Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

  • Yes

    Votes: 97 27.2%
  • No

    Votes: 99 27.8%
  • To a degree

    Votes: 160 44.9%

  • Total voters
    356
Petty officer Rice the pilot of the swordfish does not mention Flares.
“With floats on a Swordfish you couldn’t carry a torpedo. What we carried was 250lbs armour piercing bombs, two 100lb bombs and an anti-submarine bomb. I decided to use the two armour-piercing bombs.”
Warspite Ian Ballantine
Trivia but PO Rice was both correct and not correct. The Swordfish floatplane was fitted for and could carry a torpedo. However the torpedo differed from those on the ships it flew from. In battle it's role was reconnaissance, ASW and as a gunfire spotter. Storing a one use torpedo and manhandling it from a safe store to the floatplane was not practical so they were not carried on the ship. From a shore base or in pre planned special circumstances one could mount a torpedo attack with a Swordfish floatplane. PO Rice is quite correct that his Swordfish could not carry a torpedo as it had none on it's home vessel and chose the correct suite of available armament. FWIW the Swordfish floatplane could also dive bomb. Not relevant to the issue here but I wonder if the rear cockpit mounted long range tank was an option on board ship?
 

Deleted member 1487

Why would one even argue such a thesis? How about 1 Russian in 9 dead? How is that brute force superiority? Besides; the Germans in 1944 did drop the ball as badly as the Russians did in 1941. The Russians had this little party planned called "Bagration".
You mean the one where despite crush superiority in numbers and material, far greater than the Axis had in 1941, they still suffered equal casualties to the Germans?
 
There are also the times when the Allies were victorious without better logistics.
E.g. At Guadalcanal when the USN sailed off with the Marine's supplies leaving them to work with captured Japanese equipment to complete the airstrip.
Or 14th Army in Burma, which was last in the Allies supply chain, but still managed an advance further than the distance from Warsaw to Moscow over worse terrain and roads.
 

Deleted member 1487

There are also the times when the Allies were victorious without better logistics.
E.g. At Guadalcanal when the USN sailed off with the Marine's supplies leaving them to work with captured Japanese equipment to complete the airstrip.
Or 14th Army in Burma, which was last in the Allies supply chain, but still managed an advance further than the distance from Warsaw to Moscow over worse terrain and roads.
What was the comparable Japanese logistics during the period of Allied advance? In the case of the 14 Army the Japanese opposite them had at least as bad of logistics if not considerably worse.
 
You mean the one where despite crush superiority in numbers and material, far greater than the Axis had in 1941, they still suffered equal casualties to the Germans?

Army group center disappeared. ~400,000 troops. The Russians may have had 100,000 KIA and 4x as many maimed for life out of ~ 900,000 casualties, but still returned 400,000 to duty. As for superiority in numbers, when the Germans sent their reserve south to confront the Russian deception? Tough. That's called "Soviet Operational Art".

vizzer said:

There are also the times when the Allies were victorious without better logistics.

E.g. At Guadalcanal when the USN sailed off with the Marine's supplies leaving them to work with captured Japanese equipment to complete the airstrip.

Or 14th Army in Burma, which was last in the Allies supply chain, but still managed an advance further than the distance from Warsaw to Moscow over worse terrain and roads.

What was the comparable Japanese logistics during the period of Allied advance? In the case of the 14 Army the Japanese opposite them had at least as bad of logistics if not considerably worse.

Hmm. In the case of the Guadalcanal bugout, the overriding concern was to preserve TF 61 from Japanese land-based air, that would be what was left of the US Pacific fleet, to fight the aircraft carrier battle Fletcher knew was coming as the result of Richmond Kelly Turner's bungling, both of the unloading the supplies at Lunga Point and of the Battle of Savo Island. (Why Turner was never court martialed and why the Marines blame Fletcher, who saved their butts, at the Battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands has always amazed me.) The Marines had three days worth of combat ammunition use and two weeks of US rations when Turner cut and ran. Now it is true that the Japanese left behind a labor battalion of Korean troops and earth moving machinery and road paving equipment which Vandegrift's Marines used to extend and repair the already finished, but battle damaged runway at Lunga Point. The JAPANESE logistics, from Rabaul forward to Guadalcanal, had, until the Americans arrived, been excellent. Good enough to install Japanese radar and air traffic control gear to make standing up Henderson Field for MAG 23 the matter of crowning the runway and filling in a bomb crater. Japanese supply efforts were still good to land some 23,000 troops and supply them until about the middle of November, when the Americans finally were able to make it too expensive to run night barge trains through the Slot from Choiseul. As for the myth that the Marines were cut off? The USN used converted 4 stackers called APDs to fast ferry forward from Efate; ammunition, rations, and fuel to the Marines in daylight runs similar to the Tokyo Express. Replacements for casualties came with the supplies and the wounded were ferried back.

