DH Mosquito, daylight bombing offensive?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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No more than 6 months. Most people working in the aircraft industry weren't skilled labor going into it.

Yes, but they weren't making Mosquitos.

The oval-section fuselage was a frameless monocoque shell built in two halves being formed to shape by band clamps over a mahogany or concrete mould, each holding one half of the fuselage, split vertically. The shell halves were made of sheets of Ecuadorean balsawood sandwiched between sheets of Canadian birch, but in areas needing extra strength— such as along cut-outs— stronger woods replaced the balsa filler; the overall thickness of the birch and balsa sandwich skin was only 7⁄16 inch (11 mm). This sandwich skin was so stiff that no internal reinforcement was necessary from the wing's rear spar to the tail bearing bulkhead.[64] The join along the vertical centre line[65] greatly aided construction as it allowed technicians easy access to the fuselage interior.[66]

While the glue in the plywood skin dried, carpenters cut a sawtooth joint into the edges of the fuselage shells, other workers installed the controls and cabling on the inside wall. When the glue completely dried, the two halves were glued and screwed together. The fuselage was strengthened internally by seven bulkheads made up of two plywood skins separated by spruce blocks, which formed the basis on each half for the outer shell.[67] Each bulkhead was a repeat of the spruce design for the fuselage halves; a balsa sheet sandwich between two plywood sheets/skins. Bulkhead number seven carried the fittings and loads for the tailplane and rudder.

The original glue was Casein-based, later replaced by "Aerolite", a synthetic urea-formaldehyde, which was more durable.[68][nb 10] Many other types of screws and flanges (made of various woods) also held the structure together.[65] The fuselage construction joints were made from balsa wood and plywood strips with the spruce multi-ply being connected by a balsa V joint, along with the interior frame. The spruce would be reinforced by plywood strips at the point where the two halves joined to form the V-joint. Located on top of the joint the plywood formed the outer skin.[66]

During the joining of the two halves ("boxing up"), two laminated wooden clamps would be used in the after portion of the fuselage to act as support.[66][71] A covering of doped Madapolam (a fine plain woven cotton) fabric was stretched tightly over the shell and a coat of silver dope was applied, after which the exterior camouflage was applied.[72] The fuselage had a large ventral section cut-out (braced during construction) that allowed the fuselage to be lowered onto the wing centre-section. After the wing was secured lower panels were replaced and the bomb bay or armament doors fitted

Wikipedia. Completely different skills to those required in conventional aircraft manufacturing - so different in fact that much of the most demanding work was done by furniture makers, not engineers. The gluing in particular was a demanding skill that took years to perfect, and despite that Mozzies still had a "loss of control" failure rate three times higher that of any other aircraft, largely caused by badly glued wood delaminating.

One of the advantages of the Mosquito (in addition to speed, range, etc.) was that it utilised the skills of sectors of the economy that didn't otherwise have much of a war role - furniture making, small boat building, even musical instrument making - but the same esoteric skill base meant that you couldn't easily transfer resources (including workers) from other sections of the economy into Mosquito construction. Cutting production of Wellingtons, Lancasters, etc. doesn't allow you to build more Mosquitos - it just leaves you with fewer Wellingtons and Lancasters.
 
I just checked, a 14 inch shell was 720kg, a rather massive all steel target. It also doesn't say at what range the shell could be tracked at. To be useful for scrambling fighters they'd need to see it at least 100 miles away if it was at altitude.

The CXAM-1, the improved version of the XAF with more power(15kw)
Range Accuracy: ± 200 yds
Azimuth Accuracy: ± 3°.
Detection Example 1: Battleship at 16 nautical miles
Detection Example 2: Destroyer at 12 nautical miles
Detection Example 3: Fighter at 10,000 feet at 50 nautical miles
Detection Example 4: PBY at 10,000 feet at 70 nautical miles
Info from _Naval Radar_ by Norman Friedman

By 1945, with jet-propelled aircraft in the offing, the Navy was looking for a way to track planes more precisely—and that meant using short-wavelength transmitters that could send out narrow radar beams. On came a string of short-wavelength successors to the CXAM—the SR, SPS-6, and SPS-12. It seemed as though the 1938-era system was on its way out.

