DBWI: What if Germany invades France through the Ardennes in 1940?

As we all know, Germany tried a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan when she invaded France in 1940. As we all know, Germany was able to occupy most of Belgium and a small slice of northeast France, but her forces were eventually stopped, nowhere near their objectives, and shortly afterwards, in early August of 1940, the German General Staff overthrew Hitler and reached a peace agreement with Britain and France.

However, in recent years, it's been discovered that there was consideration given to, instead of what they actually did, using a powerful armored thrust through the Ardennes and north to the Channel ports, thereby coming up behind the BEF and French forces in Belgium and forcing their surrender.

How successful do you think this plan could have been? How would it have made the history of the Second European War any different?
 
Seen the roads there? World's biggest traffic jam, I think. It's a nice idea because if it works you'll be able to cut behind the Allied units advancing into Belgium, but you'll spend so long getting through the forests and across the Meuse that they should be able to react in time.
 
I've heard of this 'plan'. Apparently it emerged in response to a wargame requirement Halder issued in November 1939. He wanted to test three alternative ideas for Case yellow. The first had the German main effort north of the Meuse river, the second placed the main effort south of the Meuse - in the Ardennes, and the third had no main effort, but with the attack evenly weighted across the front.

There are claims the second option showed more promise when tested at the Zossen map exercises in early December. The CoS of Army Group A, a general named Manstein claimed the Ardennes option was the best, and expanded on the Zossen war game manuver writing portions of a detailed plan for Army Group A to use were that option choosen. I've been unable to find any original documents of that planing and suspect it was all discarded when Manstein got his promotion to corps command in January 1940. Apparently he mentioned it to Hilter because after Hitler had his routine meeting with several newly promoted corps commanders in January he asked Halder about it.

Halder refered to his report on the December war game, which Hitler had already seen. In it Halder and other officers present judged either weighted attack to show some promise, but neither producing decisive results. They all agreed the third option, with the mass of manuver evenly spread out was the least sucessful on the map.

The Melchin incident caused Hitler to cancel the scheduled January offensive, and Halder took the opportunity to completely rework the plan in place, which was to weight the offensive north of the Meuse river. Over the next three months his staff and the army group commanders completely rebuilt the plan and refined it extensively.

I dont think we need to go into the details here, there are dozens of descriptions of the may offensive and 800,000 dead and maimed of that summer.

What is really intersting is a reamrk made by Guderian in a very rare and obscure book he published post war. As tank or armored warfare fans know Gunderian was one of the principles in creating the German mechanized forces in the 1930s. He commanded one of the armored corps in the May-August battle. This book, titled 'Panzer Leader' had a limited print run and AFIK has never been translated to English. In it Guderian makes the argument the flaw of the May offensive was the dispersal of the armored corps among the several armys. One in the Netherlands, two on the Belgian plains, one south of the Meuse River in the Ardennes, and one initially in reserve, as part of the Swiss deception gambit. Guderian argues at least four of these corps should have been massed in a single "Panzer Army" that would charge across the Masstrict province, by pass Liege, and straight on between Namur and Brussels. Once in the vicinity of Mons/Lille this 'Panzer Army' could either move on to the Channel and split the Allied armies, or turn south and threaten Paris.

I tested this idea on the game board and it has some merit. If the Allied player does not see it coming his own reserves will be out of position and the Allied front can certainly be badly disrupted. Under the right circumstance the German pieces might even reach the Channel, or Paris, but I would not count on it. the Allied player would have to make a lot of mistakes. Tho given the number of mistakes made in the actual campaign this might occur. Suprisingly the massing of the German mechanized corps did not create traffic jams on the game board. Tho one would expect them in the converging roads around Masstrict and the limited bridges across the Meuse River and Albert Canal

Guderian had nothing to say about placing such a armored army in the Ardennes, Halders war game with the Schwerpunkt in the Ardennes, or Mansteins elaboration on that. I would note that one German 'panzer korps' did operate in the Ardennes with little trouble. More important is that all the Belgian regiments deployed there were motorized, and the French sent a substantial light mechanized force into the Ardennes as a forward screen.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
No way. A small screen of cavalry could have easily delayed the advance of the German forces with mobile anti-tank guns. Moreover, the Germans would have had to crowd their forces onto the narrow roads in such a way as to present sitting ducks for British and French air attacks.

If they managed to get through the Ardennes, the German armored units would come up against ready and waiting French armored units. And as is clear from what actually happened, the German panzers were no match for the French Char B tanks.
 
No way. A small screen of cavalry could have easily delayed the advance of the German forces with mobile anti-tank guns.

The French had no 'mobile' AT guns per se in 1940. The mechanized cavalry divisions they deployed there, and the Belgian motorized formations had light tanks and towed AT guns. In any case the failure of the Belgian screening forces to delay a full day on the border unhinged the French plan for screening in the Ardennes. The single armored corps the Germans sent though the Ardennes was able to suprise the forward French units on the morning of 11 May (second day of the campaign) and by the end of the 12th the German armored cars had reached the Semois river at Boullion and the Meuse river at Dinant. The inability of the suprised French to deal with just two armored divisions and some motorized infantry suggests they could not deal with a larger force.

Moreover, the Germans would have had to crowd their forces onto the narrow roads in such a way as to present sitting ducks for British and French air attacks.

Actual losses to air strikes were a lot less than folks suspose. The effects in those early weeks were more psychological than real. The French did send several squadrons of their first rate LeO45 bombers on a strike over the Ardennes on 11 May. One group was sent on a false locations and bombed some Belgians. Four of the bombers were apparently lost to Belgian fire. The other group did attack a German column. The French low level attacks did not work there any better than anywhere else. Half the attacking bombers were lost in five minutes from German MG and light FLAK guns. The German records show that section of the column lost a half dozen trucks, a dozen men, and was stalled for sixty minutes. To end crippling bomber losses the French had to attack at higher altitudes, for which their air crew were not correctly trained or equipped.

