Deadman Switch - WI Supermarine Type 317 not cancelled

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Banned
Ch. 6: Into The Fire

Evening of 10th August 1941. RAF Coningsby, Lincolnshire.

As the green Very light curled upwards, the first vic of Mitchells opened their throttles and began to trundle forward over the grass airfield. (Fortunately for a Bomber Command that had yet to speckle the county with concrete runways, Lincolnshire in August does not get much rain.) Gradually picking up speed, the lumbering bombers strained their engines at max. revs., in the ponderous and protracted manner characteristic of the heavy bomber take-off. Far from the lightly-laden test flights of the previous weeks, these aircraft now were laden down with 8,000lb of bombs and over a thousand gallons of petrol. Even this was with the bomb cells left half-empty, to enable the planes to get airborne within the limited environs of the aerodrome; yet another reason for the planned runway-building programme. With five degrees of flap and six pounds of boost, the three bombers struggled into the air, and settled into the slow eastward climb. The Manchesters, being slower, had taken off some twenty minutes earlier, while the remaining Mitchell, P/O Ambleton's C-Charlie, was to depart for Hannover in another ten minutes' time.
The wingco, in D-Dog, was leading the vic, and F/O Kershaw was keeping his F-Freddie positioned on the starboard side. However, he knew Gibson was planning to drop down to low level for the attack (unlike the rest of the Squadron who bombed from 12,000ft like they were supposed to), so they wouldn't be maintaining this tidy formation over Germany. Still, they might as well stick together 'for moral support' until the glow of the sunset behind them faded. In the meantime he checked round his crew on the intercom. The rear-gunner had tested his guns and was already moaning about the cold; the wireless-op was winding out the trailing aerial; the flight-engineer was trying to synchronise the props; and the nav. was complaining about the bomb-aimer's map reading ("How am I supposed to get a drift if you can't even tell me where we crossed the coast?").
The route to Hamm and back had been roughly planned by Group, though each captain still had considerable freedom on the details. The bombers would make landfall at Rotterdam, then turn due east just before Eindhoven, taking them north of the Ruhr proper before steering 120° for the bombing run at Hamm. The return journey was to head north, round Münster, then westward to the southern extremity of the Zuyder Zee, jink north of Amsterdam, across the coast and set course for Lincolnshire. Straightforward sounding perhaps, but at night over blacked-out country, without electronic assistance, just finding the city would be an achievement.

~~~

Later that night. Near Cleves.

Now flying alone, F-Freddie was enveloped in darkness, albeit punctuated with brief flashes of light as flak burst nearby, and the occasional wandering pencil of a searchlight; also leavened by the light of the waning gibbous moon. The rear gunner noticed a series of flak shots approaching them from behind; in fact this was the tell-tale sign of radar-guided flak, but all the aircrew knew was that it was clearly Bad News, and Kershaw threw the Mitchell into a weaving turn, just a little too late as shrapnel from a flak shell rattled the aircraft. "Skipper to crew, damage report," he called over the intercom.
"The radio's gone for a Burton. Big blue sparks and everything," responded the excitable young wireless-op.
"Alright, calm down Jim. Any other damage?"
"I think we're ok skip," said the flight-engineer after a few moments, "bit close for comfort though."
The pilot continued weaving from side to side until clear of the Kammhuber line defences. To the south the Ruhr searchlights played over the scattered cloud; presently they picked up a bomber — clearly off course — soon afterwards seen to go down in flames. Meanwhile the bomb-aimer peered into the murky darkness, trying to recognise some kind of ground feature that might match anything on the map. In frustration the nav. put down his pencils and Dalton, and went forwards to take a look for himself. The glint of moonlight off a canal junction gave a useful navigational fix, which more-or-less matched the navigator's astro shots. "Six more minutes to the turning point, skip."

~~~

01:05 AM, 11th August 1941. The skies over Hannover.