The Guadalcanal story, "about the Marines being cut off", is full of such "Marine facts".

As for Burma, that place's terrain and environment makes Vietnam look like Central Park in Spring. The allied logistics either moved down the coast road (the one the British installed pre-war) to Rangoon, or it was supply air drop. The Japanese man-ported their logistics on the backs of their infantry, through the rain forests and up and down those _____ mountains. That is more or less why the British, Chinese and the Americans (Oh yes; there was an American presence.) kept being defeated. The Japanese, moving east to west kept outflanking the Allied columns that kept to the trails and roads moving north to south. The Japanese cut them to ribbons. Bit of operational art involved in that story. The Japanese knew what they were doing. The Allies, until they could move through the terrain as the Japanese did, and fight as light infantry, did not have a clue. Took until late 1944 that did. Way too long, despite Slim's brilliant generalship at the end, that was way too long.
 

Deleted member 1487

Army group center disappeared. ~400,000 troops. The Russians may have had 100,000 KIA and 4x as many maimed for life out of ~ 900,000 casualties, but still returned 400,000 to duty. As for superiority in numbers, when the Germans sent their reserve south to confront the Russian deception? Tough. That's called "Soviet Operational Art".
I don't know what you're basing your numbers on.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration
Casualties and losses
German

Frieser:
26,397 killed
109,776 wounded
262,929 missing and captured
399,102 overall[details][6]
The Germans had about 263,000 men written off as a result of Bagration, which was less severe than Stalingrad/Uranus.

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Белорусская_операция_(1944)
Soviet
178,507
killed / missing
587,308 wounded [3]
The Soviets meanwhile suffered at least 178,000 killed or missing and an additional 587,000 wounded and sick per Krivosheev, who did a very conservative study on Soviet losses in WW2. Per his figure 18% of the wounded and sick category were the sick, while the remainder were wounded of various degrees. 105,660 sick then out of 587,000, which leaves 481,340 wounded. That means total Soviet combat losses were about 660,000 for Bagration. Which was worse than I thought, meaning the Soviets suffered 1.65 casualties for every 1 inflicted. Depending on how many men were permanently disabled on both sided even with a numerical superiority of 2.5:1 the Soviets took roughly equal permanent losses as the Germans in their 'ideal' offensive. This was actually considerably worse than they did during Operation Uranus.

And German reserves were actually sent to Normandy, with some units from AG-Center stripped out to send to AG-North Ukraine to counter the Soviet build up opposite them after units were pulled out there to be sent to Normandy (like the 10th SS Panzer division). So while Soviet deception efforts did bear some fruit namely as a result of having so many extra units formed and not yet committed to the front so remaining unknown, the greatest work was done by the Wallies launching the Normandy invasion before Bagration so that the German strategic reserve was committed to France and not available to counter Bagration. When Bagration kicked off then units had to be pulled out of AG-North/North Ukraine, and South to help, while the Soviet had such deep reserves that during Bagration they were able to launch the offensive they had been building up for in Ukraine. That was also when they were attacking Finland as well. Effectively it was the result of having so many more men, plus allies attacking in Italy and France at the same time, not some special 'operational art'.
 
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My numbers are based on what the Russians report, themselves.

Of course the Germans sent troops to Normandy. But those troops were in transit, and the part you did not mention and which I will, is that Overlord and Bagration were timed together to yoyo the Germans, make them move troops in the middle of two operations 2,300 kilometers apart and so forth; that is troops stuck on a railroad transportation network and not fighting anybody while they are being bombed as per Eisenhower's orders to his air chiefs. Hitler did move about half of Army Group Center's panzers, artillery and close air support to meet the expected "Russian Offensive" he knew was coming there. So that part of what I wrote about "Soviet Operational Art" is again true. As for Overlord and Bagration's timing? Credit two Marshals. Zhukov for the Russians and George C. for the Americans. The Americans have an "operational art", too.
 

Deleted member 1487

My numbers are based on what the Russians report, themselves.
For German losses? Big mistake, no one takes them seriously, as the Soviets exclusively put out propaganda in their official histories. Soviet internal data on casualties is generally pretty reliable after 1942, though some inconsistencies have been found as late as Kursk. I used official Russian data for Soviet losses in my post and Wehrmacht internal reports for the Germans.

