1976-1980: The China Crisis, Europe, and the Wider World
Two unaccounted for Chinese bombers were the inevitable flaw in Westmoreland’s plan. One was intercepted over the East China Sea and shot down by F-14 interceptors without incident. The other, flying low, released some of its payload near Quemoy island before being shot out of the sky by the USAF. The 80kt bomb exploded on the shore facing the mainland side, killing 8,000 ROC soldiers instantly. It was the first time a nuclear device had been used in anger since Nagasaki. The pressure on Westmoreland to respond was overwhelming – China had to “lose,” or at least be “checked.” Accordingly, he began perhaps the most concentrated bombing campaign in American history – round the clock conventional bombing of Chinese military infrastructure and deployments lasted until January of 1979, when it became clear there was no longer a People’s Republic of China to bomb – in the strict sense.
The US had made every effort to avoid destroying civilian targets – the bombing campaign was aimed at destroying China’s immediate military capability. What the United States had not fully accounted for was the importance of the PRC military in maintaining order in the country. The CCP had no effective reserves to call upon when disorder and protests grew in the closing months of 1978, and instead had to rely upon the fanatical Red Guards, whose excesses only further encouraged revolutionary movements. In the south, a vaguely pro-democratic movement emerged, clashing with the Red Guards and PLA remnants. While the Chinese government could still command enormous amounts of manpower, its capability to mobilize and supply them was weak. In Tibet, a new round of independence protests sprung up while the USSR eyed the restless Xinjiang province. Westmoreland was reluctant to openly deploy ground forces anywhere in China, but the CIA nevertheless began heavy operations in the southern and eastern regions. Bulganin, for his part, wanted to ensure the entire country would not go over to Western hands, not wanting any further encirclement of the USSR. Fighting would continue to rage through the end of 1979, but it became increasingly clear that some kind of partition would occur under the terms of a superpower agreement.
The Chinese Civil War also put considerable strain on Euro-American relations. Portugal and the United Kingdom had to deploy military forces to their respective holdings in the area to hold back tides of refugees, angering their publics. Additionally, European countries felt the US lacked an appreciation for the problems of communism in Europe – America, it seemed, no longer felt the Iron Curtain to be the most important theater of confrontation between West and East. While this view had some support – after all, existing conflicts hold more importance than hypothetical ones – the elections from 1979 to 1980 all reflected some degree of backlash against the United States. The long-running string of British Conservative governments ended in 1979 with the victory of Michael Foot’s Labour government, promising action on a stagnating economy and a reduction in British overseas military commitments – British troops began withdrawals from residual Baghdad Pact commitments in South Iran, the broader Persian Gulf, and other locations, forcing the US to shoulder more of the burden. Economically, Foot’s government locked in promises it could no longer afford to keep to the trades unions and public servants – in order to pull the economy out of recession, a wage-price spiral formed under Foot’s government that exploded the UK budget deficit to greater and greater proportions. This was widely held as the final nail in the coffin of Euro-British integration. The EEC now had clear evidence of fiscal irresponsibility and nationalist economic intervention to warrant denying Britain a place in the broader European economy.
While Britain’s political shift had a distinctly leftist, anti-militarist tone, it was hardly a fair indicator of elections to come. Francois Mitterrand’s 1974 victory had brought France some short-term economic stability, but it was likely a more rightist and militarist candidate would present themselves in 1981. In Germany in 1976, Helmut Kohl had begun his conservative government. While Kohl was still very supportive of the United States, the 1978 crisis lead him to begin the German nuclear program, in the spirit of the past CDU leader Adenauer. Germany’s concerns over the modernized tactical nuclear arsenals of the French and Soviets, while leftist governments dismantled strategic deterrence systems (and indeed strategic deterrence systems proved increasingly ineffectual in the Middle East and China) resulted in a program for an independent German nuclear deterrent. While France was angry, the US tacitly accepted Germany’s decision, hoping to reduce some of its own military commitments in Europe for other theaters. Increasingly paranoid about Europe’s direction, Switzerland’s AAA finalized its own nuclear program, having long suspected Germany would attempt the same.
In Eastern Europe, December brought mass uprisings in Eastern Germany and Poland. Surprisingly to some, it was the local governments of these states, rather than the USSR troops, which were most eager to put down resistance. For decades, Eastern European governments had bought into Molotov and Bulganin’s Stalinist system – securing independence would likely encourage democratization, and that would mean the end of their rule.
Japan amended its Constitution to allow military action in support of its allies in 1979, though it stopped short of pursuing its own nuclear weaponry. Nevertheless, a significant military buildup, fueled by Japan’s booming exports, would help Japan secure itself for the dark decades ahead. South Korea continued to struggle with democratization, but many were optimistic – with the Soviet Union never endeared to the DPRK and the PRC no longer capable of supporting it, hopes of reunification seemed within reach. The question, of course, was how to do it without giving Asia another war.
The fall of China committed the USSR to its partnership with India, resulting in significant military cooperation and the basing of Soviet forces in the latter half of the 1970s. The Indian Ocean was no longer an uncontested Western domain, and consequently the United States stepped up its support of Thailand and Pakistan. An open question was what to do with the Burmese socialist junta. Formerly a client of the PRC as a balancer against India, there were now concerns of its new position. India, increasingly paranoid about the ambitions of its neighbors and wary of secret talks between the US and Burma’s government, began preparing for a pre-emptive strike on the Burmese government, mobilizing soldiers to the Burmese border. As this occurred, the paranoid Burmese government blamed India for a variety of ethnically motivated uprisings in 1979. By 1980, exchanges of gunfire had become common across the border. It seemed only a matter of time before war broke out there. Meanwhile, India pondered taking advantage of lawlessness in China to take the areas it had lost during the war, despite the fact that the USSR had mediated that same dispute in the 1960s.
In Africa, the end of supply flows to Maoist insurgencies created ‘growth opportunities’ for the USSR’s African policy. Military equipment flowed in from the USSR and revolutionary movements now worked towards pro-Soviet ends. In Libya, the Jamahiriya waged a successful war of aggression against Chad and the Islamic Legion marched throughout the Sahel in hopes of creating the “Islamic Sahel state.” Algerian political destabilization brought about similar violence there. In response, France deployed troops to Francophone countries (though not Algeria itself) beginning in 1974, though not necessarily in frontline combat roles. Elsewhere in Africa, the Ambazonian region of Cameroon revolted, as Tuareg revolts sprung up in the Sahel. A resurgence in mercenary movements appeared due to the uptake in demand, drawing out the conflicts. Apartheid South Africa continued combat operations in Angola with some success, though the Soviets were likely to back another push to force the RSA back to Namibia. The South Africans also accelerated the pace of their nuclear program, and made secret appeals to the US about cooperating against communism, especially now that India had essentially joined COMDEF.
Back in the United States, the gears began turning for the 1980 elections. Westmoreland would likely face an energized Democratic party. Fears of economic trouble in the US had not materialized thanks mainly to the diligence of the Federal Reserve, but many felt 1980 could see the end of Westmoreland’s Presidency. Democratic contenders included Edward Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and a variety of others. Even if the Democrats did not win the Presidency, the nomination, it seemed, would be transformative in itself.