December, 7, the assault on Washingon, D.C

However much I love this thread for the hilarity that has ensued, I seriously wonder where Bard and the others get this sh*t from. In all honesty, is it really possible for sane, normal, otherwise logical people to actually believe this bollocks?

It's due to the relentless spread of Assburgers.

Incidentally I love the fact that the equation on the chalkboard is going "Hi-ho! Hi-ho!" :D
 
Well there goes those few braincells I was saving for later use, thanks bard.
 
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I'm going to turn this on its head a bit.

It is possible for the Japanese to attack Washington, D.C. on December 7.

Humor me a moment.

Point one: On April 9, 1940, Germany launched Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Denmark and Norway. Owing to Germany's lack of naval strength, surprise was a key element of the operation. Many German soldiers were air-dropped on Norwegian targets, wn the Danish capital of Copenhagen, German soldiers emerged from the holds of scheduled German ferries. Though the vast majority of German soldiers in Weserubung were landed via warship instead of the slower, more vulnerable merchantmen, uninformed historians often mention Germany's "surprise" tactic of landing soldiers from the holds of merchantmen as being a key part of the operation's success.

Point two: On the night of November 11-12, 1940, the British aircraft carrier Illustrious launched several torpedo bombers on a raid against the Italian port of Taranto, in southern Italy. This strike's success -- one battleship was sunk, two others and a light cruiser were damage -- was extensively studied by the Japanese prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Until the Taranto raid, most naval strategists believed deep water was needed for a successful aerial torpedo attack. Specially modified British torpedoes, dropped from a low height, proved this theory wrong, and the Japanese were quick to capitalize.

Point three: Late in the war, the Japanese were the only nation to implement suicide tactics on a large scale. Though this tactic was driven mostly by desperation, it does demonstrate a willingness to accept death above and beyond that exhibited by western nations. Germany, which was in similarly dire straits in 1945, made plans for a suicide aircraft ramming squadron, but never implemented them.

So, as unlikely as it seems, let's combine these three points. What we get is an extremely unlikely result, but for the sake of argument, bear with me. Japanese kamikaze tactics were driven by desperation -- not present in 1941 -- but the fact that they exist at all leaves the door open a crack. Let me outline a little scenario for you.

In April 1940, German propaganda about the fall of Norway being accomplished by "German soldiers emerging unexpectedly from the bowels of the most humble merchant ships" reaches Japan. This information is dutifully filed away in the archives of the Japanese naval intelligence service, as are thousands of other tidbits of information that flow similarly from the war in Europe. Following the fall of France in June 1940, Japan annexed the northern portion of French Indochina. The United States responded to this action by freezing Japanese assets in the United States and by instituting an oil and steel embargo on that nation.

In the spring of 1941, the Japanese military began to draw up plans for an attack on the Dutch East Indies in order to secure the oil fields there. As part of the plan to capture those territories, the Philippines would need to be subdued. This would draw the United States into the war, and in order to keep the United States distracted until Japan could fully secure its new possessions, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto drew up plans for an attack on the U.S. Naval Base at Pearl Harbor in hopes of destroying the portion of the U.S. Pacific Fleet there. With the Pacific Fleet destroyed, it was thought that the United States would have no tool with which to strike back at Japan and would be forced to recognize Japanese possession of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.

From the start, Yamamoto, who had been posted as a Japanese military attache in Washington, D.C., was firmly against attacking the United States. He felt that doing so would be awakening a "sleeping giant" and pointed to military war games that showed Japan was singularly unable to hold off America's might forever. Despite his misgivings, he planned a series of sharp, sudden attacks against the United States. "I will run rampant for the first two years," Yamamoto said, "but beyond that ... fate is in the wind."

In a letter to an ultranationalist friend in favor of war with the United States, he wrote, "Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. To make victory certain, we would have to march into Washington and dictate the terms of peace in the White House. I wonder if our politicians.. (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war).. have confidence as to the final outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices." The final sentence of that excerpt was cut from the message and circulated among doubters as 'evidence' that Yamamoto believed Japan would not only be victorious -- but that its victory would be so overwhelming as to conquer the continental United States.

It was about this time that planners in naval intelligence rediscovered the German propaganda documents dealing with the capture of Norway. In Europe, the stories had never completely died out, and the Royal Navy had been ordered in mid-1940 ordered to inspect suspicious neutral shipping. Among the more nationalist naval staff, there grew a question that wondered if it might not be possible to accomplish Yamamoto's goal with the surprise tactics of the Germans. This question was dutifully passed upward through the ranks, where it reached the desk of an ultranationalist admiral. He disdained Yamamoto's negativity and had far more in common with the generals who believed that victory in China was "just around the corner."

