Just off the top of my memory, wasn't it more like Pearl - Wake - Guam - PI? Darwin especially seems rather out of the way once you've gotten to Wake.
December 28th, 1941: The Day of Infamy
- Thread starter Gridley
- Start date
Just off the top of my memory, wasn't it more like Pearl - Wake - Guam - PI? Darwin especially seems rather out of the way once you've gotten to Wake.
Guam didn't have an airfield that could land B-17's. That's why there were no aircraft at Guam. Other than the Pan Am Clippers and maybe PBYs there were no aircraft at Guam.
Dave in St. Louis
Banned
So I've learned. A fact which is surprising, weird and troublesome. How did they expect to defend the place? What were they thinking?
An excellent question to which I have no answer. My memory said there was a field there pre-war, though not a large one. I know there was one on Wake, and plans to expand it considerably.
With about 400 military personnel, mostly Navy, I don't think anyone sane planned to hold the 225 square miles of Guam. Consider that Wake had almost that many Marines and has an area of only 2.85 square miles.
FYI, Wake had a 5,000ft runway in 12/41 according to the Pacific War Online Encyclopedia.
The Philippines
“We shall return.” Gen. Wainwright, just before boarding PT 34 to leave the Philippines.
While a small island north of Luzon had been occupied on the 30th, the invasion of the Philippines is generally recorded as beginning on the January 3rd, with the first landing on Luzon. Officially, Gen. MacArthur’s plans called for a forward defense, taking advantage of the nearly 400 aircraft available to him including what was perceived as his ace: over 70 B-17’s of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups (Heavy). Also available were the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) of A-24 dive-bombers, which would wind up being equally useful, and over 100 P-40’s. Ground forces were also substantial, with 12 divisions, several independent infantry regiments, the 1st Provisional Tank Group, and an assortment of independent artillery units. On paper, The US Armed Forces, Far East, and the Philippine Army appeared capable of holding indefinitely against the few divisions the Japanese could spare.
The reality on the ground, however, was quite different. Many of the Philippine Army units had only been allowed to fire their rifles for the first time less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, so short had been stocks of ammunition. Drill had been all but non-existent and some of the Philippine Army divisions had not yet been joined by their organic artillery.
Worst of all, however, was the commander himself. While no proof has survived to the present day, it now seems clear that MacArthur was, at least, aware that President Quezon hoped to keep the Philippines neutral and was willing to aid in that endeavor. To repeated requests from Gen. Brereton to allow the FEAF to attack Formosa, MacArthur made no response. As a result, many of the FEAF aircraft were on the ground or circling their fields when the Japanese air attacks arrived on the first day of the war. Almost half of the vaunted B-17’s and numerous other aircraft were destroyed in under an hour, without dropping a single bomb.
MacArthur’s plan of forward defense fared little better. Although reports from the front consistently praise the fighting spirit and determination of the Philippine and US troops, especially the Philippine Scouts, command failures existed at every level. Co-ordination was poor to non-existent and complicated when it occurred by multiple language barriers. Japanese forces, by contrast, were able to execute a number of complex flanking and encircling attacks, chopping the defenders into bits and forcing them to retreat. By late February, it was clear that the Philippines were doomed.
One of MacArthur’s last acts (in early March, 1942) was to accept half a million dollars from Quezon’s government, just before Quezon and his family were evacuated from the Philippines at MacArthur’s orders. Two days later MacArthur, along with Chief of Staff Gen. Sutherland, were killed in a Japanese air attack. Command passed to Gen. Wainwright.
Gen. Wainwright proved to be a quite different commander from MacArthur. While MacArthur never visited the front lines, earning him the nickname “Dugout Doug”, Wainwright “appeared to be everywhere – at the front, at his headquarters, in conference with the Navy, or right behind you if you weren’t doing your job,” as one staff officer related. While MacArthur had retreated under pressure, Wainwright counter-attacked at every perceived opportunity. He ordered aggressive use be made of the remnants of the FEAF, particularly the A-24’s in a close-air support role. The Japanese, who had begun to withdraw forces as the campaign appeared to wind down, were caught by surprise and were forced to pull forces from everywhere they could just to hold their lines.
