Decisive Engagement on the Rapidan, 1862

In the weeks following the conclusion of the Seven Days, it became clear to the Confederates that McClellan was no longer a threat to Richmond and was preparing to withdraw altogether. Content the Army of the Potomac was no longer an active concern, Robert E. Lee's attention thus shift to John Pope's 50,000 strong Army of Virginia advancing south overland. Lee, with his Army of Northern Virginia also at around 50,000 strong, soon marched to face Pope and thus engendered the Northern Virginia Campaign. Initial major clashes would be held at Cedar Mountain, ending in a close run Confederate victory that forced Pope to withdraw to just above the Rapidan River.

Pope's new position, however, was dangerously exposed. The aforementioned Rapidan was directly in front of his forces while the Rappahannock River was to his right, effectively meaning his forces were in a triangle and could be boxed in. Worse, Cedar Mountain could screen a movement of Confederate forces to cross the Rapidan and slam into the exposed left flank of Pope and then pin Pope's Army between the two rivers. Further, prior to the start of the attack, Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry was to burn the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station, which would cut Pope’s only supply line. Without supplies and with no escape against a numerically equal Confederate force having collapsed his left flank, the annihilation of Pope's Army was imminent. It was at this point, however, that disaster struck for Lee. From the Osprey Campaign Series, Second Manassas 1862 (Pg 27):

Lee followed and joined his army in Orange near the middle of August. On 19 August, he ordered his commanders to move against Pope and defeat him before McClellan could link up with the Army of Virginia. Longstreet advised a movement to the left in order to strike Pope's right. Lee and Jackson thought it better to turn Pope's left and put the Army of Northern Virginia between the Union troops and Washington. This would cut both Pope's line of supplies and retreat. To accomplish this, Lee directed Longstreet to cross the Rapidan at Raccoon Ford with the right wing of the army. He was to move toward Culpeper Court House, while Jackson, with the left wing, was to cross at Somerville Ford and proceed in the same direction, keeping on Longstreet's left. R.H. Anderson's division and S.D. Lee's battalion of artillery was to follow Jackson, while Stuart, crossing at Morton's Ford, was to reach the Rappahannock by way of Stevensburg. He was directed to destroy the railroad bridge, cut Pope's communications, and operate on Longstreet's right.

Ever spoiling for a fight, Jackson wanted to attack earlier. Longstreet rebutted that he was not prepared. In addition, Fitz Hugh Lee's Brigade of Stuart's cavalry, the lead brigade on the march from Richmond, had strayed too far to the right, in the direction of Fredericksburg, and was a day late in joining the army, causing another delay. During all this activity Stuart had set out with his small staff in search of Fitz Lee. On the evening of 17 August the group reached Verdiersville. Not finding his cavalry reinforcement waiting there as expected, Stuart dispatched a rider with a message for the troops to hurry to join him. He then had his horse unsaddled while he stripped off his saber belt, hat, and other gear to get a night's sleep in the garden of the Rhodes house.

Dawn of 18 August broke with the sound of hooves, which Stuart thought must be Fitz Lee. But it was not. Pope had called for a reconnaissance in the area, and Colonel Thorton Broadhead with elements of the 1st Michigan Cavalry along with the 5th New York had obliged. Now the blue-clad troopers were riding towards the slumbering "Beauty" Stuart. The Confederate cavalier jumped on his unsaddled horse and beat a quick retreat, leaving behind his tack, cloak, and sash. Also abandoned was his plumed hat, which he had recently received from a former comrade from his days in the United States Army, Samuel Crawford. After Cedar Mountain, Crawford and Stuart had met during a brief truce and the Confederate cavalryman bet his old friend that the Northern press would declare the clash a Union victory, which it was not. When the action was reported as Stuart predicted, Crawford sent the hat to Stuart in payment of his wager. Although leaving behind many personal items, Stuart managed to vault the fence on his steed and escaped capture.

His adjutant general, Major Norman R. Fitz Hugh, however, was not that fortunate. He fell into the hands of the Union troops. What was worse, the major had a copy of Lee's order of march, and had no time to dispose of it before capture. These documents were quickly forwarded to Pope, who hastened to evacuate Culpeper and put the Rappahannock between himself and Lee. Lee's original plan now had to be revised.

