Denmark in CP, what happens to its colonies?

... the Faeroe Islands would likely stay under Danish control...
If they're losing all their other territories why would they be allowed to keep the Faroe Islands? Geographically it's closer to the British mainland than Denmark and you have to go past Shetland to get there.
 
That is a Strategic interest, not a claim for conquest

In a scenario where Iceland has taken up arms with Germany that strategic interest will be more than enough justification as with Malta, Cyprus, etc.

Who's going to disagree with the British for the sake of 88,000? Cyprus had more than that.
 
Look, how exactly is the Faroe Island going to cause any damage to the British? It was occupied without loss in World War 2 (though in this case that case the homelands didn't side with Nazi Germany and the people were on their side) but should the British want they could literally just bomb it from well out of range. What casualties are going to appear? And certainly I highly doubt any amount of deaths would cause the British Empire to not decide to at the very least reduce the capacity of Icelandic ports.

And again we can look at the Invasion of Iceland in WW2 as proof that it really is not a problem even when landing without notice and with terrible planning they only brought 1,000 men

I'm pretty sure the Faroes were out of range of WWI-era bombers, and if not, the weather and the prototypical nature of WWI bombers would make any bombing attack against the islands difficult.

And there's a huge difference in the British occupation of the Faroes in WWII and any hypothetical occupation here. Both Denmark and Germany have a vested interest in defending these islands, so can probably spare a small garrison to make taking them difficult. But yes, they can bomb it--by sea, but probably not air.

Iceland is any difficulty the Faroes might have multiplied exponentially. It's also most certainly out of range for air power. The main decision will have to be to bomb it by sea if the potential casualties for a land campaign look too unacceptably high.

Armed civilians, yes, no doubt they pose a mighty threat! How many guns were in civilian hands in 1914 Iceland? If Denmark attempts to fortify the Faroes then the UK will move far faster before war is even declared. Something like the Cuban blockade might develop prior to the war starting if Denmark and Germany are openly shipping troops to the islands. Plus if that's the case it'll give Britain more time to put troops in France because it's an indication that Germany will force their hand.

I was more thinking passing out guns to a militia to add extra firepower. And I don't think they'd fortify it before the war would be declared, but if you drag Denmark into this, they can put a certain number of men in both areas plus raise local regiment(s).

I'm sure the multimillion men armies of the Allies can spare 9,000 men to take out Iceland. Or no, in your world they would close their eyes and allow U-Boats and Danish subs to restock there? Wonder why they didn't do it in WW2 too... Speaking of which they stationed 10s of thousands of troops there in WW2 (Foreign troop numbers in some years equalled 25% of the population or almost 50% of the native male population and this is with a largely supportive Iceland!) so how terrible that reality is not as smart as you...

And would you stop bringing up pissing of Iceland? This whole think is SOLELY BASED ON the premise that Iceland is not cooperating. None the less stop moving the goal posts, nothing you've said makes it a "difficult campaign". 9,000 men is not a difficult campaign. Troops would be happy they were going to Iceland and not say fighting in the Battle of the Somme. Now that's a difficult campaign.

But remember, those are 9,000 (at least) not going to the Western Front or anywhere else. If Germany delegates Iceland to the Danish military, then they'll lose maybe a few officers to assist Denmark as well as the crew for the submarine bases (also adding to local strength). Iceland can give a thousand men, easily, Denmark can attempt to ship more and at least some will get there (also potentially distracting the Royal Navy).

It's difficult to give analogues for how the campaign would go, but I'm thinking a mixture of the Solomons campaign of WWII but with the climate of the Aleutians campaign (the climate is comparable). Now put that in an era where combat tends to favour the defender, while attempting a naval invasion, which also favours the defender. Trench warfare on Iceland? That doesn't seem particularly inviting. Less than 3,000 Japanese held out for 3 weeks on Attu against 15,000 Americans, an abandoned island (the population was deported beforehand). Now imagine how long 9,000 (at least) Danish and Germans can hold out on an island much bigger, with a large native population who will gladly assist them every step of the way. This means the campaign will drag past the Icelandic summer. Now, granted, the CP are not the WWII Japanese--they'll know when to surrender. But that will be when rescue is impossible, when supplies are absent, and Iceland has no more strategic value to them. And how long will that take? Definitely a couple months.

I don't know where you possibly got the idea that I was advocating the best idea for a CP Iceland. I was merely pointing out that it wouldn't be a difficult campaign and showing that by being grotesque in my misuse of resources to prove that even with a minuscule amount of effort Iceland could be completely dominated. AND YES OF COURSE, 9,000 PEOPLE ARE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN KEEPING THE BRITISH INDUSTRY RUNNING AND IT NOT. SURE.

