Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

  • Yes

    Votes: 97 27.2%
  • No

    Votes: 99 27.8%
  • To a degree

    Votes: 160 44.9%

  • Total voters
    356
Attrition is also fighting until you break the will of the enemy to fight.
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/attrition_warfare

Your own citation:

"Attrition warfare is the term used to describe the sustained process of wearing down an opponent so as to force their physical collapse through continuous losses in personnel, equipment and supplies or to wear them down to such an extent that their will to fight collapses.

Falkanhayn at Verdun.

Cronkite didn't cost the Americans the war, nor was he 'chosen' by North Vietnam. He simply called the US government out for it's blatant lies that the war was basically won.

You were not there. You did not see the collapse of American will.
 

Deleted member 1487

Your own citation:

"Attrition warfare is the term used to describe the sustained process of wearing down an opponent so as to force their physical collapse through continuous losses in personnel, equipment and supplies or to wear them down to such an extent that their will to fight collapses.

Falkanhayn at Verdun.
I see you ignored the word 'OR' and all that came after it.
 
I see you ignored the word 'OR' and all that came after it.

Sophistry. It strictly refers to material losses, in the definition. It does not refer to programmed processes to exert mental pressure on a key enemy decision lever. The only reason I tag Kronkite specifically is because he broke first.

It could just as easily been some other opinion shaper.

You see this warfare today with Vladimir Putin's own bunch of warriors attacking through the same means to disrupt, confuse, debilitate and defeat western will.
 
That also ignores what impact Cronkite would have had on Marvin the ARVN's will to fight

You could also mean the changed attitude instilled that the American soldiers would impress and pass along on to the ARVN troops?

Here is something about that...


I could also mention "McNamara's 100,000".


Two men who led the American effort. How far would the PRVN have to push the information warfare methodology to disrupt the will to fight among the two armies? Not very far at all.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Sophistry. It strictly refers to material losses, in the definition. It does not refer to programmed processes to exert mental pressure on a key enemy decision lever. The only reason I tag Kronkite specifically is because he broke first.

It could just as easily been some other opinion shaper.

You see this warfare today with Vladimir Putin's own bunch of warriors attacking through the same means to disrupt, confuse, debilitate and defeat western will.
Please don't bring current politics outside of Chat.
 
And yet to counter that example. the US Sherman/75 force in 44 with its own gun and ammunition not too dissimilar was able to handle PZKWIVs

the US M3 75mmL40 gun had two useful AP and APHE rounds that could handle the Mk IV thru 1945, the Mk IV with the 75mmL24 had no decent AP for the T-34/76

PzGr. 39/43 Armor-piercing
  • Projectile weight: 6.80 kg
  • Muzzle velocity: 385 m/s
Penetration figures given for an armored plate 30 degrees from vertical
Range Penetration
100m 41mm

T-34/76 had this for armor

Hull front upper 47 mm /60°
Hull front lower part 45 mm /60°
Hull side upper 40 mm/41°
Hull rear 45 mm,
Turret front 60 mm
Turret side 52 mm/30°
Turret rear 30 mm
 
the US M3 75mmL40 gun had two useful AP and APHE rounds that could handle the Mk IV thru 1945, the Mk IV with the 75mmL24 had no decent AP for the T-34/76

PzGr. 39/43 Armor-piercing
  • Projectile weight: 6.80 kg
  • Muzzle velocity: 385 m/s
Penetration figures given for an armored plate 30 degrees from vertical
Range Penetration
100m 41mm

T-34/76 had this for armor

Hull front upper 47 mm /60°
Hull front lower part 45 mm /60°
Hull side upper 40 mm/41°
Hull rear 45 mm,
Turret front 60 mm
Turret side 52 mm/30°
Turret rear 30 mm

Penetration sure. How robust was the early T-34/76 running gear? I would think a lot of those mobility kills I read about in the literature, might just be high explosive shell hits? Just asking.
 

elkarlo

Banned
More stuff. And the axis lost at the extreme of their supply lines , Stalingrad, Tunisgrad, Guadalcanal and midway. That wiped out their offensive capabilities, and allowed the Allies with their superior resources to size the initiative and win
 
Penetration sure. How robust was the early T-34/76 running gear? I would think a lot of those mobility kills I read about in the literature, might just be high explosive shell hits? Just asking.

Tracks were far more reliable than the UK cruisers, weakest of any nation in the War. When Italian and Japanese designs are superior...
Nazis found many of the captured British tanks could use either Panzer I or II tracks, close enough in width and pitch, while having far longer life with less breakage.


The early T-34 had issues with the gearbox and aircleaners

Want to know more?
http://tankarchives.blogspot.com/2013/04/aberdeen-t-34-and-kv-1-test.html
 
However the defensive positions at Leningrad, Stalingrad, Moscow, Kursk, Alamein, Kasserine, Normandy ( allied side) Guadalcanal, Imphal all held.

Stalingrad fell, but at immense cost to the Germans. The Germans broke through at Kursk (expensively), and were contained by reserves. At Alamein, the British defenses held; the German defenses eventually broke under a very strong attack. At Normandy the Allies never had "fixed" defenses; nor really at Guadalcanal.