Although some criticized his attacks as reckless, Wainwright had a deeper plan. MacArthur’s uncoordinated retreat had involved few preparations for a siege at Corregidor, but called for such a siege in any case. Wainwright, by throwing the Japanese off balance, hoped to create a window of opportunity. In the process, he became a hero: the Lion of the Philippines.
Roosevelt decided that a hero was necessary, and accordingly ordered Wainwright to remove himself and his staff from the Philippines in late April, when the Japanese again began to push the defenders back. Wainwright fought against this order almost as hard as he fought the Japanese; he ordered his signals section to lose messages and report others garbled, and appealed to everyone in his chain of command, as well as senior naval officers, to be allowed to remain with his troops.
The end, however, was not in doubt. Bataan fell on July 3rd, and Wainwright received an order direct from Roosevelt, specifying the exact times and means by which he would be transported to Australia. Just before boarding PT 34 for the first leg of his journey, Wainwright addressed a group of US and Philippine army officers and men with just three words: “We shall return.”
On August 8th, Gen. Lough on Corregidor, faced with a Japanese ultimatum, ordered all forces in the Philippines to surrender, and the last organized defense ended. Guerrilla warfare would continue, involving almost a third of the US personnel in the Philippines and hundreds of thousands of natives, until the islands were liberated.
Edit: changed a few dates and made a few tweaks.
“We shall return.” Gen. Wainwright, just before boarding PT 34 to leave the Philippines.
While a small island north of Luzon had been occupied on the 30th, the invasion of the Philippines is generally recorded as beginning on the January 3rd, with the first landing on Luzon. Officially, Gen. MacArthur’s plans called for a forward defense, taking advantage of the nearly 400 aircraft available to him including what was perceived as his ace: over 70 B-17’s of the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups (Heavy). Also available were the 27th Bombardment Group (Light) of A-24 dive-bombers, which would wind up being equally useful, and over 100 P-40’s. Ground forces were also substantial, with 12 divisions, several independent infantry regiments, the 1st Provisional Tank Group, and an assortment of independent artillery units. On paper, The US Armed Forces, Far East, and the Philippine Army appeared capable of holding indefinitely against the few divisions the Japanese could spare.
The reality on the ground, however, was quite different. Many of the Philippine Army units had only been allowed to fire their rifles for the first time less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, so short had been stocks of ammunition. Drill had been all but non-existent and some of the Philippine Army divisions had not yet been joined by their organic artillery.
Worst of all, however, was the commander himself. While no proof has survived to the present day, it now seems clear that MacArthur was, at least, aware that President Quezon hoped to keep the Philippines neutral and was willing to aid in that endeavor. To repeated requests from Gen. Brereton to allow the FEAF to attack Formosa, MacArthur made no response. As a result, many of the FEAF aircraft were on the ground or circling their fields when the Japanese air attacks arrived on the first day of the war. Almost half of the vaunted B-17’s and numerous other aircraft were destroyed in under an hour, without dropping a single bomb.
MacArthur’s plan of forward defense fared little better. Although reports from the front consistently praise the fighting spirit and determination of the Philippine and US troops, especially the Philippine Scouts, command failures existed at every level. Co-ordination was poor to non-existent and complicated when it occurred by multiple language barriers. Japanese forces, by contrast, were able to execute a number of complex flanking and encircling attacks, chopping the defenders into bits and forcing them to retreat. By late February, it was clear that the Philippines were doomed.
One of MacArthur’s last acts (in early March, 1942) was to accept half a million dollars from Quezon’s government, just before Quezon and his family were evacuated from the Philippines at MacArthur’s orders. Two days later MacArthur, along with Chief of Staff Gen. Sutherland, were killed in a Japanese air attack. Command passed to Gen. Wainwright.
Gen. Wainwright proved to be a quite different commander from MacArthur. While MacArthur never visited the front lines, earning him the nickname “Dugout Doug”, Wainwright “appeared to be everywhere – at the front, at his headquarters, in conference with the Navy, or right behind you if you weren’t doing your job,” as one staff officer related. While MacArthur had retreated under pressure, Wainwright counter-attacked at every perceived opportunity. He ordered aggressive use be made of the remnants of the FEAF, particularly the A-24’s in a close-air support role. The Japanese, who had begun to withdraw forces as the campaign appeared to wind down, were caught by surprise and were forced to pull forces from everywhere they could just to hold their lines.
