True that. The Nizam-I Cedid Army did perform well before the coup of 1807. Without Napoleon there is only Moldova and the Ionian Islands as tension points for war. But without, Selim III is safe.
Indeed, and neither were large enough priorities for Russia (Who still had the Caucauses and taming of Siberia to handle, as well as potential flashpoints with Sweden and her allies over their recent seizure of Finland and conflicting claims/tensions over the partitioned Poland with Austria and Prussia) to be the one pushing to instigate a war, which would give Selim all the breathing space he needed for both civil and military reforms. Granted, exactly how much benefit that nets the Empire depends a great deal on just how much the Austrians get out of the continued Revolutionary Wars and what lessons they integrate (A relatively easy victory would, in my opinion, hamstring them in the long run as it would allow them to sit comfortably in their old disorganized, top-heavy, and regional-mess limited conscription pre-war system, but without the huge gains on Prussia's part and sticking consolidation of the minor states would likely result in them focusing their attentions back north towards the Germanies as a chamption of continued/restored HRE decenteralization under their hegemony).
Would the British be able to gain naval dominance in the Med without the Egyptian expedition though?
I have actually repeated the idea that the fall of Egypt strengthened the reformists againsts the conservative factions but after further research, the only indication of that seems to be a single comment about a notable in Syria who supposedly retracted his earlier complaints about the New Order troops after seeing them in action. And even that was from writings from a reformist with a vested interest in presenting the New Order as being effective. Are there any other sources about how the invasion of Egypt effected the reformers?
If anything, I've found after further research that no invasion of Egypt would actually be a huge boon to the reformists. Hadji Mustafa Pasha had great success in arming and working with the Serbs to expel the Janissaries and had even pushed the powerful notable Osman Pazvantoğlu (who had allied with the Janissaries and attacked Belgrade) back to his capital Vidin where he was being sieged in 1798. Napoleons invasion ruined that and forced Selim III to divert crucial forces to Egypt while allowing the Janissaries to return and leaving Pazvantoğlu alone. The Janniesiers that murdered Hadji Mustafa and resumed severely oppressing the Serbs and ignoring the autonomy and privileges Selim had previously granted. This is what caused the first Serbian uprising. The invasion of Egypt is also what allowed Mehmet Ali to come to power.
Where did you hear that the CM's were going to gain control? Why wouldn't Sieyes just pick another general like Moreau to carry out the coup? I mean, he wanted Joubert in the first place and only went for Napoleon after Joubert died, Napoleon returned, and Moreau referred him to Napoleon.
1. If Revolutionary France ends up defeated, than I imagine France isen't exactly going to be set back up with a world-class navy. Though, without influence in Egypt, France prostrate, and a lack of any major operations within the Med. Britain may not see any NEED to establish a position of naval dominance in the region. However, if there's no Venice... the islands are just there for the taking. Britain has the right combination of naval muscle and neutrality that it seems the most likely power that Russia and the OE could agree on as a "caretaker" for the little archipelago, though maybe it gets sold off to a different Italian state.
2. I fully agree; losing control of Egypt to an expedition of Frenchies hardly was good for the reputation of the military reforms since... well, they were proving ineffective at allowing the military to do its job. That much is obvious. However, you have to remember that one of the objections that the conservatives had was exactly the privileges being granted to the Serbs for what was, in their eyes, violating the laws of a Muslim state by being allowed to carry and use arms not only around but in conjunction with the Sultan's armies (A fairly unambiguous no-no) against their favored party (The Janissaries). Now, if Selim can head off a coup than that's not a long-term issue but it certainly hightened the risk of local reactionaries making a move while he was still in a vulnerable state of mid-reform. TL;DR: Statistically higher odds for reform success but also higher odds of "Black Swan" bet/result unless they find a way to keep the conservatives distracted for a year or two.
3. I apologize: I probably phrased that wrong/too vaguely. There was a belief that pro-peace factions would gain control, who would have to adopt a policy of at least nominial Constitutional Monarchy as per the terms presented to them by the members of the Coalition, as well as the population accepting it under the strain of war-weariness rather than continued forced conscription and confiscation as part of what was become a decade-long war. As for Nappy, I would argue that his public popularity and the fact that he and his men had been far from the country for a good long while, as well as his admiration by members of most major factions within France (IE: His isolation and appeal had made it so he diden't have any hard pre-existing stances or blots on his record that could disqualify him and would make him a good "middle man" to effectively gain dictorial power: any other general would need to be running more of cohalition as "first among equals"), which allowed him to reorganize France so effectively and thus get her out of her sticky military and economic situation (Which only served to further boost his reputation and legitimacy, further stablizing an unstable France... a viritious cycle)