Did Pres. Truman fire MacArthur because of “military defeats”? (like Wikipedia says)

I had a look at RAND declassified reporting of the budget post WW2 and the Army was screwed hard. It was like policymakers thought the nuclear monopoly and the Air Force was so all important they didn’t even need an Army.

All the services suffered pretty badly. The Air Force and the nuclear deterrent were only neglected slightly less badly then the army and navy, and for such critical lynchpins they were massively under-resourced. Some of the issues with the nuclear deterrent were unavoidable, like the reactor problems that crimped bomb production from '45-'47, but the horror show that was late-'40s SAC is less excusable. I think it was largely instinct: every other major war in American history had seen the US forces mobilize up from miniscule to massive and powerful size in order fight it only to be absolutely disbanded back down too miniscule sizes with tiny budgets once the war was over and the fact that there was a Cold War going on took a few years to become obvious to the man-on-the-street, so there was too much political pressure to really avoid it. The bigger mystery to me is why it took as late as the Korean War for the catalyst to finally reverse the resource starvation of the armed services instead of, for example, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade & Airlift, the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, or the Soviets acquiring an atomic bomb.
 
Truman during an interview in the 60's:

"I fired him because he wouldn’t respect the authority of the President. I didn’t fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, . . . ”
Well, if one considers the casual relations here, MacArthur started freaking out, trying to go over the President’s head, and being openly insubordinate* as a result of the defeats the Chinese had inflicted upon him. . .
I like General Douglas MacArthur!

I think he did a first-rate job in the Pacific theater during WWII. And I think he did a great job re-building Japan into a modern liberal democracy and preventing any future wars between our two countries.

In fact, the re-building of Japan is too much an outlier. We have to find more medium examples of military occupation, because if we use the example of MacArthur in Japan (with some luck along the way of course), it’s too high a standard and we’re going to be disappointed again and again.
 
I think he did a first-rate job in the Pacific theater during WWII.
Sorry, my sarcasm detector is down for repairs, was that a joke or are you serious? Since I don't think causing thousands of unnecessary casualties count as first-rate job? First he messed up Phillipinnes, left Wainwright to hold the bag, then heaped the blame on him for surrendering, probably the most shitweasel move of his carreer. In New Guinea he ignored information about ilness rates amongst the troops, he ignored the fact that soldiers don't have the weapons to knock out the Japanese bunkers and demanded that decimated units do repeated assualts against Japanese fortifications. He pressured Roosvelt to accept his plan of drive towards Philippines, campaign whose only strategic result was bolstering of MacArthur's ego and diverting resources from Navy strategy of cutting the Japan off it's resource areas, strategy which ultimately brought Japan to it's knees.
 
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Well, if one considers the casual relations here, MacArthur started freaking out, trying to go over the President’s head, and being openly insubordinate* as a result of the defeats the Chinese had inflicted upon him. So one could say that the defeats did indirectly lead to his relief. In the end though, it was less the defeats themselves and more how MacArthur reacted to them that sealed the deal.

*The insubordination was really always there, MacArthur freaking out over the Chinese intervention merely drove it into the open.

He was also talking to Chiang Kai Shek about them starting operations against the PRC, without the permission of anybody in the US or UN chain of command. US Generals are not supposed to go on freelance diplomatic excursions and jumping over the President to undercut him with congress is about as dumb as you can get.
 
Digression: If Ike does not run in '52 does MacArthur get the Republican nomination over Taft and Warren like Eisenhower did, and become the 34th President of the United States?

No. After returning to the US he met a few Republican party leaders. After a hour or two of 'conversation' they came to see him as a poor candidate, & a liability. Mac had his supporters but his ego, a lifetime as a Army officer, and near 20 years in the top positions left him with political skill inappropriate to the Presidency, ignorant of civilian politics, and zero filter for speaking his mind. He also had some uncomfortable baggage with the Great War veterans. They were still a political force in 1952 & if nothing else the eviction of the Bonus Army was a bitter memory that would not have been left quiescent.
 
I like General Douglas MacArthur!

I think he did a first-rate job in the Pacific theater during WWII. And I think he did a great job re-building Japan into a modern liberal democracy and preventing any future wars between our two countries.

In fact, the re-building of Japan is too much an outlier. We have to find more medium examples of military occupation, because if we use the example of MacArthur in Japan (with some luck along the way of course), it’s too high a standard and we’re going to be disappointed again and again.

I agree about the Japanese administration being genius. On the other hand, MacArthur's abilities as a general were a mixture of real ability, even amongst the global pantheon of military expertise ( New Guinea "hit them where they are not", Operation Cartwheel through the Solomons, Inchon) mixed with the mediocrity of badly prepared troops (Phillipines 1941, Korea initially) and under estimating opponents (Chinese, North Koreans, Japanese).

In the end, I think the only way to truly know the ability of a general is to see how they perform when "all the chips are down" and the fate of their nation is at stake. Zhukov's defensive and later offensive battles in 1941-43 and Manstein who was a key commander in the invasion of Soviet Union and then salvaged the German front after Stalingrad (1942-43) each showed their excellence in these situations. Fortunately, the US has never faced an "all the chips are down" situation in modern times.
 
... On the other hand, MacArthur's abilities as a general were a mixture of real ability, even amongst the global pantheon of military expertise ( New Guinea "hit them where they are not", Operation Cartwheel through the Solomons, ...

