Did Pres. Truman fire MacArthur because of “military defeats”? (like Wikipedia says)

My conclusion: MacArthur was correct to call for atomic weapons vs the Chinese. And Truman was a moralizing idiot whose dithering first lost China to an ideology worse than Nazism, then let them set up a puppet state in NK.
It was not just Truman that opposed MacArthur's plan.
Omar Bradley, the chairman of the joint chiefs, flatly rejected MacArthur’s call for a wider war. “In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy,” he said.

Democrat Harry Byrd of Virginia asked Omar Bradley about Russian strength in the vicinity of Manchuria and North Korea. Bradley responded forthrightly, “There are 35 Russian divisions in the Far East. Nine of them are in the Vladivostok area; four in the Port Arthur-Dairen area; three in Sakhalin; two in the Kurile Islands; one near Kamchatka; and 16 others scattered along the railway from Lake Baikal on east.”

“About 500,000 in all?” asked Byrd.

“Thirty-five divisions, plus supporting troops, run probably something like 500,000 or more,” Bradley replied.
(...)
Bradley answered: “Should Russia come in with this army strength, her naval strength, which is quite strong in submarines, and her air power, which is quite strong in the Far East—if she should come in with all of those, we might have a hard time supplying our troops in Korea and would even, under certain circumstances, have difficulty evacuating them.”

Other excised testimony revealed a fundamental reason for the administration’s reluctance to escalate in northeast Asia: There was precious little for the United States to escalate with. American air power, in particular, was stretched very thin. Hoyt Vandenberg, the Air Force chief of staff, told the committee that Korea was already claiming a large part of America’s available air strength. “The Air Force part that is engaged in Korea is roughly 85 percent—80 to 85 percent—of the tactical capacity of the United States,” he said. “The strategic portion, which is used tactically, is roughly between one-fourth and one-fifth. The air defense forces are, I would judge, about 20 percent.”
(...)
“The air force of the United States, as I have said, is really a shoestring air force.” Vandenberg had used the phrase in open testimony; now he provided details. One small, intrinsically insignificant country—Korea—was absorbing an alarming portion of America’s air resources. “These groups that we have over there now doing this tactical job are really about a fourth of our total effort that we could muster today.” To escalate against China, even if only from the air, would be reckless in the extreme. “Four times that amount of groups in that area over that vast expanse of China would be a drop in the bucket.”
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/hist...ns-why-general-macarthur-was-fired-180960622/
 

A. Danov

Banned
Sure the Soviets had a lot of conventional strength in the Far East.

And I just don't think it's plausible that Stalin would have sent them into the US's atomic meatgrinder, especially right after watching the Chinese troops evaporate.
 
Personally, I like MacArthur.

As for "nuclear Armaggeddon" ...not even close. We're talking about April 1951. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_nuclear_weapons_stockpiles_and_nuclear_tests_by_country

299 US vs 5 Soviet as of 1950. Not even a fight.

China had no nuclear weapons, and Stalin would never have exposed the Motherland to American A-bombs for the benefit of the Koreans and Chinese. And even if he went full stupid and did, The USSR's ability to deliver nuclear weapons to anywhere outside Eurasia was effectively nil at the time.

Stalin knew this, and he knew that the price for "communist brotherhood in the face of capitalist aggression" (or whatever nonsense he would have said) would have been a glow-in-the-dark USSR.

My conclusion: MacArthur was correct to call for atomic weapons vs the Chinese. And Truman was a moralizing idiot whose dithering first lost China to an ideology worse than Nazism, then let them set up a puppet state in NK.
It would also have set a precedent. It would have smothered the Nuclear Taboo in its infancy, rendering the nukes as Yet Another Weapon of War - albeit one with staggering consequences. Liberal use of nuclear weaponry would have been the norm, rather than just the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviets would "owe" the Americans a nuke, basically nuking one of the USA's clients in future as payback in a future conflict.

Furthermore, once China got its own nuclear arsenal, it'll be very eager to pay American back in spades. Yes, Mao was a nutjob who didn't mind the consequences of nuclear warfare (he probably didn't understand the scale of the damage a nuclear exchange can inflict, but he probably didn't care), but the next Chinese leader would still have a serious bone to pick with the US over the devastation of Manchuria, formerly one of China's most prosperous territories.