But when these new models were tested, they produced surprising results. The new, more streamlined jet fighters reflected these short-wavelength pulses away. So while a jet carrying external bombs or fuel tanks was relatively easy to detect and track, one that wasn’t carrying such bulky appurtenances was more difficult to see.
The radar experts at NRL understood what was happening. The longer the radar wavelength, the less the signal is affected by details of target shape. As a result, the Navy developed new long-wavelength radars—the SPS-17, SPS-29, SPS-37, and SPS-43—whose antennas were reminiscent of the “big mattresses” of the 1930s and 1940s—with an extra-wide antenna version for carriers and guided-missile cruisers.


https://www.navalhistory.org/2015/12/29/the-launch-of-navy-radar

So shorter wavelengths isn't always better. Freya early detection radars, being 1.2m, shouldn't have trouble detecting them accurately.
 
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Really? Tell me how well did that stop the US fighter sweeps/strafing runs in 1944-45 despite their being a massive increase of light FLAK in Germany compared to 1943? Mosquitos could come in high and attack that way too or descend to lower altitudes to attack. Range wasn't an issue to hit most targets of value in Germany. Economical cruise gave Mossies something like 1800-2000 miles of range without 'cookie' bombs, so having to go faster to penetrate 400 miles deep isn't a problem.

The LW fighters and light Flak were hammer and anvil. The hammer was removed from equation by early 1944, thus leaving anvil to be either overpowered by superior numbers if that was intention or to be avoided, depending on mission. The Mosquito was almost twice the size of P-51, and about 50% bigger than P-47 or P-38, less maneuverable, thus making for an easier target.
Without cookie (4 x 500 lb bombs) range was 1620 miles on most economical speed (making 265 mph at 15000 ft), and 1135 on max weak mixture (327 mph speed at 15000 ft). However, economical cruise can't be achieved when engine is in high power (with LW fighters still in picture), say 1200 HP per Merlin in this case.
The Mosquito without 4000 lb cookie means 2000 lb bomb load, severely reducing the appeal of the Mossie as a bomber. The gun-armed Mossie FB, that we might expect to duke it out vs. Flak batteries, carried perhaps 1000 lbs of bombs, and was slower than bomber version.

Fully doable by late 1943.

Hence my suggestion. Just make at least 4 groups of P-38s available in UK by mid-1943, and attach the wing drop tanks on the P-47. Send the P-51A in UK, not in India(!). Couple of groups of Spitfire VIII?
As a bonus the LW atrittion comes many months earlier.
 

Deleted member 1487

Yes, but they weren't making Mosquitos.



Wikipedia. Completely different skills to those required in conventional aircraft manufacturing - so different in fact that much of the most demanding work was done by furniture makers, not engineers. The gluing in particular was a demanding skill that took years to perfect, and despite that Mozzies still had a "loss of control" failure rate three times higher that of any other aircraft, largely caused by badly glued wood delaminating.

One of the advantages of the Mosquito (in addition to speed, range, etc.) was that it utilised the skills of sectors of the economy that didn't otherwise have much of a war role - furniture making, small boat building, even musical instrument making - but the same esoteric skill base meant that you couldn't easily transfer resources (including workers) from other sections of the economy into Mosquito construction. Cutting production of Wellingtons, Lancasters, etc. doesn't allow you to build more Mosquitos - it just leaves you with fewer Wellingtons and Lancasters.
Aircraft manufacturing on the floor was not done by engineers. Production processes could be designed by engineers, but de Havilland, the engineer of the aircraft, used already trained wood workers because they'd need minimal training to make the aircraft and because they weren't already being used for other production. Do you have a source that confirms that they had a structural failure problem and that gluing was a skilling that took years to perfect?

The Mossie had the benefit of using existing skills sets of people not already working in other industries for the war effort, so they needed minimal retraining...that doesn't mean workers could not be trained to do those jobs. They'd likely not be masters at it, but with a dilution of the skilled workforce you'd have the experienced carpenters oversee the new labor. Cutting production of Wellingtons, Halifaxes, and Sterlings (Lancasters would still have a role), plus outsourcing some production to say the US and more to Canada to boost production and take advantage of their carpenters, means a temporary cut in production of those existing types until you could ramp up production....but part of it would mean not laying the foundation for Lancasters and other heavy bombers in the ramp up in 1942 and on and instead directing that labor (as yet untrained in Lancaster and other new bomber production) in Mossie production processes.


