DBWI: Manchuria not nuked

When the Chinese crossed the border during the Korean War, the US government threatened to use nuclear weapons if they didn't retreat in three days. Mao, thinking the Americans were bluffing and that the Soviets would back him, refused. In four days, Dalian, Harbin, Bei'an, and Changchung in Manchuria were hit by American nuclear strikes, and the Soviets promptly washed their hands clean of Mao following American threats of further nuclear strikes, leading to a panicked retreat by the Chinese from Korea and the beginning of the PRC's slow slide to self-destruction over the following decades.

But what if Mao was right, and the Americans were bluffing? What if the Americans didn't bomb Manchuria?
 
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OOC: If the information is correct, about 299 nuclear weapons by summer 1950, mostly of variants of the Mark III (Fat Man design) and Mark IV bomb (an improved implosion device). It could be carried by either the B-29 or the B-50 (which became operational in 1948).
 
When the Chinese crossed the border during the Korean War, the US government threatened to use nuclear weapons if they didn't retreat in three days. Mao, thinking the Americans were bluffing and that the Soviets would back him, refused. In four days, Dalian, Harbin, Bei'an, and Changchung in Manchuria were hit by American nuclear strikes, and the Soviets promptly washed their hands clean of Mao following American threats of further nuclear strikes, leading to a panicked retreat by the Chinese from Korea and the beginning of the PRC's slow slide to self-destruction over the following decades.

But what if Mao was right, and the Americans were bluffing? What if the Americans didn't bomb Manchuria?

I'm not sure if China would really have had a huge impact in the conflict, to be honest. They could send bodies, yes, but they were having trouble supplying their troops, meaning bodies were about all they could supply (and those would be coming home in body bags. I can't imagine this would strengthen the Mao regime.) Besides, the United States was fighting the war with only limited mobilization. Even if the Chinese made some positive impacts, the United States could easily just mobilize more forces and swat them down.

However, it WOULD have an interesting impact on Soviet-American relations. The bombing of those four cities were a godsend to Soviet propagandists who would use them to 'show' the Capitalists as warmongers who cared nothing for eradicating civilians if it suited their aims, and it certainly lead to the USSR in stepping up its own nuclear construction program during the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, assuming the PRC doesn't utterly dissolve, you avoid the situation of OTL where China was divided into a number of different states during the Cold War and into the modern era.
 
London, 15 October 1967

When one views the terrible footage from Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Manchuria, Havana, or Miami, one cannot help but think that the horror of "limited" nuclear warfare might have been avoided if leaders had considered the weapons too terrible to use. Skin burnt in the patterns of clothing -- third degree burns under the dark parts and almost unaffected tissue under the light -- and that is only the beginning. But, having ended one conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, the US did not take up the policy that the use of such weapons was unthinkable... nor did the USSR, after the "Joe-1" test. President Truman's 1949 speech on the US policy towards nuclear weapons ought to have made things plain: the US will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in any future conflict, and so hoped to avoid conventional conflicts from starting up at all. So, when the Chinese crossed the Yalu River and threatened US positions in North Korea, it was only a matter of policy to deploy the Silverplate B-29s loaded with the same bombs that leveled Nagasaki.

And when the Soviet Union installed nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba in 1962, US policy was so constrained -- especially by the decision to bomb Manchuria -- that a nuclear retaliation was the only possibility. We can, perhaps, be thankful that the US had the element of surprise when it conventionally bombed the MRBM sites in Cuba, or else more than one American city might have disappeared under nuclear fire. As it happened, the exchange was limited to Havana being destroyed as revenge for Miami, resulting in about 3 million deaths.

Now more and more American troops are being committed to the conflict in South Vietnam. One can only imagine what might happen if the North Vietnamese and their guerilla fighters, the Viet Cong, were to mount an extensive offensive against the American and South Vietnamese interests. President Johnson has already made it clear that there is a "line in the sand" that cannot be crossed, and Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev has made it equally clear that the Soviet Union also has drawn such a line. As it is now, North Vietnam holds the future of the world in its hands. We can only pray that the line will never be crossed and that Johnson and Brezhnev have in mind another "limited" nuclear exchange...
 
