Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

  • Yes

    Votes: 97 27.2%
  • No

    Votes: 99 27.8%
  • To a degree

    Votes: 160 44.9%

  • Total voters
    356
@wiking, yes that is what mean. :) The effects on the battlefield, regardless of the source, were the same.

The whole point I was trying to make, though, was my growing realization that idea of German tactical superiority really doesn't hold up. I am not trying to say the Allies were necessarily tactically superior and I still stand by my first post (a few pages back) that the Allies logistical advantages played a very large part in their eventual victory; just that even failing that logistical superiority the Allies still may have won.

IOW: brute force wasn't the sole factor.
 

Deleted member 1487

So much this.

The intellectual dishonesty of the Wehraboos - and we have a couple of them in this thread - is shown by how they absolutely will not discuss the litany of failed German attacks from 1943-1945.

The performance of the German Army in the Lorraine fighting around September 1944 was disgustingly poor. 111 and 112 Panzer Brigade fought badly by the standards of the British Army in 1941, making all the same mistakes of getting themselves impaled on enemy anti-tank guns and enemy tanks fighting from the reverse slopes of ridges, while attacking with complete disregard to the principles of combined arms.

The wider German Army then repeats the performance in the Ardennes two months later.
Sure by late 1944 the Germans had run out of quality manpower and were relying on poor quality conscripts with minimal training to combat veteran Allied divisions. They lost badly in maneuver battles especially where the Wallies controlled the skies with vast armadas of fighter-bombers. In the Ardennes the Germans actually fought pretty well and if we go by the work done by Christer Bergstrom they outfought the Allies until the skies cleared and air power cut off the supply lines. Of course if we were to critique the strategy/operational plan that goes back to Hitler's demands against the advice of his professional officers, which doomed the operation. That along with the serious failings of the Waffen-SS leadership that ran a large part of the operation.
 

Deleted member 1487

@wiking, yes that is what mean. :) The effects on the battlefield, regardless of the source, were the same.

The whole point I was trying to make, though, was my growing realization that idea of German tactical superiority really doesn't hold up. I am not trying to say the Allies were necessarily tactically superior and I still stand by my first post (a few pages back) that the Allies logistical advantages played a very large part in their eventual victory; just that even failing that logistical superiority the Allies still may have won.

IOW: brute force wasn't the sole factor.
Sure, despite the question of the OP Brute Force wasn't the sole factor by any stretch. The accumulating massive intelligence success of the Allies, including the Soviets, was pretty huge as well. Still, without the logistical advantages I don't see how the Allies could have sustained their forces in a way that would have enabled them to win with their OTL tactics/operational conduct. If they fought differently, that is better, then they would have done well, but the learning curve would have been much harsher.
 

Deleted member 1487

Kinda hard to fight when your primary source of material aid has cut you off.
ARVN had a shit ton of material left by the US. Plus they still had some air support. Aid was not cut off, just reduced by 30% financially, though rising world oil prices made using all that left over equipment expensive, though they had largely 300% more heavy weapons than the North. In the end the North was much more willing to fight to win than the Southern Army was.
 
ARVN had a shit ton of material left by the US.
Which they expended pretty quickly seeing as how they had to assume former US operations and a lot they simply weren't able to upkeep.

Aid was not cut off, just reduced by 30% financially,
In 1973 the US gave them 2.8 billion dollars worth of aid, in 1975 aid was capped at 300 million. That's not 30%, that's closer to 90%.

though they had largely 300% more heavy weapons than the North.
How much of that was actually operational? I know that their M48 fleet was suffering a chronic lack of spare parts parts and munitions at the time of the Spring Offensive.
 
Last edited:
Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force (larger manpower and industrial capability) as opposed to superior skill and fighting prowess?
<commence humorous tongue-in-cheek reply>
No.
I present as evidence Jack Churchill: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/7733516/Lieutenant-Colonel-Jack-Churchill.html
How many Axis troops fought with a claymore and longbow?
Clearly the Allies had the guy with most superior skill and fighting prowess on their side.
<conclude humorous tongue-in-cheek reply>
 
Sure by late 1944 the Germans had run out of quality manpower and were relying on poor quality conscripts with minimal training to combat veteran Allied divisions.

But the rot had started much earlier:

He is trying to attack me in daylight with tanks, followed by lorried infantry. I have 500 6pdr atk guns dug in...I have 400 tanks...good infantry...and a great weight of artillery. It is an absolute gift, and the man must be mad.
 
USA found how difficult it was to counterattack with towed AT guns, and those 88s were big targets, as were their prime movers.

Al Ghitar

, most of the Mk III were 37mm, With the J model the first to be delivered with the 50mm KwK 38 L42. After June 1941, E,F,G and H were regunned with 50mm guns as conditions permitted. Ther were maybe 800 50mm armed Mk III available for the invasion.

Enough to offset the defective T-34/76s. The rest with the 37s were sufficient to offset the usual BT or T-26.

The low vel 75mm not much good till HEAT production was ramped up for them in late 1941, on finding the first series Gr.38 Hl HEAT shell had real issues, as in not penetrating for their rated performance. Russia was their first combat use, having just missed France. The 'A' series used a steel liner that worked reliably, but no large numbers of that reached the Front till 1942

And yet to counter that example. the US Sherman/75 force in 44 with its own gun and ammunition not too dissimilar was able to handle PZKWIVs and a generous dollop of PZKWVs because their combined arms drill was what again? Good. German tanks were part of a system of systems. Bean counting should be built on systems not weapons platforms. How many KVs and T-34s received a mine slapped on the hull, a Molotov cocktail dropped on the vulnerable engine deck or was obstacle killed? Infantry killed thousands of Russian tanks during Barbarossa where the panzers were not there. Nobody has mentioned that, and yet that was the norm for the Germans. It was not just AT guns or tanks you know? And the Russians did a lot of unsupported tank attacks. That was their doctrine and practice.
 