P/O Ambleton, in C-Charlie, was pleased to see a fire ahead where the target should be. Only a small fire; it might be a decoy, but hopefully it was an oil tank; certainly it was the right colour, deep red and smoky. The Hannover force had flown out over the North Sea, crossing the coast between Juist and Nordeney islands, before skirting around the south side of Bremen. Finding the target successfully meant they would be on track on the way out, vital as the route snuck through the gap between Hamburg and Bremen.
The bomb-aimer took over in the time-honoured manner, with a "left-left" and a "steadyyyyy...", watching the ground fire move up his Mark IX bombsight. Then- "Bombs gone!" as C-Charlie's load, a mixture of 1,000lb MC and 500lb GP bombs, fell away. Still the agonising straight run continued, for C-Charlie was carrying a camera and the bombing photograph had to be taken. The flash went off just as another aircraft's stick of incendiaries straddled the (supposed) target, then with bombdoors closed and revs. up, the Mitchell banked to port and dived away on the first leg of the homeward journey.
A couple of single-engined fighters were spotted prowling around in the moonlight, but, too preoccupied with the basic business of night flying, they were unable to find the bombers passing through their Himmelbett boxes.
As C-Charlie crossed the coast, just west of Cuxhaven, her crew — about halfway through their first tour — breathed a sigh of relief at once more leaving behind the perils of Germany, and shared out the flask of hot coffee brought from base; like most crews, they were superstitious and considered drinking it earlier to be 'tempting fate'. Though they now began to look forward to touching down on terra firma, it would be some time yet before they did so; blown north by a strengthening wind, they would make landfall in Yorkshire and then slog southwards to base.

~~~

Diary of Cpl Cartwright (WAAF), entry dated 11/8.
On ops room duty again last night. Another Manchester, L Leather, lost an
engine and boomeranged about an hour after they set off. Always horrible
to have an empty space on the board in the morning; tonight it was Smith in
N Nuts. Relief later when we heard they'd ditched their damaged 'plane in
the Wash and were picked up pretty promptly by the coastguard. Saw them
arrive back on base this afternoon; they looked a good deal worse for wear.
~~~

5 Group Summary of Operations, 10-11 August 1941 (excerpt)
Many a/c reported fires at Hannover; assessment is moderate damage to the
Deurag-Nerag refinery. (See Appendix for bombing photos.)
At Hamm scattered bombing; photos do not match crew claims, casting doubt
also on claims of crew not carrying cameras. However, several reports of
a large explosion confirm a claimed low-level attack on a munitions train
by CO 106 Sqn.
[...]
In total three a/c lost from 89 sorties dispatched, a rate of 3.37%.
 
Catching up and wanted to say thanks for the update. The RAF is getting some of their targets. I look forward to seeing how well the bombers can do against more intense defences.
 

soundnfury

Banned
Catching up and wanted to say thanks for the update. The RAF is getting some of their targets. I look forward to seeing how well the bombers can do against more intense defences.
Correction: the RAF think they're getting some of their targets. David Bensusan-Butt is about to disagree...
 
Sweating with the exertion of flying the big bomber (there being no such thing as powered controls in those days)

That's the thing, there were.
Anton Flettner invented aerodynamic boost tabs that reduced the load on the pilot for moving large control surfaces during WWI

Wasn't till WWII that they were added to fighters to reduce aileron loads, and to Flying Boats.

Never could figure why they were popularized much sooner.
Many bombers could have used them.
 

soundnfury

Banned
That's the thing, there were.
Anton Flettner invented aerodynamic boost tabs that reduced the load on the pilot for moving large control surfaces during WWI

Wasn't till WWII that they were added to fighters to reduce aileron loads, and to Flying Boats.