One of the reasons the Vietnamese were so reluctant to negotiate with Nixon in the 1970s was because he supported a proposal by the French that the Vietnamese rebels be hit with American nukes. Eisenhower (who was president at the time) and the British thought it was a horrible idea, and nixed it. And yet it eventually came out, making the Vietnamese hold a grudge against the man who pushed hard to get them nuked while they were fighting French colonial occupation. By that token, the Chinese would be extremely reluctant to accept the olive branch that Nixon offered them in 1979, because the US had used nukes and killed millions of people in the scenario you propose. The detente would never have happened, and we'd have a more hostile China.

Imagine the Cuban Missile Crisis with the USA already having used nukes. It would less be two guys talking each other into lowering their guns down and talking like sensible people, and more like one guy trying to talk a mafia killer into not pulling the trigger. The impetus would not be on reducing tensions, but getting a first strike in because the other guys clearly has no qualms about firing the nuclear gun when it suits him. Better to score some damage while we can, because he'll certainly try to annihilate us.

Also, MacArthur's problem was not that he demanded to use nukes and Truman denied him, but that the General, a member of the United States' Armed Forces went back behind Truman's back to appeal to the American people, basically going above his head and trying to subvert the chain of command. Popular general or not, correct decision on China or not, that was a fucking coup, a blow against the very jurisdiction and authority of the President, and one that resulted in a much-deserved dismissal.

Was Truman too much of a coward to use nukes? Probably, but I disagree; using nukes would have set a horrible precedent. But there is something called "obeying orders" and "being a good soldier", and MacArthur clearly failed at that, his own ego deciding he was the only one that mattered.
The atomic bombs would've turned southern Manchuria into a nuclear wasteland on par with Chernobyl, which would've begun affecting the local environments of both China and a newly-united Korea. Radiation tends to spread over a long period of time.
Plus, this. While 50 nukes in the 100-kT range wouldn't have been that devastating, there's still going to be plenty of radiation, plus any city, population center or industrial complex hit by one will be utterly devastated, thousands killed (with a high chance of massive civilian casualties). It'll be used as anti-American propaganda forever, especially since there have been exactly two countries nuked, both of which were Far Eastern, which can be easily construed as racist/imperialist intent.
 
Sure the Soviets had a lot of conventional strength in the Far East.

And I just don't think it's plausible that Stalin would have sent them into the US's atomic meatgrinder, . . .
Probably not.

But how about the argument that we lose a fair measure of credibility with people of third world nations we’re trying to win over to our side?

To me, we come across looking like a bully, and that’s not good for our cause.
 
It says "Following a series of major defeats...", not "Because of a series of major defeat..."

Which is entirely correct, if not comprehensive. But this is only the intro para. The actual body of the article goes into detail on the affair, and makes it clear that Macarthur's insubordination was the decisive factor.

So Wiki is not wrong.
Okay, so Wikipedia is not wrong, merely misleading. Which in my universe is even worse.

Wikipedia is reasonable good at some things, but not others.
 
AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE


AIR UNIVERSITY





THE REVOLT OF THE ADMIRALS


by Andrew L. Lewis, LCDR, USN





A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/98-166.pdf

' . . . The testimony before the House of Representatives by senior military personnel, and specifically senior officials from the Navy, during October 1949 sent a shock wave through the entire country. The United States Air Force "won" the debate known as the "revolt of the admirals." . . . '
The Navy's proposed aircraft carrier was not reinstated, whereas he Air Force did get their proposed plane the B-36 bomber. And even the Naval air power demonstrated during the Korean conflict was considered an exception until Vietnam.

Basically, the Navy lost the "Revolt of the Admirals."

-----------------------------

Yes, I know this is someone's thesis. And he's likely favorably predisposed to the Air Force as illustrated simply by virtue of fact that he joined the Air Force, and has also been exposed to pro-Air Force viewpoints, etc. But at 39 pages, it's about the right length. And I think the guy really tries to find good references, and largely succeeds.

Later edit: @RanulfC points out that USN means U.S. Navy! Yes, thank you, even though Lewis studied at Air University, he was a Navy man. And his case can be summarized that even though the Navy's case had the better merits, it lost due to crummier PR.
 
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The Navy's proposed aircraft carrier was not reinstated, whereas he Air Force did get their proposed plane the B-36 bomber. And even the Naval air power demonstrated during the Korean conflict was considered an exception until Vietnam.

Basically, the Navy lost the "Revolt of the Admirals."

