Beating a Dead Sea Lion
All right, I have my copy of Mr. & Mrs. Kaufman's
Maginot Imitations (hereinafter referred to as
MI) in my hands. I also have the Kaufmans'
Fortress Third Reich (usually hereinafter referred to as
FTR), which is probably a better guide than
MI (and much less expensive--my new copy copy cost me $6.00 or so, iirc, due to having a wrinkled cover, as opposed to $77

or so for
MI cost, iirc). I am also looking for my copy of the Kaufman's
Fortress Europe.
Unfortunately, what I have read in both
MI and
FTR, as well as in
Mr. Reiss's article, The Fortified Front: Oder–Warthe–Bogen near the pre-1939 German eastern border, disagrees with what you generally claim and, specifically what you claim what the Kaufman's wrote in
MI. There are particular disagreements about the number of fortifications, the amount of resources, particularly steel, involved in the OWB, the amount tunneling done, the timing of the construction, and the general defenses of Germany's eastern borders. Over all, you seem to have been confused over what the Kaufmans wrote in
MI.
That you or anyone else would be confused in reading
MI or any of these texts is not surprising. The books and articles are rather clumsily written and badly edited. Nor are they are particularly consistent in their use of their terms. For example, on page 10 of
MI, the Kaufmans state give one definition for the Ostwall/Eastwall, which encompasses the entirety of all the German defenses on the eastern frontier of Germany, but later implies that the OWB Line is the entire Ostwall. Similarly, Gunther Reiss's article seems to use the terms interchangeably at one point. Terms in general are not well defined and considerable re-reading and cross-checking is needed. (Just reviewing about 100 pages of text and typing this up took me hours.) There is even an end note in
MI noting, in essence, scholars on this matter do not use the terms consistently.
Let's look at what is written in
MI,
FTR, and Reiss's article.
The defenses of Germany's eastern frontier are discussed in the Chapter 2 of
MI, The East Wall, which in German is (obviously) der Ostwall. On page 10 of
MI the Ostwall is described:
On paper, the East Wall stretched from Czech border to the Baltic, consisting of three distinct regions, one heavily defended and two more lightly defended. The first area, known as the Oder Quadrilateral, eventually evolved into the Oder-Warthe Bend (OWB) line. The Germans called it Festungsfront OWB (Fortified Front OWB). It ran from Kustrin along the Oder south to Frankfort on the Oder. An advanced position was added to the initial work done in the 1920s, which became in 1936 the main position that ran north-south along Warthe and Obra rivers and across the gap between Obra and Oder rivers. The Nischlitz-Litz line was integrated into this new lines in some areas, and formed a rearward position in others. The Warthe from Landsberg to Kustrin and the Oder from the vicinity of Krossen to Frankfurt on the Oder were added to created the quadrilateral position, but these two flanking positions were never fortified. To the north of OWB line lay the Pomeranian Position, and to the south, the Oder Position, neither of which was as strong as the OWB Line. After Hitler's appointment as chancellor in 1933, work began on permanent fortifications along all three positions that would eventually constitute the East Wall: the Pomeranian Line, the OWB Line, and Oder Line.
Chapter Two of
MI goes on to discuss in depth about East Wall. Most of the chapter concentrates on OWB Line portion of the Ost Wall. Notably, the chapter shows how much of the OWB Line's work was completed prior to 1936. Construction was stepped up in 1933 under Fritz Todt. Structures built prior to 1936 included bridges, water defenses, dams, and blockhouses. In addition, a road network was constructed--which was used in the German invasion of Poland. As much of the work and money expended on the OWB was both done prior to 1936 and was needed for the German invasion of Poland, your assumptions of both savings and benefits are wrong. You have to go further back for a POD for an effective savings from reducing the Ostwall and you make the Germany's invasion far more difficult. Another butterfly is the effect on the West Wall. IM points out at p. 13 that the fortifications built on OWB Line served as a testing ground for weapons and construction of fortified positions such as the West Wall (and, later, the Atlantic Wall). For example, resistance of armor plate and concrete were tested.
