There would be lots of semi-sovereign or autonomous territories like Greenland, Puerto Rico, and Hong Kong all over the map. Various islands in the Indonesian archipelago like West Papua would either be independent or some sort of commonwealth within a United Kingdom of the Netherlands. It would be much harder to lay out where the borders of a European Union ends on the world map.
This.
More so than than even the timing of decolonization, the total xtent of decolonization and depth of it is in question.
I think an interesting question here is the shape of the British Empire after Indian independence. Without America becoming the world's premier naval power, would the Gulf States (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE) still be part of a smaller, more tightly integrated British Commonwealth and host to some of the Royal Navy's most important bases East of Suez?
Also, this. There may be 'halfway houses' available allowing imperial/colonial protectorate relations with Britain to last longer in those colonies/protectorates with more monarchical and traditional governing elites who pragmatically see British protection as politically and economically useful as compared with those that had larger indigenous middle-class/intelligentsia independence movements with more extensive and escalating demands.
To me, the first big question is India. OTOH, India was clearly on their path to independence pre-WW2,
Agree on this. This is still going to happen before New Years Eve, December 31, 1949 at the latest, realistically.
and likely to take at least Malaya (including Singapore)
Disagree on this - British rule-protectorate here in OTL outlasted the Raj by ten years, and practical British Commonwealth protection, through the SAS during Konfrontasi lasted through 1966, almost 20 years after the end of the Raj. British influence in Malaya, Singapore, Borneo clearly wasn't a creature dependent on the Raj for support. (Nor was Hong Kong- British for another thirty years, whoah!) I think because the Malay states had traditional, conservative, pragmatic princely rulers instead of overeducated and ideological intelligentsia leaders, and because their tin and rubber and oil industries made them a net economic benefit.
This would probably go with Burma or not long after, despite the British liking their exploitation of the local oil resources, because I think the Burmese were consistently pretty surly during and about colonial rule. Also maintaining control for the limited number of seaports into the interior was pretty expensive. If the Burmese can be worked up into a frenzy of fear about the Indians and or the Chinese they might cling to the British for protection, but I sort of doubt, and the British might not find cultivating the antagonism worth it, or desire to motivate India to see Burma as a British anti-Indian outpost.
Additionally, the British support for the Muslim League, driven in part by their support for the war effort, was directly linked to the creation of Pakistan. So India's decolonization would likely have looked very different, at least in form,
Yeah, so no partition without WWII.
and quite likely also somewhat in timing.
Not more than about two years I'd think.
The following other colonies, semi-colonies whose independence timescales would be minimally affected:
Egypt: Pledged for a more complete independence by 1946........in 1936
Iraq: formally independent in the interwar, occupied again because of the war
Iran: independent in the interwar, occupied because of the war
Philippines: Pledged for independence by 1945......in 1934 or 1935
Syria (and Lebanon) mandate: Pledged for independence in 1946....in 1936 ----- An issue with this one. I can very easily see the French break their promise try to amend structures and maintain some sort of union, "alliance" or "protectorate" relationship indefinitely post-1946 that would be, to Syrian eyes colonialism in disguise, but such a blatantly poor disguise, that it would provoke a Franco-Syrian war in the mid-1940s that would end up a protracted affair with the French winning militarily but gradually losing politically.
Palestine mandate: Resolved in late forties or early 50s -- It's resolution, demographics, and legal British immigration policy over the mandate from 1937 or so until the end will be highly dependent on how late the PoD is that averts WWII. The later the PoD (like after Mar or Apr 1939) the more restrictive laws will be on Jews immigration. If the PoD is so early as to prevent Nazis and Nuremburg laws, Jewish immigration push factor would also be less.
The second big question is communist party operations in Asia- meaning, China.
It will be active and kicking as long as it can, maybe taking over.
If nationalist China does not go communist,
Well without WWII China probably wont go Communist
It depends what "no WWII" means, when we apply it to Asia. Does it just mean no Japanese occupations and assaults on western colonies like Indochina and all the rest like it inaugurated the day it attacked Pearl Harbor, Malaya, Hong Kong, the DEI, and PI?
Or does it mean an early PoD where the Japanese don't go further than their Manchuria landgrab to invade China proper in 1937?
Or they don't even seize Manchuria and create the Manchukuo puppet-state in 1931?
If it is only the first situation, in the long run, the Chinese Communists still have better prospects than Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist ever do (with his prospects being hardly any better than those of various Japanese puppet rulers). If it is one of the latter two situations, where China is much less violated and devastated, the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist government has much better survival prospects and should be in good shape to contain, marginalize, and possible squeeze out entirely the Chinese Communists are an armed and relevant political faction.
communist parties in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
Before even getting to the issue of possible external Chinese Communist support on their trajectory and prospects, whether the French colonial regime is disrupted, humiliated, and temporarily overthrown by Japanese occupiers will be far more determinative of if these parties get a real chance at power in these countries over the long term......or not.
most of Asia still stays in the hands of the French and British.
This again depends more on what the Japanese are doing than on whether the Chinese go Communist.
And we should not conflate French and British colonial behaviors and policies. I will not be judging or saying one is "better" than the other, but I think by the interwar era, in some of its colonies like India, most British political figures were recognizing the inevitability of self-government certainly and even independence, but the French Republic had reached no such broad consensus nor acceptance.
To illustrate my point, I would say that Vietnamese Communists would have better prospect at establishing a nationwide political network and reputation and basis for long term political success in a situation where they filled a power vacuum during and after a Japanese occupation of Indochina displaced French control, but China or southern remained Nationalist and not Communist, than in a scenario where foreign invasion and occupation never knocked the French administration and colonial occupation regime out of place from Indochina, but Chinese Communists emerged from the wreckage of a Sino-Japanese War that never expanded into a "Greater East Asia War", "Great Pacific War" or "WWII, Pacific Front", and the Chinese Communists started providing cross-border sanctuary and aid to Vietnamese and other Indochinese Communists. The cross-border material support and inspiration could be/would be helpful, but not likely decisive all by itself politically, or leading to eclipse other political currents and trends in Indochina.
This ATL would be almost utopian for Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand
Not having the famine associated with the end part of the Japanese occupation would be nice. So, would not having war. Not having Communist rule also, especially for certain classes of people and faith groups. But colonialism is violence by definition. Many would dispute the "utopian" adjective applied, or at least suspend judgement for many, many decades until the French finally quit, and we'll see what gets them to quit and how violent/corrupt that process might be. Also, the Vietnamese, Cambodians, Lao "won't know what they're missing", the bad and the ugly, as well as the good, so are unlikely to be "counting their blessings" to the extent they are getting any, in a comparative perspective.