While the USN did lose the "Revolt of the Admirals" the Korean war showed a VERY large flaw in Truman's thinking and that more than anything pretty much guaranteed he'd lose the upcoming election. Not only was the US Army and Navy found wanting as things in Korea shook out even the Air Force made it clear that they had been dangerously under funded and supported. This didn't get swept under the rug again even as the inter-service conflict reared up again after Korea. Really only the focus and scope changed as the military fought to control the NEXT frontier of conflict which was space. (And despite Eisenhower's nod to the Navy for Vanguard everyone understood the actual conflict in this case was between the Army and Air Force)

-----------------------------

Yes, I know this is someone's thesis. And he's likely favorably predisposed to the Air Force as illustrated simply by virtue of fact that he joined the Air Force, and has also been exposed to pro-Air Force viewpoints, etc. But at 39 pages, it's about the right length. And I think the guy really tries to find good references, and largely succeeds.

Ehm, "LCRD" is Lieutenant Commander, a Navy rank and USN means "United States Navy" so I doubt he's going to "buy" the Air Force version despite it being hosted at the Air War Collage and Air Command Collage. (Point of fact a quick read tells me he IS taking the Navy handling to task due to their failure to prepare or support a valid PR campaign whereas the Air Force did do so but as well he notes the Air Force was not the "good guys" here and they screwed up by the number in both the aftermath and follow through that led into Korea)

Good read and I'd back that up with the the following article:
https://www.theatlantic.com/politic...-prosecution-that-lost-the-space-race/495659/

Which shows just how badly the Air Force messed up the aftermath. Eisenhower in his desire to have a 'budget' defense was just as flawed as Truman had been before him and for many of the same reasons.

Randy
 
A. Danov wrote:
Personally, I like MacArthur.

We all have our unpopular opinions ;) Seriously there were actually some things to like about the man. He didn’t come up with Inchon but he had the guts to listen to the guy who did despite what his advisers said. But in his case the ‘bad’ really does out match the ‘good’ and he was in uniform and power much longer than he should have been.

As for "nuclear Armaggeddon" ...not even close. We're talking about April 1951. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_nuclear_weapons_stockpiles_and_nuclear_tests_by_country

299 US vs 5 Soviet as of 1950. Not even a fight.

Just so we’re clear you DO understand that of those 299 weapons a bit over 100 of them were air deliverable nuclear bombs. Mac wanted HALF the current stockpile and he wanted anywhere from 10 to 20 ‘spares’ on standby. Note this is in an area where it was only possible to properly store about 10 to 15 in total and there were only 10 nuclear capable bombers in Japan and SAC was NOT going to release anymore because by the summer of 1950 it was unlikely they would survive to target. (Mig-15s were shooting down dozens of B-29s per sortie a lone B-29 stood no chance)

China had no nuclear weapons, and Stalin would never have exposed the Motherland to American A-bombs for the benefit of the Koreans and Chinese. And even if he went full stupid and did, The USSR's ability to deliver nuclear weapons to anywhere outside Eurasia was effectively nil at the time.

Stalin actually deployed his nuclear capable bombers to the Far East and let the US know he had done so. (A bluff but an effective one since he only needed to HIT Eurasia and not the American heartland to ‘win’ and everyone knew it) Stalin was likely more aware of America’s shortcoming in a general way than the average American civilian at the time.

Stalin knew this, and he knew that the price for "communist brotherhood in the face of capitalist aggression" (or whatever nonsense he would have said) would have been a glow-in-the-dark USSR.

Isn’t hindsight such a wonderful way to accurately get into someone’s mind who is actually living in the moment? No? Well very much NO actually since Stalin could plainly see that American B-29s were vulnerable to the Mig-15 and deploying his bombers to the east and letting the American’s know he had countered the 10 nuclear bombers the Americans had in the area. So no, he had no reasonable expectation that supporting China and Korea would endanger the motherland. In fact IF the US had gone nuclear he’d have had no choice as the most ‘obvious’ reason for them to do so was that they WERE coming after the motherland in any case so why hold back?

And that means going after the REAL prize and taking Europe while the US and Allies back is turned because you know where a good portion of those troops on the ground or heading to Korea were from right?

My conclusion
: MacArthur was correct to call for atomic weapons vs the Chinese. And Truman was a moralizing idiot whose dithering first lost China to an ideology worse than Nazism, then let them set up a puppet state in NK.

Your conclusion appears to have been drawn from false assumptions and a lack of understanding of the time. China was lost by FDR and the lack of Chinese leadership, not because Truman screwed them over. MacArthur had a long track record of believing his own press and relying on “knowledge” he in fact did not have and he got caught with his pants down multiple times due to that alone.