Some better examples of effective defensive stands in fortified positions (and good terrain):

Karelia in 1939-1940 (Finns held for several months against vastly superior Soviet forces)

Keren in 1941 (Italians held for several weeks against strong British forces)

Tobruk in 1941 (British held out against Axis till relieved)

Odessa in 1941 (held out for several months during BARBAROSSA)

Sevastopol in 1941-1942 (held out for several months after BARBAROSSA)

Cassino in 1943-1944 (Germans repulsed numerous Allied attacks)

The Channel ports in 1944-1945 (Several German garrisons held out well after being surrounded during the breakout from Normandy; Dunkirk until till V-E Day. The Allies could have taken these positions immediately, but the cost was seen as too high, due to the fortifications.)
 

hipper

Banned
The Germans were not going anywhere. The British wiped out their tanker support. How much do you really know about Narvik? If you read my accounts then you know that I mention the RN made it a point to capture the false flagged tankers the Germans were trying to sneak into Narvik from Murmansk to refuel their stranded destroyers.. IOW Warburton Lee could mousehole the Fjord until the weather permitted his air support to work. Of course with the incompetent D'Orly Hughes that raises a whole host of other issues, but two people who don't know what they are doing is a bit much to analyze in a situation, don't ya think? or do you want me to tell you how the Twins caught HMS Glorious?

no “By 04:00 on 10 April, Jan Wellem had managed to fully refuel three of the German destroyers, and was in the process of refuelling two more” O'Hara The German fleet at war, 39-45

Two German tankers on their way to Narvick had been Sunk one by the Norwegand the other had been stopped by Hms Shropshire but scuttled herself however the Jan Wiellem had about 8000 tonnes of fuel aboard enough to refuel the entire force given enough time.

untill Warbuton lee attacked that is. on the Afternoon of the 10th only two German Destroyers were fit enough to sail to the mouth of Vestford
and attempt to escape and they were effectively trapped by Penelope and 6 destroyers at the mouth of vestford. the Most likely result of Warbuton Lee waiting for recconisance would have been a Naval battle on the 10th between Penelope and 9 Destroyers against 10 german Destroyers.

as to Air support on the 10th Ark Royal and Glorious were leaving Alexandria. the only available carrier was HMS Furious which was 10 miles NW of muckle Flugga (orkney islands) with Warspite at 5 am on April 10th about the same time Warbiton Lee was entering the Vestfjord.

As the Only Carrier currently available she was quite busy (thanks to Naval History Net)

on April 11th Launched an air strike against warships and shipping at Trondheim where German had been reported
(Note: HIPPER had sailed and torpedo attacks on other ships failed.)

12th Launched bombing attacks and photo reconnaissance flights over Narvik prior to entry
WARSPITE into Fjord, planned for 13th April.

So it was 2 days later that effective air support was available.

Then why the SECOND Battle of Narvik?

to Finish off the German ships still in the fjord


Who wrote anything about daylight? The [night] recon is to find out where the Germans set up their ambushes. One can still attack at night and do the parachute flares and starshell things (which happened at Second Narvik by the way). The point is that Warburton Lee was surprised and got half his force destroyed in his disorganized retreat: he did not damage the Germans all that much. It was a bloody shambles that the RJN felt it had to avenge or see the Germans crow about it. Hence Warspite and Victor Crutchley's sterling, and I mean STERLING performance.

Hmm Night arial recon in a Fjord in a blizzard? that would be a world first in 1940. Again I’ll point out that the weather was likely too bad for flying operations since there had been a force 7 gale 12 hours previously. Warbuton Lee’s retreat was not disorganied he was steaming in line astern back down the Vestfjord having shattered 5 german Destroyers leaving 2 sunk and three 3 damaged for one hitin Return. He was suprised and was killed in the Engagement with 5 larger German Destroyers who he’d had bypassed in his earlier advance down the Fjord.
he thought George Thiele and the Bernd Von Antrim. were two british Crusers coming down the Fjord - that was WL’s his only mistake of the night and he paid for it with his life and ship.

Second Narvick started at 11:00 and finished by 15:30 so no starshell or flares were involved.
the air support on the 12th attacked 2 ex Norwegian Patrol boats and may have caused 2 german Destroyers to go aground . The second strike was forced to abort due to Blizzard conditions.



He did not render the Germans combat ineffective at all, but he removed an entire British destroyer division from the RN order of battle. That was why the British had to go back and finish what he failed to do. As an American I would have told him to whistle up air support and wait for "fair weather for battle". He had time and resources. The Germans were bottled by fuel shortages and weather and were suffering "harbor sickness". Nelson spent months on blockades just to wait on the French to get desperate and come to him, where he would trounce them because they were the ones morally beaten up by "harbor sickness" while his men were fresh and vigorous from sea duty. I take it Warburton Lee never was a USNWC graduate?

Warbuton Lee was a Destroyer captain 16 years experience in 1940 and had been to Staff college. Close blockade was obsolete since the invention of the submarine and aircraft.


let’s look at the damage results on the morning of the 10th
German Destroyers

Wilhelm Heidkamp sunk by Torpedo
Anton Schmitt sunk by Torpedo
Hans Ludemann on fire disabled forward guns flooded magazine
Hermann Kunne engines disabled, entangled with Anton Schmitt
Diether von Roeder on fire Abandoned (immobile)
George Thiele on fire magazines flooded

only these four destroyers escaped Damage from Warbuton Lees Force
Wolfgang Zenker
Erich Giese
Erich Kollner
Bernd von Arnim


British Destroyers

Hunter sunk after being rammed by Hotspur
Hardy Grounded (lost)
Hotspur Damaged by shellfire and collision
Havock
Hostile

Warbuton lee had inflicted much more than Equal damage on the German Destroyer force and delayed their refuelling. His decision on the Morning of April 10th was to attack or wait. after discussions with the Norwegian Pilot station he suspected larger Gerrman forces one cruiser and 6 destroyers. unsurprisingly for a British destroyer captain he Decided to attack. if he had not attacked it’s possible the Germans could have escaped the next evening.
 
Except for Normandy all the examples were of the defenders outnumbering the attackers and the attackers having worse supply, with the exception of Moscow in October, but the weather was a serious factor there. Normandy was also proof of the Allies being able to overpower fix positions by masses of greater firepower and manpower. Anyway there were any number of factors in each of those situations beyond defensive terrain lines that determined the outcome.


