Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force?

  • Yes

    Votes: 97 27.2%
  • No

    Votes: 99 27.8%
  • To a degree

    Votes: 160 44.9%

  • Total voters
    356
Did the Allies win WW2 mostly due to brute force (larger manpower and industrial capability) as opposed to superior skill and fighting prowess?
 
Where do you put technological innovation here?

Because I think you'll find the Allies well ahead there, but perhaps you consider it part of the industrial bit.
 
Where do you put technological innovation here?

Because I think you'll find the Allies well ahead there, but perhaps you consider it part of the industrial bit.

Also was not the industrial capability not at least part down to superior skill in management, cf Germany industrial performance post war.
 

Anchises

Banned
Yes but that is not a "bad" thing. The tactical skills of the Wehrmacht made it fairly fragile and high casualties degraded capabilities fairly quick.

Superior firepower, better RnD and stronger economic muscle are the winning factors in a war.

The Wehrmacht approach only works in very specific circumstances.
 
Bit of both really. But it wasn't just BFI all the way. And when you say 'brute force' do you mean in battles, economic power? Tactics and strategy etc?
 
In the same way the Germans and Japanese used brute force, yes. Overwhelming material and numerical superiority at the key point of contact are just how things are done. The Germans won at Sedan by smashing a lone second-rate French infantry with three panzer divisions, with several more in echelon behind them, backed up by overwhelming air power.
 
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Not in the military way, but in the industrial way. When you have a country that can produce a freighter from nothing to done in 2 weeks in multiple locations and is pumping out a brand new B-24 in a little more than 1 per hour from one factory, it's truly overwhelming.
 
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Deleted member 1487

In the same way the Germans and Japanese used brute force, yes. Overwhelming material and numerical superiority at the key point of contact are just how things are done. The Germans won at Sedan by smashing a lone second-rate French infantry with three panzer divisions, with several more in echelon behind them, backed up by overwhelming air power.
In this context it means more than just tactical brute force, rather instead a strategic material and manpower overmatch that is used with regard for losses and tactical finesse. The John Ellis 'Brute Force' thesis.
 
In this context it means more than just tactical brute force, rather instead a strategic material and manpower overmatch that is used with regard for losses and tactical finesse. The John Ellis 'Brute Force' thesis.

Achieving the requisite tactical superiority from strategic superiority still requires the sort of fancy maneuvering and finesse that the Germans practiced in 1940... or that the Soviets and WAllies practiced in 1944. A strategic material and manpower overmatch means nothing without the tactical-operational finesse to apply it. Additionally the claim about losses is rather ass-backwards, at least when it comes to the WAllies: Anglo-American operations were extremely casualty conscious, especially the British, and frequently sacrificed the potential for greater gains because of it. Similarly, German methodology also required a distinct disregard for their losses. Again, Sedan: Guderian lost fully a third of his lead infantry regiment in a single day, a loss rate which would have horrified any American or British commander, being more then double what they’d consider enough to render a unit “combat-ineffective”. Post-War mythmaking not withstanding, the Germans showed a willingness to grease the tracks of their tanks with the blood of their own soldiers almost equal to that of the Russians.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Achieving the requisite tactical superiority from strategic superiority still requires the sort of fancy maneuvering and finesse that the Germans practiced in 1940... or that the Soviets and WAllies practiced in 1944.
How? If you strategically outnumber an opponent 2:1 you can keep your excess forces out of sight behind the lines and insert them as needed, especially if you've achieved air superiority based on numbers. Part of the Allied success in deception was being strong everywhere, so being able to attack where the enemy was weakening their forces to meet what they thought was the threat du jour. When you're outnumbered to start there is quite a bit more work to put in to maneuver.

A strategic material and manpower overmatch means nothing without the tactical-operational finesse to apply it.
WW1 and 2 proves otherwise. You can simply bludgeon your way forward in a brutal battle of material and manpower.

Additionally the claim about losses is rather ass-backwards, at least when it comes to the WAllies: Anglo-American operations were extremely casualty conscious, especially the British, and frequently sacrificed the potential for greater gains because of it. Similarly, German methodology also required a distinct disregard for their losses. Again, Sedan: Guderian lost fully a third of his lead infantry regiment in a single day, a loss rate which would have horrified any American or British commander. Post-War mythmaking not withstanding, the Germans showed a willingness to grease the tracks of their tanks with the blood of their own soldiers equal to that of the Russians.
The Wallies substituted firepower for manpower...which got them at best a rough 1:1 casualty exchange until 1945. German methodology, which is to say the professional army, was to tolerate heavier losses initially to get a bigger gains down the road and reduce overall losses, which worked out in 1939-42. Initially the Germans did not have a tolerance for losses on the level of the Soviets, but as time went on Hitler certainly did; the Waffen SS apparently also were quite 1941 Soviet-like in their tactics throughout 1939-42. The Soviets also had a similar theory, but didn't manage to successfully modulate their losses relative to their opponent until 1945.
As to what level of losses would have horrified Wallied commanders...they suffered losses like that and kept pressing things. Loss rates in Normandy exceeded the worst of WW1. British losses were so bad they had to disband divisions to keep the rest up to strength; Monty certainly had to be more loss conscious due to the manpower shortages the British army had as a result of their world commitments and massive air force.
 
