Defending the Realm

Uh, marching through the Sahara would be a huge logistical undertaking. Probably even more so than an amphibious assault on those ports with the same number of troops.
If I were to amend the post to increase the number of troops and supplies sent by Britain to the West African Campaign, would it then be more plausible?
 
As I read it, the Free French and British forces leave Senegal on 11 December, cross the Sahara, reach Algeria by the 16th, and take the main cities in their entirety by the 20th. That seems a bit of a stretch.
 
As I read it, the Free French and British forces leave Senegal on 11 December, cross the Sahara, reach Algeria by the 16th, and take the main cities in their entirety by the 20th. That seems a bit of a stretch.
Hm... perhaps I was a tad too optimistic on how quick the campaign would take. I'll quickly amend it.
 
Hm... perhaps I was a tad too optimistic on how quick the campaign would take. I'll quickly amend it.
I would suggest that you might want to look at the option of an amphibious move. It's got huge problems, but they are as nothing compared to crossing the Sahara. The UK and the Free French have naval dominance, so it seems sensible to use that. The first attempt will probably be a fiasco, but lessons learned, subsequent efforts against weakened defences could prevail.

Of course, there is the question as to what this gains strategically, but that is a question above my pay grade.
 
Based on everyone's recommendations, I have decided to delete the most recent update and return to the drawing board.
I should emphasise that I am fully open to any advice/criticism anyone may have in the future.
 
Based on everyone's recommendations, I have decided to delete the most recent update and return to the drawing board.
I should emphasise that I am fully open to any advice/criticism anyone may have in the future.

I may be wrong, but it looks like you started from the wrong end with the last update, namely deciding what you wanted the outcome to be (in this case, the taking of Algeria etc), and then trying to leap straight to that.

My preferred method (others may well have others, so please note that this is what works for me. It may not work for you) is to simply look at the current situation, take a quick check of the long-term objective, and then look at the various options available with the resources available and the likely resources opposing. Then run a quick risk/benefit analysis on the options, and see which option makes the biggest advance towards the long-term objective at the lowest potential cost if it all goes pear-shaped. When allies are working together, the ally with the biggest input in resources and the controlling element of said resources will dominate, to a greater or lesser degree, these decisions. In this case, the UK and the Free French will jointly decide, and the UK will dominate the discussions.

The objective is to take the fight to the Germans and Italians. The big problem, as Alan Brooke pointed out on many occasions, is that a land invasion of continental Europe is not easy. Landings are possible, but for a lengthy period, the defenders will be able to reinforce quicker than the attackers, and if the landing is contained and goes nowhere, it is futile. Therefore, the first step has to be to weaken Germany by peripheral actions.

The big, big advantage that the UK and Free French have is naval dominance. Therefore, the first target will be somewhere that this dominance is a major factor. You've identified the various Vichy French colonies as a target, which seems reasonable. Action in the Med seems plausible to achieve this. It potentially lures out the Italian fleet, which can lead to a battle on favourable terms, resulting in an increase in naval dominance. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, etc are essentially, however, stages on the road to nowhere. Whoever holds them holds a lot of sand, limited infrastructure, and damn all strategic value at this stage. Syria looks a lot more promising. With Turkey not in the war, and Greece not inclined to allow German/Italian forces to pass through, and difficult land logistics for any German/Italian forces, Syria can be isolated. It's a buffer around the Middle East oil, so has strategic value. It places Vichy France into a difficult political calculation: Fight Free French forces, and create unhappiness at home at the idea of Frenchman fighting Frenchman on behalf of Germans; surrender without a fight and piss off the German occupiers; switch sides and get curb stomped. In all probability, they will dither in deciding, resulting in a half-hearted defence providing for a quick and easy victory (OTL, Vichy France fought strongly for Syria, but that's an outcome that was thought to have been low probability). Whatever Vichy France does, it doesn't have the resources to resist for long, so Germany/Italy have to decide either to let it go, or pump in resources of their own, to fight in a region where the other side has chosen the battlefield, where the enemy can reinforce faster and with more, and where their own logistics train will be open to major depradations along the way (good luck using maritime resources in that region; good luck relying on the transport network in that region). I would suggest that of Germany, Italy, and Vichy France, Vichy France is the weakest link in the chain.