Err no and so what.

The initial arrival before Leningrad and Stalingrad has the Germans superior in Combat power and often in manpower as well in the immediate sector. The existence of other Formations covering say Murmansk in the same general area is irrelevant.

The German Plan on opening Barbarossa is to take Leningrad the fact that they then dissipate forces in subsidiary operations to the initial goal is a failure of generalship. That they are sitting outside a starving Leningrad for a month with their troops well closed up before there is a positive order not to take it shows confusion and poor generalship.

The point of Blue is to destroy the Soviet southern armies, which the German fail to do.

In fact when the remnants of the Soviet forces are able to anchor themselves on the Volga the Germans are unable to advance to the river either at Stalingrad or Kremenskaya ( among others)

At Moscow the Germans have an absolute superiority and a definite superiority in Combat power in the immediate aftermath of Typhoon.

At Alamein ( 1st Alamein) Auchinlek has one corps scattered and is improvising a defensive position after losing most of his forward depots with isolated brigades and ad hoc formations for around a week. During which time it takes DAK a whole day to overrun an isolated motor rifle Be and a whole morning to fail to overrun a field regiment, Light AA rgt and infantry company allowing an armoured bde to intervene.

In Normandy Meyer manages to shatter 12th SS in a stupid attack against a reinforced Bn. II SS panzer corps are held off by a single US ID in hasty defence.

Oxhead the German forces are:

1st Panzer Group Lang (77 tanks, including 14 tigers)

2nd Group Eder (Grenadier Regiment 755)

3rd group Audorff (Grenadier Regiment 754)

4th Group Schmid (a battalion / 10th Panzer Division, Hunters Regiment "Hermann Goering", Mountaineer Regiment 756)

5th Reserve Group (Grenadier Regiment 47, two infantry battalions)



They are attacking basically two separated infantry Bde, one light infantry with limited AT weapons, one grass green, so roughly Outnumbering the defenders 2:1 in infantry and with 100+ AFV. They take a day to overrun the commando and the outlying position at Sidi Nasir. Heavily reinforced Division or in German Corps Formation fails to smash through a light infantry bde and a detached company with Arty Support.

Contrast that with 51st RTR in the same action.

And this is kinda the problem with the german system. Its really good at overrunning weak poorly armed defensive positions, and really good at finding them and massing overwhelming power and within a few hundred km of Germany, and with a break every 3 months to refit, devastating.

And they can and do continue on looking for a flank or badly defended section and mass and exploit. But as soon as they run into even a mediocre AT defence they have to go through they are impotent. And the norm from mid 42 on is there will be an AT defence.

Even a mediocre AT defence is actually powerful, its well within the capability of a single AT troop/Platoon with say 5 guns to wreck a tank battalion in a matter of minutes. Which is the situation the Germans are trying to establish by forming pockets and defeating the breakout attempts.

The only way to overcome a mid 20th century defensive position was massed firepower, generally reckoned at 30:1 in the attack sector. The point of Mobile forces is to enable you to concentrate that combat power fast and move it so that the enemy never gets a chance to react. The fact that the other guy has 5 million under arms and you have 3 million is irrelevant if the Division holding 4Km line is attached by 10 Pz Div each on a 400m frontage. (or even 4 on a 1km frontage.) Or the 830 marines defending Edsons ridge against 3000 Japanese plus NGF.


The difference between the allies and the Germans in particular is the allies are consistently able to both mass to defeat a position and to do so while retaining a reserve to exploit which the Germans have no counter to. The Germans are consistently unable to mass but persist is a tactical and operational model that no longer works.
 
As an American I would have told him to whistle up air support and wait for "fair weather for battle". He had time and resources. The Germans were bottled by fuel shortages and weather and were suffering "harbor sickness". Nelson spent months on blockades just to wait on the French to get desperate and come to him, where he would trounce them because they were the ones morally beaten up by "harbor sickness" while his men were fresh and vigorous from sea duty. I take it Warburton Lee never was a USNWC graduate?

Sorry Mcpherson, this is all very wrong, it's a complete misunderstanding of the operational and tactical situation at Narvik.

You seem to be very knowledgeable about the Pacific but every time I see your posts on the Atlantic or the RN, my jaw drops a little. I'm still astonished by your assertion a while back that the Kongos - obsolete battlecruisers that they were - represented the pinnacle of British armour thinking, when their armour was inferior to every British dreadnought ever built.
 
no “By 04:00 on 10 April, Jan Wellem had managed to fully refuel three of the German destroyers, and was in the process of refuelling two more” O'Hara The German fleet at war, 39-45

Better read that again. Jan Wellen had only topped them in ballast.; plus she had the wrong kind of fuel.

Low on Fuel
The Germans were very pleased with themselves as April 9 wore on. However, the celebration did not last long. Dietl had to consolidate his positions, and the German destroyers had to refuel and return to Germany. And there was the first problem. The German tin cans were dependent on two large tankers that were supposed to be in Narvik ahead of the invaders, deployed in a “Trojan Horse” maneuver.

But while the tanker Jan Wellem had made it, the Kattegat did not, stopped south of Bodo by the British minefield, intercepted by the Norwegian patrol boat Nordkapp, and sunk in shallow water. The Norwegians salvaged most of her cargo.

Now Bonte required 600 tons of fuel for each destroyer to make the voyage home to the Fatherland, and he had only half the fuel the operational plan called for. He could mix diesel fuel with boiler oil to fill his tanks, but with only one tanker present, it would take twice as long to fill his ships’ bunkers. With one tanker, only two destroyers could refuel simultaneously, and each pair required seven to eight hours. Only three destroyers were refueled by midnight on April 9.