Of course the Germans sent troops to Normandy. But those troops were in transit, and the part you did not mention and which I will, is that Overlord and Bagration were timed together to yoyo the Germans, make them move troops in the middle of two operations 2,300 kilometers apart and so forth; that is troops stuck on a railroad transportation network and not fighting anybody while they are being bombed as per Eisenhower's orders to his air chiefs. Hitler did move about half of Army Group Center's panzers, artillery and close air support to meet the expected "Russian Offensive" he knew was coming there. So that part of what I wrote about "Soviet Operational Art" is again true. As for Overlord and Bagration's timing? Credit two Marshals. Zhukov for the Russians and George C. for the Americans. The Americans have an "operational art", too.
By June 22nd when Bagration kicked off the majority of German strategic forces were either in France or nearly there. Whether or not it was planned together is irrelevant to the point that the ability to even do so was a function of superior numbers on a massive scale and grinding the Axis down with said numbers...which is what happened in Normandy and on the Eastern Front. In the end the reserves showed up and did fight by July on both fronts, but with so little men vs. the Allies it was an unwinnable situation. Do you have a source to show that the Germans did strip out 50% of AG-Centers forces for the fight in Ukraine? It looks like it went to France:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Maskirowka_–_Verschleierung_der_sowjetischen_Vorbereitungen
After the landing of the Allies had begun in France on 6 June 1944 , other German units, which were previously used in the area of Army Group Center, were withdrawn to reinforce the troops stationed in France. In addition, large quantities of ammunition were delivered to the front in Italy, which in turn was missing from the Army Group Center. [70] These factors further weakened the defense capability of the Germans.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Lage_der_Heeresgruppe_Mitte_im_Frühsommer_1944
Due to the deteriorating overall strategic situation of the German Reich since the Allied landings in Italy (July 1943, Operation Husky ) and in Normandy (June 1944, Operation Overlord ) in a multi-front war, the condition of this great federation increasingly worsened. There was a lack of soldiers, vehicles, aircraft, fuel and ammunition due to insufficient replenishment. In the words of the German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser , Army Group Center was therefore a "house of cards before collapse" in early summer 1944. [14]

The morale and physical condition of soldiers deployed in the Army Group was poor due to general stagnation, bad news from other theaters of war, and supply shortages. Some of the German soldiers hoped that the war would soon be over after the Allied landings in Normandy. [15]

Since the winter of 1941-42, German soldiers had often been chronically undernourished, as there were hardly any food reserves in the German Reich due to the long-lasting war and they were no longer able to supply the prescribed cost rates. The resulting persistent vitamin deficiencies , along with other deficiencies, led to decreased physical performance, as long as the field units were unable to supplement or cover their own food needs through plunder or temporary compulsory farming in the territories they occupy. [19] [20] Alcohol and stimulants, on the other hand, were often abundant. [21]

For all vehicles of the Red Army, a fuel consumption of 25,000 tonnes per day was estimated, which could also be provided easily. By contrast, as a result of the Allied bombing,German units suffered more and more fuel shortages. [57]

Since the Battle of Kursk , the number of German combat aircraft deployed on the Eastern Front has been steadily decreasing. The reason for this was that air force units had been transferred to these theaters of war to defend the Allied landings in Italy and Normandy . Because of the Allied air superiority suffered the German aircraft forces there high losses. The replacement of these machines devoured most of the newly produced German aircraft. The German aircraft industry was no longer able to fully compensate for the increasing losses of the Luftwaffe.

The imbalance between the German and Soviet air forces increased until Operation Bagration began. The German Air Force 6 under Knight of Greim , which was intended to support the Army Group Center had due to losses and technical failures, which were due to the lack of supply of spare parts and fuel, in June 1944 only 61 operational fighters available. [85] [A 11]
Seems like the efforts of the Wallies was a huge part of Soviet success in Summer 1944 given that the Eastern Front really lacked air support, especially fighters, and more importantly fuel due to the oil campaign started in May 1944.

