Did France Underplay Its Hand in the 1930s?

So, inspired by a bit of Hearts of Iron (I know), and a Blunted Sickle...

There are lots of threads discussing the Fall of France, but I'm wondering if even getting to that point required some bad luck for France.

It seems to me that a France with a better economy in the 1930s shouldn't have even gotten to that point.
 

GarethC

Donor
France screwed up in 30-31 with a large gold reserve it sat on, rather than doing Keynesian things to ameliorate the Depression, leading to a currency crisis in '36 when it really wanted to be curbstomping Hitler in the Rhineland, and with a teeensy bit better economic policy it could well have done so.
 

longsword14

Banned
France screwed up in 30-31 with a large gold reserve it sat on, rather than doing Keynesian things to ameliorate the Depression, leading to a currency crisis in '36 when it really wanted to be curbstomping Hitler in the Rhineland, and with a teeensy bit better economic policy it could well have done so.
That and a better high command that was not as full of political garbage.
 
All that was said, plus Cagoule, Communist party considering Socialists as worse than Hitler, mismanagement of the industrial policy and military budget, politics interfering with military procurement.... etc

If you look at the whole of 1930s France, there are quite a number of facepalm moments.
 
These are all valid points, but can they be fixed? or are they baked into the Third Republic?

I mean, it showed it was capable of handing Prussian militarism just fine in WW1...
 

longsword14

Banned
These are all valid points, but can they be fixed? or are they baked into the Third Republic?

I mean, it showed it was capable of handing Prussian militarism just fine in WW1...
Perhaps begin with a government that could bat somewhere in the middle of the left and the right. Also, concern about the treaty of Versailles up in smoke so quickly, British lack of interest leading to a hardened effort to ensure that the officers and the high command are sharp. France has time more than a decade to shake off the post WWI decline, even if we give a good couple of years for shake up. Also, a somewhat less severe depression (though the factors controlling it are not in one nation's hands), or France having a better spring-back.
 
Not to mention the willingness of the French diplomats to follow British lead.
France took the lead in 1923 on enforcing the Versailles Treaty. It was a international political disaster & much of Frances internal defense & other policy derived from that. Given the stubborn and unrealistic policy of Chamberlains gov. France being more aggressive in 1938 would have stalled the French effort to rebuild a strong alliance.
 
I'm not an expert on this subject (although you've piqued my interest) but I think France was involved in many areas of the world and (to put it bluntly) didn't really do well anywhere. They were having issues in South East Asia, many problems in Africa and then the Middle East. I think their biggest issue was prioritizing where to spend their time and effort. All the issues raised in the above posts also illustrate that France didn't have the political resolve to confront Germany in the 30's.
 
I think large-scale Keynesian investment in France and Algeria would have helped economically quite a bit. An economically stronger France which also extends the Maginot Line to the Ardennes (and buys a few less tanks in the early 1930s) has a good chance of scaring the Germans. Add to this a French token force being sent to the Rhineland, and Germany is stalled for at least a few more years.
 

Archibald

Banned
The 3rd Republic chronical instability was a royal PITA that wrecked any stable foreign policy and strong action against Germany.
That, and France society was utterly and dangerously polarized (sounds familiar ? today is more and more similar), with a lot of hysteria and people blaming and pointing fingers at a supposed culprit of all the illnesses that plagued French society (such as the usual unfortunate jews obviously, but there was a lot of hysteria against communists and Francs Maçons). There was a lot of hysteria about supposed plots to take over the country - conspiracy was in everybody's mind, blinding even valuable people like Mandel or Blum - that the real danger was Nazi Germany.
The 3rd Republic was agonizing and that end of reign was pretty ugly. It was deeply rotten like some old wooden house that collapse take pople by surprise, but then you look more closely and see that collapse was a logical outcome.
1930's France was not a pretty place to live in. That how Vichy ultimately happened.
 
...
The 3rd Republic was agonizing and that end of reign was pretty ugly. It was deeply rotten like some old wooden house that collapse take pople by surprise, but then you look more closely and see that collapse was a logical outcome.
1930's France was not a pretty place to live in. That how Vichy ultimately happened.