Despite almost dismissing the idea out of hand, he passed the message on to one of his army acquaintances. Far from rejecting the idea, the general seized upon it. Despite knowing virtually nothing about the sea, he saw the stirrings of a plan begin to form in his mind. If the Japanese army could smuggle just a few companies of infantry aboard two or three seagoing freighters, a surprise attack might be possible. Their action would surely result in much glory for the Imperial Japanese Army and overshadow any minor success that the buffoons in the navy might be able to accomplish.

He received the message in May, and though the attack on Pearl Harbor was still seven months off, he had to act quickly. The most difficult task was acquiring the men. There were hundreds of thousands of men who would die willingly for their country, but far fewer would do so without even the slightest chance to survive and see the victory that their actions would bring. Still, the general was able to gather some four hundred men who would acquit themselves well in any action.

Gathering the needed three ships was another challenge, as the Japanese merchant marine was rapidly being turned into a tool of war. Every ship was needed to serve in the upcoming attacks on European colonies, and prying three ships loose required the intervention of soon-to-become Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. Throughout the summer, the selected men trained and prepared for their mission. In October, when the general learned of the date for the attack on the Westerners, the ships set sail.

Each had papers ostensibly for trading missions to various neutral countries in the Carribbean. Haiti was the choice of two ships, while Venezuela was the choice of the other. The three sailed two days apart, heading east toward the Panama Canal. Most of the soldiers -- many of whom had never been out of sight of land -- were violently seasick. By the second week aboard ship, however, all had recovered from their illness and were informed of their task. They were not told the whole story, of course. Though the general in Tokyo knew that none would likely be returning, the men aboard ship were told that their mission was to ride the ships through the Caribbean -- each making stops at its scheduled ports of call to throw off suspicion -- then ride them up the East Coast of the United States, north through the Chesapeake Bay, and up the Potomac estuary to Washington D.C.! There, they would attack the White House and capture the President of the United States. Using their superior Japanese elan, they would steal a ship and escape across the Atlantic to Germany.

It was utter rubbish, of course, and most did not believe the story. They were told that Japanese citizens infiltrated into the city -- there were none -- would aid them in their task and that it was not a suicide mission -- though each was to do his utmost to accomplish the mission of the Emperor.

The three ships dutifully transited the Panama Canal and made port in mid-November at cities in the Caribbean. Despite the best efforts of the Japanese, things did go wrong. One ship's engine failed, necessitating repairs that took more time than expected. The other two captains were prepared to sail on without the third ship, fearing discovery by customs or port police in Haiti, but repairs were completed and the third ship left port alongside the other two. A near-disaster ensued when it was discovered that three men were missing from the second of the ships. Despite frantic deliberations among the infantry officers and captains of the ships, it was decided to continue onward, and if taken under fire by the U.S. Navy, to "do their duty to the Emperor."

The three missing men, while in port in Haiti, had secretly agreed that the plan was foolhardy and had deserted their ship shortly before departure. Together, they walked across Port-au-Prince to the American embassy, and demanded to see the ambassador. In their heavily accented, fractured English, they tried to explain the secret Japanese plot to attack Washington D.C. The ambassador, confronted with three shabby-looking men, their clothes worn and dirty, speaking in barely understandable English, and who had liquor fumes wafting from their mouths -- remnants of the "Dutch courage" each had imbibed prior to deserting their ships -- had the three men thrown out of the embassy. Despite this, he dutifully made a report to Washington. This report was shuffled into a file alongside dozens of other reports of suspicious Japanese activity and was not discovered until well after December 7.

The three ships steamed northward, undisturbed. Once, a U.S. Navy destroyer intercepted one of the ships for a routine neutrality inspection. All three had switched from flying the Japanese flag to that of Nationalist China once out of sight of land and brought out forged bills of lading, figuring correctly that the Americans would not be able to distinguish between a Japanese soldier and a Chinese sailor and that they would not bother to check with the nonexistent shipping agency in Newport News. With their weapons hidden in secret compartments welded within the ballast compartment of the ship, the Japanese nervously allowed the inspection. Nothing happened. The American sailors found nothing suspicious -- even when a pistol was found in one of the ship's bunkrooms, this was passed over -- and the Japanese were let go. Only after December 7 did the destroyer's crew realize what they must have discovered.

