Jan Willhelm had 8000 tonnes of fuel oil that’s about 700 tonnes for each destroyer assuming 90% of it is useable. how much fuel do you think a destroyer holds? there is only 1000 tonnes between the 1934 class standard and full displacement. So they had the fuel required to make the return trip to germany about 600 tonnes according to your source.
HMS Glorious was in the mediteranian on the 10th of April 1940 conducting air training with Ark Royal according to Naval History.net and sailed to the Clyde. she was operational in the North sea in April 22nd.
the german zdestroyers were under orders to return to Germany. on the 9 th they could not because of the delays involved in refuelling from one Tanker, they would have been ready on the evening of the 10th unless WL had not attacked.
I’ve been mentioning the weather for some time now it was very bad throughout rendering the eventual air attack 50% ineffective two days later and rendering the Concept of close blockade problematic. what do you think the germans chances were of escaping with some of the destroyers in a Snowstorm.
it is possible that I lack understanding, on the other hand you seem to be using a ton of Hindsight to Rubbish the achievement of the First VC of the war without understanding the issues involved. Warbuton Lee Knew he was going to be outnumbered but decided to attack anyway. By doing so he caught the Germans at the moment of maximum Weakness. He disabled 5 destroyers in an action,where he got one of his destroyers damaged by one shell. this was an overwhelming victory, he then saw three more ships coming down the Fjord so he decided to retreat. these three destroyers were not handled very aggressively and were not engaging heavily. He was then Suprised by the George Thiel and theVon Arnim the Thiel was handled very effectively and inflicted most of the damage on the British Ships. it was only at this point with WL dead and his destroyer aground the British line fell into confusion. however the Thiel was also rendered combat inefective and 5he three surviving British Ships escaped down the Fjord. intercepting the german reserve amunition Ship as they left.
They were yakking on the radios at each other asking each other's position so as to not shoot each other. FOG.so no the british destroyers had not lost contact and were navigating independently because they had to change course when WL’s destroyer went aground.
Petty officer Rice the pilot of the swordfish does not mention Flares.
“With floats on a Swordfish you couldn’t carry a torpedo. What we carried was 250lbs armour piercing bombs, two 100lb bombs and an anti-submarine bomb. I decided to use the two armour-piercing bombs.”
there were no other british Forces at the mouth of the Vestfjord when WL attacked. he was ordered to Vestfjord at 06:26 on the 9th 10 minutes after Renown lost contact with Sharnhorst and Gneiseau. Penelope was not ordered to Vestfjord until 06:00 on the morning off the 10th
the germans did some Repairs between the 10th and the 13th
Warbiton Lee was ordered to the mouth of the Vestfjord and arrived there to discover that the Germans had already arrived he had to decide to attack or not, he decided to attack he destroyed or damaged 6 german Destroyer for the loss or damage of three of his own, in a destroyer fight at 2:1 odds that’s an excellent performance.
it’s interesting to note that in the later attack with Warspite and 10 destroyers the British lost two destroyers the same as WL
fundamentally I don’t see how he did badly. And I think he carried out a model attack on a defended harbour.
it was pretty much the red army winning WW2, end of story
The Battle of Midway resulted in an American victory despite them being outnumbered and operating with a crippled carrier due to a combination of luck and generally better conduct before during the battle—the Japanese not committing the 5th cardiv into the fight due to plane losses (Zuikaku, at the least, could have made do with some plane and pilot transfers, but the Japanese never thought of that) while the Americans repaired Yorktown in 24 hours, Nagumo's vacillating compared to Spruance's decisiveness, damage control differences, (Yorktown tricking Hiryu into wasting multiple airstrikes on her and not damaging the other American carriers while Kaga died to literally a single bomb), etc. That's not even to mention the pre-battle shenanigans, like the American codebreaking or the rather pointless diversionary Japanese attack on the Aleutians.
The solution, don’t invade Poland in the first place. The idea that you can win a quick decisive campaign and end the war exists only in a very selective reading of European military history from Rapallo onwards.
But 19th century Prussia shows otherwise, which may be the fundamental problem.
You are not reading that right.
1800 nautical miles at 19 knots. Cut that to 1/3 when you are running for your life.
Distance from Narvik to Bremen... 1100 nautical miles.
US destroyer example. SIMs class.