MacArthur didn’t actually understand politics or diplomacy and this is why he would never have a post-war political career. Because he did not see Russian troops on the front lines he believed that the Chinese had no support from Russia. Keep in mind this was the same logic he used to ‘show’ that the Chinese would not intervene because they hadn’t yet. Yet the evidence of material and likely technical support was clear. So despite knowing that using atomic weapons would be a major escalation of the conflict with DIRECT threat of Russian retaliation or intervention he continued to press for the release of atomic weapons when it was ALSO clear that getting those weapons to target was questionable at best.

And keep in mind this was again pretty well understood at the time as even the Allies were adamant about NOT escalating the war because it could and would spill over into Europe. So with all that, and MacArthur still insistent that “he” needed to escalate to nuclear weapons to push the Chinese back. Then continues to push this option despite being told to shut it down not only by his Commander in Chief but everyone in his chain of command, his allies and his advisers it does not look like MacArthur was “correct” at all. Especially since It was clear it would neither be a knock out blow or even a viable option considering the difficulties and drawbacks

I’m also going to call out your assertion that North Korea was ever a “puppet” state of China since it actually had closer ties to the USSR, (much to China’s annoyance) and was never more than ‘influenced’ by China to the present day.

Truman, not Mac was "right" in this case and even Eisenhower was of the opinion that Mac had stepped over the line WAY to far. (To be clear, faced with the same situation and same responses from MacArthur, Ike would have had him thrown in Leavenworth rather than retired as shooting him would have been a waste of a perfectly good bullet)

Randy
 
@RanulfC I think there was a marsupial relationship between MacArthur and the individual “journalists” (cough, cough!) covering him. They wanted juicy quotes and MacArthur was happy to oblige them.

And also on the part of just us the regular citizens. We wanted a certain kind of hero and were more than willing to kludgeware him into being!
 
Just so we’re clear you DO understand that of those 299 weapons a bit over 100 of them were air deliverable nuclear bombs. Mac wanted HALF the current stockpile and he wanted anywhere from 10 to 20 ‘spares’ on standby. Note this is in an area where it was only possible to properly store about 10 to 15 in total and there were only 10 nuclear capable bombers in Japan and SAC was NOT going to release anymore because by the summer of 1950 it was unlikely they would survive to target. (Mig-15s were shooting down dozens of B-29s per sortie a lone B-29 stood no chance)

During the late 40s/50s period wasn’t Kim Philby supplying Stalin with accurate assessments of the US nuclear capabilities and intentions? I don’t know if Stalin shared this knowledge with Mao, but Mao sure didn’t seem worried about it. It could be construed that if MacArthur was given a green light to use nuclear weapons (given US capabilities to so), Stalin would have known and reacted. Perhaps as simple as ramping up NK air defenses (re North Vietnam), to possibly more aggressive acts in Eastern Europe. Just applying counter pressure to keep the US on the back foot.

Ric350
 
Okay, so Wikipedia is not wrong, merely misleading. Which in my universe is even worse.

Wikipedia is reasonable good at some things, but not others.
I would even take a step further back. The major defeats were the setting that explains how the conflict could exist. The major defeats were the trigger for MacArthur to act.
 
(Mig-15s were shooting down dozens of B-29s per sortie a lone B-29 stood no chance)
B-29s flew over 21,000 sorties during the War, with 16 shot down by fighters over the three years.

That's around 1 loss every 1300 sorties.

B-29 gunners had 34 aircraft kills over the same period, and 16 were MiG-15
 
B-29s flew over 21,000 sorties during the War, with 16 shot down by fighters over the three years.

Excluding aircraft which were so badly damaged they had to be scrapped after they RTB'd. Of course, even the relatively low loss rates had to do with the Air Force curtailing operations where the MiG-15s were operating in large numbers, as casualties there were unsustainable. An expansion of operations into even more hostile areas would undoubtedly see losses heavily skyrocket.

B-29 gunners had 34 aircraft kills over the same period, and 16 were MiG-15

As per The Last War of the Superfortresses, Soviet records give no confirmed kills of MiG-15s by B-29s, although there were 5 cases where it was deemed possible.
 
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Excluding aircraft which were so badly damaged they had to be scrapped after they RTB'd. Of course, even the relatively low loss rates had to do with the Air Force curtailing operations where the MiG-15s were operating in large numbers, as casualties there were unsustainable. An expansion of operations into even more hostile areas would undoubtedly see losses heavily skyrocket.