The allies won because they had more stuff to build stuff with to give people stuff with there a reason wyto it called the resources war
 
How? If you strategically outnumber an opponent 2:1 you can keep your excess forces out of sight behind the lines and insert them as needed, especially if you've achieved air superiority based on numbers. Part of the Allied success in deception was being strong everywhere, so being able to attack where the enemy was weakening their forces to meet what they thought was the threat du jour. When you're outnumbered to start there is quite a bit more work to put in to maneuver.

Because you still need to maeneuver those forces and the required skill set and difficulty in doing so in no way changes. You still need fancy footwork just as much as when you outnumber the enemy then when you had equality or even. Maneuvering tank divisions in combat requires the skills to maneuver tank divisions in combat, and whether you have one or a dozen of them doesn’t affect that one jot. Similarly, the skills required does not change when you have less then the enemy.

What does change when you have numerical superiority is your margin-for-error. You can afford to make more mistakes, suffer the consequences, and still come back for another go. The inverse is true when operating at numerical inferiority. All being outnumbered or out numbering means is that you can’t or can afford to lose more. But being able to lose more (or less) is not the same thing as being able to win.

WW1 and 2 proves otherwise. You can simply bludgeon your way forward in a brutal battle of material and manpower.

Except they don’t. An examination of the tactical-operational methods show that the side with manpower and material superiority did not simply bludgeon their way forward. Instead, they developed tactical and operational skills that allowed them to get things moving again and affect maeneuver warfare.

We do have examples of a war where the side with overwhelming manpower and material superiority was incapable of doing anything more then bludgeoning their way forward on the tactical-operational level, like the Iran-Iraq War. The result was that we never saw anything like Cobra or Bagration or even the Hundreds Days.

The Wallies substituted firepower for manpower...which got them at best a rough 1:1 casualty exchange until 1945.

And the problem they ran into is that you need to do more then that. Firepower can damage and degrade the enemy, but to destroy him you have to move forward, storm his position, and hold them with manpower.

German methodology, which is to say the professional army, was to tolerate heavier losses initially to get a bigger gains down the road and reduce overall losses, which worked out in 1939-42.

Which in the end required a willingness to accept casualties closer to that of the Soviets then the WAllies.

As to what level of losses would have horrified Wallied commanders...they suffered losses like that and kept pressing things. Loss rates in Normandy exceeded the worst of WW1. British losses were so bad they had to disband divisions to keep the rest up to strength; Monty certainly had to be more loss conscious due to the manpower shortages the British army had as a result of their world commitments and massive air force.

No, they did not suffer losses on the order of a third of their forces in a single day, save for where they suffered grievous defeats in the early war when the Germans would outnumber and outmaneuver them. The British disbandment of force’s toward the end of the war had nothing to do with the British (nonexistent) casualty intensive practices and more to do with the fact their manpower pool was so low that even their casualty-averse method of fighting had depleted them.
 
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Did the Allies win by brute Force? To a degree yes. Out producing the Reich played a big part. Also being able to bring more firepower to bear doesn't hurt. But you also have to be able use the weapons produced at the point they are needed. One thing that burns my ass is the continual "if the Germans had built this, if the (insert aircraft/tank/small arms) had been fielded earlier, questions. Germany was doomed the moment they shoved the barricades aside at the Polish German border. The Allies, especially the Wallies will adapt tactically to overcome any of these. Equipping every infantry man in the Wermacht with a FG-42 only leads to the Wallies most likely employing more mobile heavy machineguns. Think Sherman infantry support vehicles with quad .50BMG's. Earlier Panther or Tiger tanks lead to a greater effectiveness of anti armor air. Earlier jets or piston aircraft powered by Jump 222 lead to a greater effort on the Allies to push aircraft performance. Any of these innovations may have lengthened the war somewhat only to see canned sunshine illuminate parts of the Reich.
 
Well, they certainly weren't the underdogs. If you were to count the British empire as a single combatant, then the allies outclassed the axis in all factors as far as I'm aware.
 
