Der Manstein Kommt Version 2.0

I love the way the just found the dud..:)

I once spent 2 days on a ship searching for a test torp, with modern sonar and all sorts of other things. We even knew (or thought we knew) where the *** beast was supposed to be. Did we find it?? Did we hell...

They dont just sit around waiting for you to find them, then sink and you then cant find them in the mud....:eek:

Many things in weapons development are luck :)

Finding 2 torps out of perhaps dozens of test shots, as the U-boat fleet works up is still pretty lucky

Having the physical evidence in conjuction with the hydrophone records would really help the KM get off their asses on the subject... the depth keeping and steering would be, and where in OTL difficult to correct, but the trigger mechanism was just sheer stupidity and could have been adjusted rapidly following a decently scaled indoor test cycle

Prien in OTL referred to the original G7 as a dummy rifle... quite a stupid experience to line up a perfect shot on a British fleet carrier (ark royal) and have the damn thing not detonate
 
I had an idea reading the Sealion naval battle thread. It appears that the luftwaffe didn't have good AP bombs or Torpedoes. You fixed the torpedoes, but I was thinking maybe they could use the same idea the Japanese used and convert some of their AP shells from some huge gun (probably larger or with better AP characteristics then the 15")

How you get the Luftwaffe to strike on the idea? Well I have no idea, also, are you going to find a way to cut the interservice rivalry between the two branches of armed forces?
 
I had an idea reading the Sealion naval battle thread. It appears that the luftwaffe didn't have good AP bombs or Torpedoes. You fixed the torpedoes, but I was thinking maybe they could use the same idea the Japanese used and convert some of their AP shells from some huge gun (probably larger or with better AP characteristics then the 15")

How you get the Luftwaffe to strike on the idea? Well I have no idea, also, are you going to find a way to cut the interservice rivalry between the two branches of armed forces?

Been reading my mind; actually the LW had good anti (capital) shipping bombs the SC and SD 1000 and PCD1000 bombs, the problem was they didn't debut until 1941

There where two reasons for this (none of them any technical limitations on the bombs themselves) one was that the bombbay bulkhead adjustment schedule for the DO-17 HE-111 and the JU-88 got put off due to the clusterfuck that was the luftwaffe inner beauracracy and the other was that the LW thought they could sink ships with SC250 and SD250... which they could (anything below heavy cruiser for sure)

I'm going to have POD's to thin out the inner service rivalry
 
Ditto to the writing as well as Blair.

1. Take a look at the ME-309 for solving the 109 problems, believe Willy started on this in 40 and their was some test models that were tail draggers (not fond of the tri-cycle undercarriage.)

2. When do you speed up the missle research and put some on the VS-6? Maybe a better bet than the 15cm costal artillery.

3. Still waiting on the rail (maybe it'll be a green one - not as many splinters) when they come out with the TAR and FEATHERS they used on your 1st effort.

4. But anyway I am a fan.
 
Your statement about the OWB line below appears to be grossly wrong:
Well the Oder Line is a production of epic proportions... it has thousands of armored block houses... the small type of block house required 10 tonnes of reinforced steel plates and the larger type required over 30; they also employed thousands of workers (including numerous skilled welders and engineer types); it was also enormously expensive to produce this line... so it can turn into tangible projects in other areas. (ill go over the effects on the LW and KM later in a following update)

I am unable to find any sources that support your claims that the OWB was anywhere as massive as you claim. Rather than thousands of armored of armored blockhouses, from what I have been able to find there were almost no armored blockhouses built. You seem to be citing the projected size and confusing it with what was completed. For example, this online source suggests that is was rather small when Hitler basically stopped it construction in 1938. Notably, one of the problems in constructing it was lack of steel, armor in particular.:eek: The above website summarizes the failure of the line to be anything of importance, much of which has to do with the lack of resources put into the fortifications, even after considerable building was done after 1940 (to which I have emphasized points I find important):
The further history of the fortified front

As early as 1936 details of the plans were altered. Up to 1934 German industry was not active in the manufacture of armoured parts. The always more clearly discernible delays in delivery of armour of A and A1 strength, as well as in delivery of the complicated revolving turrets in strength B, seemed to let the completion of the fortified front slip more and more into the distant future. No armoured turret of strength A or A1 was ever installed in the Oder–Warthe–Bogen (nor in the Westwall / Siegfried Line for that matter). Also, none of the entrance works, the exteriors of which on plan again resembled those of the Maginot Line, were built.

The time of the greatest construction activity was from 1936 to 1938, during which time the greater part of the BWorks and about two thirds of the tunnel system were completed, if only as bare concrete work. As from 1938 the construction of the Westwall began to take precedence over the fortification in the east.

About the middle of May 1938 Hitler visited the Oder–Warthe–Bogen together with von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Förster, Inspector of Engineers and Fortresses, and declared the B-Works with their armoured turrets as obsolete. In his memorandum of 1 July 1938 he proposed quite another system of fortification than the fortified front, namely a trench system with concrete shelters and light machinegun bunkers based on the German trench systems of the First World War, emphasising that the German soldier had to fight in the open and not locked up in a bunker. For the anti-tank guns also, only garages were to be built. On 4 July 1938 Hitler declared a halt to the building in the east in favour of the Westwall.