Never could figure why they were popularized much sooner.
Many bombers could have used them.
Ah, now I get to make a pedantic distinction. What you call "aerodynamic boost tabs", I call "servo controls", and in chapter 4 I refer to a servo rudder being added to the Mitchell.
Powered controls are something else entirely: the use of an internally powered system, typically hydraulic, to drive the control surfaces. Typically when this is done, there is no direct mechanical linkage between the control stick and the control surfaces, the control laws may be non-linear (as in many modern fly-by-wire systems), and 'feel' (force feedback on the stick) must be artificially provided.
Powered flying controls made their first appearance in the 1950s, being used in (for instance) the Avro Vulcan. They would not have been very practical in an early-1940s bomber, especially as the hydraulic system was often one of the first casualties of battle damage.
 

soundnfury

Banned
I'm back, and it only took me three months...

Ch. 7: Butt Me No Buts

18th August 1941. RAF High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire.

"Yes, I've seen it. As bad as we expected, maybe even worse." Sir Richard Pierse, the C-in-C, was on the 'phone with Portal. "It looks like we're in for the fight of our lives."
The source of Pierse's disquiet was a document that had just been circulated to Bomber Command and the War Cabinet. David Bensusan-Butt's report, based on bombing photographs from June and July, reached several damning conclusions on the Command's navigational capabilities. The summary statistic, that only a third of those crews claiming to have found and attacked their targets had actually gotten within five miles, was sure to give new ammunition to those who felt the resources being devoted to the bomber offensive should be diverted elsewhere.
"I've had a pow-wow with my staff," Pierse continued, "and identified a few angles we can take. First is this business of haze. In clear conditions the numbers look rather good-"
"Only just over half, wasn't it?" interrupted Portal, "That still doesn't sound very good."
"I know, but it actually is rather impressive for men under fire. I'm sure statistics could be found that would make the Army and Navy look just as bad. But as I was saying, ground haze thoroughly ruins our performance, which is awkward since the Ruhr Valley's almost never clear. And when that combines with a new moon, it appears to be sheer luck if anyone finds the target at all."
"And how are you planning to turn this into good news?" asked Portal.
"Well, there are a few ideas going around about how to deal with haze. Of course you know about the FIDO experiments, well, someone suggested that incendiary bombs could have the same effect. So once a target's burning it should drive off the haze," said Pierse.
"That still requires the first few bombers to find it though."
"Yes," admitted Pierse, "but it suggests we should do better on larger raids. Another idea that came up was flares. At the moment we don't use them much, occasionally an crew drop one when they're well and truly lost; we could try having each bomber drop a flare at the start of its bombing run, the lighting would build up over the course of a raid."
"What about having a few aircraft full of flares that go in first and blanket the area?" suggested Portal.
"Oh, that's Bufton's idea, isn't it? Bit dependent on the flare force lighting up the right place, I'd feel like I was spinning a roulette wheel every time I launched a raid."
When the discussion ended some fifteen minutes later, the problems remained unsolved.

~~~

22nd August 1941. The same.

The six Group commanders had been summoned for a conference to hash out Bomber Command's answers to the Butt Report. Oxland, who had written the ORs for the heavies back in '36, ironically had only Wellingtons in 1 Group. 3 and 4 Groups, under Baldwin and Carr, were slowly replacing theirs with heavies, 4 Group also still having a few Whitleys. 5 Group, as we have seen, were busy 'jumping ship' from Manchester to Mitchell as a replacement for their Hampdens. Stevenson's 2 Group, the light bombers, were not really relevant to the strategic offensive. Lastly, Foster's 6 Group were responsible for the OTUs.
"You all know the problem," began Pierse, "and you and your staffs have had four days to hatch plans. So what have you got to offer me?"
Stevenson opened the batting by claiming that the heavy bomber crews weren't actually pressing home their attacks, owing to insufficient courage. The other AOCs, used to this argument from Stevenson, promptly ignored him.
"One thing we must do is get enough cameras to put one in every bomber," argued Carr. "Otherwise we're stuck trusting statisticians and their guesswork."
This suggestion, however, met with disapproval from Oxland. "Every pound the camera weighs is a pound less for bombs. Your Halifaxes may hardly notice the difference, but it really cuts into a Wimpey's payload. Besides, the aircrews don't like carrying the cameras."
"And before you regale us with your explanation for that dislike, Stevenson," interjected Pierse, "it's because the cameras can't be used in a low-level or diving attack."
"Here's a thought. The photo plots give us a crude ranking of the Squadrons, don't they? I mean as to which get the best accuracy," said Slessor. "If we make those results known, and give it a competitive aspect, crews will be eager for their turn with the camera, to prove they're the best."
After this idea was discussed, and plans for the "Command photographic ladder" roughed out, Baldwin raised the question of flares.
"I've been thinking about the ideas you sent us for ways to light up the targets," he said, "and I see two problems. First, raids will need to be much more concentrated in time, and second, the flare-light will make our bombers more visible over the target, which is just too risky. Especially if they're having to make straight and level bombing runs for the photo's sake."
"But surely that depends on altitude," Carr noted, "if we went in at operational ceiling instead of 8,000 feet, then flares on the ground or hanging under a parachute at a couple of thousand wouldn't cause a problem."
"True, but then the target's harder to spot again because you're higher," Oxland pointed out.
"To change the subject," said Foster, not wanting to listen to Carr and Oxland rehash the 'altitude argument' yet again, "what about radionavigation?"
"I don't think there's anything we can do about that," answered Pierse, "we just have to wait patiently until the boffins have something ready for us to try."
"Though perhaps we should tell TRE we're actually interested now," Baldwin added, "they almost gave up trying to sell us the idea."
Following a little further discussion, Pierse summed up: "We have several ideas, which should be put to experiment as soon as practicable. In the meantime, let's hope the Powers that Be don't lose faith in the bomber offensive."
"Hear, hear," chorused the AOCs.