Deleted member 1487

Which they expended pretty quickly seeing as how they had to assume former US operations or simply weren't able to upkeep.
I was referring to AFVs, aircraft, and artillery.

I was referencing the drop from 1974 to '75 which your link also confirms.

How much of that was actually operational? I know that their M48 fleet was suffering a chronic lack of spare parts parts and munitions at the time of the Spring Offensive.
Not clear, but a significant part of it wasn't due to lack of training and skill in maintenance by ARVN. But even operationally they should have had at least parity.
 
[QUOTE="wiking, post: 17906085, member: 1487"]Because while there are elements of truth in what you've said doesn't mean your point is correct or the facts are framed in an accurate way. The Pz III was vulnerable to just about all the AT weapons the Soviets had, especially the older models.[/quote]

THAT is not what I actually wrote. See below in bold.

About the tank vulnerability and defects side issue.

So what? At some point everybody is vulnerable to something. The trick is to maximize his and minimize yours.

Again the German tanks were just as vulnerable to the Soviets as vice versa and the Soviets had a lot of weapons to fight back with, they just did not fight effectually. I mean the Soviets have the 45mm AT gun, which aside from the Pz IV was good enough to kill the Pz III, plus Soviet AT rifles were so dangerous the Germans had to install the 'skirts' side armor to try and protect against them. The Soviets also had their 85mm FLAK guns, which they used to kill German tank at long ranges. That's not to mention their use of artillery as direct fire AT weapons.

See my previous remarks about skill and experience as force multipliers . This is not a my tank is better than your tank discussion and yet you won because you snowed me under with superior numbers discussion. This is a you know what you are doing until you don't and I finally beat you because I learned what you forgot discussion.
 
Last edited:
I was referring to AFVs, aircraft, and artillery.
Yeah and wartime operations chew through parts like no tomorrow.

I was referencing the drop from 1974 to '75 which your link also confirms.
Which was part of a larger trend in aid reduction and it's disingenuous to treat it as otherwise. The ARVN that collapsed against the Spring Offencive was operating on a tenth of the budget that the ARVN had when it threw back the Easter Offensive.

But even operationally they should have had at least parity.
And then we need to factor in the strategic missteps of its leadership in the lead up to and opening stages of the Spring Offensive (such as the chaos that the decision to abandon the Central Highlands caused), as well as the impossibly long frontier along which the ARVN had to defend. At which point the narrative that the South Vietnamese soldiers "simply lacked the will to fight" completely collapses.
 
Brute force can result in a pretty high body count for the winner. See the USSR in WW2. For that reason it is not exactly a faultless option. Similarly the attrition/material/firepower strategy can get real expensive, take a long time, and result in a lot of collateral/civilian damage/destruction. Which is why the post-Korea US military has emphasized maneuver warfare over their grinding attrition strategy of past wars.
Never claimed it was faultless, just that it’s a tool in a wider arsenal and not one that should be dismissed as lacking skill.
 
In 1975 it was the NVA vs. ARVN and ARVN was not willing to fight. The US had officially pulled out in March 1973. Fighting the US forces in the field got the NVA smashed repeatedly and cost them hundreds of thousands if not over 1 million lives. Information warfare is something else, what you're talking about is morale and propaganda. The NVA strategy was an attritional one, with a strong propaganda component, plus serious terrorism against anyone that disagreed with them. Their operations were actually pretty heavily maneuver oriented, but that is a different story compared to the main point that was the Iraq occupation conflict and the current Afghanistan war.

The NVA was willing to out-die the Americans. Part of that bitter calculus was information warfare. Propaganda and morale assault if you prefer; but the result is "getting in the mind of the enemy and imposing your will." That is Clauswitz and Sun Tzu.. It is as much force on force as winning a tank engagement, but more devastating because the mark of such a defeat when it is realized can last for decades. And it was a DEFEAT.
 

Deleted member 1487

The NVA was willing to out-die the Americans. Part of that bitter calculus was information warfare. Propaganda and morale assault if you prefer; but the result is "getting in the mind of the enemy and imposing your will." That is Clauswitz and Sun Tzu.. It is as much force on force as winning a tank engagement, but more devastating because the mark of such a defeat when it is realized can last for decades. And it was a DEFEAT.
What you're describing is attrition. The strategy was to grind out the enemy and one side broke first.
 
What you're describing is attrition. The strategy was to grind out the enemy and one side broke first.

No it is not. It is exactly what I told you. Attrition is killing off enough enemy soldiers until he runs out of replacements. An example is Verdun. The Americans had millions of men to fill their cohorts. What the point of decision the military leaders of North Vietnam wanted and chose was WALTER CRONKITE.
 

Deleted member 1487

No it is not. It is exactly what I told you. Attrition is killing off enough enemy soldiers until he runs out of replacements. An example is Verdun. The Americans had millions of men to fill their cohorts. What the point of decision the military leaders of North Vietnam wanted and chose was WALTER CRONKITE.
Attrition is also fighting until you break the will of the enemy to fight.
https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/attrition_warfare
Attrition Warfare. Attrition warfare is the term used to describe the sustained process of wearing down an opponent so as to force their physical collapse through continuous losses in personnel, equipment and supplies or to wear them down to such an extent that their will to fight collapses.
Cronkite didn't cost the Americans the war, nor was he 'chosen' by North Vietnam. He simply called the US government out for it's blatant lies that the war was basically won.
 
Top