Although some criticized his attacks as reckless, Wainwright had a deeper plan. MacArthur’s uncoordinated retreat had involved few preparations for a siege at Corregidor, but called for such a siege in any case. Wainwright, by throwing the Japanese off balance, hoped to create a window of opportunity. In the process, he became a hero: the Lion of the Philippines.
Roosevelt decided that a hero was necessary, and accordingly ordered Wainwright to remove himself and his staff from the Philippines in late April, when the Japanese again began to push the defenders back. Wainwright fought against this order almost as hard as he fought the Japanese; he ordered his signals section to lose messages and report others garbled, and appealed to everyone in his chain of command, as well as senior naval officers, to be allowed to remain with his troops.
The end, however, was not in doubt. Bataan fell on July 3rd, and Wainwright received an order direct from Roosevelt, specifying the exact times and means by which he would be transported to Australia. Just before boarding PT 34 for the first leg of his journey, Wainwright addressed a group of US and Philippine army officers and men with just three words: “We shall return.”
On August 8th, Gen. Lough on Corregidor, faced with a Japanese ultimatum, ordered all forces in the Philippines to surrender, and the last organized defense ended. Guerrilla warfare would continue, involving almost a third of the US personnel in the Philippines and hundreds of thousands of natives, until the islands were liberated.
Edit: changed a few dates and made a few tweaks.
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FYI, if you want more detail on the USAFFE, look here:
http://niehorster.orbat.com/013_usa/_41_usarmy/philippines/_usaffe.htm
That's the historical OrBat. Add all the units with the dotted lines, and you've basically got TTL's OrBat.
http://niehorster.orbat.com/013_usa/_41_usarmy/philippines/_usaffe.htm
That's the historical OrBat. Add all the units with the dotted lines, and you've basically got TTL's OrBat.
Dave in St. Louis
Banned
Nice. Well-written. And you've probably made legions of Dugout Doug detractors happy.
Malaya
On December 29th Hong Kong and Malaya were invaded. Hong Kong fell quickly.
On the morning of January 3rd, 1942, a mixed force of Japanese land-based bombers located and sank the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and the carrier HMS Indomitable, despite desperate efforts from the latter’s air wing. The 9 Sea Hurricanes and 12 Fulmars did manage to destroy 23 Japanese aircraft and damaged a dozen more, but the loss of their carrier sealed their fate. A second wave later in the day sank the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the destroyer HMS Vampire. Japanese losses were 32 aircraft destroyed and 21 damaged.
In Malaya, as in the Philippines, the attacking Japanese were outnumbered. However, the Commonwealth forces (notably the 8th Australian Division), while riddled with problems, were still far more organized then the American and Philippine forces. Gen. Yamashita also had far worse logistical problems. These factors, along with unfavorable weather, caused the Japanese offensive to run out of steam just short of Singapore in late February. Now aware of the force disparity against them, the Japanese began to shift troops from the Philippines to reduce Singapore. Gen. Wainwright’s offensive in the Philippines then caused troops to be shifted back, and the Malaya front became a stalemate.
The ABDA (American British Dutch Australian) command had been struggling to keep a supply line open to Singapore almost since the war began, and to interfere with Japanese operations in the area. They had been barely successful at the former and a failure at the latter while suffering heavy losses. The arrival in the area of Kido Butai, fresh from a string of victories, spelled the final defeat of this force in the Battle of the Java Sea on March 26th. Now cut off and subjected to a series of carrier airstrikes, Singapore joined Corregidor as “the Alamos of the Pacific.” The Alamo, of course, fell, and so did Singapore on April 30th. Kido Butai followed up on this victory by raiding into the Indian Ocean, making a whirlwind series of attacks. In ten days, the British lost the light carrier HMS Hermes, the cruiser HMS Cornwall, two destroyers, and a number of merchant ships and aircraft. Japanese losses were only a handful of aircraft.