Bonte radioed his plight to his chain of command, saying he could not leave Narvik on the 9th as planned but would have to do so on the 10th. In the interim, he scattered his ships around the fjord to lessen the danger of aerial attack. The Germans deployed U-boats off Ofotfjord as a picket against British naval attack. They reported four British destroyers on a southwest course—away from Narvik.
Two German tankers on their way to Narvick had been Sunk one by the Norwegand the other had been stopped by Hms Shropshire but scuttled herself however the Jan Wiellem had about 8000 tonnes of fuel aboard enough to refuel the entire force given enough time.

That is correct.
untill Warbuton lee attacked that is. on the Afternoon of the 10th only two German Destroyers were fit enough to sail to the mouth of Vestford
and attempt to escape and they were effectively trapped by Penelope and 6 destroyers at the mouth of vestford. the Most likely result of Warbuton Lee waiting for recconisance would have been a Naval battle on the 10th between Penelope and 9 Destroyers against 10 german Destroyers.

The most likely event is what happened. The Germans scattered among the fjords to avoid FAA air attacks. Fouled fuel and incomplete top-off in ballast.The Germans did not have the bunkerage or ballast necessary to do what you claim.

as to Air support on the 10th Ark Royal and Glorious were leaving Alexandria. the only available carrier was HMS Furious which was 10 miles NW of muckle Flugga (orkney islands) with Warspite at 5 am on April 10th about the same time Warbiton Lee was entering the Vestfjord.

HMS Glorious was in the North Sea.

Burt, R. A. (1993). British Battleships, 1919–1939. London: Arms and Armour Press. p. 285.
As the Only Carrier currently available she was quite busy (thanks to Naval History Net)

on April 11th Launched an air strike against warships and shipping at Trondheim where German had been reported
(Note: HIPPER had sailed and torpedo attacks on other ships failed.)

12th Launched bombing attacks and photo reconnaissance flights over Narvik prior to entry
WARSPITE into Fjord, planned for 13th April.

So it was 2 days later that effective air support was available.

So what? The Germans were not going anywhere. And there was HMS Renown on standby for Mousehole duty.

to Finish off the German ships still in the fjord

Again (^^^) Have any idea what the weather was like? (Please read.)

START OF NARVIK OPERATIONS

In the late evening of the 8th, the German Narvik Group reached the entrance to Vestfjord and as the destroyers entered Narvik fjord for Narvik, battlecruisers GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST turned out to sea to draw the main part of the Home Fleet away from the Norwegian coast.

Late on the 8th, the Admiralty finally awoke to the true nature of the German naval activity around the Norwegian coast and decided that Narvik was threatened. Battlecruiser REPULSE, light cruiser PENELOPE, destroyers BEDOUIN, KIMBERLEY, PUNJABI and ESKIMO, which had been detached to assist destroyer GLOWWORM, were sent north at 1956/8th to join the RENOWN force off Vestfjord. Destroyer HOSTILE joined the REPULSE force during the night and all arrived off Vestfjord at 1130/9th.

Further.

MapB1940-Narvik.GIF

Early on the 10th, German destroyer DIETHER VON ROEDER (VR - see map) was supposed to be on patrol across the mouth of Ofotfjord, but the approaches were unguarded. ROEDER was supposed to remain on patrol until relieved by HANS LUDEMANN (HL), but in ROEDER's diary there was the entry "Am relieving SCHMIDT from 0300 as anti-submarine patrol until dawn." ROEDER left her patrol area across Ofotofjord and turned towards Narvik with the British 2nd Destroyer Flotilla less than a mile behind in heavy snow and mist. ROEDER anchored at Narvik at 0420. German refuelling was far behind schedule. While tanker JAN WELLEM (11,776grt) had arrived on schedule, the second tanker, KATTEGAT (6031grt) was sunk late on the 9th before reaching Narvik. LUDEMANN and HERMANN KUNNE (HK) were alongside the converted whaler JAN WELLEM when the British attack began at 0430.

Destroyer HARDY went in first into the harbour and fired seven torpedoes. One exploded in the after magazine of destroyer WILHELM HEIDKAMP (WH) blowing off her stern; eighty one crew members including Commodore Bonte were killed. Finally, on the 11th at 0600, as a result of culminating damage, HEIDKAMP capsized and sank. Other torpedoes from HARDY struck merchant ships in the harbour. As destroyer HARDY withdrew, destroyers HUNTER and HAVOCK entered the harbour firing torpedoes. Torpedoes from HAVOCK struck ANTON SCHMITT (AS) , seriously damaging her. Destroyer KUNNE, getting underway from alongside the tanker, was near SCHMITT when the torpedoes hit and sustained damage to her engines from the concussion. SCHMITT, rolling over, settled onto KUNNE immobilising her for forty minutes. Sixty three crew were killed on the destroyer SCHMITT. German destroyer LUDEMAN had a gun knocked out from shellfire and a fire which necessitated flooding of her after magazine. Two crew were killed on the destroyer LUDEMAN.