In November 1938 Hitler undertook a further inspection tour of the Oder–Warthe–Bogen Line. On that occasion he characterised the B-Works as ‘worthless mouse-traps without firepower with only one or two miserable machine-gun turrets’. Although General Förster defended his conception, Hitler insisted on his view and sent Förster to the Western Desert. Even if one takes into consideration that on the basis of the bad delivery situation regarding armour and armoured artillery, no effective anti-tank defence could have been realised, a certain justice cannot be denied to Hitler’s opinion, especially compared with the anti-tank strength of the Maginot Line. The building and material expenditure, as well as the average cost of a B-Work of about 1.4 million Reichsmark bore no relation to the poor firepower yield of a maximum of four machine-guns in front without an antitank gun.

After the beginning of the Second World War the interior fittings of the Oder–Warthe–Bogen were released for installation in the Westwall. Among others all optical instruments were moved to the west. The same thing happened again with the Atlantic Wall. On 22nd February 1940 a visiting-day for foreign military attachés took place, when the Festungsgruppe Ludendorff was shown to them. As this was a propaganda event, the Germans made a meal of it. The American attaché wrote an elucidatory report about this visit, from which transpired that the Germans presented the already-existing ammunition galleries for the never completed armoured battery 5 as rest-rooms and accommodation for intervention troops. When the air war against the German armaments industry intensified, parts of the tunnel system were used for the manufacture of aeroplane engines.

The test of the fortified front

In 1944 the Oder–Warthe–Bogen was only a ‘torso’ rather than a whole body; it consisted, besides the waterobstacles, of the weaker C and B1 bunkers and the two thirds of the tunnel system. Because of Hitler’s ‘stop’ order not even all of the infantry works were built. The main defensive strength was provided by the 21 B-class works connected to the tunnels system; the two A-class works P5 and A8 never progressed further than their foundations. Two additional B-class works were to be found in the Festungsgruppe Ludendorff in the northern and three further ones in the southern sector.Altogether the Oder–Warthe–Bogen consisted of 83 armoured works (Panzerwerke, PzW) 7 and 14 machine-gun casemates, which were equipped with a total of 45 three-loop-hole and 88 six-loop-hole turrets. In January 1945 the fortified front was garrisoned mainly with Volkssturm (the last levy: elderly men and boys without uniforms) and hastilyformed units made up from retreating troops.

This was the state of the Oder–Warthe fortifications when the Soviet offensive, the Wistula–Oder Operation, broke loose on 12 January 1945. Zhukov’s First Guards Tank Army exploited the breakthrough of the Wistula front and reached the old German border on 27 January. During the night of the 28th the Tierschtiegel Barrier was conquered against obstinate resistance. When the 44th Guards Tank Brigade of the XI Guard Tank Corps found the railway line obstacles on the road between the dragon teeth beyond Kalau/Kalawa unguarded on the 29th, the sappers removed them on orders of the brigade commander, who deployed his reinforced brigade into combat formation and during the night (under the machine-gun fire that in the meantime had begun) raced through the line and formed a laager near Malkendorf/Malutko. The other two brigades of the corps did not have such luck, but two days later they had made their breakthroughs too. All three then made their way to the Oder, inflicting further losses to the scattered German forces that still offered resistance.

Between these breakthrough spots individual bunkers or works, such as Ludendorff, held out bravely for up to three days, before they were eliminated by the up-coming infantry armies. As Stalin was not very pleased with this resistance, he is said to have ordered those works blown up.

Why the line failed

The fortified front Oder–Warthe–Bogen provided little resistance because it was nothing more than a skeleton that could not fulfil its intended role when its hour came. It had never been completed, because of Hitler’s decision that it should not be a Festungskampffeld (prepared battlefield) and the consequent cessation of all building activities in favour of the Westwall: weapons and interior fittings that had already been fitted were removed in favour of the West- and Atlantic Walls and parts of the tunnel system were diverted tosheltered war production.

As a consequence of the cessation of building, there were no A-Works constructed. Therefore there was no armoured anti-tank defence and no artillery in armoured turrets or casemates. Also, the bunkers of the middle sector had no garages for anti-tank guns.

The line was built on the basis of the experiences of the First World War. In the meantime its equipment was overtaken by the development of armaments; for example, the 37mm anti-tank guns could not pierce the armour of a T34 tank and the new machine-gun MG42 did not fit into the loop-holes of the MG34.

In addition, there were no longer any trained fortress troops. The 121, 122 and 123 Border Regiments, formed for the purpose, which were garrisoned in the camps mentioned above, were withdrawn 1939 to form the 50th Infantry Division, used in the Polish and further campaigns, especially in the west and never returned to their original duties on the Line. Other fortress troops, kept in reserve by the General Staff, were redirected by Hitler to crisis points on the eastern front. The Volkssturm and alarm units, hastily drawn together near the end of the war, were not trained in the use of the complex installations and had no experience in fortress combat.
Further, while my German is pretty piss poor, checking with a friend and using google translate on documents indicates the 600 million Reichsmark was the estimated cost not the amount spent. From what I can find I doubt that anything more a quarter was spent prior to 1940, including the numerous bridges, which the Heer probably would need anyway to invade Poland.

Consequently, not building the line seems to free far fewer resources than you claim. The English Wikipedia article on the line notes only 100 concrete structures were completed, not hundreds or thousands. This corresponds with the numbers given in the article I cited earlier, where a little over 100 machigun cupolas were listed. Further, from what I can find, some of these structures appear to have been built after 1940.

Bottom line, you will not be able to free up the resources you hope to free up.

The acronymn is OWB Oder-Warthe-Bogen fortification region... it was a tens of miles long defensive line... there are photos and descriptions that can be had on line... one of my books at home has some nice statistics and construction dates (which I will edit in when I get off from work)

Here is the German wiki on it, although its lacking in serious detail it has some excellent photos.

