Did Russia blow several opportunities to capture Galicia?

ISTM that Russia blew several opportunities to capture Galicia during the 19th century. In addition to the possibility of doing this during the Napoleonic Wars, Russia had opportunities to capture Galicia in 1848-1849, 1866, and 1870. In 1848-1849, Russia could have demanded Galicia as a consolation prize for helping Austria crush the Hungarians--or alternatively supported Hungary back then and taken Galicia for itself. In 1866, Russia could have jumped on Austria together with Prussia and seized Galicia. In 1870, Russia could have attacked Austria when Prussia was busy fighting France.

ISTM that Russia lost several opportunities to acquire Galicia in the 19th century and thus allowed the Ukrainian nationalist movement to develop there. This ultimately culminated in Ukrainian nationalism spreading throughout all of Ukraine and in Ukraine permanently falling out of Russia's orbit. Meanwhile, had Russia captured Galicia in the 19th century, the people of Galicia might have become hardcore Russian nationalists rather than hardcore Ukrainian nationalists.

Do you agree with my analysis of this?
 
Do you agree with my analysis of this?

In the sense that they had the possability of taking the region? Yes. In the sense that it made sense for them to? No. First off, there's the diplomatic balance issue; Russia was already expanding rather faster than the rest of Europe was entirely comfortable with, and expanding at the expense of Austria which was largely considered a vital piller (by everybody) to maintaining a geopolitical balance of power in both eastern and Central Europe is liable to turn them into an international pariah. That means more strategically-desired routes of expansion (Moves towards the Straits, expansion into Asia, ect.), which produce far more profits and would be easier to hold/defend, are bound to be more powerfully resisted, which is to Russia's net lose. There's also the ideological angle; Russia was the "gendarme of Europe" for much of this period and considered itself a champion of international order/conservatism (especially in 48'). Undermining that principal for momentary gain; the idea of the legitimacy of thrones and territory shoulden't be arbitrarily seized just because "I want it and I'm strong enough"; at least from other members of the "Consort of Europe", puts the Throne at risk in the medium-long term (As Russia is keenly aware) especially since she often experianced unrest on her own periphery. Thirdly, you mention the Hungarians who a perfect example of this prinicipal; its actually easier to assimilate populations and undermine nationalists movements the more you splinter an ethnicity and prevent communities from contacting/supporting one another; not only because it reduced the amount of self-supporting interactions they have (They're forced to interact more/conduct bussiness more with the hegemonic culture, so learn its language, practice its customs, ect. in order to get ahead which feeds into assimilation) and the ability of the intelligencia to work off each other's ideas and circulate their works (which raise/renforce the consciousness of the community as "separate and special"), but allows you to share the burden by giving other states motivation to crack down on their identity as well (As opposed to supporting it if they're you're rival). Annexing Gallicia woulden't only combine the Ukranians, but also bring most of the Poles into one border... and the Poles had a robust national identity that's hostile to the Russians already. Russia would be turning her entire Western frontier into a tinderbox of self-concious seperatists... exactly while its alienating the rest of Europe who see convenient allies in limiting the threat of Russian hegemony...
 
In the sense that they had the possability of taking the region? Yes. In the sense that it made sense for them to? No. First off, there's the diplomatic balance issue; Russia was already expanding rather faster than the rest of Europe was entirely comfortable with, and expanding at the expense of Austria which was largely considered a vital piller (by everybody) to maintaining a geopolitical balance of power in both eastern and Central Europe is liable to turn them into an international pariah. That means more strategically-desired routes of expansion (Moves towards the Straits, expansion into Asia, ect.), which produce far more profits and would be easier to hold/defend, are bound to be more powerfully resisted, which is to Russia's net lose.

The Straits are much harder--not easier--than Galicia to defend, though.

There's also the ideological angle; Russia was the "gendarme of Europe" for much of this period and considered itself a champion of international order/conservatism (especially in 48'). Undermining that principal for momentary gain; the idea of the legitimacy of thrones and territory shoulden't be arbitrarily seized just because "I want it and I'm strong enough"; at least from other members of the "Consort of Europe", puts the Throne at risk in the medium-long term (As Russia is keenly aware) especially since she often experianced unrest on her own periphery.

What's interesting is that Russia had no problem allying with republican France in the late 1800s and early 1900s. This shows that Russia was primarily concerned about one thing--Russia's own interests (rather than any principles of morality involving Russia being an international champion of conservatism).

If Russia is going to perform services for countries such as Austria and Prussia, it should expect to receive a territorial reward.

Thirdly, you mention the Hungarians who a perfect example of this prinicipal; its actually easier to assimilate populations and undermine nationalists movements the more you splinter an ethnicity and prevent communities from contacting/supporting one another; not only because it reduced the amount of self-supporting interactions they have (They're forced to interact more/conduct bussiness more with the hegemonic culture, so learn its language, practice its customs, ect. in order to get ahead which feeds into assimilation) and the ability of the intelligencia to work off each other's ideas and circulate their works (which raise/renforce the consciousness of the community as "separate and special"), but allows you to share the burden by giving other states motivation to crack down on their identity as well (As opposed to supporting it if they're you're rival). Annexing Gallicia woulden't only combine the Ukranians, but also bring most of the Poles into one border... and the Poles had a robust national identity that's hostile to the Russians already. Russia would be turning her entire Western frontier into a tinderbox of self-concious seperatists... exactly while its alienating the rest of Europe who see convenient allies in limiting the threat of Russian hegemony...

So, you're saying that it's easier to assimilate minorities when they are separated from each other? If so, that's an argument against Russia annexing, for instance, Ottoman Armenia or Iranian Azerbaijan, no?
 
The Straits are much harder--not easier--than Galicia to defend, though.