Chapter Two of
MI notes on p.13
et seq that the first bunkers in the OWB line were built in 1934 and were class C bunkers, which had very little armor--about 60 mm thick at the gun shields--and which were only able to resist guns of 75 mm or 105 mm. The text's description indicates the C works lacked the armored 5.5 ton armored cupolas/ouvrages seen in the B works. For an explanation in depth of the meaning of the bunker/panzerwerke, please see the online article by Gunther Reiss to which I linked earlier.) Work on the first 13 panzerwerkes of type B strength began in 1935 (p. 17). The type B had facility had more armor than the C, generally having two armored cupolas of 5.5 tons. MI points the Type A panzerwerkes, which which were to use 38 tons of armor plate (not 2 x 38 tons as you report), were never completed either in East Wall, as the Germans decided they did not need such a well armored bunker against the Poles, or in the West Wall.
MI states on page 19 that a total of 83 panzerwerkes and 14 machinegun bunkers with garages for 37 mm antitank guns were completed in the OWB line by 1939 when Hitler put a stop to almost all construction along the East Wall. All told, the OWB, strongest section of the East Wall had 100 structures, of which 83 were the armored panzerwerkes. The Reiss article states the OWB had a total of the 133 armored cupolas/turrets, though the article is not clear whether these are all B type turrets/cupolas as opposed to lighter types). As to troops, 4,300 men would have been required to man fully the OWB Line according to
MI on p. 26.
As to the tunnel system with the underground railroad that was part of OWB Line,
MI states construction started in late 1936 and halted in July of 1938.
MI states that only about ten kilometres of a projected forty kilometres was completed before work was halted. More importantly, as far as resource reallocation, prior to the beginning of the project, much of the completed tunnel system was already in existence in the form of mines. (
IM, pp.24-26.) Other tunnels did exist, such as those connectiing various elements of a werkegruppen.
In sum the relatively short (approximately 40 km) OWB Line consisted of the unfinished tunnel and the 100+ structures, including twenty six type B fortifications (according to Reiss). This was the most heavily defended and most densely constructed section of the Ost Wall.
Besides OWB Line, the Ost Wall had two other sections, the Pomeranian Line and the Oder Line. Though these two lines were far longer the OWB, these two lines were also far, far less heavily protected. To give you an idea how unimpressive these were compared to OWB line,
MI only spends 2 ½ pages describing these two lines, compared to the over 15 pages spent describing the OWB line. In a more head to head comparison, the OWB line had 26 type B panzerwerkes,
MI reports the Pomeranian Line had just 11 "heavy fortifications" (which the text implies were type B), and
MI makes no report of the Oder Line having any type B works, panzerwerkes, or "heavy fortifications."
The Pomeranian Line was begun in 1931 had 500 emplacements of all types. The line is generally described as much less impressive than the OWB Line, having just the aforementioned eleven heavy fortifications, which were incorporated into 8 werkegruppen with some of the structures. Some of these eleven heavy fortifications, which MI seems to imply were built to type B standards, completed before 1935 before those in the OWB Line.
The Oder Line is listed as having 778 emplacements over its 250 km. Again, MI reports no specific armored structures incorporated into the Oder Line. The map in
MI on page 83 lists the Oder Line as being "light fortifications," as opposed to the OWB Line, which is listed as "heavy fortifications," and the Pomeranian Line, which is just listed as "Fortifications."
I specifically want to point this out: At no point in my copy of Kaufman'a
MI is there anything about 600 bunkers on the Northern front nor 700 bunkers on the Central front. Kaufman's books use the terms structures or emplacements, in giving total numbers of items in the three lines of the Ost Wall.
MI gives the number of total structures or emplacements on the OWB line as more than 100, on the Pomeranian line as 500, and Oder Line and 778. These emplacements include such things as barracks, machine gun rings, guardhouses, observations posts, etc., and not just bunkers. I believe your confusion arises from page 12 of
MI. Here the book reviews the numbering of the panzerwerkes (that is, the identifying numbers for the panzerwerkes), rather than the actual numbers of panzerwerkes, in the OWB Line. You appear to have mistaken these serial or identify numbers used on the each of the three fronts for the actual number of PzWs. On the Southern sector, the serial number begin with the 600s, the Central sector started with 700s, and Northern section started with 800.