Destroyers HOSTILE and HOTSPUR had been detailed to neutralize nonexistent coastal batteries on the north shore of Narvik. Upon finding no batteries, the destroyers entered the harbour fight. Destroyer HOTSPUR fired torpedoes at numerous merchant ships in the harbour and HOSTILE went into a gun action with German destroyer ROEDER damaging her so severely that the German captain ordered his ship abandoned. As the destroyers withdrew, destroyers HOSTILE and HOTSPUR laid a smoke screen and HOSTILE fired her torpedoes against merchant ships in the harbour. The 2nd Destroyer Flotilla then began its withdrawal out of the fjord. During this battle, British steamer BLYTHMOOR (6582grt), Norwegian steamers SAPHIR (4306grt) and ELRID (1712grt), Swedish steamers STRASSA (5602grt) and BODEN (4265grt), German steamers FRIELINGHAUS (4339grt), HEIN HOYER (5836grt), NEUENFELS (8096grt), MARTHA HEINDRIK FISSER (4879grt), AACHEN (6388grt), ALTONA (5398grt) were lost to British torpedoes and British and German gunfire. Six of crew of the BLYTHMOOR were lost. Thirty crew were interned in Sweden. Seven of the British steamer crew were picked up by HM ships and returned to England. The entire crew of Norwegian steamer ELRID was rescued. The wreck of ELRID was sunk on 5 May. The wreck of Swedish steamer STRASSA was sunk on 11 May by an internal explosion.

German destroyers WOLFGANG ZENKER (WK), ERICH GIESE (EG), and ERICH KOELLNER (EK) in Herjansfjord, waiting to refuel, got the alarm of the British intrusion at 0515 and got underway at 0530. They chased the British ships up the fjord and theywere on the verge of escaping as the German destroyers did not have fuel to continue the chase further. However, German destroyers GEORG THIELE (GT) and BERND VON ARNIM (BA), getting underway from Ballengenfjord at 0540, contacted the British force and attacked. In the ensuing fray, THIELE had two guns knocked out, a magazine flooded, was set afire and ARNIM was hit five times and had a boiler room flooded. Destroyers ZENKER, KOELLNER and GIESE expended more than half of their ammunition. Fifteen crew were killed and twenty three wounded on destroyer THIELE. Two crew was killed on destroyer ARNIM.

In the exchange, destroyer HARDY was badly damaged and was run aground near Virek to prevent sinking. Captain B. A. W. Warburton-Lee, Lt E. K. U. Clark, MVO, Lt C. P. W. Cross, sixteen ratings were killed. The surviving crew went ashore. Lt Cdr R. C. Gordon-Smith, Paymaster Lt G. H. Stanning, Temporary Surgeon A. P. B. Waind RNVR, six ratings were seriously wounded. Gordon-Smith died of wounds on 17 July 1940. Three other ratings were less seriously wounded. Waind, left in a local hospital, was later captured by the Germans. He was repatriated in 1944. Destroyer HUNTER was also badly damaged. As she lost speed, she swerved into the path of destroyer HOTSPUR which was unable to avoid ramming her. In this condition, HUNTER was sunk and HOTSPUR was badly damaged by German gunfire. Lt Cdr L. de Villiers, Lt K. B. P. Pearson, Lt H. R. M.Maidlow, Probationary S/Lt P. N. Lancaster RNVR, Probationary Temporary Surgeon Lt H. G. Evans RNVR, ninety eight ratings were lost with HUNTER. Forty six survivors, including Lt H. A. Stuart-Menteth, Lt (E) A. G. Reid, Acting Gunner (T) J. H. Coombe, were picked up by German destroyers ZENKER, KOELLNER, GIESE. They were put ashore on the 13th from destroyer GIESE where they had been held. Stuart-Menteth and thirty seven ratings were later able to escape to Sweden. Lt Reid and eight ratings remained prisoners of war through the end of the war. Gunner Coombe died of wounds on the 23rd and four ratings also died of wounds and exposure.

Destroyers HOSTILE and HAVOCK escaped without serious damage, but HOTSPUR suffered thirteen ratings and the NAAFI manager killed, with three other ratings dying of wounds, S/Lt L. J. Tillie and ten ratings wounded. Retiring up the Fjord, destroyers HOTSPUR, HAVOCK, HOSTILE encountered the German supply ship RAUENFELS (8460grt) carrying the Narvik force's ammunition supplies. Destroyers HAVOCK and HOSTILE hit RAUENFELS several times with gunfire and a fire was started that soon detonated the ammunition and destroyed RAUENFELS. Destroyer HAVOCK picked up the Captain and eighteen crew from one boat from the German steamer. The two other boats rowed ashore and were captured by Norwegian forces. Destroyer HAVOCK sustained some hull damage from the concussion, but the German forces at Narvik now had no reserve ammunition which was sorely needed.

Light cruiser PENELOPE and destroyers BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, PUNJABI, KIMBERLEY hastened into Vestfjord to guard the retirement of destroyers HOSTILE, HAVOCK, HOTSPUR. On meeting the retiring the 2nd Flotilla, PENELOPE, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, PUNJABI, KIMBERLEY, HAVOCK returned to support the 20th Destroyer Flotilla guarding the Vestfjord minefields. Damaged destroyer HOTSPUR arrived at Skelfjord at 1640 escorted by destroyer HOSTILE. Destroyer HOTSPUR departed Skelfjord during the forenoon of 20 April and arrived at Scapa Flow at 2200/23rd. Destroyer HOTSPUR departed Scapa Flow at 2030/26th in the company of damaged anti-aircraft cruiser CURACOA for Chatham, arriving on 1 May, for repairs completed in mid July 1940.

It appears there is a LOT despite your excellent research that remains unknown to you that you do not understand about Narvik.

German destroyers GIESE and ZENKER were refuelled by early afternoon, but KOELLNER would not be ready until midnight. Destroyer ROEDER was so badly damaged that she could not leave the pier, so she was assigned in an immobile harbour defence role. The other four surviving German destroyers at Narvik required much work before they would be fully combatant units again; two days would be required to make the ships merely fit to go to sea.

_____

Hmm Night arial recon in a Fjord in a blizzard? that would be a world first in 1940. Again I’ll point out that the weather was likely too bad for flying operations since there had been a force 7 gale 12 hours previously. Warbuton Lee’s retreat was not disorganied he was steaming in line astern back down the Vestfjord having shattered 5 german Destroyers leaving 2 sunk and three 3 damaged for one hitin Return. He was suprised and was killed in the Engagement with 5 larger German Destroyers who he’d had bypassed in his earlier advance down the Fjord.

