Dec. 7th, 1941-The BATTLE of Pearl Harbor.....

Wow, it's been a WHILE since I visited. This is my first posting since arriving in Afghanistan (ironic, I first found this site while in Iraq in 2005!).

Anyhow...I saw a bunch of threads on Pearl Harbor, and wanted to try my luck with one, hope everyone is ready to dive in.....

What if the U.S. defenses had been up during the attack? There were something in the Area of 390 aircraft on Oahu that day (about 200 were fighters AFAIK).We ALL know that there was AMPLE time to bring the fighters and AAA batteries to the ready EVEN if the alarm was raised after the Opana Radar sighting.....

How would the battle have developed?
Would Nagumo commit the third wave, assuming the first two met resistance?
Could the Enterprise and Lexington have any bearing on the battle?
How would the outcome affect U.S. war strategy?
Would Japan still persecute there attacks on targets in Asia if the attack didnt go as well as in OTL?

C'mon everyone, join in....make a man in Afghanistan happy!!!
 

CalBear

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Wow, it's been a WHILE since I visited. This is my first posting since arriving in Afghanistan (ironic, I first found this site while in Iraq in 2005!).

Anyhow...I saw a bunch of threads on Pearl Harbor, and wanted to try my luck with one, hope everyone is ready to dive in.....

What if the U.S. defenses had been up during the attack? There were something in the Area of 390 aircraft on Oahu that day (about 200 were fighters AFAIK).We ALL know that there was AMPLE time to bring the fighters and AAA batteries to the ready EVEN if the alarm was raised after the Opana Radar sighting.....

How would the battle have developed?
Would Nagumo commit the third wave, assuming the first two met resistance?
Could the Enterprise and Lexington have any bearing on the battle?
How would the outcome affect U.S. war strategy?
Would Japan still persecute there attacks on targets in Asia if the attack didnt go as well as in OTL?

C'mon everyone, join in....make a man in Afghanistan happy!!!

It depends on the warning time. If they don't have any more warning than the initial radar, they will still be in a lot of trouble, there isn't really enough time (just about an hour) to get everyone up and ready to go. If the base goes on alert when USS Ward attacks the sub, there is a better result (in a shameless plug - see Pacific War Redux).

If they have less than six hours, but more than two, the Japanese suffer serious, perhaps ever crippling, losses as the first wave will run into a serious buzzsaw. The Us has 100+ P-40s, 40 P-36s, 21 F4Fs, 8 F2As and even 26 SBD dive bombers, which were condiered tio be "back-up" fighters under Navy doctrine at the time for a total of 169 fighters (plus the SBDs) to confront roughly the same number of Japnese aircrafy (with only 54 fighters as escort). The losses, just from the air-to-air would be stunning, with the AAA being more than capable of chopping up any part of the 1st Wave that makes it through the fighter grinder. The 2nd Wave might catch a number of fighters on the ground, but surely no where near all of them, and all the AAA is at full strength. As a bonus, the Kates of the 2nd Wave are carrying fragmentation bombs, not torpedoes.

Now, if there is more than eight hours, it could be very interesting. This gives much of the Battle Line the time to get steam up and sortie. This could be a VERY bad thing, since the Japanese had 20+ subs lurking just in case this occurred, and no one doubts the quality of the IJN torpedoes. On the other hand, the IJN boats didn't exactly blow anyone's skirts up IOTL, so they may come up dry. In either case, the reaction of the American people will be a complete wild card.

The U.S. may not have gone on quite the crusade it did IOTL if the attack had occurred with some reasonable warning from Japan (say twelve hours, which would translate to eight hours or so by the time it got to Pearl). In that case the "Unconditional Surrender" might have been relaxed (as it actually was, although not publicly, IOTL) regarding the Emperor. That could even abort Hiroshima & Nagasaki.
 
The problem for the US in this situation would be how far forward do they defend. Would the American public be behind a war, if the US had discovered the Japanese aircraft carriers and attacked them - before the 'attack'.
Roosevelt couldn't risk the accusation that he had somehow misconstrued some 'training exercise' with intent of war. From that, surely it was important that Japan 'fires the first shot'. However, this does not stop the US being able to defend the skies above Oahu.