Kido Butai had ravaged the world’s two largest navies, sinking or crippling almost everything they encountered and losing not a single ship themselves in the process. The dominance of the aircraft carrier had been established. But the raids had a cost: the IJN’s elite carrier pilots had lost many of their number. By the time Kido Butai returned to Japan only a third of the aircraft it had sailed for Pearl Harbor with were still operational. A determined effort would repair many of these and replace others, but the experienced aircrews were a larger problem, one that would never be fully solved.
Edit to add: Index thus far:
Post #1: Prologue
Post #7: Pearl Harbor
Post #41: Wake
Post #86: The Philippines
Post #90: Malaya
On December 29th Hong Kong and Malaya were invaded. Hong Kong fell quickly.
On the morning of January 3rd, 1942, a mixed force of Japanese land-based bombers located and sank the battlecruiser HMS Repulse and the carrier HMS Indomitable, despite desperate efforts from the latter’s air wing. The 9 Sea Hurricanes and 12 Fulmars did manage to destroy 23 Japanese aircraft and damaged a dozen more, but the loss of their carrier sealed their fate. A second wave later in the day sank the battleship HMS Prince of Wales and the destroyer HMS Vampire. Japanese losses were 32 aircraft destroyed and 21 damaged.
In Malaya, as in the Philippines, the attacking Japanese were outnumbered. However, the Commonwealth forces (notably the 8th Australian Division), while riddled with problems, were still far more organized then the American and Philippine forces. Gen. Yamashita also had far worse logistical problems. These factors, along with unfavorable weather, caused the Japanese offensive to run out of steam just short of Singapore in late February. Now aware of the force disparity against them, the Japanese began to shift troops from the Philippines to reduce Singapore. Gen. Wainwright’s offensive in the Philippines then caused troops to be shifted back, and the Malaya front became a stalemate.
The ABDA (American British Dutch Australian) command had been struggling to keep a supply line open to Singapore almost since the war began, and to interfere with Japanese operations in the area. They had been barely successful at the former and a failure at the latter while suffering heavy losses. The arrival in the area of Kido Butai, fresh from a string of victories, spelled the final defeat of this force in the Battle of the Java Sea on March 26th. Now cut off and subjected to a series of carrier airstrikes, Singapore joined Corregidor as “the Alamos of the Pacific.” The Alamo, of course, fell, and so did Singapore on April 30th. Kido Butai followed up on this victory by raiding into the Indian Ocean, making a whirlwind series of attacks. In ten days, the British lost the light carrier HMS Hermes, the cruiser HMS Cornwall, two destroyers, and a number of merchant ships and aircraft. Japanese losses were only a handful of aircraft.
Kido Butai had ravaged the world’s two largest navies, sinking or crippling almost everything they encountered and losing not a single ship themselves in the process. The dominance of the aircraft carrier had been established. But the raids had a cost: the IJN’s elite carrier pilots had lost many of their number. By the time Kido Butai returned to Japan only a third of the aircraft it had sailed for Pearl Harbor with were still operational. A determined effort would repair many of these and replace others, but the experienced aircrews were a larger problem, one that would never be fully solved.
Edit to add: Index thus far:
Post #1: Prologue
Post #7: Pearl Harbor
Post #41: Wake
Post #86: The Philippines
Post #90: Malaya
Bearcat
Banned
I believe under the London Naval Treaty - I think it was London - Japan could not fortify the league of nations mandates, and we could not fortify Guam.
Of course, the Japanese ignored that.
We did not.
The treaty had expired, what, a year earlier? Plenty of time to build an airfield.
I believe the NEI will also have several shipments of armoured cars that didn't arrive iOTL.
I also don't think that the Japanese in Malaya can survive long enough for reinforcements to arrive if their pace of advance falters. They were very dependent on capturing enemy stores and transports.
Edit: I've checked, and I suspect that the Japanese are in deep trouble. One of the reasons the invasion was possible is that the very bad weather in the two days before the invasion covered the approach of the Japanese convoys. That's part of the reason why Force Z had to go out looking for them with inadequate information at the last minute. From what I can tell of the weather, that isn't the case at this point, so the British will have be much better prepared - a limited Matador may go ahead in time, and the convoys are much more vulnerable.