Not in the military way, but in the industrial way. When you have a country that can produce a freighter from nothing to done in 2 weeks in multiple locations and is pumping out a brand new B-24 in a little more than 1 per hour, it's truly overwhelming.


"During the conference I(Rommel) realized that the atmosphere in the Fuehrer's H.Q. was extremely optimistic. Goering in particular was inclined to minimize our difficulties. When I said that fighter-bombers (which Rommel thought were American made) had shot up my tanks with 40-mm shells, the Reichsmarschall, who felt himself touched by this, said: "That's completely impossible. The Americans only know how to make razor blades." I replied: "We could do with some of those razor blades, Herr Reichsmarschall."

1950 memoir of Erwin Rommel by DAK staff officer Fritz Bayerlein, War without Hatred
 
Because you still need to maeneuver those forces and the required skill set and difficulty in doing so in no way changes. You still need fancy footwork just as much as when you outnumber the enemy then when you had equality or even. Maneuvering tank divisions in combat requires the skills to maneuver tank divisions in combat, and whether you have one or a dozen of them doesn’t affect that one jot. Similarly, the skills required does not change when you have less then the enemy.

What does change when you have numerical superiority is your margin-for-error. You can afford to make more mistakes, suffer the consequences, and still come back for another go. The inverse is true when operating at numerical inferiority. All being outnumbered or out numbering means is that you can’t or can afford to lose more. But being able to lose more (or less) is not the same thing as being able to win.

Except they don’t. An examination of the tactical-operational methods show that the side with manpower and material superiority did not simply bludgeon their way forward. Instead, they developed tactical and operational skills that allowed them to get things moving again and affect maeneuver warfare.

We do have examples of a war where the side with overwhelming manpower and material superiority was incapable of doing anything more then bludgeoning their way forward on the tactical-operational level, like the Iran-Iraq War. The result was that we never saw anything like Cobra or Bagration or even the Hundreds Days.

And the problem they ran into is that you need to do more then that. Firepower can damage and degrade the enemy, but to destroy him you have to move forward, storm his position, and hold them with manpower.

Which in the end required a willingness to accept casualties closer to that of the Soviets then the WAllies.

No, they did not suffer losses on the order of a third of their forces in a single day, save for where they suffered grievous defeats in the early war when the Germans would outnumber and outmaneuver them. The British disbandment of force’s toward the end of the war had nothing to do with the British (nonexistent) casualty intensive practices and more to do with the fact their manpower pool was so low that even their casualty-averse method of fighting had depleted them.

QFT. Russians in southern front 1942 and Allies in southwest Pacific at the same time did not have material or numerical superiority at point of contact and went over to offense and won during the twin crises with "inferior" forces. It does take men with skill to use the tools provided. Otherwise, we would be speaking Japanese and German.
 

Deleted member 1487

QFT. Russians in southern front 1942 and Allies in southwest Pacific at the same time did not have material or numerical superiority at point of contact and went over to offense and won during the twin cries with "inferior" forces. It does take men with skill to use the tools provided. Otherwise, we would be speaking Japanese and German.
I'd relook at the numbers there. The Soviets had a 3:1 superiority over the Axis in the East in Summer 1942 and a slightly better than 3:1 superiority by November.
The US in 1942 got insanely ASB lucky at the battle of Midway, which seriously changed the naval paradigm in the Pacific for the rest of the war, while in the land fighting the Japanese were badly overstretched in the island campaigns. At Guadalcanal the Japanese were outnumbered 2:1 on the ground.

Edit:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Uranus
The Soviets heavily outnumbered and outgunned all combined Axis forces during Uranus, many of which were strangled for supplies and were suffering badly from the winter. For some reason the strength column includes Italian and Hungarians forces, which were not involved in Operation Uranus, which means that German-Romanian forces were at least outnumbered 2.5:1.
 
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Also was not the industrial capability not at least part down to superior skill in management, cf Germany industrial performance post war.
Sure, plus operations research, superior command and control, etc.

It's just it's a bit rich to accuse the side that invented nuclear power and weapons, penicillin, modern computers, the Double-Cross system, Enigma, the Dowding system, Mulberry harbours, etc., etc. of winning merely by "brute force."
 
Yes, definitely. The Western Allies won by a war of attrition. Does it matter? No, I don't think so, you don't win or lose a war by referee points. Does it matter in AH sense? Definitely. The Western Allies had multiple points of departure where the war could have been brought to a more swift end with less Western Allied and continental civilian casualties.

Or, let's put it in a different way: is there a plausible way in which Germany could have prolonged it's war toward the Western Allies further than 1946?
 
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