As it was the Soviets 'deception' was to concentrate even larger forces in Ukraine than in Belarus...again a function of huge numerical superiority in part afforded by the Normandy invasion and Italian Front stripping off German reserves.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Strategic_aims_and_deception
The intent of the Soviets to strike their main blow towards the Vistula can be seen in the Red Army's (albeit fragmented) order of battle. The Soviet general staff studies of both the Belorussian and L'vov-Sandomierz operations reveal that the L'vov-Przemyśl operation received the overwhelming number of tank and mechanized corps. Six guards tank corps and six tank corps along with three guards mechanized and two mechanized corps were committed to the L'vov operation. This totaled twelve tank and five mechanized corps. In contrast, Operation Bagration's Baltic and Belorussian Fronts were allocated just eight tank and two mechanized corps.[29] The 1st Belorussian Front (an important part of the L'vov-Peremshyl operation) is not mentioned on the Soviet battle order for the offensive. It contained a further six armies and was to protect the flank of the Lublin–Brest Offensive as well as engage in offensive operations in that area.[30]

Their vastly superior numbers then gave them the ability to run two major offensive concurrently:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration
Date 22 June – 19 August 1944

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lvov–Sandomierz_Offensive
Date 13 July 1944 – 29 August 1944
 
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For German losses? Big mistake, no one takes them seriously, as the Soviets exclusively put out propaganda in their official histories. Soviet internal data on casualties is generally pretty reliable after 1942, though some inconsistencies have been found as late as Kursk. I used official Russian data for Soviet losses in my post and Wehrmacht internal reports for the Germans.

Russian numbers had to be accurate for planning purposes. For the German estimates as well as the Russian confirmed loszsxes.

By June 22nd when Bagration kicked off the majority of German strategic forces were either in France or nearly there. Whether or not it was planned together is irrelevant to the point that the ability to even do so was a function of superior numbers on a massive scale and grinding the Axis down with said numbers...which is what happened in Normandy and on the Eastern Front. In the end the reserves showed up and did fight by July on both fronts, but with so little men vs. the Allies it was an unwinnable situation. Do you have a source to show that the Germans did strip out 50% of AG-Centers forces for the fight in Ukraine? It looks like it went to France:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Maskirowka_–_Verschleierung_der_sowjetischen_Vorbereitungen

I would not rely so heavily on Wiki.

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Lage_der_Heeresgruppe_Mitte_im_Frühsommer_1944

Seems like the efforts of the Wallies was a huge part of Soviet success in Summer 1944 given that the Eastern Front really lacked air support, especially fighters, and more importantly fuel due to the oil campaign started in May 1944.

Of course BIG WEEK contributed to the overall effort. Ploesti campaign, and the synthetic plants attacks (RAF) was much less successful. Kill pilots wholesale and retail. The Germans

As it was the Soviets 'deception' was to concentrate even larger forces in Ukraine than in Belarus...again a function of huge numerical superiority in part afforded by the Normandy invasion and Italian Front stripping off German reserves.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration#Strategic_aims_and_deception

Hmm. Post Bagration.

Even this deception operation was a function of vastly superior numbers and ability to attack with two major offensive concurrently:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration

So?


Notice the dates?
 
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Deleted member 1487

Russian numbers had to be accurate for planning purposes. For the German estimates as well as the Russian confirmed loszsxes.
Yet they never were per German loss reports. The Germans had the same problems, as did the Wallies. In WW1 despite it being necessary for planning purposes the Allies repeatedly overestimated German losses by 3-400% and were confounded when the CPs didn't collapse. So generally the best thing to do if you're going to argue about losses is refer to the archival records from each side about their own losses, even if they are flawed they are generally the best you're going to get; if you've really got the time and money refer to the lowest unit records possible to get the most relatively accurate information, as it has been found that higher levels had a tendency to fudge the numbers, especially on the Soviet side due to fear of Stalin's retribution, which of course lessened as the war went on.

https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-german-response-to-d-day
Ok? What in that link contradicts the sourcing in the links I've provided? The sources are citing books that were assembled based on archival information about the situation of German forces. As nice as the Imperial War Museum is, their website doesn't have the same detailed sort of information.

Of course BIG WEEK contributed to the overall effort. Ploesti campaign, and the synthetic plants attacks (RAF) was much less successful. Kill pilots wholesale and retail. The Germans
So you agree that the Soviets benefited heavily from the Wallied attritional efforts to wear down the Luftwaffe.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_campaign_of_World_War_II#Statistics
These are the stats about the oil campaign against German production in 1944 which were extremely successful.

Hmm. Post Bagration.
What? Before. Read again.

The point of the thread is about Allied success being due to numbers. Having a huge numerical advantage resulted in offensives in Italy, France, Belarus, and Ukraine running nearly concurrently, not to mention the strategic bombardment campaign and it's effects, both cumulative to that point and what was achieved during the multiple ground offensives that strangled the German front lines of resources.