OWB region
 
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The wiki is wrong, I have physically seen the bunkers; my maginot impersionations book has the proper stats, I referred to the German wiki for pics

Will provide follow details and quotes from the book first thing tomorrow
 
I am afraid you are wrong in your assumptions. You may have seen some bunkers, but you did not see a "thousand." Please read the articles and other citations. Some bunkers were built, as I noted above, but nowhere in the numbers you claim. I can find no sources in any language that reports thousands of armored structures. Rather, they all say the same thing: the line was started but not completed, with the resources spent on other projects, and only around a hundred or so structures were built, along with part of a tunnel system with a narrow gauge railroad. Other work was also done after 1940.

Do the math. Most of the the bunkers were small type, the rail road was not finished. You are only saving a few thousand tons of steel, including rebar, not tens of thousands of tons.

Further, as much of the resources were devoted to the West Wall, if you cut resources the from the OWB and the eastern wall West Wall will not built up to the extent that it was. Indeed, the relatively few structures built also were experimental--they served as prototypes for the structures on the West Wall and elsewhere. For both the reasons, the West Wall used items stripped from the OWB and the OWB served as a place to test designs used in OWB, a probable result if OWB is not built is the West Wall is far weaker. Of course, if the West Wall is much weaker, then the French are may be more aggressive in attacking Germany during the invasion of Poland and Phony War.:eek:

The wiki is wrong, I have physically seen the bunkers; my maginot impersionations book has the proper stats, I referred to the German wiki for pics

Will provide follow details and quotes from the book first thing tomorrow
 
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I am afraid you are wrong in your assumptions. You may have seen some bunkers, but you did not see a "thousand." Please read the articles and other citations. Some bunkers were built, as I noted above, but nowhere in the numbers you claim. I can find no sources in any language that reports thousands of armored structures. Rather, they all say the same thing: the line was started but not completed, with the resources spent on other projects, and only around a hundred or so structures were built, along with part of a tunnel system with a narrow gauge railroad. Other work was also done after 1940.

Do the math. Most of the the bunkers were small type, the rail road was not finished. You are only saving a few thousand tons of steel, including rebar, not tens of thousands of tons.

Further, as much of the resources were devoted to the West Wall, if you cut resources the from the OWB and the eastern wall West Wall will not built up to the extent that it was. Indeed, the relatively few structures built also were experimental--they served as prototypes for the structures on the West Wall and elsewhere. For both the reasons, the West Wall used items stripped from the OWB and the OWB served as a place to test designs used in OWB, a probable result if OWB is not built is the West Wall is far weaker. Of course, if the West Wall is much weaker, then the French are may be more aggressive in attacking Germany during the invasion of Poland and Phony War.:eek:


Now of course information on this is difficult to obtain due to the fact that these lines are now in modern day poland, and the polish government gobbled up a lot of structures for scrap

but according to the maginot immitations by kaufman and kaufman

on the central front approximately 40 kilometers of 40 meter deep tunneling was done to serve the central front of the OWB (a substantial engineering project) and 83 out of 114 "panzerwerke" where completed before Hitler canceled the rest of the construction in late 1938. A panzerwerke was similar to a french "ouverage" from the maginot line which could have 15 to 25 armored block houses. The book states that a small block house used two 5 tonne armored plates; and a large block house used two 38 tonne armored plates. A panzerwerke and an ouverage typically had series' of 4 small bunkers radiating out (connected by an underground pathway) with one central larger bunker for heavier weapons and command station (like an outstretched hand)

There was of course substantial mining, and dragon's teeth put in front of these positions. Kaufman estimates a little under 600 bunkers built on the northern front; over 700 built on the central front and has no estimation for the southern (since this was comprehensively demolished by the soviet union and scrapped by the Poles after the war)... but given the construction ratios of the other two sectors (since this was the longest sector) it should have had over 700 bunkers complete as well.

Even with the project only 75 percent complete the OKH estimated it needed 20k men to garrison all of the bunkers they had built

And that is just the bunkers themselves, there was also tremendous work put in with trench digging, mining, laying dragon's teeth and emplaceing weapons

The job was approximately 75 percent complete so that is 450 million RM out of 600 in the field (I assume they spent more than 450 since they probably procured a lot of the materials to finish the job, and the cancelation was sudden)

I'm not defending the bogus stopping ability or quality of the line either, just that the financials, steel and labor could have gone into other projects
 
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Many things in weapons development are luck :)

You've never worked in military R&D, have you.....:)

No, very little is due to luck. And when something comes up that is unexpected, there are a number of problems.

First, examining what went wrong means junking some of what you've done and annoying the people who already thought of it (never underestimate the issue of office politics in these things, the American 1942 torpedo disaster is a classic case of this)

Second it costs money, and the money for the project has already been allocated, so you cant just spend more without a good reason (see office politics again)

Third, there is no particular reason why you will find out what exactly is wrong and how to fix it. Again, the issue is clouded by preconceptions and peoples positions.

To change these things (for any armed service, anywhere, any time...) doesnt require a minor change, it requires a miracle delivered by an ASB the size of an aircraft carrier....