London, 15 October 1967

When one views the terrible footage from Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Manchuria, Havana, or Miami, one cannot help but think that the horror of "limited" nuclear warfare might have been avoided if leaders had considered the weapons too terrible to use. Skin burnt in the patterns of clothing -- third degree burns under the dark parts and almost unaffected tissue under the light -- and that is only the beginning. But, having ended one conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, the US did not take up the policy that the use of such weapons was unthinkable... nor did the USSR, after the "Joe-1" test. President Truman's 1949 speech on the US policy towards nuclear weapons ought to have made things plain: the US will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in any future conflict, and so hoped to avoid conventional conflicts from starting up at all. So, when the Chinese crossed the Yalu River and threatened US positions in North Korea, it was only a matter of policy to deploy the Silverplate B-29s loaded with the same bombs that leveled Nagasaki.

And when the Soviet Union installed nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba in 1962, US policy was so constrained -- especially by the decision to bomb Manchuria -- that a nuclear retaliation was the only possibility. We can, perhaps, be thankful that the US had the element of surprise when it conventionally bombed the MRBM sites in Cuba, or else more than one American city might have disappeared under nuclear fire. As it happened, the exchange was limited to Havana being destroyed as revenge for Miami, resulting in about 3 million deaths.

Now more and more American troops are being committed to the conflict in South Vietnam. One can only imagine what might happen if the North Vietnamese and their guerilla fighters, the Viet Cong, were to mount an extensive offensive against the American and South Vietnamese interests. President Johnson has already made it clear that there is a "line in the sand" that cannot be crossed, and Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev has made it equally clear that the Soviet Union also has drawn such a line. As it is now, North Vietnam holds the future of the world in its hands. We can only pray that the line will never be crossed and that Johnson and Brezhnev have in mind another "limited" nuclear exchange...

OOC: Goddamn, poor Asia. Japan, China, then maybe Vietnam being nuked. Jeez.
 
London, 15 October 1967

When one views the terrible footage from Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Manchuria, Havana, or Miami, one cannot help but think that the horror of "limited" nuclear warfare might have been avoided if leaders had considered the weapons too terrible to use. Skin burnt in the patterns of clothing -- third degree burns under the dark parts and almost unaffected tissue under the light -- and that is only the beginning. But, having ended one conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, the US did not take up the policy that the use of such weapons was unthinkable... nor did the USSR, after the "Joe-1" test. President Truman's 1949 speech on the US policy towards nuclear weapons ought to have made things plain: the US will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons in any future conflict, and so hoped to avoid conventional conflicts from starting up at all. So, when the Chinese crossed the Yalu River and threatened US positions in North Korea, it was only a matter of policy to deploy the Silverplate B-29s loaded with the same bombs that leveled Nagasaki.

And when the Soviet Union installed nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba in 1962, US policy was so constrained -- especially by the decision to bomb Manchuria -- that a nuclear retaliation was the only possibility. We can, perhaps, be thankful that the US had the element of surprise when it conventionally bombed the MRBM sites in Cuba, or else more than one American city might have disappeared under nuclear fire. As it happened, the exchange was limited to Havana being destroyed as revenge for Miami, resulting in about 3 million deaths.

Now more and more American troops are being committed to the conflict in South Vietnam. One can only imagine what might happen if the North Vietnamese and their guerilla fighters, the Viet Cong, were to mount an extensive offensive against the American and South Vietnamese interests. President Johnson has already made it clear that there is a "line in the sand" that cannot be crossed, and Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev has made it equally clear that the Soviet Union also has drawn such a line. As it is now, North Vietnam holds the future of the world in its hands. We can only pray that the line will never be crossed and that Johnson and Brezhnev have in mind another "limited" nuclear exchange...

OOC: This is really well done
 
Maybe Korea would be a strong and stable state and not a near military state that was force to deal with waves of Chinese refugees and the fallout from China.

Or maybe we could have won in Vietnam.

Or even long shot, the USSR would not blow itself up in the late 80s and 90s. All that money and resources going into military hardware and little anything else.
 