It wasn't the equipment that was lacking, it was the attitude of senoir officers that not in their wildest imaginings could it happen (i.e. an attack was ASB).
 

CalBear

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Try "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision" by Roberta Wohlstetter for lots of good info on US warning and reaction times that actually happened on Dec.7'41.

Her book can be previewed at
http://books.google.com/books?id=pO..._brr=0&sig=ACfU3U3q3d8OLPyTfF9djA0TPtiYAmjtrA

Page #6 is most informative.

The thing is, that in this POD there IS a warning, as part of the question (rather like the preconditions on the shore battery thread, but less restrictive). The source of the warning isn't all that critical, unless you push further back than 07:00, there is virtually no impact. Once the JNAF was 100 miles out, the gig was up. There was no way to get any more than slightly prepared.

Even if you go with the Ward's attack at 06:45, you can't do a lot if the preparations are the same as IOTL. Make it two hours & things begin to change, even with OTL's foolishness. Make it four-six and the 1st Wave get wiped out (70%-80% losses would be my guess). The escorting Zero's are outnumbered better than 3-1 and OTL established very well what happens to Vals & Kates when four or more .50 cals rip into them (for that matter the Zero wasn't exactly robust, maneuverable as quail, but a bit flammable). Even the Mohawks will play hell with the strike aircraft well before they reach the bases, which will have ALL the AAA both the fixed AND mobile Army guns, as well as the ships in the harbor, manned and trained out.
Depending on fuel state of the fighters, the 2nd Wave may get closer before the flak cuts them to pieces, along with whatever fighters are still up.

As I said earlier, go past eight hours warning and the butterflies are so thick it's hard to see. It could be a disaster for either side.
 

robdab2

Banned
Calbear, you wrote,

Once the JNAF was 100 miles out, the gig was up. There was no way to get any more than slightly prepared.- Which was exactly my point in giving the Wohlstetter source. Historicaly the 1st strike was picked up by the Opana Point radar when 132 miles NNE of Oahu and reported to the Early Air - Warning Centre when they were about 112-102 miles out. Even if Tyler/Taylor had figured it out, there wasn't any time left to get the warning out to the USN's battleships. Wohlstetter points out that the Early Air - Warning Centre didn't have direct communictions with any of the USAAF, Marine or Navy fighter bases and in any case the US fighters weren't anywhere near ready to scramble anyway.

She also points out that the Earlt Air Warning Centre didn't have direct radio contact with any US fighter aircraft and so could not vector any of those fighters onto the incoming Japanese airstrike. Without radar to show the relative positions of the attackers and defenders there would be no guarantee at all that the American fighters could intercept the Japanese strike before it hit PH and the Oahu airfields.

So the radar won't give sufficient warning. So what would ? Any USN PBY out patrolling to the NNE (historically there weren't any) wouldn't last long against 54 escorting Zeros. Especially since they would likely close to within very close range before recognizing the air strike as a Japanese one rather than a mass USAAF training mission that they accientally hadn't been told about.

That only leaves a USN warship or submarine to report the Japanmese strike and historically there weren't any such anywhere out to 210 miles NNE of Oahu.

Perhaps the best is to propose that the US freighter "Cythia Olsen" was only 150 miles NNE of Oahu that morning instead of her historical 1,000 miles NE where an IJN sbmarine sank her prior to 0755.

But I doubt that such would have mattered much to the final outcome.

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And btw, wrt the Oahu bombardment thread what happened to your commitment of:

Without being able to access the map, I am really crippled. If I figure out a way to view it, I'll weigh in.

Death Demon has posted a .jpg link.
 
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CalBear

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Calbear, you wrote,

Once the JNAF was 100 miles out, the gig was up. There was no way to get any more than slightly prepared.- Which was exactly my point in giving the Wohlstetter source. Historicaly the 1st strike was picked up by the Opana Point radar when 132 miles NNE of Oahu and reported to the Early Air - Warning Centre when they were about 112-102 miles out. Even if Tyler/Taylor had figured it out, there wasn't any time left to get the warning out to the USN's battleships. Wohlstetter points out that the Early Air - Warning Centre didn't have direct communictions with any of the USAAF, Marine or Navy fighter bases and in any case the US fighters weren't anywhere near ready to scramble anyway.