Diplomatic and intelligence efforts in Algeria etc could make use of success in Syria to get the isolated Vichy French forces here switch sides.

Whatever you decide to do, the first thing to consider: What can plausibly be done. Then, of these, what actually advances what we're trying to do.

I'd also strongly recommend a read of Keynes' Cruisers on this forum. Aside from being a very well-constructed thread, it's covering similar ground to what you're doing here. You've got different start points, so the details will be very different, but it will help give a feel of the details and options available.
 
Chapter Five: Operation Hammerhead
As previously mentioned, Compass had seen British and Commonwealth troops secure large swathes of Libya, with Italy being forced to send all its remaining forces in the region to Sirte to recover. Upon the end of Compass, British officers had the Allies’ newly-won gains fortified, while planning was made for a renewed offensive to completely evict the Italians from Libya. This was code-named Operation Hammerhead, and required significant reinforcements, for it would result in a large push into the remaining portion of Libya by British and Commonwealth forces. By the time Hammerhead was established, the Balkan Campaign was at an end, and thus many of the divisions removed from Libya to successfully defend Crete were returned to the Western Desert Campaign, yet this would not be enough for Hammerhead to be the decisive engagement it needed to be - indeed, this led to a greater number of troops being required, as Italy was also able to re-deploy its available troops in Libya now that fighting in the Balkans had ceased. So, Wavell sent a message to Churchill, requesting further forces to assist the drive into Western Libya. Fortunately for Wavell, Britain still had enough divisions to spare, given that (as previously mentioned) the threat of a German invasion of the British Isles remained non-existent. In the end, an additional five British divisions, numbering roughly 75,000 men, were granted to Wavell for Hammerhead, along with new vehicles and equipment to replace those lost in Compass, and so, throughout mid-1941, preparations were made to launch the plan.

Hammerhead was launched on September the 4th 1941, and saw two British corps advance towards Sirte - the XIV Corps, led by Bernard Montgomery (who had rose in prominence within the British Army following his successful defence of Hythe during the Battle of Britain), and XV Corps, led by Richard O’Connor [1]. The objective of the two corps was to encircle Sirte (thereby trapping the majority of the nearby Italian forces), which would subsequently be besieged, while the rest of the British and Commonwealth armies would proceed to advance further into Libya, eventually reaching Tripoli, where the bulk of Italian resistance was expected to lie. Rodolfo Graziani, the head of the Italian Army in Libya (and also one of the most senior fascists in the Italian Government), had three Italian divisions advance from outside Sirte and confront one of the two corps, with the hope that it would delay their advance and allow many of the Italian troops in Sirte to escape. In the end, the Italian divisions sent by Graziani chose to confront XIV Corps, leading to the Battle of Sirte, which took place over several hours on the 4th. Although the three Italian divisions were superior in numbers to the single British corps, ultimately Montgomery’s forces had superior firepower, while many elements of the Italian Army remained un-mechanised. So, the Battle ended in a British victory, with the British and Commonwealth advance only slightly slowed down by the Italian assault.

This led to the Second Battle of Sirte, as both the XIV Corps and the XV Corps reached their respective positions, and began to besiege the city, while Royal Navy ships arrived outside the city and began to blockade it from the sea, thereby preventing the Italian forces inside from securing reinforcements or supplies from Italy. The battle, which lasted from the 5th to the 12th of September, eventually resulted in the Italian forces, with little hope of being able to break the siege, surrendering, allowing Montgomery and O’Connor to enter Sirte, while Italians defending the city were left as prisoners of war.