~~~

31st August 1941. Whitehall, London.

"But I wonder if we're coming at it from the wrong end, so to speak," said Portal. The Chief of the Air Staff was meeting with Professor Lindemann, the PM's scientific adviser. "Judging by these figures, Bomber Command can't destroy anything smaller than a town. But if it were to destroy the entire town, it wouldn't really matter whether the individual factories were hit or not."
"Ah, but can your bombers destroy an entire town?" asked Lindemann.
"That," replied Portal, with a quiet smile, "is what I want you to find out. That's the sort of question your S-Branch was built to answer, right?"
"So what you're saying is, that when Trenchard laid out his philosophy for winning a war by bombing alone... he wasn't thinking big enough?"

~~~

Memorandum from Vickers-Supermarine to the MAP, 31/08/1941
The Hercules II* engines with NACA cowlings, as delivered from Bristols on
the 18th inst., have been fitted to the 317A (B.IA) prototype AT308, whose
first flight is expected in about a fortnight. As the airframe is otherwise
a standard B.I off the production line, it is anticipated that switching the
line over to the new variant can be achieved rapidly and with minimal
disruption as soon as the prototype passes its acceptance tests.
A preliminary programme has also been devised for modification of the B.Is
already in service to B.IA standard by on-site working parties of Vickers
and Bristol fitters, as detailed in the enclosed schedule documents.​

~~~

Letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State for Air (excerpt)
... and he told me that the Russians have been bombing Berlin for the last
few weeks. I got the impression that we might gain diplomatic points with
them if we launched our own series of raids on the capital; I believe we
haven't been there since the 13th? Of course I'm well aware that Ministers
can only get the RAF to do what it already wanted to do anyway, but you
might bring it up with Portal. The Russians are feeling pretty embattled at
the moment as Leningrad's just been encircled...​
 

soundnfury

Banned
Ch. 8: Some Were Unlucky

(Excerpted from "Supermarine Mitchell At War" (Ian Allan, 1972))

