For a long time I was somewhat puzzled by the fact that the Democrats suffered considerable losses in the 1950 midterm elections even though Pyongyang had fallen to the UN forces in October and the Korean War seemed as good as won. In particular, how did Millard Tydings, Scott Lucas, Helen Gahagan Douglas and others lose on the "soft on communism" issue when the US seemed on the verge of a spectacular victory over communism?
In part, of course, it is because victories in Korea could not erase the memories of how badly the war had been going a few months earlier or answer Republican charges that there might not have been a war at all if not for Acheson's "defensive perimeter" speech. (Democrats tried without notable success to use against Nixon the fact that "on January 19, 1950, Nixon joined in a 192 to 191 vote that killed a bill providing $60,000,000 in economic aid for Korea; the defense of Nixon...was that the bill contained nothing for Formosa, and he did in fact vote for Korean aid in another bill February 9 when it was coupled with an authorization to spend previously appropriated China-aid funds in Formosa." https://archive.org/stream/factsaboutnixon001591mbp#page/n83/mode/2up) In part it was because things like the Communist victory in China and the Hiss and other espionage cases were still very much in the public mind. And of course in part it was because the party not holding the White House usually gains in a midterm election.
But there is another reason which needs some emphasis: It is that by Election Day (November 7) the autumn euphoria over the UN performance in Korea was already starting to dissipate, and people were already becoming uneasy about China's involvement (though the all-out Chinese assault was yet to come). Here I would like to quote from Greg Mitchell's book on the 1950 California US Senate campaign, *Tricky Dick and the Pink Lady* (pp. 236-7):
"It was election eve, but all anyone in California wanted to talk or write about were the dire reports from across the Pacific. On its front page, the *Los Angeles Times* carried the headline 'CRY OF 'VOTE TUESDAY' GOES UP ACROSS STATE,' but it was overwhelmed by the huge banner head 'M'ARTHUR IN THREAT TO STRIKE AT REDS IN CHINA.'
"Despite hints of massive Chinese intervention, General MacArthur had carried the conflict ever closer to the Yalu River and Korea's northern border. Then, around November 1, the CIA reported to Washington that Chinese troops, ten thousand or twenty thousand strong, may have crossed the Yalu and joined the fighting. Similar unconfirmed reports from other sources persisted in the following days, with estimates of Chinese troop strength as high as seventy-five thousand. MacArthur reported that even if this was true, it would not affect his final offensive, a claim that seemed absurd. Truman, in any case, gave MacArthur permission to continue his assault and even bomb the bridges across the Yalu. *The New York Times* commented, however, that 'cheerful reports that the war was virtually over' had now been 'squelched.'
"Then, on the morning of November 6, the day before the midterm election in the United States, General MacArthur issued a special communique accusing the Chinese Communists of committing 'one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness on historic record' by intervening in the war from their 'privileged sanctuary' across the border. MacArthur's office now admitted that China could immediately send three hundred thousand troops into Korea, vastly outnumbering its opponents. Already an untold number of Chinese troops had swept across the Manchurian border. Even though the United States was not officially at war with China, there could be no escaping the fact that Chinese Communist trcops were firing on, and likely killing, American soldiers. MacArthur sought permission from Truman to strike back.
"If Helen Douglas wasn't already facing a crushing defeat, she was certainly staring at one now. Democratic candidates elsewhere in the country found themselves in a similar position. Any candidate would have had difficulty passing up a chance to make political capital out of the breathtaking and (from the Democrats' perspective) ill-timed news, and Richard Nixon seized the opportunity eagerly. He called the Chinese attack 'the direct result of our State Department's policy of appeasing Communists in China' and said that voters must therefore elect a new, 'independent Congress' that would take a firm stand in dealing with Communist aggression wherever it arose.
"He also raised to fever pitch an issue that had emerged two days earlier, when the first rumors of the Chinese entry surfaced. Asked recently by an editor whether he favored admitting Red China to the United Nations, Nixon had thundered, 'No,' while Douglas, uncertain of what was happening in Korea, had hedged. Now Nixon charged that Douglas's refusal to reveal 'whether she supports the government of Red China or whether she opposes it' was 'reason enough for her overwhelming defeat at the polls.' As far as he was concerned, 'this is the final straw . . . doesn't she care whether American lives are being snuffed out by a ruthless aggressor? I knew that my opponent was committed to the appeasement policy of the State Department toward Communism in the Far East, but I never dreamed that she would stick to it even after we were attacked.'