The CXAM-1, the improved version of the XAF with more power(15kw)
Range Accuracy: ± 200 yds
Azimuth Accuracy: ± 3°.
Detection Example 1: Battleship at 16 nautical miles
Detection Example 2: Destroyer at 12 nautical miles
Detection Example 3: Fighter at 10,000 feet at 50 nautical miles
Detection Example 4: PBY at 10,000 feet at 70 nautical miles
Info from _Naval Radar_ by Norman Friedman

By 1945, with jet-propelled aircraft in the offing, the Navy was looking for a way to track planes more precisely—and that meant using short-wavelength transmitters that could send out narrow radar beams. On came a string of short-wavelength successors to the CXAM—the SR, SPS-6, and SPS-12. It seemed as though the 1938-era system was on its way out.

But when these new models were tested, they produced surprising results. The new, more streamlined jet fighters reflected these short-wavelength pulses away. So while a jet carrying external bombs or fuel tanks was relatively easy to detect and track, one that wasn’t carrying such bulky appurtenances was more difficult to see.
The radar experts at NRL understood what was happening. The longer the radar wavelength, the less the signal is affected by details of target shape. As a result, the Navy developed new long-wavelength radars—the SPS-17, SPS-29, SPS-37, and SPS-43—whose antennas were reminiscent of the “big mattresses” of the 1930s and 1940s—with an extra-wide antenna version for carriers and guided-missile cruisers.


https://www.navalhistory.org/2015/12/29/the-launch-of-navy-radar

So shorter wavelengths isn't always better. Freya early detection radars, being 1.2m, shouldn't have trouble detecting them accurately.
Sure, the Germans also did experiments with shorter wave length radar in the mid-1930s using well angled reflective surfaces that convinced them shorter wavelengths wouldn't work, the problem is they discovered through their experiments some modern stealth techniques and deceived themselves into thinking developments into cavity magnetrons weren't worth it. Of course 9cm cavity magnetron based radar could see through chaff, while the longer wave length German developments couldn't and were jammed. Eventually they responded by going to even longer wavelengths which worked for AI radar....but at the cost of enormous 'matress' antenae.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lichtenstein_radar#FuG_220_Lichtenstein_SN-2

The LW fighters and light Flak were hammer and anvil. The hammer was removed from equation by early 1944, thus leaving anvil to be either overpowered by superior numbers if that was intention or to be avoided, depending on mission. The Mosquito was almost twice the size of P-51, and about 50% bigger than P-47 or P-38, less maneuverable, thus making for an easier target.
Without cookie (4 x 500 lb bombs) range was 1620 miles on most economical speed (making 265 mph at 15000 ft), and 1135 on max weak mixture (327 mph speed at 15000 ft). However, economical cruise can't be achieved when engine is in high power (with LW fighters still in picture), say 1200 HP per Merlin in this case.
The Mosquito without 4000 lb cookie means 2000 lb bomb load, severely reducing the appeal of the Mossie as a bomber. The gun-armed Mossie FB, that we might expect to duke it out vs. Flak batteries, carried perhaps 1000 lbs of bombs, and was slower than bomber version.
P-38s were quite large and were able to operate in FLAK environments. Plus Mossies were able to take on German SE fighters and win, I already provided quotes to that effect earlier, plus them outrunning Fw190s and Bf109s. Again they don't have to get in range of the 20mm and 37mm guns, they could accurately attack from 20k feet in 1943, especially against large industrial facilities or oil production; their main enemy would actually be the 88s, but they had problems accurately tracking them, as they were much faster than the heavy bombers. So too did the German SE fighters have problems catching them. JG50 was formed to chase them in daylight and was nearly totally ineffective.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagdgeschwader_50

The Mossie didn't need the super heavy ordnance to accurately hit it's targets, so needed for less bomb load to do it's job.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Mosquito_operational_history#RAF_bomber_operations
Most notably, the task of destroying V-1 launching sites was given to the group, as well as to others. It is the efficiency of these raids by Mosquitos that provides the generally quoted improvement of about 5 times over other bombers. It is estimated by the RAF that it took only 40 tons of bombs on average for them to destroy a site, versus 165 tons for a B-17, 182 tons for a B-26, and 219 for a B-29.[14]