While the engagements around Sirte occurred, the remaining British and Commonwealth forces focused on advancing further into Libya. On the 6th, Australian and British forces under the command of Leslie Morhead reached the city of Misurata, and were sent to capture the city. The two divisions, numbering roughly 30,000 men, under Morhead’s command, engaged the two Italian divisions of a similar size defending the city, and so the Battle of Misurata began. However, as with most other battles during the Western Desert Campaign, the Allies came out triumphant, as a result of superior equipment, and so the Italians retreated from Misurata on the 8th, allowing Morhead’s troops to enter the city. From this point onwards, British and Commonwealth troops began to advance towards their final target – Tripoli. As the Allies advanced from Misurata towards Tripoli, resistance from the remaining Italian forces became fiercer, as Graziani was under strict command from Mussolini to prevent the capture of Tripoli at all costs. Between the Battle of Misurata and the imminent Battle of Tripoli, the Battle of Al-Khums took place on the 12th, and lasted for several days, yet eventually, on the 15th, the Allies were able to capture the city.

At this point, Montgomery and O’Connor had returned to the front-line with their two corps, thereby giving the British and Commonwealth troops set to assault Tripoli an additional boost in men. On the 17th, the Allies reached the outskirts of Tripoli, and it is estimated at this point that the total number of British and Commonwealth troops present was around 154,500, whereas the Italian troops inside Tripoli numbered roughly 96,500 men. When the Allies reached the outskirts of Tripoli, the Battle subsequently began, as four separate corps (Montgomery’s XIV Corps, O’Connor’s XV Corps, Alan Cunningham’s XVI Corps, and Claude Auchinleck’s XVII Corps [1]), encircled the city from separate points – Montgomery from the east, O’Connor from the southeast, Cunningham from the southwest, and Auchinleck from the west. Meanwhile, further Royal Navy forces arrived at Tripoli and began bombarding the city’s defences from sea, so as to weaken its defences.

The battle lasted from the 17th to the 29th of September, during which British forces consistently bombarded Italian defences within Tripoli, while the Italian defenders continually fired back, hoping to make the task of besieging the city difficult enough that the Allies would, at least temporarily, withdraw. Yet no such event occurred, and by the 29th, the Italian troops’ morale had completely sunk, while the defences of Tripoli had been damaged to the extent that the Allies could easily force their way into the city within a day or two. And so, Graziani reluctantly gave the order to wave a white flag over Tripoli. The Battle of Tripoli was over, in a decisive Allied victory.

The British and Commonwealth commanders present subsequently entered the city to accept the Italian surrender, and thus Tripoli came under Allied control. By capturing Tripoli, the Allies gained numerous advantages – the remaining 95,000 men inside the city, including Graziani, surrendered to the British/Commonwealth forces, while some equipment and vehicles present inside the city were secured by the Allies – while many of these were behind Allied weaponry and equipment technologically, some proved to be rather useful, such as the remaining Italian motor vehicles, which was one field in which Italian forces held an advantage, and thus British and Commonwealth troops were able to utilise them upon putting them in Allied service (indeed, at one point, Montgomery used a former Italian motor vehicle captured in Tripoli). Yet the largest gift granted to the Allies by the capture of Tripoli was the collapse of Italian resistance in the remaining parts of Libya. Tripoli was not far from the border with Vichy French colonies, and so the remaining Italian forces still stationed in Libya were ordered to either evacuate from Libya and return to Italy, or move west into friendly Vichy French territory. And so, Britain and the Commonwealth had completely secured Libya – Operation Hammerhead, and by extension the Western Desert Campaign, was over in a significant Allied victory. Capturing Libya provided numerous advantages for Britain – as well as providing a morale boost (although not as significant as the boost to morale caused by the Battle of Britain), the former Italian colony had significant oil reserves which would be utilised by the Allies for the war effort.