She also points out that the Earlt Air Warning Centre didn't have direct radio contact with any US fighter aircraft and so could not vector any of those fighters onto the incoming Japanese airstrike. Without radar to show the relative positions of the attackers and defenders there would be no guarantee at all that the American fighters could intercept the Japanese strike before it hit PH and the Oahu airfields.

So the radar won't give sufficient warning. So what would ? Any USN PBY out patrolling to the NNE (historically there weren't any) wouldn't last long against 54 escorting Zeros. Especially since they would likely close to within very close range before recognizing the air strike as a Japanese one rather than a mass USAAF training mission that they accientally hadn't been told about.

That only leaves a USN warship or submarine to report the Japanmese strike and historically there weren't any such anywhere out to 210 miles NNE of Oahu.

Perhaps the best is to propose that the US freighter "Cythia Olsen" was only 150 miles NNE of Oahu that morning instead of her historical 1,000 miles NE where an IJN sbmarine sank her prior to 0755.

But I doubt that such would have mattered much to the final outcome.

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And btw, wrt the Oahu bombardment thread what happened to your commitment of:

Without being able to access the map, I am really crippled. If I figure out a way to view it, I'll weigh in.

Death Demon has posted a .jpg link.

I'm still trying to sort through all the circles.
 

robdab2

Banned
Calbear,

I'm still trying to sort through all the circles.- It is a less than ideal map, I know. Put simply you only need to be concerned with having 4 full circles drawn on an Oahu map. Those for batteries Hatch, Williston, Closson and Granger-Adams. And even Granger-Adams isn't all that important to a defense against IJN battleships. So, really just three big circles and don't plan on sailing any IJN battleships into Mamala Bay (just west of Honolulu).

Back to the question at hand though ... what would be the best way for the KB to be spotted while inbound to Oahu ? We know from Nagumo's orders that if spotted two days out he had the option of aborting but if spotted just one day out he ws ordered to continue the attack mission.

Idealy from a US point of view it would be better if Nagumo didn't know that he had been spotted so I'm going to suggest a US submarine, out of Midway and bound for Alaska for some unknown reason ?
 
We ALL know that there was AMPLE time to bring the fighters and AAA batteries to the ready EVEN if the alarm was raised after the Opana Radar sighting.....
We do? The fighters' guns were unloaded, in the main. I've even seen claims the guns were removed.:eek: They needed more than 30min or so warning...
Make it two hours & things begin to change, even with OTL's foolishness. Make it four-six and the 1st Wave get wiped out (70%-80% losses would be my guess). The escorting Zero's are outnumbered better than 3-1 and OTL established very well what happens to Vals & Kates when four or more .50 cals rip into them (for that matter the Zero wasn't exactly robust, maneuverable as quail, but a bit flammable). Even the Mohawks will play hell with the strike aircraft well before they reach the bases, which will have ALL the AAA both the fixed AND mobile Army guns, as well as the ships in the harbor, manned and trained out.
Depending on fuel state of the fighters, the 2nd Wave may get closer before the flak cuts them to pieces, along with whatever fighters are still up.
While I'm less convinced of the effectiveness of P-40s, let alone P-36s, dogfighting A6Ms, I can give you about 4h warning: first contact on a suspected sub by Condor & Ward at 03.40.
Idealy from a US point of view it would be better if Nagumo didn't know that he had been spotted so I'm going to suggest a US submarine, out of Midway and bound for Alaska for some unknown reason ?
This isn't "JAG". Every U.S. sub can be accounted for, & if one had sighted the Kido Butai, for damn sure word would've been sent in a big damn hurry.
 
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I read a book about the attack on Pearl on the library. There was a dutch liner coming into Pearl during the attack and its credited with downing atleast one plane iirc.