The obvious PoD here is Fitz Lee does not take his detour which forced Lee to delay the attack as well as directly resulted in the capture of Major Fitz Hugh. Without this chain of events, General Lee's attack is able to proceed as planned, resulting in the destruction of Pope's army. Now, the destruction of an entire Federal force of 50,000 in of itself is pretty decisive as far as the war goes. IOTL the Anglo-French were prepared to intervene and nearly did so over the historical Second Battle of Manassas despite that being far less decisive than this "Battle of the Rapidan". Still, it's going to take some time for London and Paris to learn exactly what has happened and then get communications back across the Atlantic. This means there's still going to be some fighting to occur before the Anglo-French fully involve themselves.

Going into the Alt-Maryland Campaign, the first thing to be noticed is that McClellan's Army of the Potomac is going to be massively under-strength:

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The First and Second Corps were with Pope's Army, and their removal means McClellan is short 33,669 men. Subtracted from his overall strength, that means the Army of the Potomac will only have 53,495 troops to face Lee and this is assuming Halleck doesn't force him to detach more to bolster the defenses of Washington. As for Lee, historically in the aftermath of Second Manassas his strength was approaching 75,000 according to John Owen Allen's “The Strength of the Union and Confederate Forces At Second Manassas” (Masters Thesis, George Mason University, 1993). Here's a link to where you can review the excel spreadsheet they have outlining this strength.

Due to straggling, Lee was ultimately whittled down to somewhere between 40,000 to 50,000 by the time of IOTL Antietam, but here this can largely be avoided thanks to the early end of the Northern Virginia campaign. IOTL fighting in said campaign didn't conclude until the start of September and was then immediately followed by Lee pushing into Maryland, resulting in his men being increasing exhausted from the continuous combat. In this ATL, however, combat operations are largely concluded by the 20th to 21st, meaning the bulk of Lee's forces will have several days to rest before ultimately pushing into the North to face a much weakened Army of the Potomac. Given this, I think it's safe to say Lee will win any engagement he gets into, probably directly before the Anglo-French intervention begins.
 
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Anaxagoras

Banned
A very interesting POD.

Another point to consider is the impact such a Confederate success would have on the mid-term elections in November. The Democrats might regain control of the House of Representatives, which could spell even further trouble for the Lincoln administration.
 
A very interesting POD.

Another point to consider is the impact such a Confederate success would have on the mid-term elections in November. The Democrats might regain control of the House of Representatives, which could spell even further trouble for the Lincoln administration.

By the end of September, the Army of Northern Virginia essentially had a free hand to raid to it's heart content as they will essentially have no opposition; Lee's plan to push into Pennsylvania undoubtedly will occur here and be a success. Between the Rapidan and Harper's Ferry alone, over 60,000 Federals will have been captured or killed without speculating on McClellan's losses. To the West, Bragg is in control of Frankfurt and Lexington with Louisville alone essentially being the only Kentucky city of note not under Confederate occupation. He too has inflicted massive losses on the Federals, most prominently at Richmond where nearly 6,000 Federals casualties were inflicted. Finally, to top it off, the Anglo-French are also now intervening to force an end to the war.

In short, November definitely will see the Democrats take control of the House given the absolute disaster unfolding before the American public.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
In short, November definitely will see the Democrats take control of the House given the absolute disaster unfolding before the American public.

All of the enormous material and manpower advantages of the Union over the Confederacy would not mean anything if there is not the political will to use them. In this scenario, we could easily see a total collapse of political will in the North, especially in light of European intervention.
 
The First and Second Corps were with Pope's Army, and their removal means McClellan is short 33,669 men. Subtracted from his overall strength, that means the Army of the Potomac will only have 53,495 troops to face Lee and this is assuming Halleck doesn't force him to detach more to bolster the defenses of Washington. As for Lee, historically in the aftermath of Second Manassas his strength was approaching 75,000 according to John Owen Allen's “The Strength of the Union and Confederate Forces At Second Manassas” (Masters Thesis, George Mason University, 1993). Here's a link to where you can review the excel spreadsheet they have outlining this strength.
There is some error within this paragraph. The Second Corps was not with the Army of Virginia; it was still operating with the Army of the Potomac. The Army of Virginia consisted of the I Corps (McDowell), XI Corps (Sigel) and XII Corps (Banks). Still, I can't argue with your conclusions.
 
There is some error within this paragraph. The Second Corps was not with the Army of Virginia; it was still operating with the Army of the Potomac. The Army of Virginia consisted of the I Corps (McDowell), XI Corps (Sigel) and XII Corps (Banks). Still, I can't argue with your conclusions.

My bad, Banks was II Corps for the Army of Virginia so I got it confused.
 
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