Notice the dates?
Yes, they ran during the same time. One started before the other, but they were running concurrently by July, same with Normandy.
 

hipper

Banned
Army group center disappeared. ~400,000 troops. The Russians may have had 100,000 KIA and 4x as many maimed for life out of ~ 900,000 casualties, but still returned 400,000 to duty. As for superiority in numbers, when the Germans sent their reserve south to confront the Russian deception? Tough. That's called "Soviet Operational Art".





Hmm. In the case of the Guadalcanal bugout, the overriding concern was to preserve TF 61 from Japanese land-based air, that would be what was left of the US Pacific fleet, to fight the aircraft carrier battle Fletcher knew was coming as the result of Richmond Kelly Turner's bungling, both of the unloading the supplies at Lunga Point and of the Battle of Savo Island. (Why Turner was never court martialed and why the Marines blame Fletcher, who saved their butts, at the Battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands has always amazed me.) The Marines had three days worth of combat ammunition use and two weeks of US rations when Turner cut and ran. Now it is true that the Japanese left behind a labor battalion of Korean troops and earth moving machinery and road paving equipment which Vandegrift's Marines used to extend and repair the already finished, but battle damaged runway at Lunga Point. The JAPANESE logistics, from Rabaul forward to Guadalcanal, had, until the Americans arrived, been excellent. Good enough to install Japanese radar and air traffic control gear to make standing up Henderson Field for MAG 23 the matter of crowning the runway and filling in a bomb crater. Japanese supply efforts were still good to land some 23,000 troops and supply them until about the middle of November, when the Americans finally were able to make it too expensive to run night barge trains through the Slot from Choiseul. As for the myth that the Marines were cut off? The USN used converted 4 stackers called APDs to fast ferry forward from Efate; ammunition, rations, and fuel to the Marines in daylight runs similar to the Tokyo Express. Replacements for casualties came with the supplies and the wounded were ferried back.

The Guadalcanal story, "about the Marines being cut off", is full of such "Marine facts".

As for Burma, that place's terrain and environment makes Vietnam look like Central Park in Spring. The allied logistics either moved down the coast road (the one the British installed pre-war) to Rangoon, or it was supply air drop. The Japanese man-ported their logistics on the backs of their infantry, through the rain forests and up and down those _____ mountains. That is more or less why the British, Chinese and the Americans (Oh yes; there was an American presence.) kept being defeated. The Japanese, moving east to west kept outflanking the Allied columns that kept to the trails and roads moving north to south. The Japanese cut them to ribbons. Bit of operational art involved in that story. The Japanese knew what they were doing. The Allies, until they could move through the terrain as the Japanese did, and fight as light infantry, did not have a clue. Took until late 1944 that did. Way too long, despite Slim's brilliant generalship at the end, that was way too long.


there was no pre war coast Road to Rangoon or indeed any rail or Road route between India and Burma. All supplies to Burma came in Via Rangoon. that’s why Burma was lost when Japanese Air power made it impossible to use Rangoon. that’s Why all the survivors of the 1942 retreat from Burma walked out of Burma rather than rode out on Trucks.

Slim’s victory was won with an integrated airdrop and Armoured thrust, what the Soviets would Call Operational Manuver groups in the 80’s
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Meiktila_and_Mandalay

Edit though it did take too long for the Imperial forces to become Jungle savvy
 
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there was no pre war coast Road to Rangoon or indeed any rail or Road route between India and Burma. All supplies to Burma came in Via Rangoon. that’s why Burma was lost when Japanese Air power made it impossible to use Rangoon. that’s Why all the survivors of the 1942 retreat from Burma walked out of Burma rather than rode out on Trucks.

Slim’s victory was won with an integrated airdrop and Armoured thrust, what the Soviets would Call Operational Manuver groups in the 80’s
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Meiktila_and_Mandalay

Edit though it did take too long for the Imperial forces to become Jungle savvy


No coast road, hunh? (^^^)
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes, well if you are technologically obsolete that does not help either.
The French weren't obsolete in most things, while the Italians weren't really any less advanced than the small British forces they faced. Other than one Matilda battalion, which artillery and AAA could kill, the British AFVs weren't really particularly more advanced at this point, especially given the gross numerical disparity. Though to be fair to the Italians they were at the end of their logistics.
 
Because the tanker in question, with them, was a converted whaling ship carrying the wrong kind of fuel. I imagine he did not know that much, but he sure did know that the Germans had to refuel at least once on the run home, and that means a tanker has to meet them about Alesunde which is just about where the Germans could get a tanker to them from their home base in Germany.

Thats the one known about after the fact there are 10 other germn merchies in harbour, which is a harbour able to handle shipping matters and WL has no way of knowing the issues Jan Willem has with refuelling.
 
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