Did Pan-Slavism help or hurt the Tsar?

Did Pan-Slavism help or hurt the Tsar?

  • Help

    Votes: 7 13.7%
  • Hurt

    Votes: 19 37.3%
  • It's Complicated

    Votes: 25 49.0%

  • Total voters
    51
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Hopefully this can be a general discussion on effects that diplomatic Pan-Slavism had on the stability of the Tsarist regime, rather than the ethical tenants of general ethno-nationalism, but I'm curious what the AH community thinks about this issue.

From a macro perspective one could argue that it pushed the Tsar into ruinous wars and other wasteful imperial ventures in the Balkans and Anatolia. Though without it, could the imperial regime have retained it's absolutist nature as deep into the age of nationalism as it did? (1917 is impressive in hindsight)
I'd contest that hurt more than it helped by a good margin, especially in the critical politically unstable years of late 19th century. Where the Tsar should've placed his entire effort on domestic development in a variety of economic sectors (capital investment for industry for one) the coffers where drained purchasing foreign weaponry for adventures against the Ottomans.

But what are your thoughts?
 
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The Pan-Slavist Russification policies alienated the previously extremely loyal Baltic Germans and Finns, and at abroad the cordial relations with Austria-Hungary were destroyed.
 
The Pan-Slavist Russification policies alienated the previously extremely loyal Baltic Germans and Finns, and at abroad the cordial relations with Austria-Hungary were destroyed.

Not to mention that it pushed Russia into the collective suicide that was WW1.

Serbia was irrelevant to Russia's well-being. The status of Christians in the Ottoman Empire was also irrelevant to Russia's well-being, and that pushed them into a stupid war as well. Hell, controlling the straits, which was a long-term Russian goal, was pointless too, if you think about it.

Had Russia sat on its ass and modernized, along with continuing expansion in Asia (Hokkaido had less than 60k people in the 1860s, for instance), it could have become unbeatable easily.
 
Not to mention that it pushed Russia into the collective suicide that was WW1.

Serbia was irrelevant to Russia's well-being. The status of Christians in the Ottoman Empire was also irrelevant to Russia's well-being, and that pushed them into a stupid war as well. Hell, controlling the straits, which was a long-term Russian goal, was pointless too, if you think about it.

How so? If we believe the idea that Russia desired an ice free port and coveted access to the Mediterranean, then the straits were the top prize.

I really believe Russia embroiled itself in the Balkans and supported pan-slavism as a way to antagonize Austria and Ottoman Empire. It was way too convenient not to. "We need to bring all of our oppressed slavic and orthodox brothers into mother russia's bosom" or some other sort of propaganda. Also, being an orthodox christian country, the idea that Constantinople could be won back from the Muslims would have been an enormous boost to the tsar's international prestige.

Otherwise I'd agree that Serbs were irrelevant to Russia other than providing a convenient excuse to wage war. I do think Russia was way more interested in the straits than caring about Christians in the Ottoman state and by pressing the issue on pan-slavism gave russia the constant causus belli to make war with the ottomans.

Even Stalin in 1936 said "a small state [i.e. Turkey] supported by Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet"

Had Russia sat on its ass and modernized, along with continuing expansion in Asia (Hokkaido had less than 60k people in the 1860s, for instance), it could have become unbeatable easily.

I'd agree with this. There was better low hanging fruit in Asia. Instead Russia bashed its head against more difficult targets in Europe and paid for it.
 
How would controlling the straits actually help Russia though? It would just turn into a constant money sink, not to mention a source of pointless friction with Britain.

Having the ability to move a couple of warships around in the Aegean doesn't actually increase industrial or agricultural output or lead to increased living standards IMO.
 
Had Russia sat on its ass and modernized, along with continuing expansion in Asia (Hokkaido had less than 60k people in the 1860s, for instance), it could have become unbeatable easily.