"There was no way for Douglas to respond effectively to this latest charge, or to the shocking events in the Far Fast, before the polls opened. Recognizing this, she didn't really try..."
Douglas may have been especially vulnerable, but as Mitchell notes, "Democratic candidates elsewhere in the country found themselves in a similar position." This raises an interesting point about the timing of the election. Had it been held during the victory euphoria of October--especially after the October 15 Wake Island conference, which linked Truman with the very popular MacArthur in the public mind--the Democrats would still probably have lost some seats, but would presumably have done better than in OTL. (Douglas, however, would still almost certainly have lost--even when Truman's popularity was rebounding in October, the California Field Poll showed Nixon with a substantial, though not yet overwhelming, lead. For that matter, Nixon got more votes than Douglas back in the June primary, before the war started...). If the election were to have been held in December with American troops reeling from the all-out Chinese assault, the GOP would have done better than in OTL and might even have won control of Congress in 1950 rather than 1952. (Of course you can't move Election Day in the US. But the Korean War might plausibly have started a month earlier or a month later, making November more like OTL's October or December.)
(Incidentally, Chinese intervention in Korea was not the only thing hurting Douglas in the final days of the campaign: she made the big mistake of answering a question by a Nixon plant with an endorsement of Jimmy Roosevelt's obviously doomed campaign against Earl Warren, which led Warren to--in effect--endorse Nixon, whom Warren disliked and from whom he had until then kept his distance. Previously, Douglas had avoided this mistake, knowing that Warren was very popular and that Roosevelt was disliked by Truman Democrats because of his leadership of the "dump Truman, draft Ike" movement in 1948. But the weekend before the election, "a tired, broken-down Douglas finaly took the bait. Asked once again by a Nixon plant whether she supported James Roosevelt...'I hope and pray he will be the next governor,' she said of her fellow Democrat, 'and he will be if Democrats vote the Democratic ticket.'" *Tricky Dick and the Pink Lady,* p. 235.)
In part, of course, it is because victories in Korea could not erase the memories of how badly the war had been going a few months earlier or answer Republican charges that there might not have been a war at all if not for Acheson's "defensive perimeter" speech. (Democrats tried without notable success to use against Nixon the fact that "on January 19, 1950, Nixon joined in a 192 to 191 vote that killed a bill providing $60,000,000 in economic aid for Korea; the defense of Nixon...was that the bill contained nothing for Formosa, and he did in fact vote for Korean aid in another bill February 9 when it was coupled with an authorization to spend previously appropriated China-aid funds in Formosa." https://archive.org/stream/factsaboutnixon001591mbp#page/n83/mode/2up) In part it was because things like the Communist victory in China and the Hiss and other espionage cases were still very much in the public mind. And of course in part it was because the party not holding the White House usually gains in a midterm election.
But there is another reason which needs some emphasis: It is that by Election Day (November 7) the autumn euphoria over the UN performance in Korea was already starting to dissipate, and people were already becoming uneasy about China's involvement (though the all-out Chinese assault was yet to come). Here I would like to quote from Greg Mitchell's book on the 1950 California US Senate campaign, *Tricky Dick and the Pink Lady* (pp. 236-7):
"It was election eve, but all anyone in California wanted to talk or write about were the dire reports from across the Pacific. On its front page, the *Los Angeles Times* carried the headline 'CRY OF 'VOTE TUESDAY' GOES UP ACROSS STATE,' but it was overwhelmed by the huge banner head 'M'ARTHUR IN THREAT TO STRIKE AT REDS IN CHINA.'