I also don't think that the Japanese in Malaya can survive long enough for reinforcements to arrive if their pace of advance falters. They were very dependent on capturing enemy stores and transports.
Edit: I've checked, and I suspect that the Japanese are in deep trouble. One of the reasons the invasion was possible is that the very bad weather in the two days before the invasion covered the approach of the Japanese convoys. That's part of the reason why Force Z had to go out looking for them with inadequate information at the last minute. From what I can tell of the weather, that isn't the case at this point, so the British will have be much better prepared - a limited Matador may go ahead in time, and the convoys are much more vulnerable.
Bearcat
Banned
Yeah, but by that time, ignoring the Pacific had become a habit, as has isolationism. Congress actually voted it down IIRC. No one wanted to spend the money.
Bearcat
Banned
I doubt it. The British really want Asia to stay quiet, and wishful thinking is a bitch.
But even with the IJA ashore, it only takes a little nudge here or there for Yamashita's Shoestring Campaign to come untied. A few ATL delays in moving down the peninsula and he could run out of supplies short of Singapore.
The situation in the Philipines is better than you realize.
OTL it was MacArthur's insisting that Wainwright take his place as commander of all forces in the Philipines which enable the Japanese to force him to issue a surrender that applied to all American and Filipino forces in the islands. Once Wainwright has left there is no one the Japanese can even claim has issued any such command and there are 5000 Americans and 15,000 Filipinos on Mindanao alone...so Japan is going to need a brand new invasion for the southern islands, if not several.
Gridley, the Japanese invasion plan for Wake which succeeded OTL was an all or nothing affair. The IJN even intended to throw away several destroyers, of which they were so lacking, to use the crews as naval infantry if it looked like the attack was failing. You could certainly justify delaying the attack on Wake by a few days but if the attack doesn't succeed the day it is launched then it probably fails.
OTL it was MacArthur's insisting that Wainwright take his place as commander of all forces in the Philipines which enable the Japanese to force him to issue a surrender that applied to all American and Filipino forces in the islands. Once Wainwright has left there is no one the Japanese can even claim has issued any such command and there are 5000 Americans and 15,000 Filipinos on Mindanao alone...so Japan is going to need a brand new invasion for the southern islands, if not several.
Gridley, the Japanese invasion plan for Wake which succeeded OTL was an all or nothing affair. The IJN even intended to throw away several destroyers, of which they were so lacking, to use the crews as naval infantry if it looked like the attack was failing. You could certainly justify delaying the attack on Wake by a few days but if the attack doesn't succeed the day it is launched then it probably fails.
Bearcat
Banned
Another thing IIRC is the Akagi was attacked by bombers during the IO cruise. Her lack of radios / poor coordination in the Zeroes and no radar on his ships almost led to calamity. Fortunately for Nagumo, the bombs all missed. Not impossible to imagine a couple of those hitting and putting a carrier out of action, or even sinking it if it hit at the wrong moment.
Unfortunately I dredged this out of my tormented memory and cannot remember a reference, though someone else here might.
Unfortunately I dredged this out of my tormented memory and cannot remember a reference, though someone else here might.
This was a bone of contention between Congress and the Navy. The Navy felt that Guam was key to keeping communications open to the Philippines, which is true. Congress felt that building up forces there would be provocative. At a certain point, the local Japanese superiority in the area was so great that there was a concern that trying to build up Guam would just lead to the Japanese capturing whatever forces and improvements were built there when war came.
The US would have had to build up a lot of infrastructure to support a garrison strong enough to hold Guam--airfields, probably port facilities, roads, barracks. It would have been tricky to avoid a situation where we build a lot of this stuff and the Japanese strike before we're ready to defend it.
Historically the main Japanese attack in the Philippines started on December 22nd, two weeks after the war started, though there were minor attacks in those intervening weeks. I'm not sure why the delay historically, so I can't say one way or the other on whether the main attack could be moved up in comparison to start of war.
Cook
Banned
Just guessing but sealift limits may have something to do with it. The landings in Malaya had first priority.