Finding 2 torps out of perhaps dozens of test shots, as the U-boat fleet works up is still pretty lucky

Having the physical evidence in conjuction with the hydrophone records would really help the KM get off their asses on the subject... the depth keeping and steering would be, and where in OTL difficult to correct, but the trigger mechanism was just sheer stupidity and could have been adjusted rapidly following a decently scaled indoor test cycle

Prien in OTL referred to the original G7 as a dummy rifle... quite a stupid experience to line up a perfect shot on a British fleet carrier (ark royal) and have the damn thing not detonate
 
You've never worked in military R&D, have you.....:)

No, very little is due to luck. And when something comes up that is unexpected, there are a number of problems.

First, examining what went wrong means junking some of what you've done and annoying the people who already thought of it (never underestimate the issue of office politics in these things, the American 1942 torpedo disaster is a classic case of this)

Second it costs money, and the money for the project has already been allocated, so you cant just spend more without a good reason (see office politics again)

Third, there is no particular reason why you will find out what exactly is wrong and how to fix it. Again, the issue is clouded by preconceptions and peoples positions.

To change these things (for any armed service, anywhere, any time...) doesnt require a minor change, it requires a miracle delivered by an ASB the size of an aircraft carrier....

Certain discoveries in microwaves and radar where sheer luck :p

The depth keeping and steering are the more obscure problems and even with extensive testing (as OTL) you wouldn't necessarily notice or fix that issue in any short amount of time

The contact pistol is surface obvious though, you would have the hydrophone recordings of the torps actually smacking into the hulls of the target ships and not detonating, then with the recovered torps, you could see their contact pistols, depressed without them having exploded which is a rather obvious problem (contact pistols could then be tested indoors which wouldn't have the unbelievable expense of fucking with the depth keeping and steering)
 
Certain discoveries in microwaves and radar where sheer luck :p

The depth keeping and steering are the more obscure problems and even with extensive testing (as OTL) you wouldn't necessarily notice or fix that issue in any short amount of time

The contact pistol is surface obvious though, you would have the hydrophone recordings of the torps actually smacking into the hulls of the target ships and not detonating, then with the recovered torps, you could see their contact pistols, depressed without them having exploded which is a rather obvious problem (contact pistols could then be tested indoors which wouldn't have the unbelievable expense of fucking with the depth keeping and steering)

Microwave radar (is that what you are talking about??) was not a matter of luck. The team that built the first working magnetron knew what they were trying to achieve, they just wern't working in radar. You dont just staple bits of electronics together at random to see what happens, you know...

It might be more profitable (and believable) to find out how the poor quality (note it wasnt broken, it did work, just not reliably) contact detonators got through the development process
 
I won't have access to my copy of Maginot Imitations until later this week, but what you are asserting is different than what I recall from my exposure to the book. Your numbers seem far, far too high--more in line with the planned numbers rather than the actual completed numbers, particularly prior to 1938 or even 1940.

What I recall from Maginot Imitations as to totals for work completed on the OWB is consistent with the webpage I linked to above. Apparently, you did not review it. The webpage I cited is an online version of an article called The Fortified Front Oder–Warthe–Bogen near the pre-1939 German eastern border. (Clearly, the article is right on point.) The article is published on a website run by The Fortress Study Group. The Fortress Study Group is a serious group of scholars and other experts. The group sponsors symposia and publishes peer reviewed articles by academics and other experts from all over the world. The Kaufmans, the authors of Maginot Imitations, are members of this group. :eek: Indeed, the Kaufmans have have had numerous articles published by the Fortress Study Group. Hence, I am pretty certain that figures given in the article to which I linked are pretty reliable, particularly as the article was written by Gunther D. Reiss. Reiss has collaborated with Kaufmans, having written the introduction to the Kaufmans' Maginot Imitations. :( I really doubt that what Reiss published in 2006 in a scholarly peer reviewed journal is going to be contradicted by a book to which he contributed an introduction in 1997. Rather, I suspect these two views are going to be very similar.

Let me restate the portion of this journal that is in total disagreement with your numbers and conclusion, though I urge to read this most excellent article in its entirety:
The time of the greatest construction activity was from 1936 to 1938, during which time the greater part of the BWorks and about two thirds of the tunnel system were completed, if only as bare concrete work. As from 1938 the construction of the Westwall began to take precedence over the fortification in the east.

About the middle of May 1938 Hitler visited the Oder–Warthe–Bogen together with von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Förster, Inspector of Engineers and Fortresses, and declared the B-Works with their armoured turrets as obsolete. In his memorandum of 1 July 1938 he proposed quite another system of fortification than the fortified front, namely a trench system with concrete shelters and light machinegun bunkers based on the German trench systems of the First World War, emphasising that the German soldier had to fight in the open and not locked up in a bunker. For the anti-tank guns also, only garages were to be built. On 4 July 1938 Hitler declared a halt to the building in the east in favour of the Westwall.

In November 1938 Hitler undertook a further inspection tour of the Oder–Warthe–Bogen Line. On that occasion he characterised the B-Works as ‘worthless mouse-traps without firepower with only one or two miserable machine-gun turrets’. Although General Förster defended his conception, Hitler insisted on his view and sent Förster to the Western Desert. Even if one takes into consideration that on the basis of the bad delivery situation regarding armour and armoured artillery, no effective anti-tank defence could have been realised, a certain justice cannot be denied to Hitler’s opinion, especially compared with the anti-tank strength of the Maginot Line. The building and material expenditure, as well as the average cost of a B-Work of about 1.4 million Reichsmark bore no relation to the poor firepower yield of a maximum of four machine-guns in front without an antitank gun.

