Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force (larger manpower and industrial capability) as opposed to superior skill and fighting prowess?
Where do you put technological innovation here?
Because I think you'll find the Allies well ahead there, but perhaps you consider it part of the industrial bit.
In this context it means more than just tactical brute force, rather instead a strategic material and manpower overmatch that is used with regard for losses and tactical finesse. The John Ellis 'Brute Force' thesis.In the same way the Germans and Japanese used brute force, yes. Overwhelming material and numerical superiority at the key point of contact are just how things are done. The Germans won at Sedan by smashing a lone second-rate French infantry with three panzer divisions, with several more in echelon behind them, backed up by overwhelming air power.
In this context it means more than just tactical brute force, rather instead a strategic material and manpower overmatch that is used with regard for losses and tactical finesse. The John Ellis 'Brute Force' thesis.
How? If you strategically outnumber an opponent 2:1 you can keep your excess forces out of sight behind the lines and insert them as needed, especially if you've achieved air superiority based on numbers. Part of the Allied success in deception was being strong everywhere, so being able to attack where the enemy was weakening their forces to meet what they thought was the threat du jour. When you're outnumbered to start there is quite a bit more work to put in to maneuver.Achieving the requisite tactical superiority from strategic superiority still requires the sort of fancy maneuvering and finesse that the Germans practiced in 1940... or that the Soviets and WAllies practiced in 1944.
WW1 and 2 proves otherwise. You can simply bludgeon your way forward in a brutal battle of material and manpower.A strategic material and manpower overmatch means nothing without the tactical-operational finesse to apply it.
The Wallies substituted firepower for manpower...which got them at best a rough 1:1 casualty exchange until 1945. German methodology, which is to say the professional army, was to tolerate heavier losses initially to get a bigger gains down the road and reduce overall losses, which worked out in 1939-42. Initially the Germans did not have a tolerance for losses on the level of the Soviets, but as time went on Hitler certainly did; the Waffen SS apparently also were quite 1941 Soviet-like in their tactics throughout 1939-42. The Soviets also had a similar theory, but didn't manage to successfully modulate their losses relative to their opponent until 1945.Additionally the claim about losses is rather ass-backwards, at least when it comes to the WAllies: Anglo-American operations were extremely casualty conscious, especially the British, and frequently sacrificed the potential for greater gains because of it. Similarly, German methodology also required a distinct disregard for their losses. Again, Sedan: Guderian lost fully a third of his lead infantry regiment in a single day, a loss rate which would have horrified any American or British commander. Post-War mythmaking not withstanding, the Germans showed a willingness to grease the tracks of their tanks with the blood of their own soldiers equal to that of the Russians.
How? If you strategically outnumber an opponent 2:1 you can keep your excess forces out of sight behind the lines and insert them as needed, especially if you've achieved air superiority based on numbers. Part of the Allied success in deception was being strong everywhere, so being able to attack where the enemy was weakening their forces to meet what they thought was the threat du jour. When you're outnumbered to start there is quite a bit more work to put in to maneuver.
WW1 and 2 proves otherwise. You can simply bludgeon your way forward in a brutal battle of material and manpower.
The Wallies substituted firepower for manpower...which got them at best a rough 1:1 casualty exchange until 1945.
German methodology, which is to say the professional army, was to tolerate heavier losses initially to get a bigger gains down the road and reduce overall losses, which worked out in 1939-42.
As to what level of losses would have horrified Wallied commanders...they suffered losses like that and kept pressing things. Loss rates in Normandy exceeded the worst of WW1. British losses were so bad they had to disband divisions to keep the rest up to strength; Monty certainly had to be more loss conscious due to the manpower shortages the British army had as a result of their world commitments and massive air force.
Not in the military way, but in the industrial way. When you have a country that can produce a freighter from nothing to done in 2 weeks in multiple locations and is pumping out a brand new B-24 in a little more than 1 per hour, it's truly overwhelming.
Because you still need to maeneuver those forces and the required skill set and difficulty in doing so in no way changes. You still need fancy footwork just as much as when you outnumber the enemy then when you had equality or even. Maneuvering tank divisions in combat requires the skills to maneuver tank divisions in combat, and whether you have one or a dozen of them doesn’t affect that one jot. Similarly, the skills required does not change when you have less then the enemy.
What does change when you have numerical superiority is your margin-for-error. You can afford to make more mistakes, suffer the consequences, and still come back for another go. The inverse is true when operating at numerical inferiority. All being outnumbered or out numbering means is that you can’t or can afford to lose more. But being able to lose more (or less) is not the same thing as being able to win.
Except they don’t. An examination of the tactical-operational methods show that the side with manpower and material superiority did not simply bludgeon their way forward. Instead, they developed tactical and operational skills that allowed them to get things moving again and affect maeneuver warfare.
We do have examples of a war where the side with overwhelming manpower and material superiority was incapable of doing anything more then bludgeoning their way forward on the tactical-operational level, like the Iran-Iraq War. The result was that we never saw anything like Cobra or Bagration or even the Hundreds Days.
And the problem they ran into is that you need to do more then that. Firepower can damage and degrade the enemy, but to destroy him you have to move forward, storm his position, and hold them with manpower.
Which in the end required a willingness to accept casualties closer to that of the Soviets then the WAllies.
No, they did not suffer losses on the order of a third of their forces in a single day, save for where they suffered grievous defeats in the early war when the Germans would outnumber and outmaneuver them. The British disbandment of force’s toward the end of the war had nothing to do with the British (nonexistent) casualty intensive practices and more to do with the fact their manpower pool was so low that even their casualty-averse method of fighting had depleted them.
I'd relook at the numbers there. The Soviets had a 3:1 superiority over the Axis in the East in Summer 1942 and a slightly better than 3:1 superiority by November.QFT. Russians in southern front 1942 and Allies in southwest Pacific at the same time did not have material or numerical superiority at point of contact and went over to offense and won during the twin cries with "inferior" forces. It does take men with skill to use the tools provided. Otherwise, we would be speaking Japanese and German.
Sure, plus operations research, superior command and control, etc.Also was not the industrial capability not at least part down to superior skill in management, cf Germany industrial performance post war.