From Rome, however, a very different view was taken – Mussolini was terrified at what the ramifications of losing Libya would be for his rule. Italy’s grip on its colonies was quickly unravelling [2], while the only Italian gains in Europe had come about as a result of German intervention, and, as a result, many Italians felt humiliated by their poor performance in the war effort. The Duce now feared internal unrest against his rule – for while Mussolini felt obliged to carry on the war on the side of the Axis, many Italians did not, and soon enough Mussolini would discover that the foundations of his power were in fact softer than he had previously believed.

***​

[1] Fictional corps created between Compass and Hammerhead.

[2] The East African Campaign goes the same as our timeline, and thus the Allies are able to secure control of Italian East Africa by November 1941.
 
How do you say "Frak, we are totally fraked in Africa, maybe this was a bad idea..." in italian?

The Med has gone tits up for the Axis. Otoh, this might be a good moment to assault Malta, assuming the axis can muster the required airborne and transport? Grabbing Malta now would be the only chance to still have some strategic leverage in the Med.
 
I take it German losses in Sealion preclude direct intervention in North Africa. If so, what does Rommel's career look like here?
 
Build up infrastructure in North Africa, especially airfields, and the Med can be used to convoy men and materiel to the Far East. With Crete in Allied hands, I can see the Allies contesting air superiority much sooner. Bombing the Romanian oil field will have to wait a while though. I'll be posting some ideas on technology soonish.
 
I take it German losses in Sealion preclude direct intervention in North Africa. If so, what does Rommel's career look like here?

Cooling his heels in France? If I understand correctly, no Panzer Div was in Sealion's 1st wave, so he should be alive and well. Otoh, with North Africa pretty much lost, there's no way Hitler will send troops there...
 
Eastern front then? He wasn't much cop at logistics, and resources are more limited here, so I doubt he'll be as (in)famous here.
 
Eastern front then? He wasn't much cop at logistics, and resources are more limited here, so I doubt he'll be as (in)famous here.

I doubt that Barbarossa will go forward any time soon, tbh. With the massive losses, and the psychological shock to the german population...
 
Otoh, this might be a good moment to assault Malta, assuming the axis can muster the required airborne and transport? Grabbing Malta now would be the only chance to still have some strategic leverage in the Med.
Believe me, the Axis won't be trying any airborne assaults any time soon - the Luftwaffe is still re-building from the Battle of Britain.

If so, what does Rommel's career look like here?
Since the Afrika Korps were never created in this timeline, Rommel instead took part in the Balkan Campaign, and is currently stationed in German-controlled Greece.
 
Chapter Six: Operation Tannenbaum
Defeat in the Battle of Britain left significant changes on Germany – in a single day, the Germans had seen their navy and the air force crippled, and their soldiers humbled. The aftermath of the Battle, therefore, was just as significant in Continental Europe as it was in Britain.

As 1941 dawned, Germany was in quite a state – the destruction of the river barges in the Battle of Britain meant that the economies of certain occupied territories where the barges had been extracted from (such as the Netherlands) entered a significant downturn, and thus the Nazi Government found itself deploying more troops to occupied territories to prevent uprisings breaking out. Meanwhile, in France and Poland, outcome of the Battle was met with secret joy – Resistance fighters knew that the enemy occupiers could be beaten, and so, throughout 1941, German forces in occupied Europe found that the number of attacks and sabotage operation organised by Resistance forces drastically increased. The impact of the defeat did not end domestically – the crippling defeat endured by the Wehrmacht meant that German plans for an invasion of the Soviet Union, code-named Operation Barbarossa (which had always been the Nazis’ main goal), had to be delayed, with its launch date moving from June 1941 to June 1942.