Hence my suggestion. Just make at least 4 groups of P-38s available in UK by mid-1943, and attach the wing drop tanks on the P-47. Send the P-51A in UK, not in India(!). Couple of groups of Spitfire VIII?
As a bonus the LW atrittion comes many months earlier.
Agreed, a good idea, but not necessary to get the Mossie to target and destroy it. They could handle SE German fighters and really outrun them at altitude. Plus they could accurately hit targets even at altitude due to their bombsights.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_XIV_bomb_sight
 
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Aircraft manufacturing on the floor was not done by engineers. Production processes could be designed by engineers, but de Havilland, the engineer of the aircraft, used already trained wood workers because they'd need minimal training to make the aircraft and because they weren't already being used for other production. Do you have a source that confirms that they had a structural failure problem and that gluing was a skilling that took years to perfect?

Do you have a source that confirms you could take everybody off a Wellington production line and have them building Mosquitos in six months? And the structural failure problem was referred to in the wikipedia article I linked to (and pretty much every article you can find on the Mosquito refers to the need for highly skilled craftsmen, usually from the furniture industry, congrats on fixating on the glue issue though.)

The Mossie had the benefit of using existing skills sets of people not already working in other industries for the war effort, so they needed minimal retraining...that doesn't mean workers could not be trained to do those jobs. They'd likely not be masters at it, but with a dilution of the skilled workforce you'd have the experienced carpenters oversee the new labor.

Yes, and using people who are "not masters at it" results in aircraft falling out of the sky.

Cutting production of Wellingtons, Halifaxes, and Sterlings (Lancasters would still have a role), plus outsourcing some production to say the US and more to Canada to boost production and take advantage of their carpenters, means a temporary cut in production of those existing types until you could ramp up production....but part of it would mean not laying the foundation for Lancasters and other heavy bombers in the ramp up in 1942 and on and instead directing that labor (as yet untrained in Lancaster and other new bomber production) in Mossie production processes.

Canada made 1,133 Mosquitos as was, I doubt they had much spare capacity left. The US was offered the design but turned it down, preferring the P-38 Lightning.
 

Deleted member 1487

Do you have a source that confirms you could take everybody off a Wellington production line and have them building Mosquitos in six months? And the structural failure problem was referred to in the wikipedia article I linked to (and pretty much every article you can find on the Mosquito refers to the need for highly skilled craftsmen, usually from the furniture industry, congrats on fixating on the glue issue though.)
Given the history of establishing production for the heavy bombers with new labor that had not been involved in aircraft production before, training them in the basic skills in an abbreviated program generally took about 6 months. Now clearly they were not masters in production at that point, that was something that took a year to get competent at and probably several to develop the experience with the basic skills and then of course with the model itself (hence why there was reluctance to lose the immense efficiencies gained in making Wellingtons by switching to a new design and starting over in terms of experience and even basic skills).
You mentioned the glue issue, not me, I was just responding to what you said, which was solved:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Mosquito#Fuselage
To solve the problem, a sheet of plywood was set along the span of the wing to seal the entire length of the skin joint along the main spar.[78]

Skilled craftsmen can oversee less experienced workers and check their work.

Yes, and using people who are "not masters at it" results in aircraft falling out of the sky.
That applies to all aircraft made with all kinds of materials; having masters oversee apprentices is how you get them to develop the skills. Have the groundwork for Mossie expansion laid in 1942 and by 1943-44 you'll have more than IOTL. Plus it isn't like they can't contract out to US companies. Perhaps they could even develop a metal version if they find that they don't have enough quality control to use wood.

Canada made 1,133 Mosquitos as was, I doubt they had much spare capacity left. The US was offered the design but turned it down, preferring the P-38 Lightning.
The US turned down the design for their own military use, they could still make some of their own. In fact Canada could even contract American carpenters to come and work in expanded facilities up north, or Canadian companies could establish American facilities for British contract.
 