Also if Britain wanted to keep a CP Iceland they would have a perfectly reasonable claim (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GIUK_gap), and the whole point of the civilian presence was to undermine that. No one is going to be defending Iceland in the defeat table after WW1.

And I'm showing you that given any effort, an Iceland campaign is a very difficult strategic undertaking, especially when the population is against you. Why else didn't the Nazis ever dream of taking the place? I don't know why you keep bringing up WWII when by the standards of military invasions, the British were effectively invited in and absolutely no effort made to defend the place and subsequently, no effort made to resist the invasion.

Now how many British permanently moved to Cyprus during colonial rule there? Now, I suppose they could put in a demand for Iceland and the Faroes, but realistically, we could expect British rule over Iceland to be fleeting (Iceland had a prominent nationalist movement even before WWI, and WWI would only strengthen it). The Faroes might have a bigger chance at having permanent British rule since there is a strong argument to be made that they're too small to be viable as an independent state, but that doesn't stop Faroese nationalism from existing.
 
There was significant opposition to sending the BEF to the Continent OTL, though clearly it was by no means decisive opposition.

But in a TL where the Faeroes, Iceland and Greenland belong to a hostile nation and need to be cleaned up, perhaps this changes and Britain tries a navalist strategy instead -- at least delaying British troops going to the Continent.
 
First I will remind you that literally my only point is disagreeing with the case that invading Iceland in a scenario where Icelanders are hostile would be a difficult campaign.

I'm pretty sure the Faroes were out of range of WWI-era bombers, and if not, the weather and the prototypical nature of WWI bombers would make any bombing attack against the islands difficult.

That was bad wording. I meant bomb as bombard, as in shell, as in ships. Yeah I doubt that old biplanes could make it.

And there's a huge difference in the British occupation of the Faroes in WWII and any hypothetical occupation here. Both Denmark and Germany have a vested interest in defending these islands, so can probably spare a small garrison to make taking them difficult. But yes, they can bomb it--by sea, but probably not air.

Obviously there is a difference. It is useful to compare nonetheless.

Iceland is any difficulty the Faroes might have multiplied exponentially. It's also most certainly out of range for air power. The main decision will have to be to bomb it by sea if the potential casualties for a land campaign look too unacceptably high.

Unacceptably high = any number. Sure, either way not difficult.

I was more thinking passing out guns to a militia to add extra firepower. And I don't think they'd fortify it before the war would be declared, but if you drag Denmark into this, they can put a certain number of men in both areas plus raise local regiment(s).

Good luck raising much of a local militia. Even assuming every man was armed and combat ready that's a paltry number compared to the Western Front. A reminder that even against Nazi Germany in WW2 the percentage of active civilian resistance was only 0.6 to 3 percent.

But remember, those are 9,000 (at least) not going to the Western Front or anywhere else. If Germany delegates Iceland to the Danish military, then they'll lose maybe a few officers to assist Denmark as well as the crew for the submarine bases (also adding to local strength). Iceland can give a thousand men, easily, Denmark can attempt to ship more and at least some will get there (also potentially distracting the Royal Navy)

That doesn't make it difficult. I don't understand this strange logic that because these people won't be at another amphibious assault that the campaign is suddenly difficult. If 1 person has to go shoot a rampaging cow, it's not a difficult campaign just because he's not on the Western Front...

It's difficult to give analogues for how the campaign would go, but I'm thinking a mixture of the Solomons campaign of WWII but with the climate of the Aleutians campaign (the climate is comparable). Now put that in an era where combat tends to favour the defender, while attempting a naval invasion, which also favours the defender. Trench warfare on Iceland? That doesn't seem particularly inviting. Less than 3,000 Japanese held out for 3 weeks on Attu against 15,000 Americans, an abandoned island (the population was deported beforehand). Now imagine how long 9,000 (at least) Danish and Germans can hold out on an island much bigger, with a large native population who will gladly assist them every step of the way. This means the campaign will drag past the Icelandic summer. Now, granted, the CP are not the WWII Japanese--they'll know when to surrender. But that will be when rescue is impossible, when supplies are absent, and Iceland has no more strategic value to them. And how long will that take? Definitely a couple months.

Yeah Germans and Danish are basically Japanese soldiers, what on Earth was I thinking saying it wouldn't be difficult.

The United Kingdom surrenders 1914 after discovering that Iceland will participate in the war. It would be a difficult campaign says Asquith.