Although German forces were able to successfully invade Yugoslavia and Greece April 1941, this victory was weakened somewhat by the inability to capture Crete, while the invasion of these countries failed to lift the morale of the German people – it was seen (correctly) as Germany rescuing its ally, Italy, from catastrophe, rather than an event on par with the Battle of France. And so, with morale amongst Germans at a significant low, Hitler and the Nazis recognised that, although they had eliminated the threat from within the Government via the Second Night of the Long Knives, discontent with the Nazi regime was simmering below the surface amongst the German people, and no amount of propaganda or brainwashing could sort such discontent out. Therefore, it was decided that a major German victory was needed, one which would occur quickly and come across as decisive, to boost morale and support for the regime. It was eventually decided by the Nazis to launch Operation Tannenbaum – an invasion of Switzerland.

Hitler and other prominent Nazis had made no secret of their disgust for Switzerland in the past, and so, when the Führer announced to his joint Chiefs of Staff that Tannenbaum was to be launched during mid-1941, there was little surprise. There was, however, a large degree of wariness – Hitler’s orders had cost the German military significantly during the botching of Sealion, and so there was scepticism as to whether or not an invasion of Switzerland would be worth the expected cost. Yet none of these concerns were raised, at least not in front of any prominent Nazis, for the officers in the German military still remembered the Second Night of the Long Knives vividly, and were aware of Hitler’s wrath. So, preparations to launch Tannenbaum were put in place, and German troops began to move towards the Swiss border.

On July the 23rd, Tannenbaum was launched. The German 12th Army, numbering roughly 150,000 men, under the command of Wilhelm List, began to advance into Switzerland from Southern Germany, with the intention of capturing Zurich, and then advancing southwest to Bern. While the German forces began to march into Switzerland, the Luftwaffe began assaults on major Swiss cities – this was the first major action of the German air force since the Battle of Britain. Yet, as List’s troops would soon find out, the Swiss had been conducting their own preparations in the event of a German invasion.

The defence of Switzerland had been put in the hands of General Henri Guisan, who had begun the mobilisation of the Swiss armed forces almost immediately after the war broke out in September 1939, and eventually the Swiss army numbered roughly 430,000 soldiers, along with another several hundred thousand in reserve if necessary. Guisan developed a strategy known as Defence du Reduit (‘National Redoubt’), whereby Swiss forces, if German troops captured the flat lands of Switzerland where most population centres stood, would retreat to the Alps and continue to fight the Germans in a terrain which heavily favoured defence. Soon enough, Guisan found this strategy was put to the test.

Unsurprisingly, List was able to capture Zurich, yet only after heavy fighting which took place between July the 25th and August the 1st. And even after the largest city in Switzerland was captured, the Germans found themselves with the unenviable task of maintaining control over the city – Swiss forces which were stuck behind enemy lines began a guerrilla warfare against German forces, often conducting night-time raids against German patrols which damaged German morale. This was another aspect of Guisan’s strategy – Swiss soldiers were ordered to dismiss all proclamations that the Swiss Government had surrendered as Nazi propaganda, and continue to fight, even if the entire country was occupied. As a result, List and the 12th Army found that such attacks were not limited to Zurich, as when they advanced into other areas of Switzerland, similar attacks and raids occurred.

On the 3rd, List and the 12th Army began to advanced out of Zurich and towards Bern, which was captured on 9th. Yet, once again Swiss forces which had not retreated from the city in time continued to hassle the Germans through similar strategies to those deployed in Zurich. This resistance frustrated List incredibly, who had initially hoped that the Swiss Government would surrender upon the capture of the nation’s capital – yet no such surrender came, and instead Guisan launched National Redoubt, with most Swiss forces entering fortifications in the Alps to continue resistance against the Germans. As a result of this, List now had to advance into the Alps, a task made incredibly difficult by the fortifications made by the Swiss, which had been constructed along nearly the entirety of the Alps’ borders within Switzerland. Initially, the German forces hoped that an Italian offensive into Switzerland would relieve a large amount of pressure on them – such an offensive began on the 10th, as three Italian divisions, numbering roughly 45,000 men, began to march into Swiss territory. Yet, after an initial advance which saw the Italians successfully capture Lugano on the 14th, Italy soon found itself in a similar position to Germany – unable to penetrate Swiss defences along the Alps.