After the beginning of the Second World War the interior fittings of the Oder–Warthe–Bogen were released for installation in the Westwall. Among others all optical instruments were moved to the west. The same thing happened again with the Atlantic Wall. On 22nd February 1940 a visiting-day for foreign military attachés took place, when the Festungsgruppe Ludendorff was shown to them. As this was a propaganda event, the Germans made a meal of it. The American attaché wrote an elucidatory report about this visit, from which transpired that the Germans presented the already-existing ammunition galleries for the never completed armoured battery 5 as rest-rooms and accommodation for intervention troops. When the air war against the German armaments industry intensified, parts of the tunnel system were used for the manufacture of aeroplane engines.

The test of the fortified front

In 1944 the Oder–Warthe–Bogen was only a ‘torso’ rather than a whole body; it consisted, besides the waterobstacles, of the weaker C and B1 bunkers and the two thirds of the tunnel system. Because of Hitler’s ‘stop’ order not even all of the infantry works were built. The main defensive strength was provided by the 21 B-class works connected to the tunnels system; the two A-class works P5 and A8 never progressed further than their foundations. Two additional B-class works were to be found in the Festungsgruppe Ludendorff in the northern and three further ones in the southern sector. Altogether the Oder–Warthe–Bogen consisted of 83 armoured works (Panzerwerke, PzW) 7 and 14 machine-gun casemates, which were equipped with a total of 45 three-loop-hole and 88 six-loop-hole turrets. In January 1945 the fortified front was garrisoned mainly with Volkssturm (the last levy: elderly men and boys without uniforms) and hastilyformed units made up from retreating troops.
Overall, there 83 armored works with a total of 133 turrets. Even if we assume the ridiculously high figure of 60 tonnes of steel is involved in each of these armored works, that's less than 5,000 tonnes for the 83 completed armored works. Reviewing the figures indicates that we are dealing with fortifications that are armed with no more than 237 machine guns, given each of the 26 B works had at most 4 machine guns and, making the generous assumption that none of the turrets mentioned are part of the B works, and each turret was actually armed with a machinegun. This gives a total of 237 machine gun fixtures, an impressive figure, but not that impressive.

Now let's calculate the cost, even figuring it based on the generous idea that the turrets are not counted as part of the B works. Certainly, we would not expect these fairly simple turrets to be as expensive as a tank. If 133 tanks cost 50,000 RM each (the cost you cited, iirc, for a Pkw IV), then the total cost for the turrets would be 6,650,000 RM. (IIRC, german tank prices did not include armament, btw.) I believe tanks with turrets, chassis, transmissions, tracks, engines, etc., but no main gun or other armament,would be more expensive per unit than just turrets in concrete emplacements, etc. The article is also very very clear about which of the major works were completed. The 26 "B works" completed cost around 36 or 37 million RM according to the article--26 x 1.4 RM. Expensive for bunkers that at most had 4 machine guns, or a maximum of 104 machine guns, but hardly a project that if cut would allow the massive expansion planned in this timeline. Sure, there were other things built but I find it hard these other improvements cost more that 100 million RM. These figures also approximately congruent with the English Wikipedia article on the line which notes only around 100 concrete structures were completed, not hundreds or thousands.

Let's review the totals. If we assume that the turrets are not included in the "B works" cost, and use a price of 50,000 RM a turret, this still only gives a total price of around 43 million RM. Even if all the rest of the work done cost over 100 milion--a ludicrously high figure--then the total is 143 million RM less than a quarter of the projected cost of 600 million RM. A more reasonable might be around 70 or 80 million RM, including the price of the all materials stripped and sent to reinforce the West Wall. Hence, I think it is reasonable to conclude your estimates as to amount completed are incorrect.

Again, consider the scope of the planned project. The project was was estimated to take 15 years so I imagine that is from where the original budget estimate of 600 million RM came. Again, given all this, it would be remarkable if the Nazis even went through even a quarter of 600 million RM.

Now of course information on this is difficult to obtain due to the fact that these lines are now in modern day poland, and the polish government gobbled up a lot of structures for scrap

but according to the maginot immitations by kaufman and kaufman

on the central front approximately 40 kilometers of 40 meter deep tunneling was done to serve the central front of the OWB (a substantial engineering project) and 83 out of 114 "panzerwerke" where completed before Hitler canceled the rest of the construction in late 1938. A panzerwerke was similar to a french "ouverage" from the maginot line which could have 15 to 25 armored block houses. The book states that a small block house used two 5 tonne armored plates; and a large block house used two 38 tonne armored plates. A panzerwerke and an ouverage typically had series' of 4 small bunkers radiating out (connected by an underground pathway) with one central larger bunker for heavier weapons and command station (like an outstretched hand)

There was of course substantial mining, and dragon's teeth put in front of these positions. Kaufman estimates a little under 600 bunkers built on the northern front; over 700 built on the central front and has no estimation for the southern (since this was comprehensively demolished by the soviet union and scrapped by the Poles after the war)... but given the construction ratios of the other two sectors (since this was the longest sector) it should have had over 700 bunkers complete as well.