The morning of December 7 was exceedingly foggy when the three ships met at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay. Each captain knew that he had to act at precisely 2 p.m. local time. None knew the reason for this -- for obvious security reasons, they had not been informed of the attack on Pearl Harbor -- but they all had their suspicions. The fog made the sailing northward difficult, and the three ships separated in the mist. In the early-morning darkness, one ship turned into the Rappahannock River estuary, rather than the Potomac River estuary, which was further north. The ship's crew did not realize their mistake until nearly noon, when it reached Port Royal. Deciding that there was not enough time to reach Washington after the mistake, the infantry captain aboard the ship resolved to start the war there, instead of in Washington, at the appointed hour. Though he had no maps of the area, he instructed each man to target local law enforcement and procure motor vehicles for an overland advance on Washington. The man was a 'true believer' and thought that if they struck quickly, they could travel overland and meet their compatriots prior to their planned escape.

The other two ships did not realize their compatriot was missing until the mist lifted at about 10 a.m. The officers were concerned, but as before, resolved to continue. With their objective so close, all nerves were on a razor's edge. Traveling further north made the ship's captains even more nervous. None had sailed the Chesapeake before, but both men knew its reputation for shifting sands and tricky currents, particularly this close to shore. Passing the low, clearly military shapes of Fort Belvoir brought all men's nerves to an even higher peak, but when nothing happened, they relaxed slightly.

Ashore, thousands of Virginians and Marylanders out for Sunday excursions caught sight of the ships, but no one regarded them as anything suspicious. Though ship traffic was unusual this close to Washington in 1941, it was not unusual. Alexandria, though nothing near the port it had been eighty years prior, still received occasional ships. When the two Japanese ships passed Alexandria just after 12:30 p.m., however, they began to receive suspicious attention.

In Alexandria, it had been assumed that the two ships were under the command of a pilot taken on downriver, as was the usual case with captains unfamiliar with the river. The harbormaster attempted to make radio contact shortly after noon, but when neither replied, he arranged to have small boats sent out, figuring that the ships either didn't have radios -- unlikely -- or that their radios were broken -- unusual, but not unheard of. The Japanese ships did not stop for the frantically signalling small boats, and the harbormaster requested help from the Coast Guard. He cursed the ships for their idiocy, but still considered their actions to be the work of a lack of intelligence rather than malicious.

A small Coast Guard patrol boat was dispatched from the Washington Navy Yard, which was barely 15 minutes away. Its crew tried to make contact with either of the two ships, but neither responded. Indeed, each instead increased speed, heading straight for the shallows off the southern tip of the facility known as Washington Barracks -- today known as Fort McNair -- and the southern tip of East Potomac Park. Fearing that the ships were about to run aground, the patrol boat's crew fired the boat's .30 caliber machine gun across the boat of the leading ship. They were met by a storm of fire.

During the last 30 minutes of the two ship's dash to grounding themselves, the Japanese soldiers had finished preparing their weapons and streamed up on deck. All morning, they had ritually prepared and purified themselves. Now, at 12:47 p.m., they fired the first shots of America's involvement in World War Two. The little white-painted wooden patrol boat was little more than a glorified cabin cruiser. Scarcely 20 feet long and gasoline powered, it exploded in the first barrage of small-arms fire. The Japanese soldiers had naturally thought they were under attack, and the patrol boat's crew, never knowing what was going on, became the first casualties of the war.

640px-EastPotomacParkAerial1935.jpg


Due to their exuberance at destroying the patrol boat, not all of the soldiers obeyed their officer's hasty instructions to lay down on the deck before the ship ran aground. They paid the price in snapped and sprained ankles among other injuries as the thousand-ton ship ground along the bottom of the Potomac River and came to a halt just a few hundred feet from the shore. The men aboard the second ship, which slewed to a halt, facing eastward, were uninjured. The first ship had stopped facing upstream, 200 feet from the southern tip of East Potomac Park. The second ship was 500 feet to the east of the first, its bow facing up the Anacostia River. Frantically, the Japanese soldiers scrambled to their feet and prepared to lower boats that had been readied for the purpose.