What if that liner had sortied from Japan and gone towards Pearl instead of coming from Indonesia and just happened to find the entire japanese fleet at daybright just as they launched their planes and perhaps radioed Pearl about its finding before the japanese had sunk it(since they most likely would)
 

Markus

Banned
While I'm less convinced of the effectiveness of P-40s, let alone P-36s, dogfighting A6Ms, ...

The P-40B had an outstanding roll rate, even the much heayier later versions were more manouverable than a Zero at high speeds and british "Hawks" fought Oskars over Burma from mid-42 until earls 44.

And the guns had definitely not been removed.
 

robdab

Banned
pacifichistorian,

I was quite surprosed to see you resurect this thread from over 6 months ago. June 28/08 was my last post to it with, "Idealy from a US point of view it would be better if Nagumo didn't know that he had been spotted so I'm going to suggest a US submarine, out of Midway and bound for Alaska for some unknown reason ?"

I'm not sure about your motivation but you just responded with, "This isn't "JAG". Every U.S. sub can be accounted for, & if one had sighted the Kido Butai, for damn sure word would've been sent in a big damn hurry."

I'm entirely at a loss to know what your "JAG" reference has to do with a WW2 Alternative History discussion ? I am well aware that historically every US sub out near Midway is accounted for and that none did historically spot any part of the Kido Butai on it's way to attack Hawaii. The gist of the AH discussion some 6 months ago was what would have happened if the US HAD spotted the KB somewhat earlier ? I was merely suggesting that a US submarine with AH orders to patrol from Midway to Alaska MIGHT have been the one to do that spotting. I was NOT suggesting that such had in historical fact, ever happened.

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mattep74, you wrote,

I read a book about the attack on Pearl on the library. There was a dutch liner coming into Pearl during the attack and its credited with downing at least one plane iirc.

I believe that you refer here to the Dutch cargo-liner "Jagersfontein" which arrived at Honolulu Harbor (not Pearl Harbor) at about 0900 on Dec.7'41 as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was underway. Due to the contry's conflict withn Germany she was already fitted with at least 4 x 20mm single barrelled AA guns which opened fire on those Japanese warplanes overhead, thus making the Dutch the first Allies of the US to aid in the fight against Japan. Sadly, as best I can find, she didn't splash any of those Japanese attack planes but her accurate AA fire was credited with aborting an IJN bombing atack on Honolulu's only electric power generating station.

She had just arrived at Oahu, from San Francisco (not from Indonsesia or Japan) with a mixed load of passengers, canned beer for the US Navy and 500 tons of dynamite destined for the British at Hong Kong. This no doubt explains speed of her unloading there AND the accuracy & quickness of her AA crews in opening fire on the attacking Japanese warplanes above her. LOL.

It is an interesting "What IF" in it's own right to propose that either a Japanese bomb or an errant US AA shell fired from the Pearl Harbor area might have landed on her, to disasterous effect ...

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Markus, you asserted that,

And the guns had definitely not been removed.

Gordon Prange's book, "At Dawn We Slept" disagrees with you. He doesn't say that ALL of the US fighter aircraft guns were removed but he does indicate that many were stripped of guns as part of the regular weekend maintenance schedule. Their fuel tanks drained of all but fumes too. Pilots trained Monday - Friday so the weekend was the only time available to strip/clean/sight/test their aircraft's guns so as not to interfere with the General Short's peacetime training schedules.
 
Much of the damage the PH strikes caused was due to careful precision bombing and torpedoing. IIRC the level bombers which dropped those cut-down battleship shells as bombs flew in tight formations of 5 planes at a precise hieght and speed to get the mix of accuracy and bomb speed they needed. If there were fighters and even Dauntlesses up shooting at the attackers these precise approaches would have been possible. So even if the Zeros had carved up the US fighters the damage to ships would have been considerably reduced by much worse bombing accuracy.
 

robdab

Banned
Riain, you wrote,

If there were fighters and even Dauntlesses up shooting at the attackers these precise approaches would have been [im ?]possible. So even if the Zeros had carved up the US fighters the damage to ships would have been considerably reduced by much worse bombing accuracy.

I think that your assertion assumes a fine degree of USAAF interceptor control that was not at all possible for the Oahu Americans on Dec.7'41.