Even with the project only 75 percent complete the OKH estimated it needed 20k men to garrison all of the bunkers they had built

And that is just the bunkers themselves, there was also tremendous work put in with trench digging, mining, laying dragon's teeth and emplaceing weapons

The job was approximately 75 percent complete so that is 450 million RM out of 600 in the field (I assume they spent more than 450 since they probably procured a lot of the materials to finish the job, and the cancelation was sudden)

I'm not defending the bogus stopping ability or quality of the line either, just that the financials, steel and labor could have gone into other projects
 
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Beating a Dead Sea Lion

All right, I have my copy of Mr. & Mrs. Kaufman's Maginot Imitations (hereinafter referred to as MI) in my hands. I also have the Kaufmans' Fortress Third Reich (usually hereinafter referred to as FTR), which is probably a better guide than MI (and much less expensive--my new copy copy cost me $6.00 or so, iirc, due to having a wrinkled cover, as opposed to $77 :eek: or so for MI cost, iirc). I am also looking for my copy of the Kaufman's Fortress Europe.

Unfortunately, what I have read in both MI and FTR, as well as in Mr. Reiss's article, The Fortified Front: Oder–Warthe–Bogen near the pre-1939 German eastern border, disagrees with what you generally claim and, specifically what you claim what the Kaufman's wrote in MI. There are particular disagreements about the number of fortifications, the amount of resources, particularly steel, involved in the OWB, the amount tunneling done, the timing of the construction, and the general defenses of Germany's eastern borders. Over all, you seem to have been confused over what the Kaufmans wrote in MI.

That you or anyone else would be confused in reading MI or any of these texts is not surprising. The books and articles are rather clumsily written and badly edited. Nor are they are particularly consistent in their use of their terms. For example, on page 10 of MI, the Kaufmans state give one definition for the Ostwall/Eastwall, which encompasses the entirety of all the German defenses on the eastern frontier of Germany, but later implies that the OWB Line is the entire Ostwall. Similarly, Gunther Reiss's article seems to use the terms interchangeably at one point. Terms in general are not well defined and considerable re-reading and cross-checking is needed. (Just reviewing about 100 pages of text and typing this up took me hours.) There is even an end note in MI noting, in essence, scholars on this matter do not use the terms consistently.

Let's look at what is written in MI, FTR, and Reiss's article.

The defenses of Germany's eastern frontier are discussed in the Chapter 2 of MI, The East Wall, which in German is (obviously) der Ostwall. On page 10 of MI the Ostwall is described:
On paper, the East Wall stretched from Czech border to the Baltic, consisting of three distinct regions, one heavily defended and two more lightly defended. The first area, known as the Oder Quadrilateral, eventually evolved into the Oder-Warthe Bend (OWB) line. The Germans called it Festungsfront OWB (Fortified Front OWB). It ran from Kustrin along the Oder south to Frankfort on the Oder. An advanced position was added to the initial work done in the 1920s, which became in 1936 the main position that ran north-south along Warthe and Obra rivers and across the gap between Obra and Oder rivers. The Nischlitz-Litz line was integrated into this new lines in some areas, and formed a rearward position in others. The Warthe from Landsberg to Kustrin and the Oder from the vicinity of Krossen to Frankfurt on the Oder were added to created the quadrilateral position, but these two flanking positions were never fortified. To the north of OWB line lay the Pomeranian Position, and to the south, the Oder Position, neither of which was as strong as the OWB Line. After Hitler's appointment as chancellor in 1933, work began on permanent fortifications along all three positions that would eventually constitute the East Wall: the Pomeranian Line, the OWB Line, and Oder Line.
Chapter Two of MI goes on to discuss in depth about East Wall. Most of the chapter concentrates on OWB Line portion of the Ost Wall. Notably, the chapter shows how much of the OWB Line's work was completed prior to 1936. Construction was stepped up in 1933 under Fritz Todt. Structures built prior to 1936 included bridges, water defenses, dams, and blockhouses. In addition, a road network was constructed--which was used in the German invasion of Poland. As much of the work and money expended on the OWB was both done prior to 1936 and was needed for the German invasion of Poland, your assumptions of both savings and benefits are wrong. You have to go further back for a POD for an effective savings from reducing the Ostwall and you make the Germany's invasion far more difficult. Another butterfly is the effect on the West Wall. IM points out at p. 13 that the fortifications built on OWB Line served as a testing ground for weapons and construction of fortified positions such as the West Wall (and, later, the Atlantic Wall). For example, resistance of armor plate and concrete were tested.

Chapter Two of MI notes on p.13 et seq that the first bunkers in the OWB line were built in 1934 and were class C bunkers, which had very little armor--about 60 mm thick at the gun shields--and which were only able to resist guns of 75 mm or 105 mm. The text's description indicates the C works lacked the armored 5.5 ton armored cupolas/ouvrages seen in the B works. For an explanation in depth of the meaning of the bunker/panzerwerke, please see the online article by Gunther Reiss to which I linked earlier.) Work on the first 13 panzerwerkes of type B strength began in 1935 (p. 17). The type B had facility had more armor than the C, generally having two armored cupolas of 5.5 tons. MI points the Type A panzerwerkes, which which were to use 38 tons of armor plate (not 2 x 38 tons as you report), were never completed either in East Wall, as the Germans decided they did not need such a well armored bunker against the Poles, or in the West Wall.

MI
states on page 19 that a total of 83 panzerwerkes and 14 machinegun bunkers with garages for 37 mm antitank guns were completed in the OWB line by 1939 when Hitler put a stop to almost all construction along the East Wall. All told, the OWB, strongest section of the East Wall had 100 structures, of which 83 were the armored panzerwerkes. The Reiss article states the OWB had a total of the 133 armored cupolas/turrets, though the article is not clear whether these are all B type turrets/cupolas as opposed to lighter types). As to troops, 4,300 men would have been required to man fully the OWB Line according to MI on p. 26.

