Did more post-1900 wars start from a security spiral (like WWI) or deterrence failure (like WWII)

Did more post-1900 wars start from a security spiral (like WWI) or deterrence failure (like WWII)

  • security spiral leading to mutual escalation (like WWI)

    Votes: 10 55.6%
  • deterrence failure tempts the aggressor (like WWII)

    Votes: 8 44.4%

  • Total voters
    18

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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WWI and WWII “taught” opposing “lessons”.


WWI, even to the victors, showed the dangers of excessive preparation for war and alliance commitments. Two alliances, making sure they were ready and not caught unprepared , intolerant of any negative shifts in the balance of power , and unwilling to ask for any concessions diplomatic sacrifices from its own side, ended up in the worst war in a century, about as bad for the victors as the vanquished.


WWII, showed the ultimate victors that insufficient preparation for war, insufficient protection of the balance of power, insufficient solidarity with allies, and excessive appeasement revisionist states, simply allowed the aggressors to get stronger, more confident, doubtful of facing resistance, while weakening their opponents, who ultimately won, but at a much greater cost than they would have with more preparation and solidarity.


The interwar behaviors of the US and the European powers, except Germany, were shaped by “overlearning” the lessons of WWI. When combined with Hitler’s ambitions this led to WWII.


The lessons of WWII led the victorious powers, especially t he superpowers to emphasize the pre-WWI values of keeping peace through preparedness for war, extending alliance commitments, and contesting adversary gains everywhere.


At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis though, JFK, who had been reading “the Guns of August” was fearing the Cold War powers were walking in to a WWIII getting started in a WWI-like manner.


The question is, which of the two ways of war breaking out was more "typical" post-1900. Have more wars post-1900 started because,


a) like before WWI, both sides overprepared their forces and plans and overcommitted to alliances, creating a security spiral of mutual escalation

b) like before WWII, the aggressor thought there would be no opposition, or no effective opposition because potential opposing coalitions showed insufficient will, preparedness and solidarity, leading to deterrence failure against aggression
 
I would say c) thanks to nuclear weapons, sides were always overprepared, but to such a ridiculous extent that deterrence could still fail (because nukes could deter an invasion of Moscow, but not weapons going to smugglers on the Pakistani border).
 
a) like before WWI, both sides overprepared their forces and plans and overcommitted to alliances,
I’d say most of the proxy wars of the cold war were of this sort, with both the U.S. and USSR over-perceiving the East-West, capitalist vs. communist dimension,

and under-perceiving the indigenous, intra-state, and regional dimensions.
 
Neither. Most post-1900 wars were colonial conflicts, insurrections, civil wars, or quasi-tribal conflicts.

Many of these were substantial.

  • The 1905-1907 Maji-maji Rebellon in German East Africa killed about 2,000 fighters and 250,000 civilians by famine.
  • The Second Caco War of 1918-1920, between US Marines and Haitian rebels, killed 2,100 people.
  • The 1926-1929 Cristero War in Mexico, between the anti-clerical post-revolution government and devout Catholic rebels, killed 20,000 people.
  • The Ifni War of 1957-1958, between Moroccan irregulars funded by the Sultan and Spanish garrisons, killed 1,200 people.
  • The 1959 Tibetan Rebellion against China killed about 100,000 people.
  • The Eritrea-Ethiopia War of 1998-2000 killed 50,000-200,000 people.
None of these wars would fall into either defined category.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
An example fitting A, the WWI model, would be the Six Day war I think. Security posturing spiralled up and led to going over the brink instead of settling things without war.
Although it was kept localized, the American war in Vietnam fits model A) better than model B), as each side matched each other's escalation. The Chinese intervention in the Korean War was perhaps a little WWI-like, but only the Chinese intervention part --- the PRC was stepping in to back up its provocative ally.

Examples fitting model B, the WWII model of miscalculated aggression, would include: Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 ["America won't intervene in arab disputes, they've practically told me so"], Argentina's invasion of the Falklands ["Britain is giving up it's empire around the world and not maintaining its carrier force, if we grab the islands of course they will talk about it rather than fight."], and North Korea's invasion of South Korea [If the Americans were serious about holding South Korea, they would have done any number of things differently like not excluded it from their security perimeter, armed up the ROKs, not withdrawn their troops, or not let the far more important prize of China fall - they won't lift a finger.]
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
WWI and WWII “taught” opposing “lessons”. WWI, even to the victors, showed the dangers of excessive preparation for war and alliance commitments. Two alliances, making sure they were ready and not caught unprepared , intolerant of any negative shifts in the balance of power , and unwilling to ask for any concessions diplomatic sacrifices from its own side, ended up in the worst war in a century, about as bad for the victors as the vanquished. WWII, showed the ultimate victors that insufficient preparation for war, insufficient protection of the balance of power, insufficient solidarity with allies, and excessive appeasement revisionist states, simply allowed the aggressors to get stronger, more confident, doubtful of facing resistance, while weakening their opponents, who ultimately won, but at a much greater cost than they would have with more preparation and solidarity. The interwar behaviors of the US and the European powers, except Germany, were shaped by “overlearning” the lessons of WWI. When combined with Hitler’s ambitions this led to WWII. The lessons of WWII led the victorious powers, especially t he superpowers to emphasize the pre-WWI values of keeping peace through preparedness for war, extending alliance commitments, and contesting adversary gains everywhere. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis though, JFK, who had been reading “the Guns of August” was fearing the Cold War powers were walking in to a WWIII getting started in a WWI-like manner. The question is, which of the two ways of war breaking out was more "typical" post-1900. Have more wars post-1900 started because,
a) like before WWI, both sides overprepared their forces and plans and overcommitted to alliances, creating a security spiral of mutual escalation
b) like before WWII, the aggressor thought there would be no opposition, or no effective opposition because potential opposing coalitions showed insufficient will, preparedness and solidarity, leading to deterrence failure against aggression

Interesting question; I think you have to qualify the definition of "war," however, in the sense that has already been raised above. Are these a) nation state vs. nation state conflicts, where largely conventional forces and operations across recognized international borders are what is occurring, or some variations of b) internal conflicts (revolution, civil war, etc.)? Or should hybrid conflicts - where a type b conflict evlves to a type a conflict - be a third category - type c?

An obvious Type A conflict would be the 1982 South Atlantic war, for example, between Argentina and the UK. A Type B would be the Cuban Revolution of 1956-59. A Type C could be the Vietnam war of (arguably) 1960-75.
 
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