Altogether, there were 286 Japanese soldiers and crew aboard the two ships. they were facing tens of thousands of American soldiers, sailors, and airmen within a 50 mile radius. Quanico, Virginia, which they had passed on their trip upstream, was the primary training ground for the United States Marine Corps. The Washington Barracks, just a few hundred feet away, contained the Army Industrial College. Half a mile away was the Washington Naval Yard, which contained a massive gun works and the headquarters of the Chief of Naval Operations, among other major offices. The defense of Washington was provided by the 16th Infantry Brigade at Fort Hunt, Virginia. This unit performed all ceremonial military duties in the capital city after the Military District of Washington was disbanded in 1927. (It would be reformed five days after the Japanese attack.)

The Japanese were aided in their attack by the fact that it was Sunday, and most Washingtonians were enjoying a leisurely lunch after church services. The country had not yet gone on to a war footing, and the armament factories at the Washington Navy Yard were closed that day. Had the attack taken place on Monday, there would have been thousands more sailors present when the Japanese landed, and hundreds more armed guards. Instead, there were scarcely 300 at both Washington Barracks and the Navy Yard. Less than half were armed with firearms. Indeed, the burst of gunfire that destroyed the Coast Guard boat was largely covered up by the noise of the explosion, and though heads turned in southern Washington and along the Anacostia and Potomac at the noise, it was to see what had happened, rather than in panic.

The first Americans to see the Japanese coming ashore were a handful of Sunday golfers at the course in East Potomac Park. They ran to the shore to see several small whaleboats motoring toward them, with a plume of dark smoke rising from the river. The Japanese officer in the lead boat, seeing the golfers, thought they were American soldiers, ordered his men to open fire. Several golfers fell, injured or dead, while others ran for their lives. A similar situation took place at the southern edge of the Washington Barracks, where unarmed men ran to render assistance to whatever had caused the explosion, only to run straight into Japanese gunfire.

The first gunshot directed against the Japanese didn't come until after the Japanese had reached the shore. A gate guard at the Barracks, he was carrying a Garand, which he fired at the Japanese before being shot himself. Though his shots missed, Private Ernest T. Laughlin became the first American to fire back at the Japanese. Other gate guards joined in within minutes. The superior numbers, organization, and firepower of the Japanese made short work of what scattered and surprised resistance there was. Frantic calls were made from around the Barracks to the police and to the 16th Brigade. Similar calls were made from the clubhouse of the East Potomac golf course.

As they advanced north, away from the shore and deeper into Barracks property, the Japanese came under increasing fire as guards from the Navy yard came to give assistance to their Army comrades. In addition, the D.C. Police quickly arrived on scene and added their revolvers to the fight. Even more importantly, however, the responding squad cars brought radios, which allowed men on the scene to give the first reports about the seriousness of the situation. In nearby precincts, duty sergeants broke open the police armories, and soon brought Tommy guns and shotguns into the fight. Every available officer was ordered to the fray, and despite their tenacity and surprising resilience, their overall lack of firepower and experience cost them high casualties. Fifty-seven D.C. police officers died on December 7 while defending against the Japanese. Their sacrifice paid off, however, when the Japanese captain was killed and organization began to disintegrate. Except for a single squad of Japanese soldiers, no attackers from the second ship (the one nearest to the Barracks) made it outside of the box defined by M Street, South Capitol Street, the Anacostia River, and Washington Channel. The lurking squad that managed to escape was eventually tracked down and gunned down at Folger Park. It is assumed they had been trying to reach the U.S. Capitol building, which was mostly empty at the time.

The men from the first ship, owing to the fact that they had come ashore at a golf course, rather than a U.S. military installation, had an easier time of it. Though D.C. Police responded quickly, they were unable to stop automatic-weapon-wielding Japanese soldiers at Maine Street, where a hasty roadblock had been formed. The Japanese company aboard the first ship had advanced north across the golf course, to the newly-built Jefferson Memorial, where the group's commander got his bearings. Detaching a platoon to cover the roadway bridge at the unit's rear, he ordered his men into Washington proper. Advancing north along 15th Street, they reached the Washington Mall, where they were met by a storm of gunfire. Secret Service men, D.C. Police, American soldiers, and even ordinary Washingtonians joined in with everything at hand to prevent the Japanese from crossing the open space of the Mall. Under duress, the Japanese sought shelter in the shadow of the Washington Monument. An attempt to fall back to East Potomac Park was abandoned when U.S. Navy and Coast Guard patrol boats sailed up the Washington Channel and D.C. Police cut off the 15th Street escape route. The blocking force at the 14th Street Bridge was remarkably effective at stopping the 16th Brigade from using that route to cross the Potomac, but the Japanese neglected to defend the three railway bridges nearby, and U.S. soldiers used those bridges to avoid Japanese fire covering the roadway bridge. The Japanese platoon was taken from the rear and killed to a man. By 3:38 p.m., all Japanese resistance had ended, and the last stragglers were hunted down in the buildings of the Washington Barracks complex.