As to the tunnel system with the underground railroad that was part of OWB Line, MI states construction started in late 1936 and halted in July of 1938. MI states that only about ten kilometres of a projected forty kilometres was completed before work was halted. More importantly, as far as resource reallocation, prior to the beginning of the project, much of the completed tunnel system was already in existence in the form of mines. (IM, pp.24-26.) Other tunnels did exist, such as those connectiing various elements of a werkegruppen.

In sum the relatively short (approximately 40 km) OWB Line consisted of the unfinished tunnel and the 100+ structures, including twenty six type B fortifications (according to Reiss). This was the most heavily defended and most densely constructed section of the Ost Wall.

Besides OWB Line, the Ost Wall had two other sections, the Pomeranian Line and the Oder Line. Though these two lines were far longer the OWB, these two lines were also far, far less heavily protected. To give you an idea how unimpressive these were compared to OWB line, MI only spends 2 ½ pages describing these two lines, compared to the over 15 pages spent describing the OWB line. In a more head to head comparison, the OWB line had 26 type B panzerwerkes, MI reports the Pomeranian Line had just 11 "heavy fortifications" (which the text implies were type B), and MI makes no report of the Oder Line having any type B works, panzerwerkes, or "heavy fortifications."

The Pomeranian Line was begun in 1931 had 500 emplacements of all types. The line is generally described as much less impressive than the OWB Line, having just the aforementioned eleven heavy fortifications, which were incorporated into 8 werkegruppen with some of the structures. Some of these eleven heavy fortifications, which MI seems to imply were built to type B standards, completed before 1935 before those in the OWB Line.

The Oder Line is listed as having 778 emplacements over its 250 km. Again, MI reports no specific armored structures incorporated into the Oder Line. The map in MI on page 83 lists the Oder Line as being "light fortifications," as opposed to the OWB Line, which is listed as "heavy fortifications," and the Pomeranian Line, which is just listed as "Fortifications."

I specifically want to point this out: At no point in my copy of Kaufman'a MI is there anything about 600 bunkers on the Northern front nor 700 bunkers on the Central front. Kaufman's books use the terms structures or emplacements, in giving total numbers of items in the three lines of the Ost Wall. MI gives the number of total structures or emplacements on the OWB line as more than 100, on the Pomeranian line as 500, and Oder Line and 778. These emplacements include such things as barracks, machine gun rings, guardhouses, observations posts, etc., and not just bunkers. I believe your confusion arises from page 12 of MI. Here the book reviews the numbering of the panzerwerkes (that is, the identifying numbers for the panzerwerkes), rather than the actual numbers of panzerwerkes, in the OWB Line. You appear to have mistaken these serial or identify numbers used on the each of the three fronts for the actual number of PzWs. On the Southern sector, the serial number begin with the 600s, the Central sector started with 700s, and Northern section started with 800.

Also, I believe in one of your posts, you have confused or conflated the term panzerwerke with the term werkeguppen. A panzerwerke was an individual armored structure, such as a Type B PzW. A werkegruppen consisted of one or more of the panzerwerkes along with other structures and things. This is explained in detail, with diagrams, in the Kaufman's Fortress Third Reich.

As to the figure of twenty thousand men need to man the lines, this is total needed to man the lines to guard the entire German eastern frontier, which is what the thee lines guarded, when the army is at full mobilization. Most of these troops were older reserve troops. Twenty thousand sounds to be a pretty reasonable number when you figure the lines protect frontier of around 500 km. That's around 40 or 50 men for each kilometer during full mobilization. For a chart listing the complete order of battle, see pp. 108-109, FTR.

The sum of all this, and the information in the Reiss articles, reveals a number of things that undercut your claims about OWB (and the entire Ostwall).

First, the line was no where as near as extensive as you had thought. There are probably fewer than 200 machine gun turrets, weighing around 5.5 tons in weight, and various other minor armored pieces, such as light armored cupolas and gun shields in the entire East Wall, not just the OWB Line. Allowing for 1100 tons of armor for 200 turrets and twice as much, 2200 tons of armor for all the other emplacements, you free up just 3300 tons of armor, and that assumes that all the armor was made after your POD in 1936. Allow a generous 20 tons of rebar and other steel for 83 panzerwkes in the OWB line and the 11 panzerwerkes in the Pomeranian Line, and a very generous of 5 tons of rebar steel and other steel in the other 1300 or so emplacements in Ostwall (even though many of these structures were constructed prior to your POD in 1936 and were just earthenwork shelters or structures or concrete and/or masonry shelters), you still have less than 5,000 tons of steel, in addition to aforementioned 3300 tons of armor, for a total 8300 tons. That, of course is probably high by a factor of two or three, as I have used very generous estimates and we are talking about steel much of which in OTL was already used prior your 1936 POD. Still, whether the amount of steel saved is 4200 tons or 8300 tons, the amount is just not that much--at most one light cruiser's worth of steel and probably not that much.

Second, as I noted above, much of the work was done prior to the 1936 point of departure. A cancellation in July of 1936 would not free up these resources. Thus, even less money and steel is saved.

Third, much of what was built was used for other things. The OWB line, as Reiss notes, was stripped to equip the Westwall, helping keep the French out in 1940. The roads of the Ostwall were used in the invasion Poland. The Ostwall in general and the Pomeranian Line in particular tied down Polish troops. Stopping the Ostwall in 1936 means that the German's will have to find resources elsewhere to do such things as design and build up the Westwall, tie down the Polish army, build the roads needed to transport the Heer to the Polish frontier so Poland can be invaded, etc.