Unlike most generals of WWII Kruger failed to leave a self-serving biography. Still a careful examination of the record shows Ecielberger & then Kruger had more to do with the bypass strategy than Mac & his staff. In the original planning for the CARTWHEEL operations Mac had thought it essential to seize Rabaul, with its 50,000+ Japanese garrison. The arguments for by passing that position came from others. The USN pointed out they did not need Rabauls harbor for further operations, and declined to support the size of ground force needed to subdue Rabauls large garrison.

Beyond that the concept of bypassing unneeded enemy held islands had been incorporated into the USN War Plan ORANGE in the 1920s or earlier. In the abstract US Army tactical, operational, and strategic doctrines expressed a preference for flanking the enemy and where practical bypassing the enemies main position.
 
Sorry, my sarcasm detector is down for repairs, was that a joke or are you serious? Since I don't think causing thousands of unnecessary casualties count as first-rate job? First he messed up Phillipinnes, left Wainwright to hold the bag, then heaped the blame on him for surrendering, probably the most shitweasel move of his carreer. In New Guinea he ignored information about ilness rates amongst the troops, he ignored the fact that soldiers don't have the weapons to knock out the Japanese bunkers and demanded that decimated units do repeated assualts against Japanese fortifications. . .
I am not a military historian. I'm giving you the views of an American who's reasonably well-educated, which I think you'll find is a fairly common view, for better or for worse.

Obviously, the high road was for MacArthur to stand in solidarity with Wainwright (I mean, give me the info, but also please give me the human details including the huge press for time, where I can still believe that a halfway decent person could make these kinds of mistakes)

And it's perfectly okay to me if you thoroughly dislike MacArthur. In fact, it's probably good for a democracy to knock generals down a peg, or even two or three.

With New Guinea, I think you're talking about malaria when American doctors found the previous treatment wasn't working hardly at all. Leaders of large groups often need to ignore such things to get things done, although I certainly wish there were better alternatives, and we can probably find such if we look.

The fact that U.S. soldiers did not have proper weapons to assault Japanese bunkers, that sounds like a straight-down-the-middle military fact which almost certainly should have caused MacArthur to change plans and not do it. I mean, stay with his overall plan of ignoring strongholds and cutting supply lines. And he needs senior officers who aren't afraid to stand up to him and argue with him.

And from what I've read, never lived through (fortunately), is that the decision whether to keep attacking or to break off is a very difficult decision for any military commander.
 
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12 hours after Pearl Harbor MacArthur still hadn't properly scrambled his air force and the Japanese took most of it out while it was still clustered on the air field.


From Wiki

"Even though tracked by radar and with three U.S. pursuit squadrons in the air, when Japanese bombers of the 11th Kōkūkantai attacked Clark Field at 12:40 pm, they achieved tactical surprise. Two squadrons of B-17s were dispersed on the ground. Most of the P-40s of the 20th PS were preparing to taxi and were struck by the first wave of 27 Japanese twin-engine Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers; only four of the 20th PS P-40Bs managed to take off as the bombs were falling.

A second bomber attack (26 Mitsubishi G4M "Betty" bombers) followed closely, then escorting Zero fighters strafed the field for 30 minutes, destroying 12 of the 17 American heavy bombers present and seriously damaging three others. Two damaged B-17s were made flyable and taken to Mindanao, where one was destroyed in a ground collision."


Other than Inchon, I never saw where this guy was such a great combat commander. He was well suited for the occupation of Japan, he played the role of conqueror well, and he was a wonderful pseudo-king for the Philippines, those things he did well, but I just don't see the history of a great combat leader here.

In regards to the OP's question, I have not studied the war properly, but at prima facie it looks as though he let the Chinese slam into his flank simply because he bought his own BS. US troops were better served, serving under Ridgway.
 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/orde...-yalu-americas-intelligence-failure-in-korea/

' . . . MacArthur had always understood that if you “control intelligence, you control decision making.” He had built an intelligence community in his area of command that listened attentively to what he wanted and gave him intelligence that reinforced his already held views. . . '
This can happen even when you're trying to build up a team that gives you the whole messy story, and not just the part you want to believe.
 


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Because it took place 60+ years ago.

Because we don't have familiar images from the home front, like the Vietnam War with its protests, hippies, and rising youth culture. And plus with television, Vietnam was a living room war.

I think we tend to underestimate the effect of the Korean War (1950-1953) on the American psyche.
 
All the services suffered pretty badly. The Air Force and the nuclear deterrent were only neglected slightly less badly then the army and navy, and for such critical lynchpins they were massively under-resourced. Some of the issues with the nuclear deterrent were unavoidable, like the reactor problems that crimped bomb production from '45-'47, but the horror show that was late-'40s SAC is less excusable. I think it was largely instinct: every other major war in American history had seen the US forces mobilize up from miniscule to massive and powerful size in order fight it only to be absolutely disbanded back down too miniscule sizes with tiny budgets once the war was over and the fact that there was a Cold War going on took a few years to become obvious to the man-on-the-street, so there was too much political pressure to really avoid it. The bigger mystery to me is why it took as late as the Korean War for the catalyst to finally reverse the resource starvation of the armed services instead of, for example, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade & Airlift, the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, or the Soviets acquiring an atomic bomb.


In 1949/50 the US Navy came very close to being gutted, as it was being viewed as superfluous in the nuclear age (see Revolt of the Admirals). The Korean War, completely reversed that opinion.

Ric350
 
but with Dunkirk, I think the British did
I agree. They also faced an "all chips are down" situation in the early stages of the battle of the Atlantic. One can also argue that the Battle of Britain was also a similar situation as a clear defeat of the RAF could have led to a cross channel invasion.
 
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