As per The Last War of the Superfortresses, Soviet records give no confirmed kills of MiG-15s by B-29s, although there were 5 cases where it was deemed possible.
Soviet records also claimed 1300 UN aircraft of all types were shot down, 650 of them the F-86, so one wonders how much pencilwhipping was going on with the Soviet side. USAF loses can be determined by serial number, those records are open.
Unlike previous conflicts, B-29s had gun cameras in the sighting stations, so it's not the same overclaiming that side gunners reported from B-17s
 
Soviet records also claimed 1300 UN aircraft of all types were shot down, 650 of them the F-86, so one wonders how much pencilwhipping was going on with the Soviet side. USAF loses can be determined by serial number, those records are open.

That the Soviets overclaimed kills is not unusual, it's a pretty universal phenomenonal, and happened amongst the USAF as well, which overall overclaimed by about 8 times the actual number of aircraft that the Communists lost. Air historians have long ago realized that mid-20th century kill claims are simply not worth the paper their printed on unless it's confirmed by the other guys loss records, so in the end it's the other guys loss records you want to look at. And Soviet records have also been open since the 90s, although they haven't been digitized and rendered into English, so you have to physically go there and make requests with either knowledge of the Russian language or an interpreter to help out.

In any case, as you so neatly pointed out, we have USAF records on the write-off figures, which are listed separately from those lost while in the air: those show 48 bombers as written off due to combat damage or crash landings after returning to base as well as the 16 lost in the air to Soviet MiGs, another 4 to AAA, and 14 to "other causes" (which sounds to me like operational losses, such as mechanical failure, although it's also possible some of those may have been induced by previous damage sustained so... eh). The only uncertainty there is how many of the write-offs were due to "crash landings" instead of damage to aircraft. Assuming the same proportion as that of outright combat losses to operational ones in the air (just under 59%), it'd be in the range of 25-30 aircraft.

And again, this all occurred under vastly more favorable strategic conditions then the B-29 raids into Manchuria would have.

Unlike previous conflicts, B-29s had gun cameras in the sighting stations, so it's not the same overclaiming that side gunners reported from B-17s

No, it is. Gun cams were used in WW2 as well and didn't make a lot of difference. The cameras would fundamentally only see the same thing the bombercrew see's: an aircraft attacking the bomber which abruptly breaks down in a hard dive. Since a hard break downward was the standard disengage for fighters against bombers, the problem this makes in regard to kill claims is rather obvious and almost the exact same as those from gunners in WW2. It's worth noting that Soviet fighters were also equipped with guncams, yet they still wound up with the kill claim figures you noted, so obviously gun cams never solved the overclaiming issue.
 
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During the late 40s/50s period wasn’t Kim Philby supplying Stalin with accurate assessments of the US nuclear capabilities and intentions? . . .
I’m sure you’ve heard that seasoned poker players often have a hard time reading newbies. Because even though newbies are giving off plenty of tells, the newby himself or herself isn’t a good judge of how likely a wide range of middle hands are of winning.

And I’ll grant that Kim Philby was a seasoned operator.

But there’s still going to be some degree of doubt on the Soviet side that he might be a double agent afterall. In addition, the Soviets don’t want to be too obvious in using his information and thereby burn him. And with Kim himself, there’s going to be some doubt in the back of his mind about whether his own agency (MI-5 or MI-6) is feeding him unique “info” that will expose him if he passes all of it on.
 
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I’m sure you’ve heard that seasoned poker players often have s hard time reading newbies. Because even though newbies are giving off plenty of tells, the new you himself or herself isn’t a good judge of how likely a wide range of hands in the middle are to win.

And I’ll grant that Kim Philby was a seasoned operator.

But there’s still going to be some degree of doubt on the Soviet side that he might be a double agent afterall. In addition, the Soviets don’t want to be too obvious in using his information and thus burn him. And with Kim himself, there’s going to be some doubt in the back of his mind about whether his own agency (M-5 or M-6) is feeding him unique “info” that will expose him if he passes all of it on.

Based on statements made in their private conversations and correspondences, Soviet leaderships knowledge on the quantity of American nukes in the late-40s and early-50s can be described as “rough, but accurate”. They never used specific numbers, but instead talked in approximates. As an example, Malenkov mentioned to a subordinate that the Americans had "around a dozen" atom bombs in 1947 (the US had 13) and Khruschev wrote the US had "several hundred" in 1950. So it seems that while the Soviet picture of the American stockpile wasn't perfect, it was still pretty good.
 