If they managed to get through the Ardennes, the German armored units would come up against ready and waiting French armored units. And as is clear from what actually happened, the German panzers were no match for the French Char B tanks.

I'm with you on that one. While the Germans broke though most (but not all) the French main defense zones there were usually reserves on or near the "Stop Line" that contained the penetration. While the tanks battles at Merdorp or Arras recive all the attention it was the grinding attrition of breaking through the French or Allied 'infantry' divisions that killed the German tanks and offensive. The battle at Gembloux is perhaps the most famous example since the German armored divisions failed to even break through the main defense zone, they were repelled in the outpost zone by AT guns supported by deadly concentrations of artillery fires.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Gembloux_(1940)

And as is clear from what actually happened, the German panzers were no match for the French Char B tanks.

And as we know they were no match for the many other AT guns and artillery of the French and British. It speaks volumes that the German refered to their PzIV as a "heavy" tank. Every AT weapon of the Allies could easily penetrate the side armor of all the German tanks. The French tanks at least had reasonable side armor, often as thick as the frontal armor. The weaker rear & side armor of the PzIII & IV and the Pz38t made them vulnerable to French artillery fires. Examination of the wrecks showed that a suprisingly large part of the German tanks were lost when shell fragments ripped through the sides and rear & damaged engines or set ammo on fire.

The French issued five rounds of AP rifle ammunition to their infantry. A few brave or deperate rifle men were able to put a tank out of action with a side or rear shot.
 
in early August of 1940, the German General Staff overthrew Hitler and reached a peace agreement with Britain and France.

This time folks could not claim the Germany army was stabbed in the back by weak civilian leaders. There were & are a few who direct the Stab In the Back accusation at the German Army leaders who overthrew the nazi government. It was not a popular idea in Germany. The casualties stacked up too fast on the battlefield and the corruption or self serving of the nazi party leaders on the home front had demoralization setting in. Tight rationing, and skyrocketing casualty lists reminded folks of just how bad things got in 1918.
 
As we all know, Germany tried a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan when she invaded France in 1940. As we all know, Germany was able to occupy most of Belgium and a small slice of northeast France, but her forces were eventually stopped, nowhere near their objectives, and shortly afterwards, in early August of 1940, the German General Staff overthrew Hitler and reached a peace agreement with Britain and France.

However, in recent years, it's been discovered that there was consideration given to, instead of what they actually did, using a powerful armored thrust through the Ardennes and north to the Channel ports, thereby coming up behind the BEF and French forces in Belgium and forcing their surrender.

How successful do you think this plan could have been? How would it have made the history of the Second European War any different?

This is unlikely to work as well as people at the time were likely to think.

There are reasons why historians think of Soviet military doctrine, heavy use of artillery and a combined arms offensive; yes, you can use tanks to hit lines with great force, but there needs to be enough strength behind that punch to avoid getting cut off.

Hence: The Soviet push into Korea turning into a complete disaster. The Soviets had far superior ground forces to Japan, but their logistics were beyond overstretched. Eventually, they were forced backward--and were unable to gain the full measure of Stalins' Far Eastern objectives.

In the hypothetical case of the German Tank Drive to the Atlantic, The BEF and French Armies would still be nearly equal in number. Were that drive through the Ardennes to be bogged down, or worse, cut off, Hitler might die a few weeks sooner.

Also remember that Hitler doesn't have the T-34s or KV-4s used by the Soviets. Their tank is the Panzer IV (which they don't have that many of), a strictly inferior machine to the Char B1 Bis.

In short, Germany loses on schedule.
 
I think in the case of the German army of 1940 that sort of ability to operate at depth existed, at least in terms of the battlefield of the Belgian plain. As it was the Allied 'Dyle Line' held only a few days and the local penetrations of the several mechanized corps set the Allied left wing back much firther than expected in the first ten days. The German 9th Armored Div reaching Breda far sooner than the French expected was a serious set back and undermined much of the premise of the Dyle plan. The distance from the Dyle Line to the Channel coast near Calais or Ostend is nothing like the distances the Red Army attempted against the Japanese. At this point I'd think it possible - nothing 100% certain - a army of concentrated mech corps could have crashed through the Dyle Line and badly disrupted the Allied left wing. Instead of requiring over four weeks of hard fighting to push the Allied armies back to the defense zone on the French Belgian border they might have been hustled back in a couple weeks before the German attack faded out.
 
Come on the road in the Ardennes are not suited for a mechanised army to pass there. Furthermore the Chasseur Ardennais will have a field day ambushing them they'll be literally sitting duck.
 
The Chassur de Ardennes, the French DLC and assorted motorized infantry battalions reinforcing them were unable to cope with the mechanized corps the Germans did send. As for the roads the better part of twenty German divisions marched through the region in barely a week. Note also how a similar number of the larger German divisions of 1914 hustled the French out of the Ardennes in less than a week. I think that for the advantages of the Ardennes to be realized the Belgian need to have much more than two light motorized divisions to delay in the border zone at the start. Second the French would have to follow up with something better than the DLC to backstop the Belgians. But, all this is secondary. To achieve anything decisive with this hypothetical plan the Germans had to also cross the Meuse river and pass through the border defenses that reached up to Givet. With the main force of the 2d Army and much of the 9th Army already in place that will be a tough prospect.

In any case the Germans, or rather Guderian, seem to have been thinking in terms of a concentrated mech army on the Belgian plain.
 
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