I would not describe the Battle of Attu as a "difficult campaign". Gallipoli is a difficult campaign why not use that comparison? The native population of Iceland is not large. A couple of months is not difficult!

And I'm showing you that given any effort, an Iceland campaign is a very difficult strategic undertaking, especially when the population is against you. Why else didn't the Nazis ever dream of taking the place? I don't know why you keep bringing up WWII when by the standards of military invasions, the British were effectively invited in and absolutely no effort made to defend the place and subsequently, no effort made to resist the invasion.

It is not very difficult! This is ridiculous! So what was Gallipoli if Iceland is very difficult? A walk in the park? Yes, the Nazis were too scared of Iceland to invade. Yes I should never use comparisons at all to invasions of Iceland. Good point, how useless that is!

Now how many British permanently moved to Cyprus during colonial rule there? Now, I suppose they could put in a demand for Iceland and the Faroes, but realistically, we could expect British rule over Iceland to be fleeting (Iceland had a prominent nationalist movement even before WWI, and WWI would only strengthen it). The Faroes might have a bigger chance at having permanent British rule since there is a strong argument to be made that they're too small to be viable as an independent state, but that doesn't stop Faroese nationalism from existing.

Dunno that's hardly relevant. No British would move to Iceland. I was just pointing out that if the British government wanted to they could make it so easy as to literally just ignore the Iceland natives.

I don't know why you are saying realistically. Realistically Iceland would never side against the UK because they would be destroyed.
 
There was significant opposition to sending the BEF to the Continent OTL, though clearly it was by no means decisive opposition.

But in a TL where the Faeroes, Iceland and Greenland belong to a hostile nation and need to be cleaned up, perhaps this changes and Britain tries a navalist strategy instead -- at least delaying British troops going to the Continent.

I completely disagree. A huge motivation in not helping France out was the idea that Britain wouldn't join the war, in fact much of German discussion around the time was whether or not the Plan was worth it if it brought Britain in and you can see that from the Kaiser's comments at the time.

However in the situation where the Danish are allied strongly with Germany is a much more strategically threatening alliance. In this case Britain knows it will join the war and prepares for it as such, including reinforcing France and maybe making a serious difference in defence.
 
I completely disagree. A huge motivation in not helping France out was the idea that Britain wouldn't join the war, in fact much of German discussion around the time was whether or not the Plan was worth it if it brought Britain in and you can see that from the Kaiser's comments at the time.

However in the situation where the Danish are allied strongly with Germany is a much more strategically threatening alliance. In this case Britain knows it will join the war and prepares for it as such, including reinforcing France and maybe making a serious difference in defence.

I'm not suggesting that Britain would stay out, but rather that large hostile colonies placed near Britain, and between Britain and the U.S., likely suitable to host commerce raiders and cruisers, will call for immediate action. This will draw down British strength that could otherwise be sent to the Continent.

The temptation to take out the Faeroes, Iceland and Greenland first, then reassemble major units for despatch to France afterwards, might be pretty strong. Especially given the many Cabinet and Commons members who still resented Grey's unauthorized prewar Army talks with France, and who were not at all convinced, during the first couple of days in August, that Britain's participation in the war should involve sending large forces to the Continent.

Of course, France's poor performance on the battlefield in Aug 1914 would then convince everyone of the need for British forces on the Continent anyway; but whatever happens in the interval might be interesting.
 
I'm not suggesting that Britain would stay out, but rather that large hostile colonies placed near Britain, and between Britain and the U.S., likely suitable to host commerce raiders and cruisers, will call for immediate action. This will draw down British strength that could otherwise be sent to the Continent.

The temptation to take out the Faeroes, Iceland and Greenland first, then reassemble major units for despatch to France afterwards, might be pretty strong. Especially given the many Cabinet and Commons members who still resented Grey's unauthorized prewar Army talks with France, and who were not at all convinced, during the first couple of days in August, that Britain's participation in the war should involve sending large forces to the Continent.

Of course, France's poor performance on the battlefield in Aug 1914 would then convince everyone of the need for British forces on the Continent anyway; but whatever happens in the interval might be interesting.

Well I understand that logic so I suppose it depends on how much of the British Army was sitting at home prior to WW1 starting. If the majority of British Armed Forces were sitting in France anyway then yes, I can see the point you raise. But it is my understanding that the lack of confidence in entering the war and the speed at which the war began meant that the British forces were not all present. In that scenario I do not think that the amount of troops required to subdue the islands would be significant enough to make an overall net negative on British forces in France.