Also, I believe in one of your posts, you have confused or conflated the term panzerwerke with the term werkeguppen. A panzerwerke was an individual armored structure, such as a Type B PzW. A werkegruppen consisted of one or more of the panzerwerkes along with other structures and things. This is explained in detail, with diagrams, in the Kaufman's
Fortress Third Reich.
As to the figure of twenty thousand men need to man the lines, this is total needed to man the lines to guard the entire German eastern frontier, which is what the thee lines guarded, when the army is at full mobilization. Most of these troops were older reserve troops. Twenty thousand sounds to be a pretty reasonable number when you figure the lines protect frontier of around 500 km. That's around 40 or 50 men for each kilometer during full mobilization. For a chart listing the complete order of battle, see pp. 108-109,
FTR.
The sum of all this, and the information in the Reiss articles, reveals a number of things that undercut your claims about OWB (and the entire Ostwall).
First, the line was no where as near as extensive as you had thought. There are probably fewer than 200 machine gun turrets, weighing around 5.5 tons in weight, and various other minor armored pieces, such as light armored cupolas and gun shields in the entire East Wall, not just the OWB Line. Allowing for 1100 tons of armor for 200 turrets and twice as much, 2200 tons of armor for all the other emplacements, you free up just 3300 tons of armor, and that assumes that all the armor was made after your POD in 1936. Allow a generous 20 tons of rebar and other steel for 83 panzerwkes in the OWB line and the 11 panzerwerkes in the Pomeranian Line, and a very generous of 5 tons of rebar steel and other steel in the other 1300 or so emplacements in Ostwall (even though many of these structures were constructed prior to your POD in 1936 and were just earthenwork shelters or structures or concrete and/or masonry shelters), you still have less than 5,000 tons of steel, in addition to aforementioned 3300 tons of armor, for a total 8300 tons. That, of course is probably high by a factor of two or three, as I have used very generous estimates and we are talking about steel much of which in OTL was already used prior your 1936 POD. Still, whether the amount of steel saved is 4200 tons or 8300 tons, the amount is just not that much--at most one light cruiser's worth of steel and probably not that much.
Second, as I noted above, much of the work was done prior to the 1936 point of departure. A cancellation in July of 1936 would not free up these resources. Thus, even less money and steel is saved.
Third, much of what was built was used for other things. The OWB line, as Reiss notes, was stripped to equip the Westwall, helping keep the French out in 1940. The roads of the Ostwall were used in the invasion Poland. The Ostwall in general and the Pomeranian Line in particular tied down Polish troops. Stopping the Ostwall in 1936 means that the German's will have to find resources elsewhere to do such things as design and build up the Westwall, tie down the Polish army, build the roads needed to transport the Heer to the Polish frontier so Poland can be invaded, etc.
Given this and other facts set out in the books and the article I cite, it is pretty clear that you need a different point of departure. The OWB Line and even the entire Ostwall simply did not consume the amount of resources after 1936 that you hope to free up by halting its construction two years sooner.
Researching the Ost Wall revealed another problem with the assumption for this timeline. Not surprisingly, it goes back to your hope to come up with a justification for the Heer to procure more of the 150 mm K-18 kanones. Reviewing all this material on fortifications pretty much reminded me that the Heer knew the Maginot Line's fortifications for the most part were able to resist the shells of the 150 mm K-18 kanone. (There was a reason that Krupp was making the two enormous 80 cm kanone for attacking the Maginot Line, and it was not just an unhealthy fascination with the gigantic. The French, in designing and building the Maginot Line took into account the German seige artillery, such as the Gamma Morser, from the Great War.) Hence, your reason for the Heer to want to acquire more of these clumsy, expensive, nearly immobile, slow firing, slow to set up weapons has disappeared. It would make no sense to acquire more of these.