Deleted member 1487

Found the quote from the Bundeswehr's "Germany and the Second World War series":
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_and_the_Second_World_War
VII The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia 1943–1944/5 (Das Deutsche Reich in der Defensive Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 1943 bis 1944/45) Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs (de), Detlef Vogel Derry Cook-Radmore, Francisca Garvie, Ewald Osers, Barry Smerin, Barbara Wilson 2006 928
De Havilland’s new light bomber and long-range reconnaissance aircraft, the Mosquito, was, because of its high speed (almost unmatched by German fighters), operational ceiling, and range, seen by some of the military as ideal for the selective attacks they were aiming at; its cheap wooden construction meant a saving of materials in short supply, so it could be mass-produced. The Air Staff, however, took a sceptical view of the Mosquito and, not really knowing what to do with it when it came into frontline service in March 1943, at first used it solely for long-range reconnaissance. Soon 2 Bomber Group had two squadrons of Mosquitoes, one of which was used against Cologne and Essen in late May/early August 1942.107 On 19 September 1942 a Mosquito even made a first raid on Berlin, without its presence there being noticed. On 25 September four Mosquitoes, one of which was lost, attacked the Gestapo headquarters in Oslo, to lend the Norwegians moral support; most of the damage was, however, done to the house on the opposite side of the street.108 While the economic warfare ministry, encouraged by a few precision-raid successes, drew up lists of individual targets to be destroyed in daylight precision attacks, Bomber Command told the Mosquito squadrons that their main task was not the destruction of individual industrial targets, but the breaking of enemy morale. In setting targets, more thought was given to the built-up areas themselves than to the factories these contained although Mosquitoes had not been designed for area bombing.109 On 6 December 93 twin-engined bombers, including ten Mosquitoes, flying low by daylight, hit the Philips works in Eindhoven with 60 t of bombs, causing severe damage to a factory whose output was important for electronic warfare; but at 15 total losses and 53 aircraft damaged, the cost had been high.110

A daylight raid on the molybdenum mines at Knaben in Norway on 3 March 1943, with ten Mosquitoes, was more successful. For the loss of only one aircraft, the site was so badly damaged that production was halted for about a year and the Wehrmacht economic staff was very fearful for the supply of specially hardened steel.118 Particularly successful was a long-range attack on the Zeiss works at Jena on 27 May 1943, by only 11 out of 14 Mosquitoes that took off. Five of these were, however, lost. It was one of the deepest penetrations by this light bomber into Germany. In spite of heavy flak, only 24 high-explosive bombs of 225 kg each caused a 90 per cent loss of production. Seven civilians in the town were killed, a further seven badly and 47 lightly injured.119 Remarkably, there is no mention of this raid in the official British account of the bomber offensive by Webster and Frankland, and Harris in his Despatch did not waste a single word on it. He had a deep-rooted aversion to precision attacks of this kind against what he termed ‘panacea targets’. It is true that, in the opinion of the Ministry of Economic Warfare and secret service experts, hitting these ought to inflict paralysing losses on the enemy’s war supplies; in his view, however, their effects were invariably made up for in some other way, thanks to German inventiveness, and he regarded them as superfluous.120

He did not, therefore, intend to continue using Mosquitoes as daylight precision bombers, the role for which they were ideally suited. He transferred 2 (light) Bomber Group, whose mode of operation was ‘so different’ from the rest of Bomber Command, via the air defence organization to 2 Tactical Air Force, of which it formed the nucleus; the two Mosquito squadrons of 8 (Pathfinder) Bomber Group he allocated to night attacks, although the aircraft had proved itself by day.121 Naturally, they did equally well as OBOE aircraft at night. In the twelve months up to their transfer, the Mosquitoes had flown 726 sorties with 48 (6.6 per cent) losses, while the Lancaster attack on MAN at Augsburg alone cost over 48 per cent total losses, and that of the light bombers against Eindhoven 16 per cent. Total losses in the Lancaster raids on the Ruhr dams were 42 per cent. In making these comparisons, it must be borne in mind that the loss of a Mosquito meant that of only two aircrew and two engines, while losing a Lancaster or Stirling cost seven men and four engines. Up toNovember 1943 a further 819 Mosquitoes were used for nuisance raids and for setting off frequent air-raid warnings, and for diversionary or feint attacks to split up the German air defence, as well as for defensive sorties or precision raids. They suffered only 13—that is, 1.6 per cent—losses. In the following period to the end of March 1944, only ten, or 0.4 per cent, of the 2,034 Mosquitoes in action were lost.122

In 1944 some versions of the Mosquito could even carry a 1,800-kg bomb all the way to Berlin. Undoubtedly the light strategic bomber units, consisting of Mosquitoes with their aircrew-saving speed and precision, would, as Bowyer has written, have been able to achieve even greater daylight successes and done ‘so much more for victory’, had the tactical development they already had at the start been taken further, and ‘had 2 Group been equipped entirely with them’. This view was shared by the planners in the Ministry of Aircraft Production, one of whom, Sir Alec Cairncross, wrote: ‘The Mosquito might very well have surpassed the record of the Lancaster in terms of damage done per hour of work in building it’;123 it was much cheaper to build and delivered its bombs on individual targets with greater accuracy, while the Lancaster could bomb only broad areas, which was far from producing such a decisive effect. The building of heavy bombers should, he said, have been left to the Americans, since their four-engined machines were equipped for the more accurate daylight bombing.