The important difference is that with the inclusion of Denmark and Iceland into the Central Powers means the threat on Britain strategically is much worse than Germans navy (which was bad enough) that can at least be blockaded which I think means that the UK takes a much different attitude in the preparation for the war being far more proactive which I believe should lead to more troops in France.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Briti...Units_not_employed_in_the_Expeditionary_Force

See here for example, things like dispatching Indian troops sooner.
 
First I will remind you that literally my only point is disagreeing with the case that invading Iceland in a scenario where Icelanders are hostile would be a difficult campaign.

Good luck raising much of a local militia. Even assuming every man was armed and combat ready that's a paltry number compared to the Western Front. A reminder that even against Nazi Germany in WW2 the percentage of active civilian resistance was only 0.6 to 3 percent.

See, if Iceland was supportative (I tend to think that would most likely be the case considering the course of Icelandic nationalism), I'd be inclined to agree with you. But you deliberately chose the difficult scenario, which readily leads to plenty of counter-arguments. A supportative Iceland, for all I know, could basically just stage a coup and declare a republic the moment the Royal Navy shows up with some soldiers, and the campaign would end quickly. That's one end of the spectrum for this concept. The opposite end of that is what I'm arguing.

You're still looking at another 1,000 or so free soldiers to be added to the CP manpower pool in Iceland. Presumably in addition to policemen or others being ordered to resist.

That doesn't make it difficult. I don't understand this strange logic that because these people won't be at another amphibious assault that the campaign is suddenly difficult. If 1 person has to go shoot a rampaging cow, it's not a difficult campaign just because he's not on the Western Front...

By difficult, I don't mean impossible, I mean something that raises the question "is this really the most effective way to be spending manpower and economic resources--can we get this done in a better manner?" In which case, yes, an Iceland campaign would be hard enough to raise those questions.

Yeah Germans and Danish are basically Japanese soldiers, what on Earth was I thinking saying it wouldn't be difficult.

The United Kingdom surrenders 1914 after discovering that Iceland will participate in the war. It would be a difficult campaign says Asquith.

I would not describe the Battle of Attu as a "difficult campaign". Gallipoli is a difficult campaign why not use that comparison? The native population of Iceland is not large. A couple of months is not difficult!

I gave you the numbers for Attu, there's also a note that over 2,000 soldiers had to be evacuated for frostbite/weather related illness. There's also the "battle" of Kiska, where many injuries occured due to a mix of friendly fire, mines, and the climate again--no Japanese were present. All of that is a potential to happen in Iceland, where the climate is essentially the same as the Aleutians. Attu was a surprisingly hard fought campaign for the Americans, and was comparable if not worse than some of the more famous island invasions in the Pacific--by numbers, by length of Japanese resistance, etc.

Speaking of the Japanese, as I noted, the New Guinea/Solomons campaign is a good example. Note that the population tended to be hostile against the Japanese and supportative of the Allies. I'd think a supportative population on the levels of Iceland (88,000 in 1914) and the Faroes (almost 20,000) would cause some issues, definitely. As I said, Attu's population was 0 during the battle.

No, Germans and Danes are not WWII Japanese, I already described how they would handle a battle like this and I believe I gave a plausible scenario. When you have a strategic location the enemy is hellbound on taking, you can afford to bleed them until you yourself can bleed no longer. And think of the opportunities--plenty of chances for convoy raiding the logistical ships, you're distracting the Royal Navy as they provide security for those ships, you're making things in general more difficult for the enemy.

Climate-wise, you have some Mediterranean heat for Gallipoli. Climate-wise for Iceland, you have large amounts of rain, wind, and by winter, absolutely no heat at all. Plenty of chances for trench foot, frostbite, etc. Gallipoli in miniature, let's put it as that--victory is possible, if not probably, for the Entente, but only if they are prepared to sacrifice the resources needed for it to neutralise what is basically some U-Boat bases (plus perhaps tying up a few thousand Danish/German soldiers in the meantime).

It is not very difficult! This is ridiculous! So what was Gallipoli if Iceland is very difficult? A walk in the park? Yes, the Nazis were too scared of Iceland to invade. Yes I should never use comparisons at all to invasions of Iceland. Good point, how useless that is!

Dunno that's hardly relevant. No British would move to Iceland. I was just pointing out that if the British government wanted to they could make it so easy as to literally just ignore the Iceland natives.

I don't know why you are saying realistically. Realistically Iceland would never side against the UK because they would be destroyed.[/QUOTE]

Do you still not see the difference between basically being invited in (WWII Iceland/Faroes) and having people actively resist you? I mean, look at the topography of the Faroes and Iceland, it's perfect terrain to mount a defense.