The story of the third ship, which had gotten lost and ended up at Port Royal, is even more interesting. That ship actually launched its attack later than the two that landed at Washington, but owing to the surprise attack, news was not received in Port Royal in time. In 1941, Port Royal had a population of just 60 people. When the Japanese came ashore, they did so quickly and surprisingly bloodlessly when compared with their compatriots in Washington. Only two Americans were killed: a local police officer and a man who took a shot at a Japanese soldier, and the Japanese quickly commandeered enough vehicles to transport their entire 117-man force. Despite attempts to cut telephone lines, the residents of the town immediately called local police to report what had happened. None of the officers on duty in the county sheriff's office believed what had happened until other reports started coming in from along U.S. Highway 301 and later, U.S. Highway 17. Police cars were duly dispatched, and when those vehicles came under fire, the Virginia State Police was contacted.

Meanwhile, the Japanese commander of the impromptu convoy was attempting to decipher a map liberated from a roadside gas station in Port Royal. After going too far south on U.S. 301, he directed the convoy to turn around, then got it heading north on U.S. 17, which would take them to a bridge crossing the Rappahannock River. He knew that they needed to head north, and so crossing the river was a priority. The first bridge across it, however, was in a somewhat larger town named Fredericksburg.

As the Japanese drove through small towns with names like Featherstone Fork and Moss Neck, more and more frantic calls to the police resulted. So did the occasional shot directed at the Japanese-driven vehicles. With the State Police fully alerted, by the time the Japanese arrived at the outskirts of Fredericksburg, an enormous roadblock of white-painted Virginia State Police cars had been gathered. The Japanese were met by submachinegun and rifle fire of the state police, and the disorganized Japanese were only able to reply with scattered automatic weapons fire. Two dozen Japanese were killed, as well as five State Troopers, and the Japanese commander ordered a left turn in hopes of reaching U.S. 1, which he could tell by the map would take them to Washington.

Unfortunately for the Japanese, this turn brought them into contact with a column of U.S. Army soldiers who had been alerted to the emergency and were being driven north. The Japanese were forced to evacuate their vehicles and take positions on a small portion of high ground to the west of the town. Several houses and a nearby stone wall provided good ground for defense, and the Japanese commander prepared for the inevitable. Shortly before nightfall, it came. American artillery, brought up from nearby bases, battered the Japanese before mortar fire and grenades were followed by American automatic weapons fire. The Japanese commander ordered a last charge of Banzai!, and the final Japanese soldier fell at 5:57 p.m. on the hills of Marye's Heights.

Today, the attack on Washington overshadows the far larger attacks on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines much as it did in the hours and days immediately following December 7. Despite the best efforts of the Japanese involved, at no time was Franklin Roosevelt in danger. When news of the Japanese attack on the Washington Barracks reached the White House, he was quickly and firmly evacuated north by Secret Service agents. Thus, when Japanese soldiers fired on the White House -- two windows were broken at the residence -- from the Washington Memorial, he was in no danger. Still, to an American public that by and large had no idea where Pearl Harbor was, the attacks on Washington and Fredericksburg had an effect all out of proportion to the 298 Americans killed by the Japanese. Throughout America's Japan-first strategy of revenge during the Second World War, American soldiers told each other to "Remember Washington!" That single-minded focus on Japan damaged relations with other Allied nations, which believed Germany to be the greater threat, but by the time the Japanese surrendered in April 1945 and the focus turned to Germany, these difficulties had been paved over. By the time of the German surrender in October 1945, the alliance had been cemented in place that would pave the way for NATO and the beginning of the Cold War. Never again, however, would Americans believe that the ocean was a shield.
 
I mainly threw that together as a writing and theoretical exercise to see if I could get the Japanese to attack Washington. It's outlandish, of course, but it's not utterly impossible. You'd have to have the Japanese roll sixes the whole way to keep the thing secret, but ...
 
Wow... you turned this into a semi-plausible scenario. Amazing.

