...


Example: the lend lease oil was av-gas. It is logistics, "logistics". I might point out that this stuff is critical items supplied and it is with that stuff that guy and you get it wrong. Lend Lease gives the Russians OFFENSE. I agree that 1943 is when it tips.

To quote a famous statement: "American uniform; filled with Russian body."
 
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Deleted member 1487

Clearly you are trying to argue army on army and that is not the metric. I am arguing logistic effort. The US was putting the equivalent of 14 divisions worth into the Pacific. Three Chinese field armies at the end of a 10,000 kilometer line of supply? That's more than the British have, and incidentally, who is supplying those British forces?
Who is supplying the Brits? The Brits. Out of India mostly.

But your map does not show this. All those little red arrows show what I described, not what you stated. Why is that?
You're misreading the map? The little red arrow from Moscow says 1st Reserve Army, which then shows up in front of Stalingrad in July. Most of the reserve armies marched a short distance from the East to the Don river front line in July or were already forming around Stalingrad. Your claim was that they were sent from Moscow, which is most certainly not the case.
060.jpg
 
Who is supplying the Brits? The Brits. Out of India mostly.

Ledo Road, and the airlift? (Those C-47s for example.) All American. Grant tanks? American. P-40s and those lousy dive bombers (Vultee Vengeance) American. Everything from shelters to Tommy guns... Not a made in UK in sight.

You're misreading the map? The little red arrow from Moscow says 1st Reserve Army, which then shows up in front of Stalingrad in July. Most of the reserve armies marched a short distance from the East to the Don river front line in July or were already forming around Stalingrad. Your claim was that they were sent from Moscow, which is most certainly not the case.
060.jpg

Same again. Look at the symbology. It is not saying what you claim.

Try THIS.

Sample:

On the Soviet side, the Supreme High Command, or Stavka, prepared to defend against another German offensive. Although captured documents revealed the Germans’ advance would be in the South, Stalin dismissed this intelligence as a ruse and was convinced Moscow would be the German objective. So, the Red Army put its main effort on defending the center of the front and, as a result, was not well-prepared for the approaching German campaign.


Georgi K. Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, trans. Theodore Shabad (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1969), 117.

============================================

Smart guys there at Carlisle Barracks.
 

Deleted member 1487

Ledo Road, and the airlift? (Those C-47s for example.) All American. Grant tanks? American. P-40s and those lousy dive bombers (Vultee Vengeance) American. Everything from shelters to Tommy guns... Not a made in UK in sight.
How many of those were there?


Same again. Look at the symbology. It is not saying what you claim.

Try THIS.

Sample:

Georgi K. Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles, trans. Theodore Shabad (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1969), 117.

============================================

Smart guys there at Carlisle Barracks.
I don't even know what point you're trying to make any more. Plus your link doesn't work. No one is denying that Stalin though Moscow was the main goal before and in the early stages of Case Blue, but his reserves armies still forming were spread out across the country and the majority that ended up being used against Case Blue were forming directly east of the Case Blue attack axis. The forces massed around Moscow prior to Case Blue largely stayed there with some notable exceptions and ended up being used against Rzhev while Case Blue was going off.
 

FBKampfer

Banned
Counting the Soviets? Absolutely. The Eastern Front is almost entirely brute force for the Soviets.

Even during Citadel, when they were attacking into the teeth of Soviet defenses, the Germans were still getting a casualty exchange above 1:1.
 
How many of those were there?

Enough.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1039924.pdf

https://history.army.mil/brochures/burma42/burma42.htm

Notice the P-43s?

I don't even know what point you're trying to make any more. Plus your link doesn't work. No one is denying that Stalin though Moscow was the main goal before and in the early stages of Case Blue, but his reserves armies still forming were spread out across the country and the majority that ended up being used against Case Blue were forming directly east of the Case Blue attack axis. The forces massed around Moscow prior to Case Blue largely stayed there with some notable exceptions and ended up being used against Rzhev while Case Blue was going off.

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/ksil/files/000158.doc

or

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a424054.pdf

Maybe that will work.
 