"Despite hints of massive Chinese intervention, General MacArthur had carried the conflict ever closer to the Yalu River and Korea's northern border. Then, around November 1, the CIA reported to Washington that Chinese troops, ten thousand or twenty thousand strong, may have crossed the Yalu and joined the fighting. Similar unconfirmed reports from other sources persisted in the following days, with estimates of Chinese troop strength as high as seventy-five thousand. MacArthur reported that even if this was true, it would not affect his final offensive, a claim that seemed absurd. Truman, in any case, gave MacArthur permission to continue his assault and even bomb the bridges across the Yalu. *The New York Times* commented, however, that 'cheerful reports that the war was virtually over' had now been 'squelched.'
"Then, on the morning of November 6, the day before the midterm election in the United States, General MacArthur issued a special communique accusing the Chinese Communists of committing 'one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness on historic record' by intervening in the war from their 'privileged sanctuary' across the border. MacArthur's office now admitted that China could immediately send three hundred thousand troops into Korea, vastly outnumbering its opponents. Already an untold number of Chinese troops had swept across the Manchurian border. Even though the United States was not officially at war with China, there could be no escaping the fact that Chinese Communist trcops were firing on, and likely killing, American soldiers. MacArthur sought permission from Truman to strike back.
"If Helen Douglas wasn't already facing a crushing defeat, she was certainly staring at one now. Democratic candidates elsewhere in the country found themselves in a similar position. Any candidate would have had difficulty passing up a chance to make political capital out of the breathtaking and (from the Democrats' perspective) ill-timed news, and Richard Nixon seized the opportunity eagerly. He called the Chinese attack 'the direct result of our State Department's policy of appeasing Communists in China' and said that voters must therefore elect a new, 'independent Congress' that would take a firm stand in dealing with Communist aggression wherever it arose.
"He also raised to fever pitch an issue that had emerged two days earlier, when the first rumors of the Chinese entry surfaced. Asked recently by an editor whether he favored admitting Red China to the United Nations, Nixon had thundered, 'No,' while Douglas, uncertain of what was happening in Korea, had hedged. Now Nixon charged that Douglas's refusal to reveal 'whether she supports the government of Red China or whether she opposes it' was 'reason enough for her overwhelming defeat at the polls.' As far as he was concerned, 'this is the final straw . . . doesn't she care whether American lives are being snuffed out by a ruthless aggressor? I knew that my opponent was committed to the appeasement policy of the State Department toward Communism in the Far East, but I never dreamed that she would stick to it even after we were attacked.'
"There was no way for Douglas to respond effectively to this latest charge, or to the shocking events in the Far Fast, before the polls opened. Recognizing this, she didn't really try..."
Douglas may have been especially vulnerable, but as Mitchell notes, "Democratic candidates elsewhere in the country found themselves in a similar position." This raises an interesting point about the timing of the election. Had it been held during the victory euphoria of October--especially after the October 15 Wake Island conference, which linked Truman with the very popular MacArthur in the public mind--the Democrats would still probably have lost some seats, but would presumably have done better than in OTL. (Douglas, however, would still almost certainly have lost--even when Truman's popularity was rebounding in October, the California Field Poll showed Nixon with a substantial, though not yet overwhelming, lead. For that matter, Nixon got more votes than Douglas back in the June primary, before the war started...). If the election were to have been held in December with American troops reeling from the all-out Chinese assault, the GOP would have done better than in OTL and might even have won control of Congress in 1950 rather than 1952. (Of course you can't move Election Day in the US. But the Korean War might plausibly have started a month earlier or a month later, making November more like OTL's October or December.)
(Incidentally, Chinese intervention in Korea was not the only thing hurting Douglas in the final days of the campaign: she made the big mistake of answering a question by a Nixon plant with an endorsement of Jimmy Roosevelt's obviously doomed campaign against Earl Warren, which led Warren to--in effect--endorse Nixon, whom Warren disliked and from whom he had until then kept his distance. Previously, Douglas had avoided this mistake, knowing that Warren was very popular and that Roosevelt was disliked by Truman Democrats because of his leadership of the "dump Truman, draft Ike" movement in 1948. But the weekend before the election, "a tired, broken-down Douglas finaly took the bait. Asked once again by a Nixon plant whether she supported James Roosevelt...'I hope and pray he will be the next governor,' she said of her fellow Democrat, 'and he will be if Democrats vote the Democratic ticket.'" *Tricky Dick and the Pink Lady,* p. 235.)