Yes, that is realistic Iceland wouldn't join against the UK, but in 1914, Iceland would be forced to go along with what Denmark wants. Icelanders realistically would probably not want their island turned into a hellish warzone, but you wanted the "difficult" scenario. Maybe the Royal Navy commits some atrocity against some fishermen, I don't know how you'd get Iceland that much behind the war effort.

Oh, and another point I found--St. Pierre and Miquelon contributed almost 10% of their population (400 out of about 4,200 men give or take) to World War I. Granted, this was under France's draft laws, but even with a third of that number of men drafted per capita, the Faroes can give 500 men, Iceland can give about 2,500. Greenland about 400 too, for that matter (though Greenland's social situation is very different).

There's also Danish forces going to the Western Front to consider. Denmark nowadays has an army of about 12,500 men. While Denmark was about half as populous in 1914, that number should still be easy to raise as well as the men require to defend Iceland and Greenland (using the same formula I calculated for Iceland and such, Denmark could contribute up to 80,000 so--more realistically I'd use Portugal as an example, so about 26,000 Danes if we use Portugal's ratio of soldiers sent to population--I'll count Iceland/Faroes separately). Now, take a few thousand British soldiers away from the Western Front and add 20,000 Danish soldiers (minus those meant for Iceland/Faroes)--will that make a difference overall? Doubtful in the big picture, but it will give plenty of Entente generals a headache as well as add to the casualties.
 
See, if Iceland was supportative (I tend to think that would most likely be the case considering the course of Icelandic nationalism), I'd be inclined to agree with you. But you deliberately chose the difficult scenario, which readily leads to plenty of counter-arguments. A supportative Iceland, for all I know, could basically just stage a coup and declare a republic the moment the Royal Navy shows up with some soldiers, and the campaign would end quickly. That's one end of the spectrum for this concept. The opposite end of that is what I'm arguing.

I deliberately chose the scenario? What? Someone said in a situation where Iceland was hostile the campaign would be difficult. No one said in a situation where Iceland was not hostile it would be difficult. Why would I make up a strawman to argue against?

You're still looking at another 1,000 or so free soldiers to be added to the CP manpower pool in Iceland. Presumably in addition to policemen or others being ordered to resist.

Not difficult.

By difficult, I don't mean impossible, I mean something that raises the question "is this really the most effective way to be spending manpower and economic resources--can we get this done in a better manner?" In which case, yes, an Iceland campaign would be hard enough to raise those questions.

What? That's not what difficult means. Since you've literally had to redefine the word difficult to make your point I don't really see much reason to read the rest of your post. Especially since I was very fucking clear that this was not the best use of resources in fact I was clear that it was a completely wasteful and inefficient use of resources just to prove that the Allies don't even have to have functioning brains to be able to squash Iceland like a bug.

The word difficult means it requires considerable skill or effort to accomplish. An invasion of Iceland for the British Empire in 1914 is not a difficult campaign. WW1 itself is difficult, Gallipoli is difficult. This is the context an invasion of Iceland is in, and of course you even know that using the real definition of difficult would make your defence nonsensical so that's why you've had to redefine it.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
ASB, why would Denmar join the CP?

But if they for some reason did:
Trankebar to Britain
Danish West Indies to the US
Iceland becomes independent early under Entente guidance
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, my guess is remain with Denmark but US or UK gets basing rights. Also both territories get early autonomy.
 
Snip.

But if they for some reason did:
Trankebar to Britain
Danish West Indies to the US
Iceland becomes independent early under Entente guidance
Greenland and the Faeroe Islands, my guess is remain with Denmark but US or UK gets basing rights. Also both territories get early autonomy.

I think a more honest assessment would be that Iceland becomes a British puppet, Britain being the naval hegemon and Iceland being in a strategic location in the Atlantic.

At least this perhaps butterflies away the "Cod Wars", which UK now wins by default.

Given the uncompromising way WW1 ended, if Denmark joins the CP it doesn't get to keep anything at all.
 
I deliberately chose the scenario? What? Someone said in a situation where Iceland was hostile the campaign would be difficult. No one said in a situation where Iceland was not hostile it would be difficult. Why would I make up a strawman to argue against?

I'm just quoting you "invading Iceland in a scenario where Icelanders are hostile would be a difficult campaign". I'm basing all my analysis on that, regardless of how probably or not that would occur. I personally don't think that is probable with my knowledge of Iceland in 1914, but you're the one who seems to want this argument--are we in agreement more than our posts are coming off as?