See account above. each British destroyer lost contact and was trying to navigate independently in fog.

he thought George Thiele and the Bernd Von Antrim. were two british Crusers coming down the Fjord - that was WL’s his only mistake of the night and he paid for it with his life and ship.
Not hard to do in fog and poor visibility. (See Above.)

Second Narvick started at 11:00 and finished by 15:30 so no starshell or flares were involved.
the air support on the 12th attacked 2 ex Norwegian Patrol boats and may have caused 2 german Destroyers to go aground . The second strike was forced to abort due to Blizzard conditions.

SECOND BATTLE OF NARVIK

MapB1940-Narvik.GIF
Early on the 13th, destroyer ICARUS led the minesweeper sweep followed by destroyers HERO, FOXHOUND and FORESTER streaming minesweeps. These ships swept for mines in Vestfjord prior to battleship WARSPITE's entry into the Fjord for Operation DW. At 0730, the Narvik attack force was composed of battleship WARSPITE (Captain V.A.C. Crutchley, now flying the flag of Vice Admiral Whitworth) with destroyers FORESTER, FOXHOUND, HERO and COSSACK joining destroyers BEDOUIN, KIMBERLEY, ESKIMO and PUNJABI, which formerly operated with light cruiser PENELOPE and destroyer minelayer ICARUS of the 20th Destroyer Flotilla. Destroyer IVANHOE of the 20th Destroyer Flotilla and destroyer HOSTILE of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, while not taking part in the attack, entered the fjord after the WARSPITE force on general duties which would include screening damaged ships and picking up survivors. At 1040, U.48 was discovered by ESKIMO in Vestfjord. Destroyers ESK, IVANHOE, HOSTILE, HAVOCK were sent to hunt the submarine and ESKIMO continued with the WARSPITE group. The submarine was attacked, but no damage was done. WARSPITE's aircraft scouting ahead of the force located U.64, on her first war patrol, on the surface off Bjevik and sank her with bombs in 68‑29N, 17‑30E. Thirty six crew of the forty four man crew were able to swim ashore and were assisted by German Alpine troops. The crew of U.64 was returned to Germany commencing on the 13th on the Swedish railway and arriving on the 26th on a German passenger ship.

Ten Swordfish of 816 and 818 Squadrons under Captain A.R. Burch RM, from aircraft carrier FURIOUS attacked the German destroyers. HERMANN KUNNE (HK - see map) and BERND VON ARMIM (BA) were near missed, but not significantly damaged. Two Swordfish of 818 Squadron were shot down by the German forces. The crew of one from 816 Squadron, piloted by Midshipman (A) D H Dammers, was rescued after the plane landed in a snowdrift.Dammers was wounded; his TAG Leading Airman A.J. Sturgess was unhurt. Acting S/Lt (A) G.R. Hampden and Naval Airman R. Dale of the other SWORDFISH were missing.

U.46, five miles up the fjord from Baroy, made an approach at periscope depth on WARSPITE. Maneuvering submerged, she struck an unchartered rock and broke surface. U.46 was able to escape, however, on the surface as the British force was occupied with the sighting of German destroyer KUNNE. ERICH KOELLNER (EK), escorted by KUNNE, on her way to Taarstad sighted the WARSPITE force at 1300 as it was approaching the Narrows. KUNNE sounded the alarm and destroyers HANS LUDEMAN (HL), WOLFGANG ZENKER (WZ) and ARNIM got underway. KOELLNER slowly made her way to Djupvik Bay to wait in ambush as she was in no shape to offer battle. However, KOELLNER's fate was sealed when she was located by WARSPITE's aircraft. The two leading destroyers, BEDOUIN and ESKIMO, alerted by the WARSPITE scouting plane, sighted KOELLNER as they rounded the point of Djupvik and sank her in a few minutes. Thirty one crew were killed and forty wounded on KOELLNER. KUNNE exchanged shots with the British force as she retired down the Fjord, but at such long range, nothing came of it. As KUNNE retired towards Narvik, she encountered LUDEMAN and ZENKER and they turned towards the British force. Just as they came into sight, the German force was strengthened by the arrival of ARNIM. Destroyer PUNJABI was hit by many five inch shells and was seriously damaged with large fires. She retired up the Fjord for a time, putting out her fires. PUNJABI then returned to the battle, but was limited to fifteen knots and had a jagged hole in her bow. Six were killed, and seventeen, including Lt Cdr (E) R.R. Shorto, were wounded. One wounded died of wounds the next day on board WARSPITE.

By this time, KUNNE, ZENKER and ARNIM were all damaged by shellfire and had exhausted their ammunition. KUNNE, retiring up Herjangsfjord and pursued by ESKIMO, ran herself aground. ESKIMO fired torpedoes into KUNNE to complete the destruction. There were no casualties on KUNNE. German destroyer ERICH GIESE (EG), now with steam up, sailed out of Narvik harbour and was sunk by gunfire from COSSACK, BEDOUIN, FOXHOUND, FORESTER, HERO and ICARUS. Eighty three crew were killed, many wounded, and nine crew were captured from GIESE. As the British force was nearing Narvik, they were taken under fire by destroyer DIETHER VON ROEDER (VR), but the gunfire was mistaken for coming from a shore gun. As COSSACK made her way between the wrecks in the harbour, she was taken under fire by ROEDER and hit eight times by five inch shells; two of which inflicted serious damage. One shell exploded against the fore end of the forward superstructure killing or wounding all the ammunition party inside. The other shell burst in the forward boiler room, killing the stokers and severing the leads from the bridge to the steering engine and the engine room telegraphs and fractured the main steam pipes. Without steerage or means to stop the engines, COSSACK ran hard aground on the south shore opposite the harbour. For the next twelve hours, she remained on this perch, sniped at by General Dietl's troops. Fortunately, most of the mountain guns carried on the destroyers for Dietl were swept away in heavy seas encountered on the voyage to Narvik. Eight ratings were killed and nineteen crew, two dying of wounds, were wounded on destroyer COSSACK.