The question is, could the regime survive in its despotic form without the added glue provided by Slavic nationalism?
With such a lull in warmongering for instance, might the disaffected masses, that otherwise might've been thrown at Western European guns, start demanding for more freedoms at home in this ATL?
To be fair to the pro-Slavic argument, international prestige gained by pro-Slavic expansionism was really all the Tsarist regime could rest it's head on, especially as it quickly became the sole absolutist regime in Europe.
 
Asking whether Panslavism helped or hurt the Tsars seems to be based on the assumption that Panslavism was an important influence in Tsarist foreign policy, which has been disputed. For example, https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/panslavism seems to minimize the role, noting that "the support of the Russian government was mostly pragmatic; Panslavism was used to buttress Russian policy in the Balkans." There would certainly be plenty of reasons for the rivalry between Russia on the one hand and Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other if pan-Slavism never existed. (The article does note that "While limited, the impact of Panslav efforts on Russian diplomacy was not negligible. The Russian ambassador in Serbia, Nikolaus Hartwig (1857-1914), was an ardent Panslav and contributed to the deterioration of relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary before the war.")
 
How would controlling the straits actually help Russia though? It would just turn into a constant money sink, not to mention a source of pointless friction with Britain.

Having the ability to move a couple of warships around in the Aegean doesn't actually increase industrial or agricultural output or lead to increased living standards IMO.

It was for the same reason Russia made war with Sweden and obtained the area around the Neva River where St. Petersburg was built. Prior to that the only port Russia had was Archangelsk, partially frozen through the year. Peter the Great wanted an better seaport for reasons of trade. Russia always desired free passage through the straits.

If I may speculate, Russia, despite having St Petersburg, was never fully satisfied. Shipping from St. Petersburg had to go through the Baltic where it was susceptible to interception by a variety of powers. This carried over to post WW2 where Finland had to cede Porkkala peninsula to the Soviets. Of strategic importance, control of Porkkala meant shipping from St. Petersburg could be threatened.

Unfettered sea access was always a Russian ambition and even today they are still geographically challenged (with the except of the far east: Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky). I do see your point though. Having direct access to the Med is alot different than actually getting that access. Getting such access would surely make enemies, especially with UK.
 
It didn't help that, regardless if Panslavism was only a propaganda tool or an actual political goal, it was unpopular outside of Russia proper and maybe Serbia. It pushed the Austrian[-Hungarian] Slavs towards Vienna, prefering them over Russian Imperialism, while Bulgaria was relatively split over fears of Russian dominance and the necessity of Russian assistance (and the few Panslavists themselves). Poland had both serious pro-Russian panslavists and ardent revolutionaries and independentists, but their support was ruined when they dismantled their autonomy.

Arguably, along with other factors, alienating Austria-Hungary destabilised the precarious post-partition balance of power, which had kept Austria[-Hungary], Prussia/Germany and Russia from fighting. The moment the peace was broken, Russia and Austria would push for Polish unification under their leadership. The importance of partitioned Poland is severely understated when it came to maintaining peace between the three powers. Once broken, two powers would fight the third for dominance of the region.
 

raharris1973

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It pushed the Austrian[-Hungarian] Slavs towards Vienna, prefering them over Russian Imperialism.

Really? I never got the impression there was much genuine anti-Russian sentiment among Austro-Hungarian slavs other than the Galician Poles.
 
Really? I never got the impression there was much genuine anti-Russian sentiment among Austro-Hungarian slavs other than the Galician Poles.
Calling it "anti-Russian sentiment" would be an exaggeration. It was more of a widespread belief that the Russians would subjugate them worse than the Austrians and that they had a far better chance at cultural and even political autonomy under the latter than former.

As an example of the opposite, the "Ruthenians" (what we'd call Ukrainians these days) were bitterly divided between Russophiles and "Ukrainians". Generally, though, the conclusions made in 1848 held until 1915-1918.
 
Hurt, obviously, otherwise they would have backed out of world war 1 and the dynasty may have survived, at least longer..
 
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