What? That's not what difficult means. Since you've literally had to redefine the word difficult to make your point I don't really see much reason to read the rest of your post. Especially since I was very fucking clear that this was not the best use of resources in fact I was clear that it was a completely wasteful and inefficient use of resources just to prove that the Allies don't even have to have functioning brains to be able to squash Iceland like a bug.

The word difficult means it requires considerable skill or effort to accomplish. An invasion of Iceland for the British Empire in 1914 is not a difficult campaign. WW1 itself is difficult, Gallipoli is difficult. This is the context an invasion of Iceland is in, and of course you even know that using the real definition of difficult would make your defence nonsensical so that's why you've had to redefine it.

Yes, the Allies can win and quite likely will win in a dedicated invasion. But the issue is how many casualties they are willing to take to subdue what is basically a glorified U-Boat base? I'm just basing this on what I know--bringing up WWII again, no one would argue Japan didn't put up a serious fight on those islands. Tarawa, Bougainville, etc., are ingrained on the minds of people who know WWII. I think it's reasonable an Iceland campaign would be engrained on British minds in the same way those battles are. I've presented significant evidence for my case that a land campaign will not be easy. "Difficult", correct, taking Iceland or even the Faroes will be enough to sort out any incompetent general/admiral. A skilled leader will be able to win--the question is, at what cost? Iceland can hold out for months--no, WWII Iceland is a horrible example--and that means you are campaigning in the winter with all the issues that will entail. Iceland is a far easier goal than the Western Front or Gallipoli, but it's a difficult campaign that could take thousands of deaths for the Entente in what is, yes, ultimately a sideshow for the Western Front.

So that's why I think that yes, a naval assault on Iceland would do more than a land invasion would if you look at casualties and such. But if you want a land invasion, well, this isn't going to be WWII Iceland or the Faroes, this is going to be a fight.
 
He, he, funny reading on invasion of Faeroe Is and Iceland during the Great War.
There was close to no military presence in either perhaps if you're lucky a small fishery inspection ship but that would be it. Perhaps the Danes would like to send a few troops off but that would be few and anyway the Danish contingency plan called for defence of Copenhagen by the vast majority of the Army and Navy to guard minefields. Not much if any to spare for the North Atlantic. Heck even Jutland wasn't to be really defended much less anything outside Denmark proper. So it would take some time for the Danes to sort stuff out and make a change of plans; probably plenty time for the Allies to occupy what they wanted without loss except if some Danish Submarines would be sent out perhaps with German escort.
The 1917 scenario would be a dead end in this respect - I don't see Denmark getting anything off for the North Atlantic.
BTW Iceland had had Home Rule since 1874 and would probably grab the opportunity to leave the Danish Commonwealth declaring itself a Republic and asking for protection.
Funny read really. ;)
 
I'm just quoting you "invading Iceland in a scenario where Icelanders are hostile would be a difficult campaign". I'm basing all my analysis on that, regardless of how probably or not that would occur. I personally don't think that is probable with my knowledge of Iceland in 1914, but you're the one who seems to want this argument--are we in agreement more than our posts are coming off as?

Yes, I didn't say that. Someone else said that, and I disagreed with them and that's what I'm responding too.

Yes, the Allies can win and quite likely will win in a dedicated invasion. But the issue is how many casualties they are willing to take to subdue what is basically a glorified U-Boat base? I'm just basing this on what I know--bringing up WWII again, no one would argue Japan didn't put up a serious fight on those islands. Tarawa, Bougainville, etc., are ingrained on the minds of people who know WWII. I think it's reasonable an Iceland campaign would be engrained on British minds in the same way those battles are. I've presented significant evidence for my case that a land campaign will not be easy. "Difficult", correct, taking Iceland or even the Faroes will be enough to sort out any incompetent general/admiral. A skilled leader will be able to win--the question is, at what cost? Iceland can hold out for months--no, WWII Iceland is a horrible example--and that means you are campaigning in the winter with all the issues that will entail. Iceland is a far easier goal than the Western Front or Gallipoli, but it's a difficult campaign that could take thousands of deaths for the Entente in what is, yes, ultimately a sideshow for the Western Front.

So that's why I think that yes, a naval assault on Iceland would do more than a land invasion would if you look at casualties and such. But if you want a land invasion, well, this isn't going to be WWII Iceland or the Faroes, this is going to be a fight.

Well no one is arguing they will lose. The breadth of this argument is that you think an invasion of hostile Iceland is difficult no matter what, and I don't think it is.