That was certainly the line of the 'conservatives' then and post war. I'm not a expert but it looks like the extreme left, the Communists, pushed the same line. Rotten capitalist democratic governments was a stock angle with them. Of course those were the same people who claimed conspiracy, claimed incompetence, claimed rot, and all else through the 1930s, or earlier. In the end the voters on the left and right got what they feared or wanted.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
France took the lead in 1923 on enforcing the Versailles Treaty. It was a international political disaster & much of Frances internal defense & other policy derived from that.
That's ... interesting.

I assume you refer to the in many ways for France disatrous 'Ruhr-occupation' which lead to
- several communistic uprisings in Germany
- the exaggeration of the already galloping inflation in Germany
- the 'Beerhall-putsch'
(a miracle that the Weimar republic survived this year at all, IMO)
- the diplomatic isolation of France of its former Entente-partners
- a financial crisis due to the unbalanced and buid-upon-reparations budget in France at that time
- the 'fall' of Poincaré in summer 1924

but in its follow up also to
- the Dawes-plan (more or less what the germans wanted before the Ruhr-occupation)
- the influx of american money esp. to germany
(at least part of the reasons for the Great Depression in financial terms)
- the Locarno-treaties ... as well as the Rapallo-treaty

Therefore, if France aka Poincaré would have given in to the german requests in late 1922 at least partially with something like the Dawes-plan already then, lets say March/April 1923 :
no Ruhr-occupation would have happened ...
without all tghe above mentioned ...
but perhaps with a 'better' understanding with the Entente-partners leading to also a better understanding about their war debts ... with ...

and therefor the 'need' of 'doing better' in the 1930s would be much reduced



... could be a starting for a V_E_R_Y interesting ATL, but ... how to get Poincaré to this point ?
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I endorse what NoMommsen said - no Ruhr occupation would be an interesting PoD.

There's a lot of domestic problems in France but they should not have sufficed to allow the Germans to come from behind to get the advantage.

Could a figure, even under the 3rd Republic constitution, have emerged with a ballsy 1930s policy and survived in office?

The key ingredient ISTM would be a willingness to ignore British preferences.
Not to mention the willingness of the French diplomats to follow British lead.

This was a key hobbler.

The insight the French needed to have in the 1930s is that Britain was going to be unreliable in any of the tasks of deterrence, or active containment of Germany, or in making a military commitment to maximize French chances of winning a war quickly and easily. The second part of the insight is even more critical, and that would have been to decide that even if Britain disapproved vehemently with French moves to preempt or contain Germany, Britain would never go so far as to let France lose in France without trying to back the French up.

In other words, against Hitler, it was worth trying a more assertive policy more attuned to continental partners even at the risk of war. Even over British objections. Best-case, Hitler is contained without a shooting war. Next best case, a war starts that France and its continental allies wins. Third best case, France and its allies end up in a stalemated war but Germany's offensive potential is blunted. In the worst case scenario, Germany is able to fend off French containment measures and is able to take the initiative to bring the war to French ground. I think a safe assumption to make would be that the British, however much they objected to French policy in the beginning of a conflict, would come to feel that "we cannot afford to let Germany defeat France" if the tide of war actually began to make German victory/French defeat look like a real possibility.

Thoughts Faeelin, Magnificate, everybody?
 
I think large-scale Keynesian investment in France and Algeria would have helped economically quite a bit. An economically stronger France which also extends the Maginot Line to the Ardennes (and buys a few less tanks in the early 1930s) has a good chance of scaring the Germans. Add to this a French token force being sent to the Rhineland, and Germany is stalled for at least a few more years.
I'm very glad I'm not the only one promoting Keynesian economics. Very much a breath of fresh air.

I think once you start focusing on the overall economy, and not just whether the government is ahead or behind in the balance of payments, you kind of start thinking along Keynesian lines.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
I'm very glad I'm not the only one promoting Keynesian economics

This is a fertile field in my opinion. Keynesian projects in France, or Britain under different leadership could have interesting historical consequences. As could and FDR *more* committed to Keynesianism and keeping spending up for civilian or military purposes from the beginning of his second term rather than striving for a balanced budget as in OTL.

But what do y'all think of my estimate of Britain's probable reaction to French firmness? IE, London may not like it, but it would not sever the British strategic interest in French survival even in the worst case.

Faeelin, if you wanted to see an argument for why France could *not* play its hand more assertively in the 1930s, I'd google up David Tenner's posts on "Rhineland".
 
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