The Air Ministry had, on the contrary, given the building of heavy bombers ‘overriding priority’, and showed no interest in the light Mosquito bomber. Although almost as many Mosquitoes (6,710) were built during the war as
Lancasters (7,372), most of the early ones were used as fighters.124 Harris gave the following, not very convincing, explanation for neglecting the Mosquito as a light bomber in favour of the heavy Lancaster
The decisive factor was the supply of pilots; the heavy bomber carries about three times the load of the medium type [the Mosquito], but both aircraft only need one pilot. It is certain that even with the whole resources of the Empire Training Scheme we should never have got enough pilots to fly enough medium and light bombers to drop the bomb load that was dropped by the heavies. And, of course, the problem of concentrating the bomb load, if it had been carried by many light bombers instead of by a comparatively few heavies, would have been insoluble.125

This argument gives the impression of reasoning in economic terms, and ignores the fact that the far more accurate Mosquitoes needed far fewer bombs than the heavy Lancaster to destroy a target, so that the number of pilots needed cannot logically be set against the absolute tonnage of bombs. The thought that more accurate bomb-aiming would mean fewer civilian casualties did not even cross Harris’s mind. The supremacy of the bomber doctrine, with its area attacks on industrialized centres of population, once again becomes clear.
 
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P-38s were quite large and were able to operate in FLAK environments. Plus Mossies were able to take on German SE fighters and win, I already provided quotes to that effect earlier, plus them outrunning Fw190s and Bf109s.

The issue I see here is that we pick desirable qualities of recon mossies (fastest on 1-stage Merlins, but useless as bombers or fighters), gun-armed Mossies (can kill enemy fighters, slowest of the bunch, useless as bombers in mid-and high altitudes) and bomber mossies (those that can do actual damage by bombing if left alone by pursuers; fastest of the bunch when 2-stage Merlins are installed, but with less range than 1-stage Merlin versions; can't kill enemy A/C in the air) and then apply those qualities over all Mosquitoes. Or to put it another way, desire to have both high speed, full 536 imp gals and cookie in the same time, all while evading and killing LW fighters. TASTAAFL.
I'l agree that osquito was outstanding aircraft, but one version can't do what other dedicated versions are for.

Again they don't have to get in range of the 20mm and 37mm guns, they could accurately attack from 20k feet in 1943, especially against large industrial facilities or oil production; their main enemy would actually be the 88s, but they had problems accurately tracking them, as they were much faster than the heavy bombers. So too did the German SE fighters have problems catching them. JG50 was formed to chase them in daylight and was nearly totally ineffective.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagdgeschwader_50

Trying to catch recon Mossies?
I agree that heavy Flak will be less of a threat vs. hi-alt Mossies than it was vs. heavies, especially once 2-stage Merlins are avilable.

The Mossie didn't need the super heavy ordnance to accurately hit it's targets, so needed for less bomb load to do it's job.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Havilland_Mosquito_operational_history#RAF_bomber_operations

Looks like B-29 was bombing V1 sites :)
One thing is to bomb sites dozens of miles from North Sea coastline, another thing is to go 500 miles deep in Germany and try to do same. The factory is not as fragile as V1.

Agreed, a good idea, but not necessary to get the Mossie to target and destroy it. They could handle SE German fighters and really outrun them at altitude. Plus they could accurately hit targets even at altitude due to their bombsights.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_XIV_bomb_sight

The heavy loaded bomber can't handle well the enemy fighter, it is not a lighter FB version or even lighter recon.
The accuracy data for the Mk.XIV bomb sight seems elusive.
 
No more than 6 months. Most people working in the aircraft industry weren't skilled labor going into it.
The Wellington stayed in production because it was still useful enough, was super cheap and easy to be made, production was already established, and there was a demand.