Putting up a fight isn't the same as being difficult. Especially in the Japanese islands case it was always a case of being thorough not a case of the USA actually being in any danger of losing (in terms of invading the islands rather than say naval battles). The whole front may have been difficult, but the island hopping and invading while exasperating and perhaps overly costly in terms of ratios it wasn't difficult. Whether we're talking about the Aleutian Islands Campaign or Guadalcanal Campaign (comparatively a lot more difficult than Aleutian).

Nor is being memorable a factor of difficulty.

And your evidence is not in favour at all, the majority of your points have been about the loss to the rest of the war from troops, not about the campaign itself.

And no, an incompetent general or admiral would not lose an invasion of Iceland. And that is a good way of showing our fundamental disagreement. A campaign is not difficult when skill is irrelevant to the outcome. Even the worst British general would struggle to lose an invasion of Iceland and I thought that I made that point very clear when I pointed out the grotesque differences in resources available here.

Saying that they would lose just shows that you do not understand the forces at hand here.

The number of deaths is not a measure of difficulty either.

Also I do not get your point about a naval assault. Are you saying the only scenario where the invasion of Iceland is difficult is when it is lead by an incompetent general who starts a land invasion?

Invading Iceland sounds like it could be a difficult campaign on the part of the Entente--that is, assuming the local Icelanders aren't in favour of it. If Iceland doesn't want to be a part of Denmark's wartime alliance with Germany, they could probably arrange a declaration of independence with British support. But if not, it could be a challenging campaign, and securing Iceland as a base is important for both sides of the war.

Greenland is an even more difficult campaign, so I don't think a land invasion would occur. Probably it would be limited to some coastal bombardments to make sure the place can't be used as a raiding base, since that could get the job done just as well.

This is what I responded to that you originally said.

Edit: Actually, perhaps a good way of showing how it isn't difficult is pointing out how difficult is for an Icelandic general to win the campaign. If a toddler can beat the Icelandic general then it isn't difficult.
 

Grimbald

Monthly Donor
Although Wilson insisted that the US take nothing for its participation in WW1 the availability of Greenland, the DWI and Iceland might have changed that,

IOT the US should have taken the rest of Samoa (which would now be the 51st or 52nd state).
 
Although Wilson insisted that the US take nothing for its participation in WW1 the availability of Greenland, the DWI and Iceland might have changed that,

IOT the US should have taken the rest of Samoa (which would now be the 51st or 52nd state).

Indeed, the USA offered to buy Greenland after WW2 anyway: https://www.gwern.net/Greenland

After WW1 it probably wouldn't be hard for the USA or the UK to remove them from Danish control, and even make a faux purchase depending on how badly Denmark homeland fares.
 
Well no one is arguing they will lose. The breadth of this argument is that you think an invasion of hostile Iceland is difficult no matter what, and I don't think it is.

Putting up a fight isn't the same as being difficult. Especially in the Japanese islands case it was always a case of being thorough not a case of the USA actually being in any danger of losing (in terms of invading the islands rather than say naval battles). The whole front may have been difficult, but the island hopping and invading while exasperating and perhaps overly costly in terms of ratios it wasn't difficult. Whether we're talking about the Aleutian Islands Campaign or Guadalcanal Campaign (comparatively a lot more difficult than Aleutian).

Nor is being memorable a factor of difficulty.

And your evidence is not in favour at all, the majority of your points have been about the loss to the rest of the war from troops, not about the campaign itself.

And no, an incompetent general or admiral would not lose an invasion of Iceland. And that is a good way of showing our fundamental disagreement. A campaign is not difficult when skill is irrelevant to the outcome. Even the worst British general would struggle to lose an invasion of Iceland and I thought that I made that point very clear when I pointed out the grotesque differences in resources available here.

Saying that they would lose just shows that you do not understand the forces at hand here.

The number of deaths is not a measure of difficulty either.

Also I do not get your point about a naval assault. Are you saying the only scenario where the invasion of Iceland is difficult is when it is lead by an incompetent general who starts a land invasion?

The fundamental point is--what casualties are you willing to take, once again "difficult"? We have seen this in warfare throughout the centuries--that's why the term "Pyrrhic victory" exists after all. And I'm not going to go into all the examples where the concept of casualties suffered versus what you're getting out of it played a major role in decision making both militarily and politically. Now, am I saying, "Britain invades Iceland = Central Powers victory", no, I'm not, and I never said that. In combination with whatever Denmark can muster for the CP? Possibly. Remember Sun Tzu: "There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must not be attacked, towns which must not be besieged, positions which must not be contested..."