Given this and other facts set out in the books and the article I cite, it is pretty clear that you need a different point of departure. The OWB Line and even the entire Ostwall simply did not consume the amount of resources after 1936 that you hope to free up by halting its construction two years sooner.

Researching the Ost Wall revealed another problem with the assumption for this timeline. Not surprisingly, it goes back to your hope to come up with a justification for the Heer to procure more of the 150 mm K-18 kanones. Reviewing all this material on fortifications pretty much reminded me that the Heer knew the Maginot Line's fortifications for the most part were able to resist the shells of the 150 mm K-18 kanone. (There was a reason that Krupp was making the two enormous 80 cm kanone for attacking the Maginot Line, and it was not just an unhealthy fascination with the gigantic. The French, in designing and building the Maginot Line took into account the German seige artillery, such as the Gamma Morser, from the Great War.) Hence, your reason for the Heer to want to acquire more of these clumsy, expensive, nearly immobile, slow firing, slow to set up weapons has disappeared. It would make no sense to acquire more of these.

The Great General Staff Zossen Germany December 1936

The first quartermaster general was critical in shaping how the German army would be built and equipped following Hitler's subsequent expansions of the army's size and potential role in Europe. Manstein and his mentor Ludwig Beck had many battles to fight from many quarters, both within their services many sects (especially with armored enthusiasts like Heinz Guderian and Fritz Bayerlin) but also there was a fierce competition for funds and resources being waged with the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe.

One thing that had impressed itself beyond most on Manstein was France's recently completed "Maginot Line"... a series of well constructed fortifications meant to shield France's eastern border from direct assault. Detailed sketches and skematics where aquired by a number of countries including Germany. Many of the design elements that went into the Maginot Line where now being incorporated in the "west wall" which would similarly shield Germany from a French attack.

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The well constructed Maginot Line presented many challenges to Germany and her first quartermaster general

Manstein, and his masters wanted a similarly well built defensive line to be constructed along the Oder river, which would add on to work that had been going on there well before Hitler came to power. However the enormous cost, and vast amounts of resources required in order to build the thousands of block houses Manstein envisioned caused a serious battle with Hermann Goering, who was tasked with leading Germany's various 4 and 5 year economic/military schemes. Goering's caustic line during a planning session with Hitler Why does the army need all this money for a defensive line against Poland when we are building them up to be able to crush Poland outright struck a cord with Hitler who shut the project down. Manstein, and Beck where extremely bitter, and this became the first in a long series of feuds between Manstein and the head of the Luftwaffe. Funds previously earmarked for the Oder Line where gobbled up by the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe

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Goering convinces Hitler to cancel the Oder Line and spend the money and resources elsewhere.


You are underestimating the resources material, financial and labor that went into the Oder line... it had THOUSANDS of block houses that took highly skilled welders and engineers to make and used hundreds of thousands of pounds of reinforced steel to form the bunkers... having that project be cancelled and resources directed elsewhere can have a huge impact (for example allowing Rheinmetal to take on more workers and set up additional production lines if they where given more contracts)
Well the Oder Line is a production of epic proportions... it has thousands of armored block houses... the small type of block house required 10 tonnes of reinforced steel plates and the larger type required over 30; they also employed thousands of workers (including numerous skilled welders and engineer types); it was also enormously expensive to produce this line... so it can turn into tangible projects in other areas. (ill go over the effects on the LW and KM later in a following update)

Now of course information on this is difficult to obtain due to the fact that these lines are now in modern day poland, and the polish government gobbled up a lot of structures for scrap

but according to the maginot immitations by kaufman and kaufman on the central front approximately 40 kilometers of 40 meter deep tunneling was done to serve the central front of the OWB (a substantial engineering project) and 83 out of 114 "panzerwerke" where completed before Hitler canceled the rest of the construction in late 1938. A panzerwerke was similar to a french "ouverage" from the maginot line which could have 15 to 25 armored block houses. The book states that a small block house used two 5 tonne armored plates; and a large block house used two 38 tonne armored plates. A panzerwerke and an ouverage typically had series' of 4 small bunkers radiating out (connected by an underground pathway) with one central larger bunker for heavier weapons and command station (like an outstretched hand)

There was of course substantial mining, and dragon's teeth put in front of these positions. Kaufman estimates a little under 600 bunkers built on the northern front; over 700 built on the central front and has no estimation for the southern (since this was comprehensively demolished by the soviet union and scrapped by the Poles after the war)... but given the construction ratios of the other two sectors (since this was the longest sector) it should have had over 700 bunkers complete as well.

Even with the project only 75 percent complete the OKH estimated it needed 20k men to garrison all of the bunkers they had built

And that is just the bunkers themselves, there was also tremendous work put in with trench digging, mining, laying dragon's teeth and emplaceing weapons

The job was approximately 75 percent complete so that is 450 million RM out of 600 in the field (I assume they spent more than 450 since they probably procured a lot of the materials to finish the job, and the cancelation was sudden)

I'm not defending the bogus stopping ability or quality of the line either, just that the financials, steel and labor could have gone into other projects
 
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PhilKearny, I must congratulate you sir, that was clearly a substantial bit of work.

So the mass purchase of giant cannons is rendered even more inexplicable, the hydrofoils still may not work in the North Sea and there are no significant resources freed from the East Wall. It's not looking good for this Manstein-wank is it?
 

maverick

Banned
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Congratulations are in order.

That was some good research, strong arguments and a well elaborated thesis, Phil.
 
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