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Deleted member 1487


Example: the lend lease oil was av-gas. It is logistics, "logistics". I might point out that this stuff is critical items supplied and it is with that stuff that guy and you get it wrong. Lend Lease gives the Russians OFFENSE. I agree that 1943 is when it tips.

To quote a famous statement: "American uniform; filled with Russian body."
BTW TIK really doesn't know what the fuck he's talking about:
http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Essay-alt-view-TIK-presentation.pdf
 
War production? Yeah the allies had massive advantage and they used it. But it's not that simple. The Germans did a piss poor job of mobilizing their economy and at time the Allies did an amazing job of it. And a resource badly mobilised is a resource who's advantage is wasted.

Fighting ability? This is tough on a few points:

1). given the numbers of different forces involved let alone countries let alone different troops in different situations. You'll find badly led, poorly prepared and poor morale troops on either side. As well as examples of troops doing stuff no one could have expected of them.

2). fighting ability isn't just down to a can do spirit, but also good planning, good logistics and good equipment, good support are all multipliers (it's pretty hard to split out)

3), great fighting spirit doesn't matter if your men are dead and it takes years to instil it but you have weeks before the Russians arrive. Also to be frank if you can only win by sheer grit and determination against all the odds then frankly something's gone wrong. It makes a great story but ultimately it's not how you want to fight your wars

4). Armies grow in ability and change in capability, the Red army in 1941 is not the red army in 1945 (and the German army in 1945 ain't the one that marched across France in 6 weeks either)

5). Postwar re-imagining and mythology, there is basically an entire industry of (surviving) German military men shall we say use rose tinting not only for their careers but for the German military in WW2 in general. In order to distance themselves not just from defeat but from the nazis. That involved making not just their actions look good but their abilities as well.
 
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Its war, the whole thing is brute force at some point. The issue is the proper application of force.

So the Germans manage to apply overwhelming force vs the French at Sedan and the opening moves of Barbarossa and Blue. They also do that in Poland, Denmark, Holland, Yugoslavia and Greece against vastly inferior opponents, During Sonnenbluhm against a locally inferior opponent. And launch tactically and operationally abysmal attacks at Citadel, before Moscow Stalingrad, Tunisia, Anzio. Whereas the Allies manage to concentrate superior forces for Uranus, little Saturn, Bagration, Overlord, Diadem to name but few.

The Eastern Front is anything but brute force, the german apologia for their failure is brute force, from the brutish mongolian hordes, but its nothing to do with reality. In reality the German method fails in 41 and 42, as it is unable to force a decision even in the most favourable circumstances of a surprise backstab in 41 followed by the Soviets frantically mobilising units into the line and, you know, winning the campaign.

As far as tactical superiority is concerned, Defence of Tobruk, Snipe, Oxhead, Capri, Fischfang, Attack on the Husky beaches, Hitler Jugend in Normandy, In fact Normandy in general is the destruction of OB West in 3 months, the Panzer Brigades everywhere, Lorraine, the Ukraine after Citadel, Nehring losing a Panzer Bn in 41 to an ambush by 3-5 Soviet tanks ( one of which might have been a T34). Odessa. Failure to take Stalingrad.
 
Absolutely, just look at their casualties compared to the Germans. People that dont understand military strategy might sneer at a superiority of 2:1, yet even this "small" superiority means a tremendous advantage.
 
Not in the military way, but in the industrial way. When you have a country that can produce a freighter from nothing to done in 2 weeks in multiple locations and is pumping out a brand new B-24 in a little more than 1 per hour, it's truly overwhelming.
RAdm Dan Gallery (Chicago's greatest naval hero!) wrote in his memoirs that the Allies might have ended WW II years early by letting a delegation of senior Axis commanders tour American war plants.
 
Germany had a technological edge in many areas at the start of the war and parity in many others. Her resources were quite limited and prevention of her acquisition of key materials certainly played a role in her defeat (oil, chromium, etc.). Efficiency played a key role as well - had the Germans organized their research into unified teams as the West did their accomplishments might have been phenomenal. At war's end they were fielding technology not to be seen again for perhaps another decade and were on the cusp of several other breakthroughs.
 
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