5,600 nautical miles at 12 knots. In BATTLE, (Coral Sea) when they were fighting for their lives it was 1,200 nautical miles at 25+ knots, hence the constant need for Fletcher to refuel almost every one or two days.
I am aware of how this works because I have "some" experience.
But what about British destroyers? They have tanker support, good engines and non-contaminated fuel oil. What do the Germans NOT have? a p
ZERO. I have developed the weather picture for you in detail so that you understand that Warburton Lee thought he could use it to sneak in and do his business and escape, but found out that TWO can play that game. You have also not explained the British light cruiser or the other destroyers mouse-holing the fjord.
The point is that Warburton Lee had that light cruiser and another DESTROYER DIVISION at hand on the scene. He went in and left them behind. Can you not see the obvious?
They were yakking on the radios at each other asking each other's position so as to not shoot each other. FOG.
it was pretty much the red army winning WW2, end of story
I see, you started out asserting that the Germans had no fuel, I pointed out they had a tanker the. it was only Ballast fuel or that they had to top up with Deisel. now you are saying that even if the German destroyers were fully fuelled they could not have made it to safety at maximum speed.
well Perhaps the german Destroyers had lousy range but they had made it to Narvik. so they could sail home. or to any german owned port in Norway.
However WL had no information of their fuel state range or anything else. this is all arguing from Knowledge not available To WL at the time. when he went into the Fjord S&G could have been there or German Destroyers could have had diesel engines and be good for 10000 miles. there was no way he could assume the Germans were trapped due to fuel shortages.
for interest the german Destroyers had a maximum fuel load of 740 (metric) tonnes however they had to keep 30% of their fuel load in the tanks or Suffer stability issues so they only needed 530 tonnes to top up each german destroyer. - Whitley german Destroyers
It is in error. 24 April she is off central Norway bombing targets. She spent the week prior embarking planes before that sortie. The math does not add up.(/Quote)
I don’t believe the timeline is in Error
3rd to 9th
- The ARK ROYAL in company with GLORIOUS carried out flying exercises off Alexandria during the day and returned to harbour at night.
[Late on 9/4/40 Vice Admiral Wells received a signal from the Admiralty ordering immediate return of the ARK ROYAL and GLORIOUS to the UK. This was because of the German invasion of Norway]
10th - At 0600 the ARK ROYAL, GLORIOUS with the destroyers BULLDOG and WESTCOTT sailed from Alexandria.
At 0730 ARK ROYAL and Glorious commenced landing on their Swordfish squadrons from Dekheila.
After all the aircraft were landed on course was set for Gibraltar at 25 knots.
11th - At 1200 the force was in position 35-26N, 16-59E.
At 1630 the destroyers HMAS STUART and WATERHEN joined from Malta.
At 1645 the GLORIOUS, WESTCOTT and BULLDOG detached to Malta to refuel.
Overnight to the south of Sicily the ARK ROYAL carried out night flying exercises.
12th - At 0630 the GLORIOUS, WESTCOTT and BULLDOG joined from Malta.
At 0700 the WATERHEN was detached to return to Malta.
At 1200 the ARK ROYAL, GLORIOUS, WESTCOTT, BULLDOG and STUART were in position 37-44N, 8-21E.
13th - At 1200 the ARK ROYAL, GLORIOUS, WESTCOTT, BULLDOG and STUART were in position 36-29N, 2-45W.
At 1830 the ARK ROYAL, GLORIOUS, WESTCOTT, BULLDOG and STUART arrived at Gibraltar.
14th At 2100 the flag of Vice Admiral, Aircraft Carriers transferred from ARK ROYAL to GLORIOUS.
[The admiralty ordered the GLORIOUS to join the Home Fleet with all despatch. At 2130/14/4/40 the GLORIOUS and the destroyers STUART, VELOX and WATCHMAN sailed from Gibraltar for Greenock. ARK ROYAL was ordered to remain at Gibraltar to continue with flying exercises]
14th Passage to Clyde with HM Australian Destroyer STUART for deployment with
Home Fleet off Norway (Operation RUPERT/R4).
19th Nomination for cover of Trondheim landings (Operation HAMMER) cancelled.
21st Sailed from Clyde to rejoin Fleet.
22nd . Embarked RAF GLADIATOR aircraft, previously based at Filton, Bristol.