We do not know for certain the fate of the first Mitchell lost in action, as all six of its aircrew perished. But using eyewitness accounts, from both other aircrew and German civilians on the ground, the RAF's Missing Research team was able, after the war, to reconstruct its story. While it may seem otiose to describe in painstaking detail this one sortie, having as it did no wider significance to the bomber war, it nonetheless presents a clear picture of 1941-vintage Bomber Command, with its contrasts to both the earlier and later war periods.
AL607 "D-Dog" was one of 12 Mitchell B Mk I bombers taking part in the Berlin raid of September 8th/9th, all flown by No. 106 Sqn. It, along with its crew (captained by F/O H Stoffer), had flown to Berlin already that week, on the night of 4th/5th; they had missed the raid on the following night (to the same target) as their aircraft's turret was being repaired. In fact Harry Stoffer had spent the 6th at Waddington, giving pilots of No. 97 Sqn conversion training on the first of their Mitchells which had recently arrived.
The 106 Sqn crews were somewhat concerned to be making another trip to the Big City so soon, as the Germans were expected to be prepared for it; however, this anxiety was to some degree offset for those flying in the Mitchells as these were considered far less 'dicey' than the Manchesters they were replacing. The WAAF corporal who was Stoffer's girlfriend at the time later recalled that he appeared unperturbed and indeed (displaying the 'it-can't-happen-to-me' attitude common among the aircrew) somewhat gung-ho.
Officially, the raid's target was a rail junction in the northern part of the city surrounded by various industrial buildings; but in practice, any bombload that hit any part of Berlin would be considered a job well done by a Bomber Command that still had the Butt Report ringing in its ears. The moon that night was a waning gibbous (three days past full) which was above the horizon for the entirety of the operation. Besides the twelve Mitchells, 20 Manchesters (nine of them from 106 Sqn) and 41 Hampdens constituted 5 Group's contribution to the raid, which also involved eleven Halifaxes, seventeen Stirlings, 22 Whitleys, and 79 Wellingtons. The majority of the routes used the gap between Hamburg and Bremen on the outbound leg, this gap being a perennial favourite with Bomber Command planners owing to the shorter distance over enemy territory as compared to more southerly routes to the capital.
D-Dog was carrying a load of nine 500lb GP bombs.

~~~

The night's first losses came as the bombers broached the "Kammhuber Line": four bombers crashed in this area, of which three (two Wellingtons and a Whitley) are known to have been shot down by fighters. These combats were all of the older "Helle Nachtjagd" (searchlight illuminated) form; perhaps the Würzburg in that 'box' was unserviceable that night. The other loss, a Halifax, cannot be definitively attributed but it is thought to have been at least damaged by Flak. The debriefing reports of crews who observed its fate imply that its efforts to evade the Flak possibly led to a fatal rudder stall; alternatively the Flak damage may have rendered it uncontrollable.
Shortly afterwards a Hampden which strayed over Hamburg was severely damaged by that city's Flak and turned for home; it was written off after crash-landing in England, but fortunately its crew were unharmed. It was also near Hamburg that a Manchester of No. 97 Sqn crashed owing to engine failure - records show that the pilot of this aircraft was one of those who had flown with F/O Stoffer on the 6th - its crew all surviving as prisoners of war. In one other combat a Stirling's gunners fired upon a single-engined fighter which they reported as having gone down in flames; Bomber Command credited them with a probable. This cannot be confirmed owing to the paucity of unit-level Luftwaffe records, but at least one other aircrew observed a fireball in the area which does not correlate with any of the known bomber casualties.
The weather in the Berlin area was largely clear with only a little broken cloud, and most aircrews bombed visually (as opposed to on E.T.A. and dead-reckoning), although few of these were near the Aiming Point. Most of the bombs fell in the suburbs, though a cluster of chemical and other factories in Spandau, which by chance resembled the target area, drew several bomb loads. Berlin's flak defences, characterised by the aircrews as "lively" and "aggressive", took their toll on the bombers, as did fighters assisted both by the city's searchlights and by a Würzburg Riese in the Tiergarten. Among the seven aircraft lost to these combined causes was D-Dog; observers on the ground largely maintain that it was destroyed by Flak after being coned by searchlights, but such reports are often unreliable. Gustav Tham, then a Leutnant flying Bf110s, claimed a four-engined bomber as destroyed, and his recollections are consistent with his victim being a Mitchell - he notes that it had a single tailfin - though it could also have been a Stirling which was also lost over the city. Tham's account of the combat also begins with the bomber being illuminated by searchlights; it was, he says, "so close and so bright that I could see nothing else in the sky" but immediately entered a diving turn. After a few seconds the searchlights lost the bomber, but in the moonlight Tham was able to maintain visual contact and, taking advantage of the tail-gunner's night vision having been even more severely affected, he closed to short range as the bomber, its crew no doubt believing themselves safe after escaping the lights, settled back into level flight. "In position from below and behind, my cannon spoke," continues Tham, "but rather than setting alight the bomber exploded immediately, almost engulfing me." * The fighter was damaged by the explosion; Tham insists that he hit the aircraft's wing where the fuel tanks should be. Perhaps, if it indeed was the Mitchell, some of the bombs were being carried in the wing cells rather than the fuselage, though as D-Dog's load would have easily fitted inside the bomb bay, it is unclear why this should have been the case. At any rate, it is understandable that no crew from the bomber survived the explosion.

* Jägerblatt, April 1968.