COSSACK from her location, seeing that ROEDER had now been abandoned, ordered FOXHOUND into the harbour to board her. As FOXHOUND neared ROEDER, a burst of machine gun fire and rifle fire from the shore erupted and FOXHOUND stood off while she returned the fire. While this exchange was going on, ROEDER exploded and was totally demolished. There were no casualties on ROEDER. Destroyers ESKIMO, FORESTER, HERO, BEDOUIN and ICARUS went up Rombaksfjord in pursuit of ZENKER, ARNIM, LUDEMAN and GEORG THIELE (GT). Destroyer ESKIMO encountered LUDEMAN and THIELE which opened up with the last of their main armament ammunition. ESKIMO was the joined by FORESTER and HERO. LUDEMAN fired torpedoes at them but they were evaded by ESKIMO and outrun by FORESTER and HERO. LUDEMAN was hit a number of times by shellfire from the three destroyers and retired up the fjord to join ZENKER and ARNIM where all three scuttled themselves and their crews went ashore. There were a number of casualties in the number 4 and 5 guns on LUDEMAN. There were no casualties on ZENKER and ARNIM. THIELE fired torpedoes at the British ships and then, badly damaged herself, ran aground and capsized. One of the torpedoes struck ESKIMO under the forecastle blasting away the forward part of the ship. The forward turret was out of action, but B turret managed to keep up the fire. FORESTER and PUNJABI stood by ESKIMO, while HERO, ICARUS and KIMBERLEY continued up the fjord. There were fourteen killed and twenty eight wounded on THIELE. There were fifteen ratings killed and ten crew wounded on ESKIMO.

HERO, ICARUS and KIMBERLEY found THIELE, LUDEMAN and ZENKER, all aground and abandoned. As they approached, ZENKER slid off the rocks and sank. A boarding party was put aboard LUDEMAN but after discovering that all the documents had been destroyed prior to abandoning ship, the landing party left and a torpedo was fired to complete the destruction. There was one rating killed and two wounded on FORESTER, and one crewman wounded on KIMBERLEY.

At 1755, WARSPITE escorted by destroyers FOXHOUND, BEDOUIN, HERO and ICARUS retired from the area and got as far as Vestfjord at 2050 when she reversed course and returned to Ofotfjord to assist the damaged COSSACK, ESKIMO and PUNJABI. KIMBERLEY had been left to stand by COSSACK, while PUNJABI and FORESTER had been left to stand by ESKIMO. Two other destroyers, IVANHOE and HOSTILE, which had arrived were left off Narvik to investigate the merchant ships, but the detail was soon abandoned when the destroyers were ordered to hunt a German submarine.

During the battle, Norwegian steamer CATE B (4285grt) and merchant tanker RODSKJAEL (133grt), Swedish steamers TORNE (3792grt) and OXELOSUND (5613grt) and tug STYRBJOEN (167grt), German tanker JAN WELLEM (11,776grt) were lost, but later salved. Swedish steamer OXELOSUND was sunk on 8 May by an internal explosion. U.51 had been at Narvik when the British attack began and, believing the attack to be an air raid, went into the harbour to bottom. Later, U.51 slipped out of the harbour, undetected, to attack the British force but without success. Destroyer FOXHOUND dropped depth charges on U.25 off Tjellebotn doing minor damage to her at 1840. During the night of 13/14 April, destroyer IVANHOE found the destroyer HARDY survivors and the crew of the British Narvik merchant ships that had been put ashore from the German tanker JAN WELLEM during the First Battle of Narvik. IVANHOE embarked these men at Ballengen and took them back to England.

Shortly after 2000, destroyer KIMBERLEY unsuccessfully tried to tow COSSACK off the ground. It was not until 0315/14th that COSSACK finally got underway on her own in high water. COSSACK proceeded to WARSPITE to offload her casualties. Then with destroyer FORESTER escorting, COSSACK proceeded stern first to Skelfjord. At Skelfjord emergency repairs were made to COSSACK. Her ammunition was transferred to destroyer ZULU and her torpedoes to destroyer BEDOUIN. COSSACK departed Skelfjord at 2300/23rd after more emergency repairs with British tanker WAR PINDARI and arrived at Scapa Flow at 0830/27th. COSSACK departed Scapa Flow at 1510/28th and arrived at Portsmouth on the 30th for repairs which were completed on 15 June 1940.

ESKIMO also arrived at Skelfjord early on the 14th towed by BEDOUIN and escorted by HOSTILE and IVANHOE. After emergency repairs at Skelfjord, ESKIMO departed under the tow of British repair ship VINDICTIVE on 14 May to Tjelsundet when Skelfjord was abandoned as a base. ESKIMO proceeded under own power to Hol. She was at various anchorages before berthing at the jetty at Harstad on 17 May. On 25 May, ESKIMO was ready to be moved to England and left stern first under tow for the Clyde where she arrived on 4 June. ESKIMO was under repairs until the first week of September 1940.

PUNJABI after emergency repairs at Skelfjord departed Skelfjord during the forenoon of 20 April. PUNJABI arrived at Scapa Flow at 2200/23rd, departed at 2000/25th and went to Plymouth arriving at 1700/27th. The repairs to PUNJABI were completed on 12 June 1940.