23rd Took passage from Scapa Flow with HMS ARK ROYAL, HM Cruiser BERWICK
HM AA Cruiser CURLEW, screened by HM Destroyers FEARLESS, FURY, HASTY,
HEREWARD, HYPERION and JUNO to relieve HM Aircraft Carrier FURIOUS
Narvik (Operation DX)
(Note : HMS CURLEW was fitted with aircraft warning radar equipment.
This was the first RN multi-carrier operation).
24th Commenced air operations in support of military.
GLADIATOR aircraft flew off to establish airfield on frozen lake in Romsdal valley.
i’ll make 5he point again Warbuton Lee Was ordered to the Vestford with 5 destroyers he was A flotilla leader Captain (D) Penelope was not in Sight or under his command when he decided to attack
Penelope with Renown Repulse and another 5 destroyers patrolling 30 miles out to sea. they were worried about S&G turning up. having 5 destroyers escort 2 battleships seems unexceptional and loitering off the mouth of the Fjord would be an invitation to submarine attack.
Penelope should have been sent in support of WL earlier but that decision was not Warbuton Lee’s to make. he had to decide to attack or not with the ships he had available at the time.
in 1940? no British destroyer was equipped with VHF voice radio at that point, it was Flags or Signal light.
Anyway Ive said enough on this. given the Situation WL decided to attack, to engage the enemy more closely.
Waiting on higher authority for more support is not generally the path to success.
regards
Hipper
Not sure what this discussion about Narvik is about, but for what it's worth, Churchill (The Second World War, Volume I, 'The Clash at Sea 1940' (1950 edition)) describes the weather of April 10th as '...mist and snowstorms...' (page 538) and indicates that Penelope was '...searching for enemy transports reported off Bodo...' (page 543) shortly before Penelope ran ashore.
(1) If he could not calculate their fuel situation or be advised by someone who could do the math, then he had no business being in command of one of His Majesty's warships.
This is bread and butter for an USN officer. So, he should have been aware.
(2) She and the other destroyers covered the extraction so what is going on? That is no more than one hours steaming, no more than 30 nautical miles. You see the problem with your claim?
30 miles is 30 minutes and that decision is not acceptable, nor does it make any sense. Warburton Lee had enough PULL to make the call. And even if he did not, he could request it.
When time is clearly on your side, you delay for the reinforcements. Especially when the reinforcement is 30 minutes away. This is not hard to figure out. WL screwed up from the start. Mass your forces, define your single objective and seek decision. First thing you learn in naval op-art.
McP.
(1) That Warburton-Lee had incomplete intelligence is a Historical Fact! He simply did not know what German Forces where even in Narvik Fjord. Suggesting that he could make exact calculations without knowing what forces he was facing is just plain ridiculous.
He could undoubtedly have made the calculations for his own ships in moments, but for enemy vessels and especially since he simply did not know how many there were, or when they had last re-fuelled, or what tanker support they had?
Please stop making such an obvious fool of yourself. You are obviously failing to understand the situation correctly.
On your point 2 given that it is known that multiple tankers were dispatched and there are multiple German ships in harbour, why would WL assume that the Germans ( the VC citation says 6 DD and a sub) could not be refuelled?1. My mistake I should have written 60 minutes. Happens.
2. The British with their intelligence services at work, were knocking over German tankers heading from Russian ports to Narvik. So were the Norwegians. The British knew about it, since they were headed there for NARVIK themselves to cut off Swedish steel shipments from the port. It was how the Swedes shipped the iron to Germany. There is a railroad from the iron mines to Narvik. (See map. From Kiruna to Narvik.) They had a good idea about what was German going on at Narvik too. Or they should have, because the Norwegian patrol boats; Kelt, Senja, and Michael Sarz, bumped into the Germans. One of those patrol boats got off a radio warning to the Norwegian coast defense ship, Norge. And why would Warburton Lee head for Narvik if he did not know these details about his German opponents? He should have had at least a Brassey, or Conway's available to describe the German Model 1934 destroyer, no? And he should have had some contacts to at least navigate the fjords and to describe what he should find? You know, pilots to guide him into the fjords?
3. I think you need to read the article, again, amend your assumptions, and think it through. What the article suggests was a proper decision, does not make any sense to me at all. Not when the British were massing to strike themselves.
I may have made a simple math transit error and aircraft carrier ID error; but you seem to have incomplete information about what the British knew or why they did what they did or where they were and when.