Well the obvious effect would be the US not becoming the focal point of Asia's eternal hatred and a pariah in most of the world's eyes with the Red River Delta, Manchuria and Japan all being nuked by one country.
That could perhaps prevent the Euro-American split of the ’70s following the Red River Delta bombings.
 

thorr97

Banned
Jaenera Targaryen,

I think you're missing a key point here. In OTL the US did not use its nukes for fear of the Soviet's using theirs. Even at that early stage of the Cold War the US was profoundly fearful of the Soviet nuclear capability. A capability which, as of the early 50s, was not much more than a paper threat. That changed quickly, to be sure. But the fear was substantial enough to restrain the US from using its "Big Stick."

In this ATL, that fear is obviously not present.

That means that the US must therefore be very aware of just how limited the Soviet nuclear arsenal was and of how much greater America's nuclear weapon's advantage was - and the US therefore opted to use that advantage far more aggressively.

I think the obliteration of Chinese military forces in Manchuria and the ensuing schism between the USSR and the PRC would have been utterly devastating to Communism throughout the world.

In OTL, Korea demonstrated that the West was NOT prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend itself and that it was actually willing to fight to a draw. That was a significantly emboldening thing to the Soviet's and to Mao. They, particularly Mao, viewed the West as weak and that it could be pressured successfully. Hence the Communist support of just about every revolutionary, anti-colonial, and "war of national independence" groups thereafter.

In this ATL, the US has demonstrated that it would back up its conventional forces with nuclear annihilation if the Communists threatened them too much. In Moscow, the Soviets were keenly aware of just how limited their nuclear capabilities were and were - even in OTL - rightly terrified of America's vast nuclear arsenal and its profusion of different delivery systems. In this ATL that terror would be near blinding if the US had just glassed over much of Manchuria in the name of protecting its forces in Korea.

The break between the USSR and the PRC would also serve to destroy Moscow's credibility among all those rebel and independence groups throughout the world. The Soviets would be seen as cowardly and an utterly unreliable partner that was not worth the risk of allying with against any Western nation. And the PRC would, as you mentioned, be on the fast track to implosion. Mao's sending off his newly formed PLA in to Korea only for it to wind up as nuclear fireball fodder would've spelt an end to his chairmanship.

And a PRC without the backing - and without the implied threat of the use of the Soviet's bombs to defend it - would soon be carved up by the US and the West.

I think that in very short order after the US renewed its use of nuclear hellfire as a means of defending America's national interest, the Soviet Union would be on the retreat and downward slide internally. The nations of Eastern Europe would be looking at the atomic craters in Manchuria and seeing them clearly in place of their own capitols. The fear of the Red Army kept them in the Soviet sphere in OTL and while that wouldn't go away in this ATL, the fear of America's nuclear annihilation would be far, far greater in this ATL. And that might spell an end to Soviet domination of Europe decades earlier than in our timeline.

Even in Moscow there'd be a political reassessment and whoever was holding the reins at the time would have their hands full keeping those reins in their hands as the debacle that was the USSR's Korean intervention becomes realized.

In short, America's opting to use nukes to win the Korean war means doom for the Soviet Union, for the People's Republic of China, for the Warsaw Pact, and a far shorter Cold War - and one much more likely to end in the West's favor.
 
Jaenera Targaryen,

I think you're missing a key point here. In OTL the US did not use its nukes for fear of the Soviet's using theirs. Even at that early stage of the Cold War the US was profoundly fearful of the Soviet nuclear capability. A capability which, as of the early 50s, was not much more than a paper threat. That changed quickly, to be sure. But the fear was substantial enough to restrain the US from using its "Big Stick."

In this ATL, that fear is obviously not present.

That means that the US must therefore be very aware of just how limited the Soviet nuclear arsenal was and of how much greater America's nuclear weapon's advantage was - and the US therefore opted to use that advantage far more aggressively.

I think the obliteration of Chinese military forces in Manchuria and the ensuing schism between the USSR and the PRC would have been utterly devastating to Communism throughout the world.

In OTL, Korea demonstrated that the West was NOT prepared to use nuclear weapons to defend itself and that it was actually willing to fight to a draw. That was a significantly emboldening thing to the Soviet's and to Mao. They, particularly Mao, viewed the West as weak and that it could be pressured successfully. Hence the Communist support of just about every revolutionary, anti-colonial, and "war of national independence" groups thereafter.