~~~

Overall, the raid of the 8th/9th cost Bomber Command fourteen aircraft, including at least one of each of the four 'heavies'. It was a bad night for 4 Group, who lost a second Halifax on the return journey as well as losing the Whitley and four of the seven Wellingtons shot down that night, whereas 3 Group's only casualty was the Stirling lost over Berlin. 5 Group were somewhere in between, losing one each of Manchester, Mitchell and Hampden, plus another Hampden written off with battle damage. Like many raids of the period, the return on this 'investment' was disappointing, with mainly light, scattered damage to the target. One bombload did cut railway lines quite close to the Aiming Point, though these were fully repaired within a week. Other damage included a margarine factory where stock later valued at 500,000 Reichsmarks was destroyed, and a railway signalbox which received a direct hit was 'eradicated'.
Despite its limited effect, the raid was prominently reported in the following day's British newspapers, with headlines like the Daily Express' "Berlin Bombed Again - Over 200 Planes In Last Night's Raid". These reports also particularly noted that sixty of these were heavy bombers, including the new Mitchells which had only recently been shown to the public, first appearing in cinema newsreels about a week beforehand.
There was, naturally, a somewhat downcast mood at RAF Coningsby, both at the loss of Stoffer and his crew, and at the puncturing of the aura of safety that had previously attached itself to the Mitchell. Of course the aircrew of No. 106 Sqn had known on a rational level that the aircraft was not invincible, but most had had, on a gut level, an exaggerated confidence which was now shown to be misplaced. At the same time, they recognised that statistically it was still much safer than the Manchester, and remained largely optimistic about their conversion from the latter. This conversion was furthered that afternoon, two new Mitchells arriving from the manufacturer, and would be completed by the 20th of the month. Of their now-superfluous Manchester aircraft, some went to other squadrons to replace losses, while others formed the nucleus of No. 1651 Heavy Conversion Unit.

~~~

No. 4 Group Equipment Staff Report, 9 Sep 41
Both Halifax squadrons have independently decided locally to remove the beam
guns from their aircraft and fly with a six-man crew. While these will of
course revert to seven when the B.IIs, with their dorsal turrets, arrive, it
may be expedient in the mean time to modify the B.I aircraft now under
production in a like manner, and perhaps omit some of the mounting hardware
from subsequent B.I production. We suggest this recommendation should be
passed on to the Ministry of Aircraft Production.​

~~~

War diary of RAF Fighter Command
9/9. No 85 Sqn reformed at West Raynham with Bristol Beaufighter Mk.IIF,
tasked with night Intruder operations against Luftwaffe night-fighters and
their bases in the Low Countries. Also available as a night defence reserve
unit in the event of a resumption of major enemy raids.​
 
Nice to see a new update. The Mitchells one of their own on a raid with little gain. Hopefully they will be able to be more effective in futute raids.
 
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