Deleted member 1487
And you completely missed my point with your repost.I'll just requote myself on that:
http://worldwariiarchives.weebly.com/uploads/9/5/1/1/9511171/world_war_ii_eastern_perspective.pdfThat latter assertion is actually not clear if that is the case. It is quite possible that the Axis numbers exclude those in the hospital and in rear-area garrison duty, which could account for the discrepancy between my numbers and his (at least, as far as the Axis side is concerned).
Iststarke Actual strength, includes all men that are part of the unit's composition. Men on leave or temporarily detached to other units are included. Also men sick or wounded are included if they are assumed to return to service within eight weeks. Thus, despite its name, this strength category does not give the actual number of men available for service with the unit at the given time.
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=219452
As to Müller-Hillebrand's figures for 1 July 1942: Original documents give an Iststärke (without Finland and SS/Lw) of 2,635,000 in the rea of operations and just 99,000 (instead of 212,000) additional soldiers in the rear zone. They are in good agreement with the attached document.
Given that that number roughly matches what Glantz is putting out his numbers are more likely than not 'Iststärke', which does not include all men actually at the front. Similarly citing all Axis minor forces as 'at the front' for his comparison also has a similar issue of those soldiers not being actually at the front, just mobilized and inducted in the military in some capacity.Regarding the increase in Army Iststärke, I would surmise that it was primarily due to the addition of security units in the Reichskommissariate. There's also the Luftwaffe field divisions that arrived late in the year, which apparently are being counted as Heer personnel until spring 1943. What this shows is that German forces deployed against the Soviets (putting aside the RKs) remained remarkably stable between summer 1942 and spring 1943, at roughly 2.9 million (2.7m+ in the east proper and 150,000+ in Finland).
Regardless though, even if we go by Glantz's numbers for November 1942 they outnumbered the Axis 1.76:1, which means that even matching man for man across the front the Axis, they'd have an additional 2.584 million men to use wherever they wanted...which they did for Mars, Uranus, and Saturn to overload the Axis forces...which they did.
That gets into the variety of terms the Germans used. I was referring to the Iststärke number, which is the most commonly cited one, which counts everyone officially assigned to units, but who may actually be in the hospital, on leave, or detached; as it says above this category does not give the actual number of men available with the units even if officially posted.Blatantly false. Glantz's numbers are pretty clearly about what the Germans had on hand. They are too low by around a million-and-a-half for what the Germans should have on hand according to their TO&Es.
In 1942 the US wasn't the bulk of shipping used. They kept the majority of their shipping to service their domestic needs; the British provided the bulk of shipping, especially given that their naval industry had been building merchant shipping for Britain flat out, not retaining it for their own use. Compare though US shipping problems to those of the Japanese and you'll find that comparatively the US was swimming in logistics surplus.Yes. In addition to supporting Torch and Guadacanal, the US had to field convoys to Britain, to Russia through three different routes, to Egypt, to India, to Australia, and to operation bases throughout the rest of the Pacific... just to name a few. The Americans very much felt this at Guadalcanal. Supporting the operation was a nightmare for the Americans, and in the words of Admiral Turner "we were living from one logistic crisis to another." When Nimitz asked Turner how many transports and cargo ships he could make available to support MacArthur's upcoming offensive operations, Turner through a fit, explaining that he barely had enough ships as it was, and he certainly didn't have enough to give any to anyone else. For all that Guadalcanal may have been a logistical nightmare for the Japanese, don't for a moment think that the Americans just blithely shipped men and equipment thousands of miles on unlimited numbers of ships without a logistical care in the world.
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
Merchant Ship Production (in tons)
Year United States Japan
1942 5,479,766 260,059
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