Their air warning service was not yet fully operational, the staff there were still being trained in interceptor control techniques, as were the US radar operators AND the pilots themselves. The one single USAAF officer sent to England to learn British interceptor control techniques developed during the airwars of the Battle of Britain had only returned to Oahu a very few days before Dec.7'41 and had not yet passed on any of those new ideas to American commanders nor trained any other Americans in their tactical uses. I always get the names Taylor and Tyler mixed up too.

Radar screens of the day were not the continually refreshing circular sweep console views usually seen in the war movies that we see today. Each radar antenea had to be turned by hand to follow its target and didn't AFAIK report altitudes. You must admit that there were many, many Japanese targets in the air over Pearl Harbor then, spread over a large variety of altitudes. With the excited reports of 5-6 radars (some of which over-lapped) coming in I would expect that the Air Warning Center's plotting boards would soon have become a confused mess on that Sunday morning.

Wohlstetter's book on the PH attacks also relates that the very low powered USAAF fighter radios of 1941 would only work out to about 5 miles off of Oahu's shorelines so controlled American interceptions of inbound Japanese air attack formations far out to sea would not have been possible.

There are several internet animation views of the two unfolding PH air attack waves coming in from multiple directions to hit US targets all over Oahu. How would the US radar operators/plotters/fighter directors have known what the intended targets of any one inbound Japanese air group were, in order to assign interception priorities ?

You now have perfect 2009 hindsight to guide you but those 1941 Americans wouldn't have any such luxury, even if pre-warned.

Without ANY fore-knowledge that the Japanese had modified some of their 16" BB shells to act as freefalling AP bombs, why would the American interceptor controllers decide to hit a formation of what appeared to be (generally inaccurate) high level bombers when Japanese divebombers were still infesting the Pearl Harbor airspace right above the bleeding American warships of the US Pacific Fleet ?

Even with warning, I'd think the American defensive task above Oahu to have been a difficult one on Dec.7'41.
 

Markus

Banned
Much of the damage the PH strikes caused was due to careful precision bombing and torpedoing.

And just triple-A will greatly disrupt their attack. Shipborne AAA was weak by 1943/44 standards, but VERY strong compared to what the Japanese were used to. If the guns had been ready before the arrival of the slow and low flying torpedo planes most damage would not have been done. Ohh, and the Coast Artillery had plenty of guns, too.
The bomb that killed USS Arizona was a lucky hit, she had already been hit once or twice without sustaining much damage. A minimal butterfyl effect and she won´t be hit at all or damage controll will greatly minimize the effect of another hit.
 
warning

From a Navy standpoint, even 2-3 hours of warning (that was believed) could have made a major difference. with all ships set at condition ZEBRA & GQ, some sinkings would have avoided, you might have seen some torpedo nets out etc. Some ships would have cleared the harbor, and all the AAA in the harbor/ships would have made torpedo runs especially difficult - remember they had to be done very precisely to make the modified torpedoes work in the shallow harbor. By the 2nd wave many ships would have been out of Pearl, and the 2nd wave would not only have had the task of attacking maneuvering ships, certainly doable but harder than ones tied up, but also having to look for them when they arrived over Pearl & they were not there - any search time will be a problem, and disrupt attack patterns.
Even with problems with US air intercept, fighter quality issues etc Japanese losses will be way higher & attack effectiveness way down. Another important fact is that many shot down US pilots will land in Hawaii to fight again another day, for the Japanese the degredation of their pilot numbers & quality starts much earlier.
 
I'm not sure about your motivation but you just responded with, "This isn't "JAG". Every U.S. sub can be accounted for, & if one had sighted the Kido Butai, for damn sure word would've been sent in a big damn hurry."
... I am well aware that historically every US sub out near Midway is accounted for and that none did historically spot any part of the Kido Butai on it's way to attack Hawaii. ... I was merely suggesting that a US submarine with AH orders to patrol from Midway to Alaska MIGHT have been the one to do that spotting. I was NOT suggesting that such had in historical fact, ever happened.
Yes, & I was suggesting your premise is as faulty as "JAG"'s was: it was impossible.
 
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