That's exactly the point here--there's very, very few battles (if any) in that theatre the Japanese could have in some way won. But they were there, and the US strategy demanded they fight there. Likewise, Iceland (and Faroes) is there, and voices will be raised demanding they be captured or neutralised. Like the island hopping campaign, there were ways of neutralising the threat an island might post besides an all-out invasion. I think I've stated multiple times that naval bombardment is an option, and probably a saner one for a place like Greenland or even the Faroes. I'm not sure if Iceland can be totally neutralised by naval bombardment, but it can deal enough damage to reduce the threat. And make no mistake, any sane British general isn't going for a land invasion of Iceland without checking all the other option. Not that the Royal Navy is totally safe, since this affects the ships fighting U-Boat patrols, ships which could be used elsewhere for other tasks--engaging in offensive operations against Iceland or the Faroes invites possibilities for the Germans to exploit.

I don't think I've been clear enough about potentials for CP victory on Iceland--it isn't so much they can win as they can avoid losing, and that means if Britain withdraws. In some conflicts that would be a possibility, but knowing WWI, extremely unlikely for this one. But an Iceland battle does affect things in the grand scheme of things for the conflict. And historical memory will play a huge role in what happens post-war, to the point where, if Britain, Iceland, Denmark, believe it was a difficult campaign and a bloodbath (it will be, for reasons I've said), then it effectively was a difficult battle based on the impact historical memory will play on things to come. The role of the British general, however likely his odds of victory are (near 100% if not 100%), is to minimise casualties to make the campaign as less bad as it has to be. And once again knowing WWI, that'll be a tall order.

This is what I responded to that you originally said.

Edit: Actually, perhaps a good way of showing how it isn't difficult is pointing out how difficult is for an Icelandic general to win the campaign. If a toddler can beat the Icelandic general then it isn't difficult.

I said that and I stand by it. I've added a lot more to our discussion since my first post. I think with your response involving deportations, sending in settlers, etc., we are presuming a scenario where Iceland will be hostile and clearly on the defenders' side which affects all of my responses since. And from there, I think our main disagreement is on the meaning of the word "difficult" in context to warfare. Which, I think we might be writing a bit too much on what ultimately amounts to semantics.

Can an Icelandic/Danish/German general win an Iceland campaign? Highly, highly doubtful. I believe if things went right (both for preparations as well as the course of battle on both sides), they could inflict enough casualties to force a withdrawal. But this is WWI with generals feeding lives into a meatgrinder. Yes, any British general/admiral can win an Iceland campaign. But it will be difficult, for the same reason the US remembers Iwo Jima as a difficult battle even though Iwo Jima's result was never in doubt. And it isn't just popular memory--it's fact that leadership (political and military) will look at the campaign and ask the leadership serious questions about it which will have butterfly effects on promotions, assignments, etc. as well as the individual soldiers and officers involved who might live, might die, end up being different people. What goes on in an Iceland/Faroes campaign is setting loose a swarm of butterflies, if not directly affecting the result of the war in the grand scheme of things.

Although Wilson insisted that the US take nothing for its participation in WW1 the availability of Greenland, the DWI and Iceland might have changed that,

IOT the US should have taken the rest of Samoa (which would now be the 51st or 52nd state).

I don't know if Iceland is doable. Seems like something the US would rather have as a client state rather than deal with assimilating a restless population that doesn't speak English. Greenland and the DWI definitely, though.

Samoa is still probably too small--around half the population of Wyoming even when combined, unless you make some weird union of all the non-Hawaii Pacific territories, which I guess might be doable somehow. But as far as I know, the Guam statehood movement is nowhere near as well organised as the Puerto Rico one.
 
The Entente launched any number of colonial campaigns during the early parts of WWI. I don't see any reason why DWI, Greenland, the Faroes or Iceland would be notably more challenging than any of them (and tropical diseases in many of those campaigns were far more dangerous than the cold of Greenland/Iceland). The only reason we remember von Lettow-Vorbeck is because his was the only colonial front that put up significant successful resistance.

Major battles on the Western Front involved millions of soldiers; I doubt the small number needed to subdue a few isolated islands would be notable.

The Danes wouldn't heavily garrison their overseas possessions for the simple reason that they knew those positions were indefensible. Even in the best case, they would fall as soon as the Entente made a serious effort; much better to keep the Danish military at home (even if it were expanded drastically from its tiny OTL size) where it could be used for offensive operations in concert with their fellow Central Powers allies (most likely against the Russians). If they win the war, they get those colonies back; if they lose, they lose everything anyway. Much better to keep their forces for the main battle. The British can easily spare a few troops from e.g. Canada or the BWI to capture Danish colonies, whereas the Central Powers need to squeeze everything out of their troops in the initial offensive.
 
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