And if WL did not know what he headed for, and charged in blind, as you suggest, then what does that say about him? Not even I have made that claim, because I believe he did know what to expect.
1. My mistake I should have written 60 minutes. Happens.
2. The British with their intelligence services at work, were knocking over German tankers heading from Russian ports to Narvik. So were the Norwegians. The British knew about it, since they were headed there for NARVIK themselves to cut off Swedish steel shipments from the port. It was how the Swedes shipped the iron to Germany. There is a railroad from the iron mines to Narvik. (See map. From Kiruna to Narvik.) They had a good idea about what was German going on at Narvik too. Or they should have, because the Norwegian patrol boats; Kelt, Senja, and Michael Sarz, bumped into the Germans. One of those patrol boats got off a radio warning to the Norwegian coast defense ship, Norge. And why would Warburton Lee head for Narvik if he did not know these details about his German opponents? He should have had at least a Brassey, or Conway's available to describe the German Model 1934 destroyer, no? And he should have had some contacts to at least navigate the fjords and to describe what he should find? You know, pilots to guide him into the fjords?
3. I think you need to read the article, again, amend your assumptions, and think it through. What the article suggests was a proper decision, does not make any sense to me at all. Not when the British were massing to strike themselves.
I may have made a simple math transit error and aircraft carrier ID error; but you seem to have incomplete information about what the British knew or why they did what they did or where they were and when.
And if WL did not know what he headed for, and charged in blind, as you suggest, then what does that say about him? Not even I have made that claim, because I believe he did know what to expect.
And the Russians never would have lasted long enough to recover from the initial blow if their country didn't have such massively superior 'brute force' capabilities; if the Germans had dropped the ball as badly as the Russians did in 1941, there would have been no Germany left. Obviously you can fault them for picking a fight with such huge and powerful coalitions, but that doesn't change the fact that the Allies probably couldn't have won without such vastly greater resources.The Russians had to survive to get there to 1944, didn't they? And 1943 was the fulcrum year where the combat odds were fairly equal. Losing population, production and manpower manhour productivity equivalent to the US east of the Mississippi (overrun territories the Germans seized in 1941-1942) and coming back from that deficit is what the Russians did.
On your point 2 given that it is known that multiple tankers were dispatched and there are multiple German ships in harbour, why would WL assume that the Germans ( the VC citation says 6 DD and a sub) could not be refuelled?
And the Russians never would have lasted long enough to recover from the initial blow if their country didn't have such massively superior 'brute force' capabilities; if the Germans had dropped the ball as badly as the Russians did in 1941, there would have been no Germany left. Obviously you can fault them for picking a fight with such huge and powerful coalitions, but that doesn't change the fact that the Allies probably couldn't have won without such vastly greater resources.
How are you getting "Charged in Blind"?
What I, other posters, the accepted history and the citation for Warburton-Lee's VC are telling you was that he made the correct decision with the information he had. The article clearly says that Warburton-Lee was sceptical of the intelligence he had received from the Admiralty, and he was right to be since only one German Ship was reported by them so he sent a party ashore to Tranoy Lighthouse. Unfortunately no one aboard his ships spoke Norwegian, and none of the Light-Men were fluent in English, but from local intelligence he was able to determine that the German force contained at least 6 Destroyers and a U-Boat. So he believed that he was outnumbered, but not decisively so. (As a key point the Local Pilots were all in Narvik under German control)
What he then conducted was effectively a Reconnaissance-in-Force. As Napoleon said "You can ask me for anything except time", Warburton-Lee was convinced that decisive action immediately applied was more important that a measured response later. Not to attack would be to gift the enemy time, which is an unforgiveable military error. Yes greater British Forces were on their way, but if the enemy had time to prepare they would have had a much harder fight. Even an inadequate action at the right time is better than a perfect response too late to matter. His attack was carried out with surprise and careful timing, at the Dawn High Tide, to provide maximum sea room and passage over a potential minefield, as 1934 Model Destroyers had mine-rails this was a sensible precaution. Waiting 60 minutes would have cost any attacking force this advantage!!!
Warbuton-Lee knew that Narvik had been attacked, but by a force of unknown size and strength, and he could not know its future intentions or capabilities. "If you do not know the size, strength and intent of your enemy, then attack, and you will surely find out"