In this ATL, the US has demonstrated that it would back up its conventional forces with nuclear annihilation if the Communists threatened them too much. In Moscow, the Soviets were keenly aware of just how limited their nuclear capabilities were and were - even in OTL - rightly terrified of America's vast nuclear arsenal and its profusion of different delivery systems. In this ATL that terror would be near blinding if the US had just glassed over much of Manchuria in the name of protecting its forces in Korea.

The break between the USSR and the PRC would also serve to destroy Moscow's credibility among all those rebel and independence groups throughout the world. The Soviets would be seen as cowardly and an utterly unreliable partner that was not worth the risk of allying with against any Western nation. And the PRC would, as you mentioned, be on the fast track to implosion. Mao's sending off his newly formed PLA in to Korea only for it to wind up as nuclear fireball fodder would've spelt an end to his chairmanship.

And a PRC without the backing - and without the implied threat of the use of the Soviet's bombs to defend it - would soon be carved up by the US and the West.

I think that in very short order after the US renewed its use of nuclear hellfire as a means of defending America's national interest, the Soviet Union would be on the retreat and downward slide internally. The nations of Eastern Europe would be looking at the atomic craters in Manchuria and seeing them clearly in place of their own capitols. The fear of the Red Army kept them in the Soviet sphere in OTL and while that wouldn't go away in this ATL, the fear of America's nuclear annihilation would be far, far greater in this ATL. And that might spell an end to Soviet domination of Europe decades earlier than in our timeline.

Even in Moscow there'd be a political reassessment and whoever was holding the reins at the time would have their hands full keeping those reins in their hands as the debacle that was the USSR's Korean intervention becomes realized.

In short, America's opting to use nukes to win the Korean war means doom for the Soviet Union, for the People's Republic of China, for the Warsaw Pact, and a far shorter Cold War - and one much more likely to end in the West's favor.

While I agree about US Nuclear superiority in this situation, the Soviets wouldn't just be okay with their usage. How would we act if they did that? The Soviets don't have many bombs, but they had enough to make it hurt somewhere-- and no US President would risk taking that kind of hit against our citizens. So maybe the eastern satellites get unruly, they'd crush them. The US has a laughably better nuclear arsenal at that point, but the Soviets still have the deterrent that the US public was not willing to have WWIII and that causality level if they moved on Berlin. Try explaining to Bonn why Frankfurt got nuked.
 
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thorr97

Banned
Creighton,

While I agree about US Nuclear superiority in this situation, the Soviets wouldn't just be okay with their usage. How would we act if they did that? The Soviets don't have many bombs, but they had enough to make it hurt somewhere-- and no US President would risk taking that kind of hit against our citizens. So maybe the eastern satellites get unruly, they'd crush them. The US has a laughably better nuclear arsenal at that point, but the Soviets still have the deterrent that the US public was not willing to have WWIII and that causality level if they moved on Berlin. Try explaining to Bonn why Frankfurt got nuked.

In OTL that was the fear. That the US would not be willing to trade New York for Berlin if it came down to "nuke-u-lear combat, toe to toe with the Rooskies."

In this ATL however, the US has just demonstrated a far greater willingness to use its overwhelming nuclear advantage against the Communist. This, to the point of eagerness to do so.

The best explanation for this is that the US learned just how pathetic the Soviet nuclear arsenal was and how even more pathetic was their ability to project that limited arsenal to anywhere useful. This, while the US had the capability of reaching anywhere into the Soviet Union and vaporizing its cities and industrial complex at our whim.

No, Moscow would not take the US actions "laying down" - but what could they do in response?

Clamping down on unruly Eastern Bloc countries is a self-defeating thing. The more they tighten their grip the more will slip through their fingers. During the 50s, part of the calculus in suffering the Soviet Occupation was that attempting to overthrow it would be more costly than allowing it to continue. And that the Soviets had the US sufficiently cowed that the Americans would not rain down nuclear hellfire just to prove their point. Well, at this point, there's a bunch of glassy craters in Manchuria utterly invalidating that calculus. It's now apparent that membership in the Soviet Bloc means appalling oppression by the Soviets AND the likelihood of being vaporized by the US. With that new calculus, it now becomes a better long term strategy to get out from under the Soviet's thumb.