A Mosquito, Lancaster or late model Halifax would have been far more useful but no attempt at conversion was done with Vickers making Warwicks, possibly toying with the idea of a geodetic airframe Buckingham (this according to Goulding and Moyes) and starting to make Windsors when it finally became blindingly obvious to everyone the Wellington had had its day. Could the reason the Wellington stayed in production for so long or that Vickers were given so much time to try to develop the Windsor was because at the time their factories couldn't make anything other than geodetic airframe aircraft. Of course after 1945 the pressure is off and there is no excuse, they have to change or go under.
 
Looking at production, it doesn't look like there is a really sizeable force of Mosquito bombers available until early 1943. So to really carry out an effective bombing campaign you need about 1,200 of them assigned to Bomber Command and all production efforts to keep a force that size (taking into account combat and operational losses and airframes that wear out). That means you need to replace them in the other roles they had, such as night fighters, fighter bombers (for the tactical air forces), naval strike etc. Perhaps more help from the Americans in the form of A20 and A26 (when those show up) as well as P38, maybe more Mitchell's, perhaps more production of the Whirlwind, and the Beaufighter's are retained at home more instead of going to places like the CBI.

That at least means fewer aircrew for the RAF Bomber Command, but it sharply reduces its bombardment ability. There are most definitely trade offs here. However the Sterling, Halifax and Wellington do have uses. They could serve in the CBI and they are needed for Coastal Command.

Fewer aircrew for Bomber Command might translate in some more replacements for the British Army though, something it was in dire need of by 1944.
 

Deleted member 1487

Mossies built in Canada and Australia took far longer to begin production than 6 months.
From initial ramp up sure, we are talking about training only, not facility construction, tooling, creating the necessary institutional knowledge on the ground with a totally inexperienced facility, etc.
 
Looking at production, it doesn't look like there is a really sizeable force of Mosquito bombers available until early 1943. So to really carry out an effective bombing campaign you need about 1,200 of them assigned to Bomber Command and all production efforts to keep a force that size (taking into account combat and operational losses and airframes that wear out).

The insufficient numbers of Mossies would be probably a bigger problem than a tiny flaw Moquito has (or has not). The Anglo-Americans need to ramp up production perhaps 6 months earlier than in OTL so there is enough of Mossies both to overwhelm the defenses and to deliver the payload needed.

That means you need to replace them in the other roles they had, such as night fighters, fighter bombers (for the tactical air forces), naval strike etc. Perhaps more help from the Americans in the form of A20 and A26 (when those show up) as well as P38, maybe more Mitchell's, perhaps more production of the Whirlwind, and the Beaufighter's are retained at home more instead of going to places like the CBI.

As for the night fighters, the Beaufighter is useful even if it is not a Mosquito.
Good thing would've been a greater production of Mustangs in 1942-43, for fighter and fighter-bomber duties. A-20 is a very useful aircraft, so is the P-38 but it's production is low in 1942. Whirlwind is cancelled many months before 1942. B-25 can carry good payload over distance - use it as a night bomber after it is suitably modified?

That at least means fewer aircrew for the RAF Bomber Command, but it sharply reduces its bombardment ability. There are most definitely trade offs here. However the Sterling, Halifax and Wellington do have uses. They could serve in the CBI and they are needed for Coastal Command.
Fewer aircrew for Bomber Command might translate in some more replacements for the British Army though, something it was in dire need of by 1944.

Problem with evaluating the number of aircrew is that Mosquito will need 3 pilots to carry 12000 lbs of payload, the Lancaster needs just one. The pilot needing much longer to train than radio-opearator or a gunner. Another problem is that Mosquito can't carry a really big bombs that were needed for some targets, like the 8000 or 12000 lb cookie + asortment of incendiary bombs, or the Tallboy, or Gland Slam.
The Lancaster with front and upper turret deleted, streamlined nose (like the Lancastrian), while operating on a bit more aggresive power settings should be able to carry more over distance at greater speed than historic Lanc, while saving on manpower, cost and with incresed survivability.
 
There were a huge number of mosquito variants, each suited to different roles but any mosquito can't be pressed into any role. So what mission profile and therefore what variant family are people thinking about for this scenario? Following that, how many of that variant family were produced worldwide?
 
Gluing issues were solved by the next generation of glues which also allowed tropical use and by local strengthening. Some of the later airframes were still in regular use for nearly twenty years.