The Great General Staff Zossen Germany December 1936
The first quartermaster general was critical in shaping how the German army would be built and equipped following Hitler's subsequent expansions of the army's size and potential role in Europe. Manstein and his mentor Ludwig Beck had many battles to fight from many quarters, both within their services many sects (especially with armored enthusiasts like Heinz Guderian and Fritz Bayerlin) but also there was a fierce competition for funds and resources being waged with the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe.
One thing that had impressed itself beyond most on Manstein was France's recently completed "Maginot Line"... a series of well constructed fortifications meant to shield France's eastern border from direct assault. Detailed sketches and skematics where aquired by a number of countries including Germany. Many of the design elements that went into the Maginot Line where now being incorporated in the "west wall" which would similarly shield Germany from a French attack.
The well constructed Maginot Line presented many challenges to Germany and her first quartermaster general
Manstein, and his masters wanted a similarly well built defensive line to be constructed along the Oder river, which would add on to work that had been going on there well before Hitler came to power. However the enormous cost, and vast amounts of resources required in order to build the thousands of block houses Manstein envisioned caused a serious battle with Hermann Goering, who was tasked with leading Germany's various 4 and 5 year economic/military schemes. Goering's caustic line during a planning session with Hitler
Why does the army need all this money for a defensive line against Poland when we are building them up to be able to crush Poland outright struck a cord with Hitler who shut the project down. Manstein, and Beck where extremely bitter, and this became the first in a long series of feuds between Manstein and the head of the Luftwaffe. Funds previously earmarked for the Oder Line where gobbled up by the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe
Goering convinces Hitler to cancel the Oder Line and spend the money and resources elsewhere.
You are underestimating the resources material, financial and labor that went into the Oder line... it had THOUSANDS of block houses that took highly skilled welders and engineers to make and used hundreds of thousands of pounds of reinforced steel to form the bunkers... having that project be cancelled and resources directed elsewhere can have a huge impact (for example allowing Rheinmetal to take on more workers and set up additional production lines if they where given more contracts)
Well the Oder Line is a production of epic proportions... it has thousands of armored block houses... the small type of block house required 10 tonnes of reinforced steel plates and the larger type required over 30; they also employed thousands of workers (including numerous skilled welders and engineer types); it was also enormously expensive to produce this line... so it can turn into tangible projects in other areas. (ill go over the effects on the LW and KM later in a following update)
Now of course information on this is difficult to obtain due to the fact that these lines are now in modern day poland, and the polish government gobbled up a lot of structures for scrap
but according to the maginot immitations by kaufman and kaufman on the central front approximately 40 kilometers of 40 meter deep tunneling was done to serve the central front of the OWB (a substantial engineering project) and 83 out of 114 "panzerwerke" where completed before Hitler canceled the rest of the construction in late 1938. A panzerwerke was similar to a french "ouverage" from the maginot line which could have 15 to 25 armored block houses. The book states that a small block house used two 5 tonne armored plates; and a large block house used two 38 tonne armored plates. A panzerwerke and an ouverage typically had series' of 4 small bunkers radiating out (connected by an underground pathway) with one central larger bunker for heavier weapons and command station (like an outstretched hand)
There was of course substantial mining, and dragon's teeth put in front of these positions. Kaufman estimates a little under 600 bunkers built on the northern front; over 700 built on the central front and has no estimation for the southern (since this was comprehensively demolished by the soviet union and scrapped by the Poles after the war)... but given the construction ratios of the other two sectors (since this was the longest sector) it should have had over 700 bunkers complete as well.
Even with the project only 75 percent complete the OKH estimated it needed 20k men to garrison all of the bunkers they had built
And that is just the bunkers themselves, there was also tremendous work put in with trench digging, mining, laying dragon's teeth and emplaceing weapons
The job was approximately 75 percent complete so that is 450 million RM out of 600 in the field (I assume they spent more than 450 since they probably procured a lot of the materials to finish the job, and the cancelation was sudden)
I'm not defending the bogus stopping ability or quality of the line either, just that the financials, steel and labor could have gone into other projects