@RanulfC I think there was a marsupial relationship between MacArthur and the individual “journalists” (cough, cough!) covering him. They wanted juicy quotes and MacArthur was happy to oblige them.

And also on the part of just us the regular citizens. We wanted a certain kind of hero and were more than willing to kludgeware him into being!

No doubt, we needed a hero and he was more than willing to take the job. The problem was he managed to botch it in the end by believing his own press :)

During the late 40s/50s period wasn’t Kim Philby supplying Stalin with accurate assessments of the US nuclear capabilities and intentions? I don’t know if Stalin shared this knowledge with Mao, but Mao sure didn’t seem worried about it. It could be construed that if MacArthur was given a green light to use nuclear weapons (given US capabilities to so), Stalin would have known and reacted. Perhaps as simple as ramping up NK air defenses (re North Vietnam), to possibly more aggressive acts in Eastern Europe. Just applying counter pressure to keep the US on the back foot.

Actually no since the US wasn't giving Britain, (or anyone else, even most of the Pentagon) and accurate assessment of the US nuclear capability. Stalin was basically using what the USSR could do and assuming comparative efforts in the US. You may not a 'slight' flaw in this thinking :) The thing was he was well aware that the US had no clear idea of Soviet capability so running a bluff was pretty easy as the US has to assume that the USSR effort was comparative to our own. (Again it has basic flaws but in the case of the US that would amount to being more careful whereas the USSR was being more provocative)
B-29s flew over 21,000 sorties during the War, with 16 shot down by fighters over the three years.

That's around 1 loss every 1300 sorties.

B-29 gunners had 34 aircraft kills over the same period, and 16 were MiG-15

As pointed out the USAF's own assessments and figures were much more bleak and specifically SAC was adamant that they could not in fact guarantee even a minimum of the effort Mac wanted as they had TOO FEW nuclear capable bombers.

It's a point that the USAF itself rejected and recommended Truman reject MacArthur's plan. They didn't feel it was viable nor could they give a high confidence in carrying it out. Something to keep in mind is that in early 1949 SAC had run a test using two "wings" (actually squadrons and those weren't at full compliment) to simulate bombing Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio. The closest aircraft to the base MISSED by over four miles! The first "Bomb-Comp" (Bomber Competition) contest held in mid-1950 was won by a squadron that managed to drop ON THE RANGE at least during the simulated atomic bombing portion. Charles Lindbergh issued a scathing report on SAC and the Air Forces capability in late 1949 and Curtiss LeMay himself said that by late 1950 things had not significantly improved.

LeMay also noted that the Air Force 'grand-plan' to wage atomic war on the USSR encompassed in Emergency War Plan 1-49, (133 air dropped nuclear weapons on 70 Soviet cities over a months time) was borderline fantasy for many reasons but the only 'viable' plan at the time. (And keep in mind those 133 air dropped weapons did not in fact exist at the time)

Randy
 
As pointed out the USAF's own assessments and figures were much more bleak and specifically SAC was adamant that they could not in fact guarantee even a minimum of the effort Mac wanted as they had TOO FEW nuclear capable bombers.

That's true, but is also true that in actual combat missions, the B-29s were not exactly swept from the skies over Korea. It wasn't B-29 losses alone that moved attacks to Radar bombing at Night.

Look at B-24s in the ETO, 226,775 sorties with 3,626 losses, that was 1 loss in 62.54 sorties. North Korea was far safer for bomber crewmen. This was the point I was making, and it does not invalidate that SAC Brass felt they didn't have the force they wanted.
 

CalBear

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Personally, I like MacArthur.

As for "nuclear Armaggeddon" ...not even close. We're talking about April 1951. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_nuclear_weapons_stockpiles_and_nuclear_tests_by_country

299 US vs 5 Soviet as of 1950. Not even a fight.

China had no nuclear weapons, and Stalin would never have exposed the Motherland to American A-bombs for the benefit of the Koreans and Chinese. And even if he went full stupid and did, The USSR's ability to deliver nuclear weapons to anywhere outside Eurasia was effectively nil at the time.

Stalin knew this, and he knew that the price for "communist brotherhood in the face of capitalist aggression" (or whatever nonsense he would have said) would have been a glow-in-the-dark USSR.

My conclusion: MacArthur was correct to call for atomic weapons vs the Chinese. And Truman was a moralizing idiot whose dithering first lost China to an ideology worse than Nazism, then let them set up a puppet state in NK.
Did you just advocate the use of nuclear weapons?
 
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