OTL Mosquito production still was not enough to let the USAAF have any as night fighters so they were still using Beaufighters into 1945 until the P61 arrived in quantity.

Vickers claimed that replacing the Wellington would need a six month stoppage in production to entirely retool the factories and retrain the staff for sheet metal aeroplanes. Post war they did the change as the Viking production progressed.

I doubt (opinion) that the supply of balsa could meet a huge increase in demand for DH construction. Today we would use other materials as the core filler. In the day the options were fewer. The wartime production staffing was broken down to small steps to allow untrained staff to learn enough to do each small step and skilled ones to supervise, train and do the prototype work. I see no reason why the same could not be done with woodworking.

We saw wooden versions of metal aeroplanes made to circumvent material shortages. Might it be possible to design a metal version of the Mosquito? I am doubtful it could be done in time.

As a small increase change the Horsa production to a metal type to release some extra wood based production for some extra Mosquitos. Aluminium was not a material in short supply in the UK during the war.

Could Commonwealth forces use other types for the fighter role and release the fighter airframes for bomber use? Could coastal Command also use alternative types?

Given a decision to maximise the Mosquito force for daylight bombing (and you still need the 4 engined jobs for the more distant targets and large volume tasks) and using OTL Mosquito types releasing the fighter types and using the Horsa capacity would add significantly to the number for daylight bombing without affecting the heavy bombers. This would allow RAF parallel daylight precision low level bombing and high capacity imprecise high level night bombing. Possibly as far as you can get if the decision is made when the Mosquito is proven in mid 1942.
 

Deleted member 1487

There were a huge number of mosquito variants, each suited to different roles but any mosquito can't be pressed into any role. So what mission profile and therefore what variant family are people thinking about for this scenario? Following that, how many of that variant family were produced worldwide?
The bomber offensive would be waged by the general bomber, not the bulged 'cookie' bomber, except for special missions.
 
This migh be another nod against Mosquito waging a major 'bomb war' - variants without bulged bomb bay were carrying just 4 x 500 lbs internally. Six Mosquitoes are needed to equal one Lancaster or Halifax, six pilots vs. one, 12 Merlins vs. 4.
'Cookie carriers' were available by late 1943 anyway - another nod against the idea.
 

MrP

Banned
This migh be another nod against Mosquito waging a major 'bomb war' - variants without bulged bomb bay were carrying just 4 x 500 lbs internally. Six Mosquitoes are needed to equal one Lancaster or Halifax, six pilots vs. one, 12 Merlins vs. 4.
But as Thoresby pointed out upthread, one must also take into account the fact that these bombs would be launched with greater accuracy. High altitude strategic bombing had an atrocious accuracy record for hitting anything smaller than a city.
 

Deleted member 1487

This migh be another nod against Mosquito waging a major 'bomb war' - variants without bulged bomb bay were carrying just 4 x 500 lbs internally. Six Mosquitoes are needed to equal one Lancaster or Halifax, six pilots vs. one, 12 Merlins vs. 4.
'Cookie carriers' were available by late 1943 anyway - another nod against the idea.
But Mosquitos put their ordnance on target much more accurately. The Lanc and other heavies were kind of a shot gun approach to bombing and were only advantaged in terms of area targets like city centers (or major oil facilities like Leuna that were city center sized), while smaller industrial targets were more accurately hit by Mossies in small groups with small payloads with limited dispersion; the heavies had major dispersion of their ordnance, so most was generally wasted just by how much was being dumped all at once. Like with B-17s operating by day (more accurately than the British heavies), they found that after the master bomber dropped his loads the rest of the bombers didn't aim and just dropped as soon as they saw the master bomber dropping, while following on groups found the target obscured by smoke from the previous bombing runs; most of the heavy payloads then used on industrial targets were wasted and scattered all over the place because they either couldn't see the target, didn't air properly, or the sequenced release of multiple bombs carried them outside the aiming point due to delayed release action. Against non-area targets the dispersion inherent in heavy bomber payloads in large groups made they wildly inaccurate and the vast majority of their payloads a total waste. If a Mossie could put all four 250kgs on target, but the Lancaster could only put 500kgs out of 6000 or more on target, the Lanc is a waste of explosives, crew, aluminum, etc. compared to the lighter bomber.
 
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