Can you provide some figures? IIRC something like (according to the USSBS) 2.35% of production losses was due to direct damage/cleanup while ~14% was due to missed work days calling in. Indeed, there is no question that bombing had a morale effect, but according to both the RAF and USAAF the night bombing campaign failed to achieve much in the way of actual damage and, indeed, in this hypothetical ATL the loss of daylight bombing would thus reduce the morale effect in half, given the Germans would now have the daytime free.
They wouldn't, and I'd really like you to read with greater attention what I post.
1. A German effort against the USAAF, even if successful, wouldn't automatically deter Bomber Command, which at this time was
routinely carrying out daytime bombing;
2. Assuming the Germans also attack British daytime raids,
both the British and the US bombers did at this time carry out daytime attacks under 10/10 cloud cover. Sometimes this would still leave them vulnerable to over-the-clouds fighter attacks, and sometimes meant the fighters, on the contrary, could not see them in the clouds.
Both points were already made in my previous posts, so please pay more attention.
As to the figures, see below. They are but an example, taken from the book I recommend.
Again, maybe or maybe not. During the Big Week the Luftwaffe was able to destroy 226 Bombers and that's without the R4M. Pilot and production/maintenance had obviously declined but Galland had been making an effort to preserve the best as much as possible.
The Germans lost 1.5 fighter for every bomber they downed during that week. The Allies could replace their losses, the Germans could not. The Jagdwaffe in February 1945 was weaker, and immensely less well trained. The units capable to use those rockets were few, and even if we assume an ATL in which more units receive training, that will be very poor training, given the desperate shortage of fuel. And it's not as if having those rockets makes the German fighters immune from the Allied escort fighters.
Okay, I didn't suggest the British solely carried out city bombing but I was instead responding to the specific example of Dresden you cited. As it were, when directly targeting industries, the official studies conducted by the Allies after the war showed they had little direct effect.
Yes, that's exactly what you are missing. That area bombing was effective through
indirect effects.
So here are a few figures, taking Dresden as an example.
Zeiss-Ikon was the main employer, with over 14,000 employees in many medium-to-small separate production units. Several of these factories were not directly affected at all. Yet on average, in February 1945, more than half of those 14,000 employees did not show up for work.
4,000 of those employees worked in the Goehle-Werke, untouched by bombs. Two weeks after the bombing, about 50% of the workforce was present.
The Ica-Werke factory had suffered material damage, and addition to that, at the end of February the workforce, 2,800 persons before the bombing, was less than 500.
The Zeiss-Ernemann factory had suffered only minor damage, but the workforce went from 2500 to 500.
In addition, there also
was direct damage. The Alpha-Werke and Delta-Werke factories, and the Petzold & Auhorn subsidiary were razed. Other factories suffered heavy damage.