This would force the Soviet's to ramp up both their nuclear program and their conventional weapons spending in order to maintain sufficient forces to both counter NATO on the other side of the Fulda and to keep the conquered peoples of Eastern Europe sufficiently conquered. This, while also watching the US take even more steps to corner the Soviet Union and China with its superior nuclear arsenal.

From the sound of things, it's much more likely that the US would kick-off Dropshot in this ATL, recognizing that allowing the Soviets time to build their nuclear arsenal was not the wisest of choices. Better then, to hit the Soviets earlier when their ability to respond was far lesser.

If the US figured that "glassing" Manchuria was an appropriate response to Soviet and Chinese actions in Korea, then Dropshot - or something akin to it - seems very likely indeed.
 
Looking back, it's easy to be like, 'gosh they had no power projection' but even one nuke against US assets would be a detterant. You can't power project like chess when you're politically accountable for those deaths politically. That being said, I don't 100% disagree. My only main point of disagreement is on the satellites. What's the downside of just moving on your eastern satellites by force? I think it's morally bankrupt, but they clearly didn't. That being said, you've made me evaluate other things.
 

thorr97

Banned
Creighton,

The "calculus" in this ATL is significantly different and that's what's driving the rest of these changes.

A US far more wiling to use its overwhelming nuclear advantage is a US far more dangerous to the Soviet Union. It's also, after the overwhelming success that vaporizing the PLA and Manchuria, is a US with the knowledge that the Communists can not only be beaten with its nukes but that they'll run from direct conflict rather than see their own cities get vaporized. That means the US will be far more willing to confront the Soviets force them to blink first.

At the same time, the US will be much more keenly aware of how temporary their advantage is and that through its very use it is driving the Soviets to meet the American nuclear capability with their own as soon as they can. Thus there'd be an even greater imperative to "strike while the iron is hot" against the Communists.

The Soviets will realize this as well and their priority will be to not give the US any excuse to escalate things while at the same time arming themselves even faster than they did in OTL.

Which, in turn, will make it clear to the US that they have the Soviets "on the run" and that their retreat would be a situation that wouldn't last for long.

It would also be clear to the rest of the Soviet Bloc that the Soviets were shying away from challenging the US. The break with China would be the biggest proof of this. But so too would the Soviets "pulling their horns in" when dealing with the US lest those dealings turn into a shooting war that they'd lose as the US was now eager to use more of its nukes.

I agree that the prospect of losing a single American city would be sobering. But so too would be the realization that the longer the US didn't pressure the Soviets the greater the likelihood the Reds would soon have the capability to vaporize a lot more than just that one American city. Better then, to stop the Soviets before they got that strong.

As to the Soviet's treatment of their newly acquired lands in Eastern Europe, they got those as a buffer zone to better defend Russia. The point there being that those peoples in those lands were not Russian and thus their lives were expendable when compared to the lives of those in the USSR. And sending in the Red Army to remind those uppity nations was a thing the Soviets did repeatedly in OTL. With more of a justification for being more uppity, the Soviets in this OTL are gonna be using that mailed fist a lot more often as well.

Mind, I'm not saying any of this is a wonderful thing. It just flows from the original POD. If the US was willing to use its nukes to win Korea then that means a whole bunch of things would be different and a whole bunch of things would change as a result.
 
Yeah, we're both in agreement that all this would be horrible, but I'm saying the Soviets have enough firepower to invoke Article V, and Truman can't justify 3 million gold star mothers.

EDIT----the US would hypothetically win Operation Dropshot but what's the point
 

thorr97

Banned
Creighton,

Perhaps. But, in this ATL, Truman assessed the Soviet capability as limited enough to create quite a few "gold star mother" equivalents in China.

And it worked. Doing so meant he won Korea and thus not only stopped the Red Menace by sending it fleeing but he also thereby saved many thousands more (at least) American troops.

With that victory and the Red being on the Run, the trend will be for more pressure by the US, not less.

Which will kick off more reactions from the Soviets.

Which will... well, you know how things go from there...
 
Let's make a thread in non-political chat about late 1940s/early 50s Korean war, because I want to further go into this
 
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