What's interesting is that Russia had no problem allying with republican France in the late 1800s and early 1900s. This shows that Russia was primarily concerned about one thing--Russia's own interests (rather than any principles of morality involving Russia being an international champion of conservatism).

If Russia is going to perform services for countries such as Austria and Prussia, it should expect to receive a territorial reward.



So, you're saying that it's easier to assimilate minorities when they are separated from each other? If so, that's an argument against Russia annexing, for instance, Ottoman Armenia or Iranian Azerbaijan, no?

1. The Straits have huge prestige, economic, and strategic value. And they are indeed easy to defend considering you can mainly do so navally and there'd be no strong polity nearby on land to contest you (The Straits are only going to be Russian in the event of Ottoman collapse out of even secondary power status). In addition, you've now made the Black Sea a Russian lake, so even if you have to invest in fortifying the Straits you get a net savings by not having to spend on defending anything behind them.

2. Different periods: all the examples you cited are well before the 1880's and the start of the Russian realignment, which happens long after the old era of Balance of Power is dead and buried and Bismarkian Realpolitik has become the order of the day. Geopolitics can shift quite a bit during those decades.

3. Yes
 
They never even tried - had they managed to take the effort to disrupt the Reconquista (and drive the Escorial nuts), I'm sure someth . . .

. . . oh, right. That Galicia, not the other one. :eek: (And the wrong time period, too!) Says something when I look at that thread title and get a double-take.

In all honesty, no I don't think they didn't. Even in the 19th century the state of Tsarist Russia was such that they couldn't have been able to get, well, that territory even if they wanted to.
 
By taking Galizia Russians would increase number of Poles within their borders and at the same time Habsburgs, after losing their bit of Polish lands, would be totally free to support Polish irredentism.
 
According to Kurtz, Empress Eugenie raised with Tsar Alexander II the possibility of various revisions of European borders, including the transfer of Galicia to Russia. Alexander politely declined, saying that the division of Poland was à trois and should remain so. Evidently he felt he already had as many Poles (and Jews?) in his dominions as he could manage.
 
In the sense that they had the possability of taking the region? Yes. In the sense that it made sense for them to? No. First off, there's the diplomatic balance issue; Russia was already expanding rather faster than the rest of Europe was entirely comfortable with, and expanding at the expense of Austria which was largely considered a vital piller (by everybody) to maintaining a geopolitical balance of power in both eastern and Central Europe is liable to turn them into an international pariah. That means more strategically-desired routes of expansion (Moves towards the Straits, expansion into Asia, ect.), which produce far more profits and would be easier to hold/defend, are bound to be more powerfully resisted, which is to Russia's net lose. There's also the ideological angle; Russia was the "gendarme of Europe" for much of this period and considered itself a champion of international order/conservatism (especially in 48'). Undermining that principal for momentary gain; the idea of the legitimacy of thrones and territory shoulden't be arbitrarily seized just because "I want it and I'm strong enough"; at least from other members of the "Consort of Europe", puts the Throne at risk in the medium-long term (As Russia is keenly aware) especially since she often experianced unrest on her own periphery. Thirdly, you mention the Hungarians who a perfect example of this prinicipal; its actually easier to assimilate populations and undermine nationalists movements the more you splinter an ethnicity and prevent communities from contacting/supporting one another; not only because it reduced the amount of self-supporting interactions they have (They're forced to interact more/conduct bussiness more with the hegemonic culture, so learn its language, practice its customs, ect. in order to get ahead which feeds into assimilation) and the ability of the intelligencia to work off each other's ideas and circulate their works (which raise/renforce the consciousness of the community as "separate and special"), but allows you to share the burden by giving other states motivation to crack down on their identity as well (As opposed to supporting it if they're you're rival). Annexing Gallicia woulden't only combine the Ukranians, but also bring most of the Poles into one border... and the Poles had a robust national identity that's hostile to the Russians already. Russia would be turning her entire Western frontier into a tinderbox of self-concious seperatists... exactly while its alienating the rest of Europe who see convenient allies in limiting the threat of Russian hegemony...

Very well put. One should remember that the Polish 1863 uprising did cause the Russians quite some problems and that the French and British made enough of a noise about going to war with Russia over the issue of Polish independence for Russia to send part of her fleet to the US in a "naval visit" to keep it from being locked into the Baltic Sea. A second Crimean War is entirely possible of the Polish revolt is worse (with the added resources of Galizia) and Russia is viewed as more aggressive and a threat to stability.

Another option is a more extrensive Crimean War - if the Russians have taken Galizia 1848, the pan-Europan anti-Russian alliance that Sweden percieved during the Crimean War to permanently push Russia back could happen - Austria would want Galizia back, and could join. Prussia and the German Confederation might join to not be seen as weaker and less war-like than Austria, and Sweden would join if Austria and Prussia do.

A more aggressive Russia may be seen as more of a threat, which could cause the British (and perhaps the French) and the Austrians to support the Ottomans 1877.

There's plenty of times the Russian gain of Galizia could be reversed during the 19th century - this is an era when the conservative Russian military leadership consistently had Russia be half or a full generation behind on the latest military development. They used Napoleonic tactics and smoothbore muskets during the Crimean War. The Berdan rifles used 1877-78 did not have long-range sights, and there were only enough rifles to equip the first line forces - 3/4 of the troops in Russia had muzzle-loaded rifles or breechloaders converted from muzzle-loaders. There were even quite a few smoothbore muskets still in service. They used volley fire during the Russo-Japanese War.

Being aggressive in Europe invites a general Europan pile-up on Russia, which Russia is ill equipped to handle during this era, as the Crimean War and the Russo-Japanese War as well as ww1 showed.
 
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