Eventually, starting on the 12th, List decided to embark on a strategy of constantly attacking Swiss fortifications, with the intention of gradually wearing down the Swiss forces until they could no longer hold the line and had to retreat. This strategy continued throughout August and September (both German forces in the North and Italian forces in the South used this strategy), until, by September the 22nd, Swiss soldiers along the fortifications began to run low on ammunition, and consequently List and the 12th Army were able to penetrate the Swiss defensive line, and soon enough brutal fighting took place in the Alps, as the remaining Swiss forces continued to hassle the Germans and Italians as they advanced through the mountains. Yet, by the end of October, even these soldiers were running low on supplies and munitions, and so, on October the 30th, List declared Switzerland to be completely under Axis control.

Shortly after the end of Tannenbaum, occupied Switzerland was partitioned between the Axis Powers – German-speaking Switzerland was directly annexed into the Third Reich, Italian-speaking Switzerland was directly annexed by Italy, while French-speaking Switzerland was jointly occupied by German and Italian troops (the Vichy French Government protested that they should receive a share of the spoils, yet when their demands were rebuked, Pétain once again went quiet, recognising that the Vichy state could do little to assert its demands). The invasion of Switzerland had cost the Germans 47,189 men, and the Italians 11,681 men, significant casualties for invading a country the size of Switzerland, while the amount of ammunition spent on destroying Swiss fortifications in the Alps was also heavy. Yet fighting in Switzerland did not end with the partition of the country – the Swiss Resistance, well-armed and following Guisan’s order to ignore all reports of a Swiss Government surrender, organised a prolonged guerrilla warfare, often ambushing German patrols and destroying ammunition and other supplies brought to Switzerland by the Germans. Meanwhile, the Swiss were inspired by the story of their Government’s escape – Guisan, and other senior military figures, were able to escape the Alps in disguise and, by trekking through rural France, crossed the Pyrenees into Spain, where they secured a ship to London, and formed the Swiss Government-in-exile. Consequently, Germany found itself having to pour more and more troops into Switzerland simply to perform garrison duties, yet this did not end the Swiss’ determined resistance.

Of course, in Germany itself, none of this was reported – upon the 12th Army’s return to Berlin, Goebbels and the Ministry of Propaganda were quick to portray Tannenbaum as a quick and decisive route, and a show of Germany’s military might. As a result, the German people, with few other available news sources, believed this, and so the Nazis had achieved their morale-boosting exercise. Yet while this had been achieved, the Nazi Government was aware that Tannenbaum was in fact something of a pyrrhic victory, and the resistance of the Swiss people would continue.
 
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nbcman

Donor
So the Germans threw away the significant advantage of a neutral Switzerland for a 'morale booster'? There were far easier targets to be had in the fall of 1941 which would have played to the German and other allies forces strengths such as attacking Sweden-or even Spain.
 
Um, what's the strategic objective in taking Switzerland?

It's not got much in the way of natural resources like oil, iron, and the things one needs to fight a way.
It's not a strategic threat - it's neutral and avowedly so.
It's not a stepping stone on the route to anywhere. Germany has clear land routes into Italy, and gaining Switzerland wouldn't improve this one jot.

On the downside, attacking neutral Switzerland is a damned good way of getting neutral and non-involved powers (Ireland, Sweden, USA, even Spain) to join the wrong (from the German point of view).
Switzerland does not have good terrain for any attacking force. The resources required for a full-scale conquest are going to be a strain. The method described

constantly attacking Swiss fortifications, with the intention of gradually wearing down the Swiss forces until they could no longer hold the line and had to retreat.

is going to be expensive in terms of men (if attacking with infantry) or really expensive in terms of artillery shells. Progress is going to be slow; launching the attack in September 23 and finishing in November 30, well, the word optimistic applies quite strongly.

The key event, from the German POV, is going to be the attack on the Soviet Union. Switzerland is a horrible distraction from that.
 
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