I will fill in a few missing details. There was an anticyclonic system that was tearing up weather in the North Sea that week from the 8th onward.

It was in poor light when the Swordfish attacked U-64 at 1050, and she had to drop a parachute flare before she dropped her bomb and strafed the German. The Germans claim it was a depth charge. There was deep twilight shadow in the fjord and there was artificial illumination used to dispatch Kunne (starshell.)

Warbuton Lee was a Destroyer captain 16 years experience in 1940 and had been to Staff college. Close blockade was obsolete since the invention of the submarine and aircraft.

D'Oyly Hughes was a submariner of equal experience, rated fit for command, and yet post Glorious sinking it is discovered that he was completely round the bend. Or to take American examples, VADM Ghormley was driven near mad by dental problems and had to be relieved for health issues. VADM Pye it is suspected was going senile, so he was beached as gently as possible. CAPT Miles Browning, who was clearly unfit to command a rowboat was cossacked by friends (Halsey) until finally relieved for moral cause (Spruance), and CAPT Bode, who may have lost his nerve at a crucial point at Savo Island, shot himself (King was after his scalp.).

And... Explain the other British backup force mouse-holing the Fjord as Warburton Lee charged in then? Hmm?

let’s look at the damage results on the morning of the 10th
German Destroyers

Wilhelm Heidkamp sunk by Torpedo
Anton Schmitt sunk by Torpedo
Hans Ludemann on fire disabled forward guns flooded magazine
Hermann Kunne engines disabled, entangled with Anton Schmitt
Diether von Roeder on fire Abandoned (immobile)
George Thiele on fire magazines flooded

only these four destroyers escaped Damage from Warbuton Lees Force
Wolfgang Zenker
Erich Giese
Erich Kollner
Bernd von Arnim

Five German destroyers attacked the Warspite incursion. So obviously something is wrong, here.

British Destroyers

Hunter sunk after being rammed by Hotspur
Hardy Grounded (lost)
Hotspur Damaged by shellfire and collision
Havock
Hostile

Warbuton lee had inflicted much more than Equal damage on the German Destroyer force and delayed their refuelling. His decision on the Morning of April 10th was to attack or wait. after discussions with the Norwegian Pilot station he suspected larger Gerrman forces one cruiser and 6 destroyers. unsurprisingly for a British destroyer captain he Decided to attack. if he had not attacked it’s possible the Germans could have escaped the next evening.

No. It was not. And you can see why. (^^^) The British MOUSE HOLED Narvik. Plus the Germans did not have the fuel they needed to get home. The British waited this time until they were ready, then they went in for round two.
 
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Sorry Mcpherson, this is all very wrong, it's a complete misunderstanding of the operational and tactical situation at Narvik.

You seem to be very knowledgeable about the Pacific but every time I see your posts on the Atlantic or the RN, my jaw drops a little. I'm still astonished by your assertion a while back that the Kongos - obsolete battlecruisers that they were - represented the pinnacle of British armour thinking, when their armour was inferior to every British dreadnought ever built.

Where did I write that about the Kongos again? You must have me confused with someone else. What I know and wrote about the Kongos was that they were re-engined, guns elevation improved, and bores mid-life relined for greater range and to improve ballistic dispersion characteristics and their deck armor was strengthened a bit to resist 250 kg bombs (and their barbette walls thickened to resist battleship shell fire up to 355 mm (14 inch) bore), their fire control updated, more work space added to their superstructure (Pagoda control station where the British would build a box superstructure on Hood) and they sported new torpedo blisters that incidentally did not work. I've written those statements I know and you will see it again shortly in story when I sink them.

I will say that the armor for the three Japanese built ships was BETTER for shell resist than the British armor in the type Kongo example the British built for Japan or in the Tiger and at least before the British reforms post Jutland, in WW I; it, the Kongo type would have made mincemeat out of aforesaid Tiger.

They were remarkably tough ships. George Thurston could be proud of them.
 
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Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force (larger manpower and industrial capability) as opposed to superior skill and fighting prowess?

All the time the Germans (and Japanese) were not fighting Peer opposition they were winning despite any disparity of numbers - Barbarossa and Malaya come to mind where the German/Japanese forces despite being inferior in number were fighting sub-peer opposition

The Red Army was not ready for war in 1941 and the Imperial forces in Malaya were 4th place for forces (while the Empire and Allies were in combat versus Germany, Italy and Vichy France) and 5th for resources after those campaigns already being fought against those 3 enemies plus supplies being sent to Russia)

However when their enemies became peer opposition and could equal or exceed Axis numbers then we begin to see the Axis losing battles and campaigns (or certainly not winning them any more)

In places the Allies became Peer and Peer plus opposition and coupled with their superiority in Logistics and industrial capacity as well as often outnumbering the Axis forces we see the Allies winning.

The issue we have with this question is that early war the Germans in quality, training and experience generally were superior to their opposition and also chose where and when they were going to attack which gives them the advantage of initiative and concentration of forces

Mid/Late war when we start seeing the allies win they are fighting a peer opponent - one who has all of the experience that they have - so it is impossible to win one on one in such a situation and what is required is a superiority in numbers in order to ensure success.

Now this superiority may come in the form of some or all of the following - artillery, Air, intelligence, weapon systems, logistics general ship/planning and of course numbers

For the Allies it was generally all of those.

Had the allies of 1940 been peer opposition then the Battle of France could not have been won by Germany without a massive superiority in all of those things I mentioned above which they probably could not have achieved.

So it was a case of the war being won by larger manpower and industrial capability of the allies but don't be lulled in the falsehood that this means that the allies did not also become the equal or superior in skill and fighting prowess in many cases to the Axis forces.
 
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