Just one thing... the line "Though ship traffic was unusual this close to Washington in 1941, it was not unusual." should probably be changed. :p
 
The Japanese strike force, the Kido Butai had 2 BB, 6 CV, 2 CA, 1 CL, and 11 DD (there were also 29 I boats assigned to the strike as pickets and looking for leakers from the air attacks) with a total of 414 aircraft.

Definitely going to be a hot time for someone.

To be fair, having Lord Yu and his fleet of Ha'taks would have evened the odds up a bit, if he had carried out his part of the Great Plan.
 
Wow... you turned this into a semi-plausible scenario. Amazing.

Just one thing... the line "Though ship traffic was unusual this close to Washington in 1941, it was not unusual." should probably be changed. :p

Heh. That's what I get for not proofreading. Second unusual should read "unheard of."
 
I mainly threw that together as a writing and theoretical exercise to see if I could get the Japanese to attack Washington. It's outlandish, of course, but it's not utterly impossible. You'd have to have the Japanese roll sixes the whole way to keep the thing secret, but ...

Amazing!

Btw, am I the only one thinking that this could be turned into a slapstick comedy with little effort? :p
 

I agree. Completely insane scenario but it's a good insane scenario.

Btw, am I the only one thinking that this could be turned into a slapstick comedy with little effort? :p

Heh--So when Spielberg does his 1941 comedy, it's about the comic misadventures of the three men who tried to warn the ambassador back in Haiti.


You see--what had happened afterwards was the three men --after being thrown out of the embassy-- realized that they must make amends for their dishonour. So--after much soul searching-- they decide that they will help in the attack as well.

But alas! They are in Haiti! What to do? How can they bring honour back into their lives again?

After much drinking, the men finally come up with a plan.

They will take a boat across the Caribbean to Florida! There, they will steal a car at meet their compatriots in the anticipated attack on Washington.

So--our three men --drunk, barely able to speak English and armed with one revolver (with only three bullets) -- make it to Miami, where they put their plan into action! Along the way to Washington they find romance! Honour! Alcohol! Gun-toting rednecks! More alcohol! Jazz music! Even more alcohol! Marijuana! Some more alcohol!

1941 - Road Trip to Washington -- Coming soon to a theatre near you!
 
is it possible that the Japanese have done a strike attack at washington instead of pearl harbor? could they have gotten past the panama canal on a sucicide mission? or maybe just stuck up the canal itself? what would the effects be on the nation, suffering from the loss of much of its political and military leadership? (if this isnt ASB)

I suppose some of their submarines would have had a chance ? They'd have had the range, maybe ? And even if not they could probably be refuelled in the South Atlantic.

I suppose disguised merchantmen/auxiliaries could also have got there

The question is what sort of attack ? All I can think of is some sort of flying of seaplanes up the river, hoping not to be noticed because who would expect the JAPANESE there ? And then....er maybe a gas bomb on the White House ?

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 
btw--how does one 'blow up' the Panama Canal?

I was thinking attacking Pearl Harbor on a better day, and simultaneously bombing the Pedro Miguel Lock. The lock would fail, letting the Chagas river flow southeast into the Pacific. Erosion would do the rest, and as Lake Gatun drained into Miraflores Lake the Calbera cut would be filled with sediment. The flooding would cost Panama enourmously. Now depending on the geology of the region this could lead to the Chagas river permenantly changing direction.
 

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Oh, so what Yamamoto really meant by that was that the combined fleet could magically get to the Eastern Seaboard, past the massive air and naval patrols searching for U-boats, sail into DC Harbor, take all government buildings in the city, secure the city, and dictate terms to the US.

And when exactly did Yamamoto say this, because it stands in stern contrast to his "afraid we've only awaken a sleeping giant" quote.

And Bard, please get your head around the fact that 'people planning things' does not equal 'all things being planned are possible'.
That especially rings true for your 'Hitler wanted to invade the US, so he could have' threads.

Hitler's second book was finally published. It's at http://www.amazon.com if you want to buy it. Another book available at the same site is Hitler's Plan To Attack The United States by James P. Duffy. It tells all about Hitler's plan
to invade the United States and goes all the way back to the late 1800s. Your problem is that you're not open to the idea that Hitler wanted to invade the United States. Try wrapping your head around that.

Shorter DeathDemon: "That something was planned doesn't make it possible".

Shorter Bard32: "But something was planned!"

This is at the level where you seem to be paying so little attention to what other people say that it's disrespectful.
 
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